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Abstract  
 
 Many scholars have noted that representations of crime and criminality cannot be 
divorced from considerations of power relations, especially in the way that they often reproduce 
derogatory and stereotypical images of socially marginalized individuals and groups. By 
extension, scholars have also analyzed how these images affect how socially normalized subjects 
are represented as pre-emptively innocent, ‘normal’, unimaginably criminal or un-criminal. In 
such instances, normalized subjects who commit violent crimes are often pathologized in the 
news. This dissertation departs from these observations and joins this conversation by exploring 
how the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject becomes imaginable through 
psychopathy. Scholars in the area of critical psychopathy research and those who study the 
intersections between crime, identity/difference and representation have not explored how the 
logic of psychopathy complements and aligns with cultural imaginings of (un)criminality in the 
contemporary context. This is my contribution to these areas. Historical researchers of 
psychopathy have noted that psychopathy was imagined in relation to the body, identity and the 
normative social order (e.g. Rimke 2003; 2005; Lunbeck 1994). Drawing on their methodologies 
and insights, I explore this relationship in the contemporary context by analyzing the news 
representations of five Canadian criminal cases—the cases of Russell Williams; Paul Bernardo 
and Karla Homolka; Lisa Neve; Robert Pickton; and, Charles Kembo. Using a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis and Alison Young’s (1996) imagination approach to crime and criminality, I 
demonstrate that psychopathy is amenable to representing the otherwise unimaginable 
criminality of the normalized subject because of the way that psychopathy is conceptualized 
through duality: the psychopath appears to be ‘normal’ which hides their underlying 
pathology/transgressiveness (e.g. Hare 1999; Rhodes 2002; Weisman 2008). I also make the 
related argument that representations of psychopathy are bound to a series of interlocking bodily 
contingencies (e.g. identity and difference), relating to both offenders and their victims. These 
contingencies affect the work that psychopathy does in constructing criminality, as well as the 
work that it does not need to do as exemplified by its absence. I conclude by detailing the 
implications of this study and avenues for future research.  
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Introduction 
 
The FBI profile, with its suggestion that the murderer would be a remorseless 
working-class man, and be knowledgeable about tools, had implied a killer who 
would be muscular, crude, and inarticulate. The fact that the suspect [Paul 
Bernardo…] turned out to be arguably attractive rather than ‘scruffy’, and of white-
collar rather than blue-collar background, enriched the mystery about him even as 
the earlier mystery of what face could be attached to the crime was resolved. (Davey 
1994, 38) 
The officer who was talking to him [Russell Williams] didn’t suspect him because of 
who he was. (Rankin and Contenta 2010c; emphasis mine) 
 
Davies [Carleton University Professor] says the public's perception of a typical 
serial killer, odd and separated from society, is another reason [Russell] Williams' 
crimes went on for so long. ‘If you were lost in a back alley and you saw Willie 
Pickton and Russell Williams, who would you go to for help? You would choose 
Williams, right?’ said Davies. (Long 2010) 
 
In terms of raw numbers, Russell Williams is not the worst serial killer in Canadian 
history, which does not mean is any less evil than the likes of Willy Pickton, Clifford 
Olson or Paul Bernardo. Williams’ case, however, does stand out as one of the most 
puzzling. While most serial killers are said to emerge from the lower middle class 
and to hold marginal jobs, Williams was a full Colonel in charge of Canada’s busiest 
air force base. (Monster Has No Answers 2010) 
 
 May 4, 1987 marked the beginning of a string of “savage attacks” that were attributed to 
the “Scarborough rapist” (P. Howell 1988). Over the course of four years, the ‘Scarborough 
rapist’ was suspected in at least eight attacks against women, leading Metro police to form a 
team of detectives to apprehend the him. During this time, investigators with the help of the FBI, 
put together a psychological profile of the rapist. They were “hunting” a man “who displays 
extreme anger toward women”, he would be likely return to the scenes of his crimes (possibly 
with a girlfriend), the cold or rainy weather did not deter him (Mascoll 1988), he wold probably 
show much interest in the case, and that the attacks were precipitated by a “confrontation” with a 
woman (Mascoll 1989a).  In addition to this understanding of the rapist’s character, investigators 
and the public also had a physical description of him: “a white male; aged 18-25; 5 feet, 8 
inches; of medium build; clean-shaven, with blond or light brown hair; and with small hands and 
stubby fingers” (Mascoll 1989a). Despite this, investigators were missing the most important 
information of all, his face (Mascoll 1989b).  
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 In May 1990, the mystery of the ‘Scarborough rapist’s’ face began to unravel. His eighth 
victim was able to provide a description of his face, enabling investigators to create a composite 
sketch. The rapist was a “boy-next-door type” (Mascoll and O’Neill 1990). Although the sketch 
led to thousands of calls (Mascoll 1990), none immediately led to an arrest and the attacks 
stopped. More than a year later, Leslie Mahaffy, 14, was found murdered in Lake Gibson, near 
St. Catherines. It was suspected that there was a link between Mahaffy’s murder and the 
Scarborough rapist, but there were still no viable suspects. In April 1992, Kristen French, 15, 
was found dead in Burlington. In February 1993, Paul Bernardo was arrested and charged with 
over 40 offences relating only to the ‘Scarborough rapes’.  He was arrested at his rented home in 
Port Dalhousie, St. Catherines which he shared with his by then-estranged wife, Karla Homolka.  
 Upon his arrest, the news reported that it was DNA evidence gathered during the 
‘Scarborough rape’ case investigation that broke the case. This raised many questions, since the 
last known offence perpetrated by the ‘Scarborough rapist’ was in May 1990. According to the 
news reports, hundreds of DNA samples has been gathered through the investigation (including a 
sample given by Paul Bernardo in November 1990), but many of these samples “sat on a shelf” 
(Priest 1993). Once the ‘Scarborough rapes’ and the murder of French and Mahaffy were thought 
to be linked, the samples made their way to the top of the priority list (Priest 1993). Significantly 
however, Paul Bernardo was known to Metro police (responsible for handling the ‘Scarborough 
rape’ case; although it is not clear from the news coverage why this was not followed through) 
and he was interviewed by the Green Ribbon task force, which was responsible for solving the 
murders of Mahaffy and French. According to one news article, although Bernardo was a suspect 
in the murders, he was low on their list because he did not fit the FBI’s psychological profile: 
“The FBI thumbnail sketch […] said police should be looking for a blue-collar worker, perhaps 
someone who worked in a machine shop. ‘They were looking for a labourer, not an upper-
middle-class accountant,’ one investigator said” (Duncanson and Pron 1993).   
 In addition to news discussions about why it took so long to apprehend him, other 
questions were also being asked right after Bernardo’s arrest: when will he be charged for the 
murders? Will he be able to get a fair trial given the media frenzy around the case? How are the 
Mahaffy and French families reacting to the news? Where is Karla Homolka? Should the sudden 
death of Homolka’s youngest sister, Tammy Lynn, now be considered suspicious? Who is the 
second suspect that police are investigating? And above all, who is Paul Bernardo? 
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 Paul Bernardo is the youngest of three siblings and grew up in a middle-class1 
Scarborough community. The exterior of their home is described as picturesque: “the front lawn 
was always neatly trimmed. There was a swimming pool in the backyard.  From a distance, they 
were the picture-perfect family” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b).  Bernardo is generally 
described as “normal” and “average” by his teachers and “every mother’s dream” by a neighbour 
(Pron, Duncanson, and Rankin 1995b).  He participated in many ordinary activities young 
Canadian boys engage in like boy scouts and playing street hockey. In his teenage years, he had 
many girlfriends and sexual encounters ‘as most young men do’.  None of these fleeting 
encounters would keep his interest for very long, until he met one woman in particular. In 1987, 
Bernardo graduated from the University of Toronto with the hopes of becoming a chartered 
accountant like his father, Kenneth Bernardo, although this would never come to fruition. 
Instead, he would turn to cigarette smuggling. In that same year, he met Karla Homolka. Two 
years later they were married.   
At the time of their meeting, Homolka was seventeen years old and in high school.  One 
high school teacher said that Homolka was “wildly” in love with Bernardo so much so that in the 
yearbook her wildest dream is “to marry Paul and see him more than twice a week” (quoted in 
Brazao 1993). As a child, reporters note that “her main goal in life was to get married, something 
she had talked about constantly when she was a child playing with her collection of Barbie and 
Ken dolls” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b). According to her testimony, “the two were 
soon dating, with Bernardo driving from Toronto to St. Catharines three times a week to visit 
her, she testified. ‘He treated me like a princess . . . like I was the only girl in the world,’ 
Homolka said of their courtship” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995a). Her marriage to 
Bernardo in June 1991, marked “a storybook ending to a long courtship” (Brazao 1993). 
The news articles constantly refer to their marriage as a fairy tale, or at least appearing as 
such. Accounts of their wedding day buttressed this image:  
Blissful smiles and video cameras - that's what guests remember most about the June 
wedding of Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka four years ago. The camcorders were 
rolling when the two exchanged vows of eternal love at the church, drank champagne 
as they rode through Niagara-on-the-Lake in a horse-drawn carriage, and embraced 
to thunderous applause at their reception. Toward the end of the evening, the 
wedding guests lined up in front of a video camera to offer their best wishes to the 
                                                 
1 Bernardo’s middle-class status was something was often referred to, in passing, in the news (e.g. Boyle and J. Hall 
1993; Pron and Millar 1993; Duncanson and Pron 1993) 
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newlyweds, before they left for Maui on their Hawaiian honeymoon. One of the first 
people to tape a video message of congratulations was Homolka's younger sister, 
Lori. ‘You're so lucky, Karla,’ she enthused for the camera. ‘Paul is the best thing 
that ever happened to you.’ (Pron and Duncanson 1995) 
 
As stories about Homolka and Bernardo’s fairy tale relationship were told in the news, so too 
were stories of abuse. According to the news reports, Homolka had left Bernardo before his 
arrest because he had assaulted her with a flashlight and was charged (Pron and Millar 1993). It 
would seem that image is not reality.  
 Appearances are meaningful. They allow us to formulate ideas and stories about people. 
They help us to (think we) ‘know’ who people are. Once Bernardo was arrested, we see quite 
clearly the power of these ideas and stories that we tell ourselves about specific people. For 
instance, many people who journalists consulted about Bernardo all relay a similar sentiment. 
They were “shocked”, “stunned” and in total disbelief that Bernardo was the person behind the 
‘Scarborough rapes’ (Boyle 1993; Boyle and J. Hall 1993):  
 
Bernardo’s friends were shocked over the arrest of the handsome University of 
Toronto graduate, who always had a smile for everyone and was generous to a fault, 
often picking up the tab on outings. (Pron and Duncanson 1995) 
 
Paul Bernardo was a ‘special’ young man whose innocence charmed men and 
women alike, says a man who worked at YMCA camps Bernardo attended in his 
teens. ‘I liked him very much, I thought he was immensely charming,’ said the camp 
staff person, who asked not to be identified. ‘Paul had a very quiet way, almost an 
aura. He was special, he was kind. . . . He'd smile and those dimples would show and 
everyone would be charmed. This is just unfathomable.’ (Ritchie 1993; emphasis 
mine) 
 
Others were also unable to reconcile the news with who they thought Bernardo was. A neighbour 
is quoted saying: “if you knew this guy, it just doesn’t make sense” (Boyle 1993). Another  
neighbour focuses less on Bernardo’s character, and more on physical appearance, noting that 
Bernardo is “the most ordinary guy you’d ever want to meet. He even looked like an accountant” 
(Boyle 1993). Bernardo’s appearance along with the stories that people told about who he was 
did not fit, so much so that Bernardo’s “first love”, Nadine Brammer, told reporters that she was 
“convinced of his innocence” (Boyle and J. Hall 1993).  
In May 1993, Paul Bernardo was formally charged for his crimes against Leslie Mahaffy 
and Kristen French.  Although these charges were not necessarily surprising, an additional 
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mystery had been solved. From the time of Bernardo’s arrest in February, the news had been 
reporting that there was a second suspect. In the first article written about this second suspect, a 
Niagara investigator is quoted, saying that “we know who the person is”, the journalist on the 
other hand, infers that this ‘person’ is a man (J. Hall 1993; emphasis mine)2. The second suspect 
was Karla Homolka. She was charged with two counts of manslaughter. Much like the reaction 
that the news of Bernardo’s arrest elicited, people were also confounded by Homolka’s arrest, 
especially because she was a woman: “The fact that charges have been laid against a woman 
makes Michelle Lundy wonder how safe it is to talk to any strangers. ‘It feels so weird. You 
always read about men,’ said Lundy, 18, who knew French from public school” (Duncanson and 
Rankin 1993).   
 Soon after Homolka was charged, a publication ban was imposed on her trial to ensure a 
fair trial for Bernardo. In July 1993, she was convicted on both counts of manslaughter and was 
sentenced for 12 years3. During the course of Bernardo’s trial, which began in May 1995, it was 
revealed that Homolka plead guilty to the charges because she had arranged a plea deal with the 
Crown. In exchange for a lesser sentence for her involvement in the murders4, she “promised full 
disclosure”, which included her testifying against her husband (McGillivary 1998, 257). When 
the plea deal was being negotiated, the full extent of Homolka’s involvement in the crimes was 
unknown and the infamous videotapes that documented the sexual assault and torture of Leslie 
Mahaffy and Kristen French were no where to be found5. Without the videotapes, it was 
contended that the plea deal was necessary to gain information from Homolka that would lead to 
Bernardo’s conviction (McGillivary 1998, 257).  At trial, the tapes would illustrate that both 
Bernardo and Homolka participated in the sexual assaults. The plea deal has since become 
popularly known as ‘a deal with the devil’, and many believe that Homolka “should have taken 
her seat beside him in the prisoner’s box and seat of ultimate evil” (McGillivary 1998, 257).  
                                                 
2In the news articles that follow, journalists report that it is not known whether the suspect is a man or a woman.   
3 Homolka received a 12 year sentence; 10 years for her crimes against Mahaffy and French (5 years each) and 2 
years for Tammy Homolka (Kilty and Frigon 2016: 5).  
4 Anne McGillivary (1998) has noted that in law, Homolka’s participation amounts to first degree murder (256-257).  
5 The videotapes were recovered from Bernardo and Homolka’s home and were held by Bernardo’s former defence 
team—Ken Murray and Carolyn MacDonald—and were given over to the Crown more than a year later. According 
to Jennifer Kilty and Sylvie Frigon (2016), because the videotapes could not be found, Homolka’s testimony was 
crucial for Bernardo’s prosecution. It was at this point that Homolka shared the information that she had about the 
crimes, including her own involvement, with the Crown and received a plea deal in exchange for this information 
and her testimony at Bernardo’s trial (4-5).    
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 Once Homolka and Bernardo were charged, the unimaginable quality of the case went 
beyond their individual involvement. The question became how could the couple be responsible 
for such horrifying crimes. As one journalist put it, “what has also transfixed Canadians is the 
wonderment of how such an attractive couple could end up at the centre of the nation’s most 
sensational murder trial” (Pron and Duncanson 1995). This “wonderment” became arguably 
more pronounced during the trial as the timeline of the crimes is punctuated by the troubling 
details of their crimes and their relationship.  
 On the night of their wedding, Bernardo confessed that he was the ‘Scarborough rapist’.  
Homolka was not surprised.  During Homolka’s testimony at Bernardo’s trial, she explains that 
their relationship was not as it seemed.  Within four months of dating, Homolka said that 
Bernardo often forced her into sexual acts that she did not want to engage in (including taking 
pictures of the sexually explicit acts) and/or that she found painful.  At the time, Homolka 
testified that she was not necessarily bothered by his demands because they made him happy and 
she loved him and wanted him to be happy.  After eight months of dating, their relationship took 
a sharp turn after he hit her for the first time.  A few months later, she endured a series of 
physical beatings, in addition to emotional, verbal and psychological abuse by Bernardo.  
Homolka reports that she never told anyone about the abuse because she still loved him but she 
was afraid of him and thought that things might get better over time (Pron, Duncanson and 
Rankin 1995a). They didn’t. As time went on things got worse and not just in terms of the abuse 
that Homolka had to endure, but also in what the couple did to others.   
 On Christmas Eve in 1990, less than a year before their wedding, Homolka gave 
Bernardo his “Christmas present”; his gift was her younger sister, Tammy.  Bernardo had been 
asking Homolka to have sexual relations with her sister and his relentlessness ‘forced’ her to 
give into to his demands. Homolka prepared for the night of the attack by obtaining Halothane 
and sleeping pills that she would mix in a drink for Tammy. Tammy would later ingest the 
mixture and fall unconscious. Once the couple was certain that she was asleep, they both 
proceeded to sexually assault her and document the attack on videotape.  Soon after, Tammy 
asphyxiated on her vomit and died. Bernardo and Homolka were never formally charged for the 
death of Tammy Homolka.  
A year and a half after Tammy’s death, Bernardo wanted a ‘sex slave’ and so he abducted 
Leslie Mahaffy in June 1991, from outside of her home and held her captive.  Mahaffy was 
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tortured and raped by both Homolka and Bernardo, and was later strangled to death by Bernardo. 
All of this happened before their wedding. While the couple was on their honeymoon (which 
Homolka dubbed the “honeymoon from hell” because of the abuse that she endured at the hands 
of Bernardo while on their vacation; Pron 1995), the body of Leslie Mahaffy was discovered 
dismembered and encased in cement.  Less than a year after Mahaffy’s murder, the couple 
abducted another young woman, Kristen French, from a church parking lot as she was walking 
home from school.  The couple stopped French and deceptively asked her for directions before 
proceeding to abduct her.  French was held captive in the couple’s home, tortured, sexually 
assaulted and drugged for at least three days before she was murdered.  On September 1, 1995, 
after the ‘trial of the century’ had taken place, Bernardo was convicted on all charges.   
 Fifteen years after Bernardo’s conviction emerged another sensationalized Canadian 
serial murder case—that of former Colonel and commander of Canada’s largest air force base, 
Russell Williams.  Born in 1963 in England, Williams and his family moved to Ontario a few 
years later for his father’s work.  In 1970, Williams’ parents got divorced and his mother 
remarried.  Once remarried, the family moved around quite a bit for Williams’ stepfather’s work, 
but Williams ended up staying in Ontario to finish high school at Upper Canada College where 
he played the trumpet and was described as “a serious student, hard working and focused but he 
didn’t stand out, say friends and acquaintances from those years” (Aulakh, Bruser and Daubs 
2010).  One of his peers describes him in a similar way “He was kind of a diligent, hard-working 
fellow who was not a high-profile guy here [...] That's how I think most people in the class 
would probably describe him: a serious student and a really good musician” (Police Search 
Ottawa Home of Col. Williams 2010).  Once he graduated from high school, Williams attended 
the University of Toronto and graduated with a bachelor’s degree in economics and political 
science in 1986.  
 In 1987 he joined the military. Rising quickly through the military ranks, in July 2009 he 
became the commander of Canada’s largest and most important air force base—CFB Trenton. 
Andy Coxhead, a retired major, tells reporters that “when [Williams] was named commander, 
one of my first reactions was, ‘hey, he’s going to do well, people like him; he’s a nice, easygoing 
guy” (Aulakh, Bruser, and Daubs 2010).  Others echo Williams’ esteemed reputation:  “an elite 
pilot, a ‘shining bright star’ of the military who has flown the prime minister and Governor 
General across Canada and overseas in one of four Canadian Forces Challenger jets” (Yang, 
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Vyhnak, McLean and Daubs 2010). Or, as another said, “he was very dedicated, very hard 
working, intelligent—all the right words, which is exactly why we selected him as commander of 
CFB Trenton” (Woods 2010a).  
Early in his 23-year military career, Williams married Mary Elizabeth Harriman, who 
was the associate executive director of the Heart and Stroke Foundation. In 2004, the couple 
bought a cottage in Tweed, a small town with a population of 6,0576 that is known as a hot spot 
for retirees and is generally considered a safe place where residents feel comfortable enough to 
keep their doors unlocked.  Because Tweed is such a small community, it is also characterized as 
tightly-knit.  Neighbours who knew Williams and Harriman described the couple as both happy 
and loving.  A neighbour says that “[t]hey would walk by and they were always walking hand in 
hand [...] I really think he really loved his wife” (Rankin and Contenta 2010a). However, in 2010 
everything would change.  On February 7, 2010, (Colonel) Russell Williams was called into 
Ottawa Police Services Headquarters for questioning about the murder of Jessica Lloyd.  During 
a ten-hour interrogation Williams confessed to the murder of Jessica Lloyd and Marie-France 
Comeau. On October 18, 2010, Williams plead guilty to 82 counts of “fetish” home invasion and 
attempted break-ins, two counts of sexual assault, two counts of confinement, and two counts of 
murder in the first degree. Harriman knew nothing of her husband’s double life, nor did anyone 
else.  
 When the news of Williams’ confession first began to circulate, friends, neighbours, and 
colleagues all responded with shock:   
 
For Bill Page, who lives two doors down from Williams’ cottage, he never imagined 
his well-spoken and respected neighbour being involved in any crime.  ‘He was the 
last person I would have thought of...,’ he said. (Yang et al. 2010; emphasis mine) 
 
                                                 
6Tweed can also be considered a white space. According to a 2011 National Household Survey, the vast majority of 
the population of Tweed are not considered visible minorities (45 people in total) and only 220 people in Tweed 
identify as Aboriginal.   See the census report produced by Statistics Canada in 2011. 
http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-
pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=3512030&Geo2=CD&Code2=3512&Data=Count&Search
Text=Tweed&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=All&Custom=&TABID=1. Statistics Canada defines a 
visible minority in terms those people who are not Aboriginal and are not Caucasian in race or who are non-white in 
colour. See http://www12.statcan.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-
pd/prof/details/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=3512030&Data=Count&SearchText=Tweed&SearchType
=Begins&SearchPR=01&A1=All&B1=All&GeoLevel=PR&GeoCode=10#tabs1. Representing spaces as “non-
threatening” by highlighting the neighbourhood’s aesthetic and the homogeneity of neighbourhoods affects how 
offenders are also constructed in the news (Kilty and Frigon 2016, 59). This is something that Kilty and Frigon 
(2016) discuss in relation to the Bernardo/Homolka case. See below for an brief overview of their work. 
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‘We can’t believe this. It’s just not Russ,’ White [a neighbour] said. ‘I would suspect 
the Pope before I would suspect Russ’. (Hurley 2010a) 
 
The most distressing aspect about the arrest, said Mr. Wells, is the esteem with which 
Col. Williams was held by most on the base. ‘He was very well respected, not just 
because he was the base commander.  He was also a nice person. He was always 
smiling and shaking hands with people. He was well thought of’. (Kenyon 2010) 
 
The sentiments quoted above generally capture how people responded to the news that Williams 
was responsible for the crimes: shock, disbelief, and confusion because this is not how people 
‘knew’ Williams. In fact, what people knew of Williams was diametrically opposed to who they 
believed could have committed these crimes. The shock and surprise lay in that the stock image 
of the serial killer and rapist did not fit reality. The news was “unimaginable” (Mallick 2010a).   
 
Difference, Criminality and Pathology 
  
 Here we have two cases, three people, and a similar reaction to the perpetrators: it’s 
unfathomable or unimaginable. What makes this kind of representation possible? How is 
criminality imagined in such a way that Bernardo, Homolka and Williams are understood to be 
unimaginably criminal? To understand how Bernardo, Homolka and Williams were described as 
unimaginably criminal or un-criminal, it is important to detail how assumptions about (binary or 
cis-) gender7, class, sexuality, and race (and whiteness specifically), allowed them to appear or 
be perceived as un-criminal subjects. In other words, how their normalized appearances and 
identities operated as a cloak that veiled the possibility that they could have been suspects, let 
alone the culprits, in the crimes they committed.  
There are a number of ways that criminality is imagined on and through the body, many of 
which centre around the concept of difference. One of the ways that difference is mobilized in 
imaginings of criminality is through identity. Subjects who depart from the benchmark of the 
normalized subject8, who, since modernity and the birth of modern science, has been generalized 
                                                 
7 From this point on, when I refer to ‘gender’ I am referring to this privileged meaning.  
8 When I use the term “normalized subject” throughout this dissertation, I use it to refer to subjects who appear 
‘normal’ because of their interlocking identity categories. Normalized identities are those identities that have long 
been constructed as dominant or superior in western society (e.g. whiteness, masculinity, middle-classness and 
heterosexuality).  I use the term ‘normalized’ instead of ‘normal’ to draw attention to the never-ending social and 
cultural work that is done to maintain this fiction. I also use ‘normalized’ to both trouble and make clear that no 
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as the white, heterosexual, middle-class man, have been and continue to be rendered Other: 
women, the racialized, the colonized, immigrants, the working classes, LGBTQ+ community, 
and so on (Urla and Terry 1995; Rimke 2003). Importantly, subjects who are thought to 
represent this difference on the basis of identity, have also been seen as biologically different 
based on biological and scientific accounts of race, sex, sexuality, and class. By seeing identity 
in terms of biology, difference and the social order itself becomes determined, naturalized and 
justified (see for example, Halpin 1989). As a result, we continue to see race, gender, class and 
sexuality playing particularly significant roles in criminalizing marginalized subjects; it is 
alleged that it is ‘their’ inherent difference, or “embodied deviance”, that renders them 
particularly vulnerable to transgression (Urla and Terry 1995, 2).  
 Difference, on the basis of identity has, and continues to be mobilized for 
understandings/imaginings of criminality. Because identity has been historically assumed to be 
innate and not socially and/or culturally determined, difference is also seen as being inscribed 
both on (i.e. visible difference) and in (i.e. invisible biological difference; for example, genetics) 
the body (S. Hall 1997c; Alcoff 2006). This understanding of identity, difference and the body 
has often led to the pathologization of that very difference (Urla and Terry 1995; Rimke 2003). 
That is, those who depart from the benchmark of the normalized subject are seen as 
fundamentally different in their bodily features (e.g. skin colour, reproductive organs etc.) as 
well as their characteristics (e.g. intellectual capacity, capacity for reason, morality, and so on) 
(Gilman 1985; 1988; S. Hall 1997c). As a result of this so-called ‘departure’ from the norm, the 
Other is seen as the antithesis of the ‘normal’, healthy subject from which they have been 
differentiated; the Other is thus, ‘deviant’, abnormal or pathological in their very being (Gilman 
1985, 25; Halpin 1989; Urla and Terry 1995). This historically contingent linkage between 
difference and pathology has not only reinforced the link between criminality and pathology 
(Olstead 2002; Foucault 2003; Covey 2008; Rafter 2008) but it has also produced a number of 
stock figures that are pathologized and criminalized on the basis of identity/difference. For 
example, the “monster-terrorist” (Rai 2004; A. Howell 2007; Razack 2008), “the born criminal” 
(Horn 2003; Rafter 1997b and 2008), “the criminalblackman” (Russell 1998; see Chapter 6 in 
her book especially), are racialized figures, “the battered woman” (Shaffer 1997) is distinctly 
                                                 
identity category, and no person is inherently ‘normal’. Describing both social identities and people in this way takes 
work, and this work is never finally finished, which consequently, also means that this work can be disrupted.  
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gendered and “the criminal sexual psychopath” (Chenier 2003), was a sexual and gender 
‘deviant’.  
 Dominant criminal imaginings (as constructed in the normative imagination9) have given 
rise to stereotypical images of criminals: “our images of ‘ideal criminals’—or those who are 
more likely to be given the status of criminal—are consistent with a traditional ideology of 
crime: criminals are poor, minority [sic] men; uneducated; psychotic; or, more recently, 
immigrants” (Madriz 1997, 343). However, in the process of creating these kinds of images on 
the basis of identity (and other features a well) we should pay attention to what else these images 
give rise to: ideas about who is un-criminal. Many scholars have observed this assumption about 
normalized subjects as un-criminal or unimaginably criminal. For example, scholars have noted 
that dominant criminal imaginings remain focused on the racialized bodies of young, poor men, 
to the exclusion of white, middle-class men (Philip 1993; Butler 1993; Delgado 1994; Russell 
1998; Rome 2004; Welch 2007; Biber 2007; Chan and Chunn 2014; Heitzeg 2015; Eastman 
2015). The term “white innocence” is usually used to refer to the assumed un-criminality of 
subjects who occupy a position of normative whiteness (Eastman 2015). While other scholars 
have discussed how, when normalized women (white, middle-class, and heterosexual) commit 
crime, especially violent crimes, it is “culturally unthinkable” (Seal 2010; see also Chesney- 
Lind and Eliason 2006; Comack 2006a; Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016). These kinds of 
assumptions based on identity, difference and the body profoundly influence how criminality is 
imagined.  
 In the next section, I unpack how Bernardo, Homolka and Williams’ criminality was 
represented as unimaginable because they appeared to be completely ‘normal’. In particular, I 
pay attention to how they are made to appear ‘normal’ throughout the texts and the kinds of 
assumptions about identities that are being drawn on throughout the texts by paying attention to 
the way that their normalcy is communicated in such a way that it “goes-without-saying” 
(Barthes 1972).  We also need to pay attention to the power and privileges accorded to bodies 
who are read as ‘normal’ and how the assumptions embedded in such a sweeping and powerful 
characterization enable us to not see or imagine criminality, but its opposite—un-criminality.  
 
 
                                                 
9 I explain this concept in Chapter 2. 
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Un-Criminality and the Body that Conceals 
 
 If we return to the representation of the Bernardo/Homolka and Williams cases, there are 
a number of telling moments where these assumptions about identities are conveyed. As I noted 
above, Bernardo was originally a suspect, but he was low on the list because he did not match the 
FBI’s profile, especially in terms of his class-status and occupation. However, a journalist who 
reflected on the case after Bernardo’s conviction, highlights that it was Bernardo’s appearance 
that was also significant in duping police officers:  
The case made some unsettling points: [...] the public now knows that two police 
officers interviewed the killer in the weeks after French's battered body was found in 
a ditch -- and left his home satisfied that the handsome and affable Bernardo wasn't 
their man (After Judgement Canadians Reflect on Faults in System 1995).  
 
Although the journalist is superficial in the description of why the police officers were satisfied 
with Bernardo’s un-criminality, there was something about Bernardo’s appearance (i.e. 
“handsome”) and character (i.e. “affable”) that enabled him to be seen as unsuspicious, law-
abiding and indeed ‘normal’.  This interpretive feat is accomplished, at least in part, by the way 
in which a discourse of (un)criminality structures what we can see and how we understand or 
make sense of what we see. For one, we do not expect serial rapists or murderers to be handsome 
or affable, but the opposite. We expect to be able to tell the difference between a serial rapist and 
killer and ‘everyman’, but in this case the difference was not discernable. According to the 
journalist, it is this knowledge—that which we imagine we see may only be appearance and not 
reality—that remains the most unsettling of all.  
In December 1989, another telling sentiment was conveyed in the news. The Scarborough 
community was desperate to put an end to the violence and so a public poster campaign was 
launched to help the police apprehend the perpetrator. The campaign was designed to provide the 
public with a way of re-imagining the image of the rapist as a stranger, by appealing to the 
public’s sense of normalcy. The posters contained an image of an incomplete puzzle of a face to 
convey that the offender still remained faceless.  The written text on the posters read: “he could 
be your co-worker, employer, friend, brother, husband or son” (L. Wright 1989).  This strategy 
attempted to rewrite the image that people had in mind about the rapist as a faceless, stranger, 
bogeyman- type and replaced this image with an image of your average, white man— the “boy-
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next-door-type”, as he was later described by one of his victims (Mascoll and O’Neill 1990)—
that hides in plain sight (and is able to hide in plain sight because of his normalcy and the 
expectations that are engendered by the normative community to which he is part). Presumably, 
the logic behind the campaign was to give the public the resources they needed to re-imagine the 
rapist as someone who is known to ‘them’, who might exist as part of ‘their’ community, so that 
the average white man might begin to appear as criminal and suspicious, so that the familiar 
might be made to re-appear as strange and dangerous.  
Describing the ‘Scarborough rapist’ as a “boy-next-door type” was also significant. What 
boys or men get described in this way? What boys or men don’t? It is perhaps in this description 
that we see the most vivid description of normalcy shored up. Within this portrayal of the 
suspect/Bernardo, racial, gendered, classed and spatial logics converge to produce an image of a 
‘boy’ that lives in a presumably white, suburban neighbourhood who is wholesome, respectable, 
neighbourly, and is seen as having a type of innocence about him.  He is familiar, friendly and 
unassuming.  It is also important to point out to whom this description was speaking to and the 
racial, classed and spatial assumptions that are being made about the readers themselves.   
Once Bernardo is identified and arrested, journalists tell many stories about Bernardo and 
Homolka that highlight their apparent normalcy. He is described in the coverage as good-
looking, handsome, and popular among the ladies. He has a girlfriend (Homolka) who simply 
adores him; he has a job and friends.  Bernardo also fits perfectly within the frame of hetero-
masculinity that valorizes and necessitates the repetitive conquest of female desire.  As he played 
out the scripts of hetero-masculinity, he was able to hide his criminal sexual proclivities under 
the pretence of the normative: 
 
There were plenty of girlfriends in his teenage years. His first love, when he was 16, 
was a girl named Nadine.  If there was anything aberrant about Bernardo’s attitude 
toward women, she didn’t see it. The relationship lasted about a year, and they parted 
on friendly terms.  There were other girlfriends, and other sexual encounters, not 
unusual for teenaged boys. (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b; emphasis mine) 
 
As I mention above, Bernardo and Homolka’s heterosexual marriage is also presented in such a 
way that their ‘fairy tale’ wedding and relationship categorically excludes them from the 
discourse of criminality. Both Bernardo and Homolka fit neatly within the “heterosexual familial 
frame” that comes to inform discourses of crime and criminality (Collier 1997).  Serial killers, 
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like spree killers, are often represented as being beyond the boundaries of the social and thus the 
familial (Collier 1997).  However, in this context, Homolka and Bernardo are fully within the 
parameters of hetero-masculinity and femininity.  As a married heterosexual couple, they are not 
feared.  In fact, they are quite the opposite; they generally represent familiarity, wholesomeness, 
and the comforts of home.  This familiar and wide-spread belief in the safety and comfort of the 
heterosexual couple is discussed in the coverage as the reason why French did not feel threatened 
by the couple who pulled over to ask her for directions in a ruse to abduct her: 
 
A woman was in the abductors' car on the day French was taken from a church 
parking lot in St. Catharines, according to police. As she was walking home from 
school on April 16, 1992, French walked about two car lengths off the sidewalk 
toward the abductors' car, leading police to suspect she knew someone in the car. 
This past weekend, however, police surmised that French walked over to the car 
because a woman had called to her and it's possible the teenager didn't feel 
threatened, at first. (J. Hall 1993; emphasis mine) 
 
While male strangers are often a reasonable source of discomfort, suspicion and sometimes fear 
for women, man hinged to the comforting image of heteronormative partnership is seen as less of 
a threat because of his perceived commitment to family-life. Moreover, “a woman” in the 
abductor’s car diminishes his dangerousness and signifies, in a very powerful way, that although 
they are strangers, it is ‘ok’ to approach the vehicle; ‘she’ makes it appear safe and 
unthreatening. White, middle-class women and the young, attractive, heterosexual couple do not 
figure in our criminal imaginaries.  
The impact of Homolka in this image cannot be understated.  A ‘blond beauty’ whose 
body is attributed with all of the normalized characteristics of white womanhood, stands as the 
tamer of hetero-masculinity as well as impossibly criminal (recall that before the identity of the 
“second suspect” was released, one journalist assumed this person was a man; it was 
unimaginable any other way). Homolka is at first pictured as sweet, and as the stereotypes of 
‘proper’ hetero-feminine women go, her main goal in life is to get married (she was part of the 
exclusive diamond club in high school, which was composed of young women who are awaiting 
the ceremonial proposal and diamond ring to secure their entrance into marriage), “to have a 
pretty house with a white picket fence, and a house full of smiling babies” (Pron, Duncanson and 
Rankin 1995b). Her presence and her appearance help to buttress the facade of Bernardo’s un-
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criminality (and her own) and together they appear to us as ‘Barbie and Ken’, unthreatening, 
unassuming, indeed, reassuring.  
After the Bernardo’s trial had ended, Stephen Williams, an author, wrote a true-crime story 
of the Bernardo/Homolka case, titled “Invisible Darkness”.  Upon the release of the book, many 
journalists wrote reviews of the book and in one review, Williams is lauded for presenting the 
complex image of ‘invisible darkness’ that characterized the couple. The reviewer notes that the 
book: 
 
makes eerie reading because it captures the middle class averageness that, at least on 
the surface, defined Bernardo and Homolka. Bernardo, a trim and attractive business 
school graduate, wore Ralph Lauren shirts and liked to go to Florida for spring break 
[… ] Bernardo was indistinguishable from any college party dude who lines up at 
downtown bars on Friday night. We learn that Homolka belonged in high school to a 
clique called the Exclusive Diamond Club -- girlfriends all planning to get a diamond 
and marry […] But as Williams thoroughly documents, Bernardo and Homolka were 
not what they seemed […] it was a collision of psychopaths. (L. Stern 1996; 
emphasis mine) 
 
Their attractive looks, their unremarkable social activities, and their aspirations all attest to their 
‘middle class averageness’—they are indistinguishable. But, “Bernardo and Homolka were not 
what they seemed” (L.Stern 1996).  Implied in this statement is that their middle-class 
averageness is not compatible with the violence and horror of their criminality.  ‘These’ kinds of 
people do not do ‘those’ kinds of things. Evidently they do, but their darkness is invisible, 
beneath the surface, concealed by their white middle-class averageness and a discourse of 
(un)criminality that has produced them as un-criminal subjects.     
 Scholars who have critically analyzed the Bernardo/Homolka case have made similar 
observations about how the news (re)produced their normalcy and un-criminality as I have put 
forth here. For instance, Marlene Nourbese Philip has succinctly argued that it was Bernardo’s 
whiteness and class that enabled him to carry out his crimes for as long as he did:   
the point here is a simple one: because of the veil of protection that whiteness (and to 
some degree class) offers its devotees and disciples, Paul Bernardo was able to walk 
around raping and murdering children and women much longer than should have 
been allowed. Contrast this with the passionate enthusiasm, energy and violence 
exercised in the policing of Black people. On the streets. In their neighbourhoods. In 
their homes. And often for minor offences, or no offences at all. Consider the number 
of Black people shot by the police. Some, like Lester Donaldson and Albert Johnson, 
in their homes. Then consider again. Paul Bernardo. (1995, 11) 
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The juxtaposition that Philip creates between how Bernardo and Black men more generally are 
imagined and treated by the criminal justice system is at once telling and disturbing. In the case 
of Bernardo his identities interlock to produce a “veil of protection” (11), and at the same time 
the identities and appearances of racialized men work as a mechanism of hyper-criminalization 
and violence. This is an observation that Wendy Chan and Dorothy Chunn have made as well, 
noting that “racialized men and women are widely perceived as being more criminogenic and 
thus as more credible perpetrators of crime than white men and women overall” (2014, 28). 
Moreover, Chan and Chunn point out that the “tunnel vision” that enables racialized men and 
women to be seen as more criminogenic has implications for how white people are seen as non-
criminal (29). One of those implications, as they note, is being able to more or less evade 
suspicion and detection:  
many of the most infamous white male serial rapists and murderers in Canada have 
escaped official scrutiny for prolonged periods of time because they did not fit the 
image of ‘the criminal’. Paul Bernardo, Russell Williams, and most notably Robert 
Pickton all escaped detection for much longer than they should have (Oppal 2012) 
(29).  
 
 In their recent book, Jennifer Kilty and Sylvie Frigon (2016) have also observed the kind 
of un-criminal thinking that informed how Homolka was represented. Kilty and Frigon make the 
case that although whiteness (as a normalized and privileged identity and a way of structuring 
thought) affects how crime is represented in the media as well as policing, there is a lack of 
critical scholarship that has discussed the Bernardo/Homolka case from a critical race/whiteness 
perspective10. The reason for this absence, Kilty and Frigon note, is because the offenders and 
the victims were white (see also Philip 1995). In their analysis of media representations of 
Homolka, the authors draw our attention to the ways that Homolka’s interlocking identities 
enabled her criminality to be seen as shocking and enigmatic (48-49).  They argue that whiteness 
was an “absent presence” in the news representations, because it was never explicitly discussed, 
but was implied in the way that Bernardo, Homolka and their victims were represented as 
belonging to Canadian society— the white, middle-class national community (51). Focusing on 
Homolka in particular, Kilty and Frigon observe that Homolka was regularly represented as 
                                                 
10 For an overview of critical criminological works that have recently begun to subject whiteness to critical analysis 
see Chapter 1 of this dissertation.  
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being an inconspicuous, ordinary, and everyday, a tactic that reinforced the normalcy and 
invisibility of whiteness (52-53). It was Homolka’s likeness to other ‘Canadians’ that propelled 
the media and the public’s curiosity about her and her crimes because it “shattered the illusion 
that whiteness and being middle-class and female inherently affords a safe identity and thus 
person[…]” (53). At the same time that her averageness was conveyed, so too was her physical 
difference from racialized ‘deviant’ others whom ‘we’ ‘expect’ to be criminals (53).  
 The significance of whiteness in the media’s construction of Homolka’s “everydayness” 
and by extension, her unimaginable criminality, cannot be understated (51), but neither can the 
other subject positions that she occupied. For example, Kilty and Frigon (2016) highlight how 
representing Homolka within the ambit of hegemonic femininity relied on emphasizing her 
‘beautiful’ physical appearance, her aspirations to be a wife and mother, and her subservience to 
her husband (55-56). Because this image of femininity is inconsistent with how female offenders 
are imagined, Kilty and Frigon detail the ways that Homolka’s hegemonic femininity was re-
written to appear as a “pariah femininity” or a “femme fatale” figure—manipulative, sexually 
transgressive, deceitful, and resistant to male superiority (57-58).  Finally, Kilty and Frigon, also 
draw our attention to the ways that spatial and class-based logics converged in the 
representations and how this added to enigmatic character of the case in general. For instance, 
the crimes against Mahaffy and French occurred inside the couple’s home in a white, middle-
class suburb. This space is not where horrific crimes are imagined to occur. Instead this space, 
and those like it, are seen as “safe spaces occupied by a non-threatening homogenous 
population” (59). Not only is this space defined as un-criminal, but as Kilty and Frigon observe, 
the description of their home as Cape-Cod like and the neighbourhood as clean, lush, and 
affluent helped to create “an outward appearance of financial wealth” (59).  
 The works of Kilty and Frigon (2016), Chan and Chunn (2014) and Norbese Philip 
(1995), along with my own reading of the case highlight how Bernardo and Homolka’s 
interlocking identities and the logics wedded to these identities produced them as unimaginably 
criminal or un-criminal. The assumptions and expectations that are embedded in these identity 
logics also help to explain the shock, disbelief and curiosity that this case inspired (see also 
Heitzeg 2015).  If we shift our attention to the Williams case, we can see how these same logics 
were put to work in constructing Williams’ criminality as unimaginable and how they also 
allowed him to evade suspicion. 
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Russell Williams was not an initial suspect in the murder investigation of Comeau and 
Lloyd. As one journalist put it: 
 
The OPP did not initially question Colonel Russell Williams about a sexual assault 
he was later charged with, because he was the commander of CFB Trenton, a former 
neighbour alleges. In late September 2009, hours after a Tweed woman was sexually 
terrorized in her home by a man who had broken in, police knocked on doors in the 
neighbourhood.  When they got to Larry Jones’ home on Cosy Cove Lane, an officer 
asked him a few questions, then asked who owned the home next door, he says.  Mr. 
Jones, 65, said he told him the home belonged to Col. Williams.  The police officer 
thought he was joking. He wasn’t. ‘So I told him again,’ Mr. Jones said, ‘that the 
owner of the house next door was the commander of CFB Trenton, and then he said, 
‘Well, I guess we don’t have to look at him then.’’  In fact, OPP detectives first 
focused not on Col. Williams, but on Mr. Jones. (Dimmock 2010; emphasis mine) 
 
The belief that is expressed in this passage—that Williams did not need to be questioned because 
of who he was imagined to be— immediately draws our attention to the types of assumptions 
that get folded into social and professional identities.  In the coverage of the case, the news 
constantly reproduces images of Williams in his military uniform in an attempt to convey that it 
was an understandable mistake to skip over Williams because of his status and the moral and 
character expectations engendered by that very status (e.g. Greenberg 2010; Rankin and 
Contenta 2010c). The military uniform is symbolic of the ‘kind’ of person Williams is—brave, 
courageous, disciplined, strong, selfless, patriotic and a ‘good’ national (white) subject. By 
extension, it also tells us what he is not—a serial killer. In addition to journalists discussing the 
symbolic assumptions his military status engenders and the kinds of conceptual leaps that 
resulted, they also reference how his military uniform was able to conceal his crimes in literal 
ways. For instance, we are told that the military uniform hides stolen female under garments: 
“There were photos of him wearing the stained pink underwear of a girl under what looked like 
his air force issued pants. Morrison suggested Williams might have worn the stained pink panties 
to work at the base he commanded” (Rankin and Contenta 2010e). The military uniform 
accordingly obstructs our vision of his criminality and who he ‘really’ is by masking the 
necessary clues. 
 But it was not simply Williams’ military status that enabled him to be ‘overlooked’ by 
police. It was also the way his occupation, marital status, appearance, and white middle-class 
masculinity were made to converge in the representations. Williams appears to be normal, 
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average, perhaps even perfectly normal, and above average: “That optical illusion is what makes 
today’s reality so disturbing. Williams, 47, appeared terrifyingly normal. He did not just blend 
in, he excelled” (MacLeod 2010). He stands as the complete opposite of our dominant criminal 
imaginings.  Reading Williams’ body as a visibly (and perhaps hyper-) normal(ized) body aids in 
the concealment of Williams’ criminality. For example, and as one journalist put it: “At the 
beginning [of the police interrogation], Williams emphasized his military status and kept saying 
‘my wife’ to emphasize his normality. ‘My wife and I went out to dinner at a restaurant.’ He’s 
not a freak, he has Mary Elizabeth Harriman. She is his wife, his mask” (Mallick 2010b). White, 
middle-class, heternormative masculinity, in this instance veils criminality; it undermines the 
possibility of a slippage between the normal body and the criminal body. It is the Other’s body 
that stands in as The Criminal Body with its alleged spontaneous and eruptive potentialities for 
terror, violence and aggression in contemporary western culture (Butler, 1993; Russell 1998; 
Fanon, 2008; Chan and Chunn 2014). This sentiment is echoed and racially sanitized in the 
media by the ‘absence’ of race and explicit racial signifiers (in much the same way that Kilty and 
Frigon, and Philip respectively observe in the Bernardo/Homolka case), but by the presence of 
the term ‘normal’.  One journalist notes that “One reason they [serial killers] evade capture is 
because they seem so normal [...] serial killing comprises less than 1 per cent of all murders.  
That said, the killers tend to be more ordinary than fiction would suggest. It is that very 
ordinariness that allows serial killers to hide in plain sight and evade detection and capture for so 
long” (Morton 2010).  Part of the normalcy which Williams is ascribed is due in part to the 
symbolic and material power of his whiteness, class position, and heteronormativity.  The 
symbolic capacity of Williams’ racial and military uniform demonstrates the concrete effects and 
privileges of the meanings and assumptions that get ascribed to Williams’ apparent normalcy.  
They also demonstrate how cultural signs and signifiers of normalcy coalesce to produce, in a 
discourse of criminality, the normalized subject as un-criminal.  
 
 Pathologizing an Otherwise Normalized Subject  
 
 As I noted above, the observation that Bernardo, Homolka and Williams were seen as 
unimaginably criminal because of how discourses of criminality, identity, and difference 
produced them as such, is not a novel observation. It is however, where this present study 
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departs. If Bernardo, Homolka and Williams were imagined as un-criminal, then the question 
remains: how is their criminality rendered imaginable in the news representations in light of the 
ideas, assumptions and expectations that circulated about who they were thought to be?  
 Thus far, we have seen how Williams, Bernardo and Homolka’s interlocking11 
normalized identities and appearances concealed their criminality in such a way that they are 
seen as unimaginably criminal. We have also briefly surveyed works that explain how 
criminality is often imagined through difference. This way of thinking about criminality in 
relation to the body, appearances and identity undergirded the news representations of these two 
cases. In the process, it makes visible a series of problematic assumptions: that we expect 
(hope?) people who do bad things to be fundamentally (i.e. biologically) different from an 
imagined ‘us’ and we assume that this difference will be visibly discernable on their bodies. But 
what if there was a way to reconcile both the assumed difference that we believe to be 
characteristic of people who do bad things and the fact, that more often than not, these same 
‘bad’ people end up not looking as criminal as we imagine them to be? What if there was a 
specific way to prove that our belief that people who do terrible things are biologically different, 
indeed evil, when compared to us, ‘good’ and ‘normal’ people? What if there was a way to 
reconcile our surprise that the person who is behind a horrific misdeed need not look different 
and may in fact look perfectly ‘normal’ (with all that this entails), but is still different in their 
very being? Imagining the Unimaginable is about a discourse that has the ability to do this: 
psychopathy. 
 That Bernardo, Homolka and Williams were represented as psychopaths is, of course, not 
a new insight (see for example, Philip 1995, 11; McGillivary 1998, 258; Rimke 2010, 79; Jalava, 
Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 47-55; Kilty and Frigon 2016).  However, when we think about what 
is specific about psychopathy that made it amenable to imagining Bernardo, Homolka and 
Williams’ otherwise unimaginable criminality, some additional and interesting insights might 
                                                 
11 I use the term “interlocking” instead of the more commonplace term “intersecting” following the lead of Sherene 
Razack (2008).  In her book Casting Out, Razack persuasively argues that the language of “intersecting” is limiting. 
An intersecting approach assumes that systems of power are discrete and only congeal in specific instances (i.e. the 
point of intersection). Whereas conceptualizing systems of power as interlocking assumes that they are always 
intertwined, “that the systems are each other and that they give content to each other (62; emphasis original). In 
other words, we cannot isolate how subjects are seen and understood in terms of only one of their identities (e.g. 
race or gender or class or sexuality) as this would miss the work that other systems of power are doing at the same 
time. I should note that at times I will use the term “intersectionality” only because there is no grammatical 
equivalent in an interlocking approach.  When I use this term however, I imply the meaning of Razack’s 
interlocking approach.     
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emerge. Before moving on to a discussion about psychopathy, I think it is important to first 
review how other scholars have explained representations of the normalized offender in relation 
to discourses of pathology in general. These works, in different ways, provide us with an 
important entry point for thinking about how we make sense of criminality where it appears as 
unimaginable because difference is not easily and already ascribed. In other words, they provide 
us with a way to think about how the normalized subject comes to be imagined as criminal.  I 
discuss how discourses of pathology construct normalized women who commit violent crimes in 
Chapter 4.   
Feminist scholars have long pointed out that racial and gendered violence perpetrated by 
men often results in those men being pathologized, and the problem of violence being reduced to 
the individual and not a product of “sick social arrangements”, like sexism and/or racism (e.g. 
Hunnicutt 2009, 556; Razack 2000; Jiwani 2006; Jiwani and Young 2006). Other scholars have 
observed that when white, middle-class men perpetrate extraordinary violence (e.g. mass 
shootings, serial murder, and so on), discourses of pathology, and especially mental illness, 
structure how they are represented or constructed (Kimmel and Mahler 2003; Mingus and Zopf 
2010; Heitzeg 2015).  Part of the conditions under which such a representation is accomplished, 
is through a series of assumptions about who this person is. More often then not, these 
individuals are assumed to be, aside from the egregious harm which they inflicted, ‘normal’. I 
would suggest that ‘normal’ has a double meaning in this instance: normal in the sense of social 
identity and normal in the sense of appearing as commonplace, innocent/un-criminal, average, 
regular. I would also argue that these two meanings cannot be divorced from each other.  
In this context, difference is not readily observable in terms of social identity, because it 
is the white, heterosexual, middle-class, male subject who has been normalized, rendered the 
norm, transformed into the benchmark of normalcy and endowed with all of the characteristics of 
modernity (Urla and Terry 1995). Simply put, criminality is not grafted onto the social identities 
of the normalized subject. For example, Mingus and Zopf observed that when it comes to 
representing mass shootings perpetrated by white men, race is summarily dismissed from news 
reports, which implicitly denies that race was meaningful in this instance (2010, 65; see also 
Heitzeg 2015). This runs in stark contrast to the way that race features in news reports of mass 
shootings which were perpetrated by non-white people.  Here, they note “race suddenly 
become[s] not only an issue, but one of such paramount importance that others who share a 
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racial identity with the perpetrator became victims of racial interpellation” (66). Instead of 
criminality being represented in relation to racial difference, Mingus and Zopf suggest that the 
white perpetrator is represented as an individual, a “deviant aberration” and their actions seen as 
“abnormal and pathological” (66).   
This way of representing mass shootings, they argue, is a “racial project”—a means of 
“[creating] and [reproducing] structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race” 
(Omi and Winant 1994 quoted in Mingus and Zopf 2010: 63). It is able to do this kind of work 
because it reproduces whiteness as normative by not being seen as a factor in the individual’s 
criminality. Consequently, the power of whiteness—its invisibility, ‘normalcy’ and hegemony—
is cemented. Implied in these representations of mass shooters (constructed no doubt, within 
what has been called “the white racial frame”; see Heitzeg 2015, 198), is that difference is 
meaningful for understanding the criminality of racialized shooters, but not white shooters.  This 
buffers the racist stereotype of criminality, where criminality is always imagined as “an-‘Other’” 
(Ritskes, n.d.). In relying on difference, not only is a racist stereotype reinforced, but so is the 
mythic idea that white people, and the normalized subject more generally, are innocent or un-
criminal (Heitzeg 2015).  
Nancy Heitzeg (2015) has explained that this representational practice—“the medical 
mitigation of whites vs. the criminalization of Blacks” (197)—is one that is relational. That is, 
whites can only be seen as criminal aberrations against an image of Blackness that posits that 
Black people are perpetually and intrinsically prone to criminal behaviour. Heitzeg argues that 
these assumptions come to inform which model of social control seems to fit more readily with 
the offender. Criminalization, which seeks to punish an irredeemable badness is often applied to 
“the poor and communities of colour”, whereas medicalization, which seeks to treat a treatable 
and redeemable condition, is often reserved for the “white middle and upper classes” (199).  In 
other words, in both instances racial identity plays a significant role for how criminality is 
imagined, however the way that identity operates is different.  
As representations of an otherwise normalized subject continue to unfold through “the 
white racial frame” (Heitzeg 2015, 198), we are able to see how the assumptions about this 
subject’s un-criminality informs representations of them as pathological and individual 
aberrations. Aside from this kind of representation, scholars have also observed that 
representations of the normalized subject differ from socially marginalized offenders in other 
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ways as well.  In an attempt to make sense of their unimaginable criminality, Heitzeg (2015) 
notes that ‘their story’ will be told and these stories individualize the violence, humanize the 
unimaginable perpetrator, and transform him into a victim of society, mental illness and/or 
circumstance which works to reinstall their ‘sickness’, not their ‘badness’ (see also Ritskes, n.d.). 
While pathology works to differentiate this subject, it does so by assuming that this subject could 
not have transgressed unless something was wrong with them (Daniels 2015); it is this subject 
who is endowed with morality, intellect, rationality, civility and so on. Here, identity is implicitly 
guiding how we understand their assumed un-criminality, and no where are these assumptions 
made explicit. This is in stark contrast to the Other, where they are thought to exist as part of a 
community of Others who are also supposedly different in the same way, and allegedly more 
vulnerable to crime (e.g. the criminalization of race; Jiwani 2002). In this instance, the 
criminalized Other’s assumed difference (their pathological departure from the norm) is used to 
imagine and make sense of the transgression. Importantly, this way of representing the 
normalized subject’s criminality reinforces its inverse, the racialized criminal stereotype of the 
dangerous and threatening “criminalblackman” (Russell 1998). As we know, however, and as 
Heitzeg has said, the actual danger of this stereotype is “to whom it is attached” (2015, 202; 
emphasis mine).  
 
Psychopathy 
 
 The scholars discussed above have focused on the ways in which a discourse of 
pathology generally structures news representations of normalized subjects. However, none 
account for the specific discourses of pathology that surface to construct them as such. I seek to 
do precisely this by focusing on how psychopathy, as a specific discursive iteration of pathology, 
constructs the un-criminal or normalized subject as criminal.   
Psychopathy is generally characterized as a biologically based personality disorder (and 
not a mental illness) that is linked to two sets of specific traits: interpersonal or personality traits 
and socially deviant behaviours. In terms of the former, traits such as glibness, superficiality, 
egocentrism, grandiosity, remorselessness, deceitfulness, manipulative, lack of empathy and 
shallow emotions are characteristic (Hare 1999). In terms of the latter, behaviours like 
impulsivity, need for excitement, lack of responsibility, poor behaviour controls and antisocial 
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behaviour are often observed (Hare 1999). The psychopath is generally considered untreatable 
(Hare 1999). One of the hallmarks of psychopathy is that the psychopath appears to others as 
perfectly ‘normal’ and even charming and intelligent.  However, this is part of the disorder itself; 
their appearance masks the reality of their being (Weisman 2008; Hare 1999; see Chapter 1 for 
an extended discussion about psychopathy).   
In his doctoral dissertation, Matthew Burnett (2013) explored how psychopathy is 
represented in Canadian newspapers and his research shows that there are three general themes 
that characterize the news representations. The first theme reveals that psychopathy or the 
psychopath features in news articles that discuss extreme forms of violence. Burnett is careful to 
point out that the presence of psychopathy in these instances does not only show that the disorder 
is associated in public discourses with violent criminality, but that psychopathy is often 
mobilized in these instances as a way of explaining horrific behaviour (189). This is significant 
for Burnett, because without psychopathy the acts would remain senseless or incomprehensible 
(189).  
The second theme is that the psychopath is explicitly and implicitly represented as evil in 
its biblical sense (190). The connection made between evil and psychopathy, Burnett argues, is 
conveyed in such a way that it “reads as plainly obvious, clear, concrete, and palpable. Tied as 
they are to archetypical notions of biblical evil, the criminal transgressions of the psychopath 
come to be read, perhaps, as darker, more troubling, more sinister and as less forgivable” (191).  
Burnett also observes that the connection between psychopathy and evil is reinforced by the 
ways that the psychopath’s appearance is described as “monstrous, imposing, menacing, and 
even ghoulish […] distorted, deformed or disfigured” (191-192). This attentiveness to 
appearance, Burnett argues is complementary to the logic of psychopathy because it suggests that 
the psychopath is so fundamental to who one is, their biological difference is visible on the body 
(192). The final theme that Burnett highlights is “dire prediction” which he uses to capture 
representations of the psychopath as “persistently criminal, unstoppably violent and 
unrelentingly dangerous” (193).  These representations suggest that the psychopath is likely to 
engage in future misconduct and that they are generally untreatable all of which testify to the 
psychopath’s dangerousness and rationalize various forms incapacitation (193-195).  
Burnett’s observations, especially theme one, draws attention to how psychopathy 
operates as a way of making sense of unimaginable crimes.  That is, crimes that are so 
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reprehensible, so violent that they defy sense. However, I also wonder to what extent 
psychopathy helps us (i.e. the ‘public’) to make sense not only of unimaginable crimes, but the 
unimaginable perpetrators of those crimes as well. It is the latter that I think seriously about 
throughout this dissertation. One thing that continually stood out in my reflections on 
psychopathy was the way that ‘the psychopath’ is imagined in pop culture as “white, middle 
class and ‘normal” (Rhodes 2002, 257; emphasis mine). For example, a basic Google Image 
search of the term “psychopath”, turns up some of the most iconic psychopaths of our time: Jack 
Nicolson in “The Shining”; Anthony Hopkins as Hannibal Lecter in “The Silence of the Lambs”; 
the late Heath Ledger playing the Joker in “The Dark Night” among others. However, it seemed 
to me that this way of representing psychopaths as “white, middle class and ‘normal” was also 
evident in news portrayals of serial murder.  
As I began researching psychopathy, it appeared that other scholars had written about the 
association between transgression, identity and psychopathy. However, most of these studies 
were historical in nature. I discuss these works in greater detail in Chapters 1, but a cursory note 
is necessary at this point to help us understand why I have turned to psychopathy specifically.  
Historians of psychopathy (or moral insanity as it was first termed) have variously observed that 
psychopathy was historically applied those who appeared ‘normal’ by the day’s standards, but 
who transgressed law, custom, and or social norms. While psychopathy was diagnosed in a 
somewhat diverse group of people, scholars have observed that psychopathy was evaluated in 
terms of the assumptions and expectations engendered by the individual’s interlocking social 
identities (e.g. race, gender and class; Rimke 2003; Lunbeck 1994). To put it simply, what the 
work of these scholars demonstrate is that historically moral insanity/psychopathy was not a 
neutral diagnostic category (Rimke 2003, 253), but was infused with assumptions about 
morality, normalcy, identity, and the body. For example, in relation to socio-economic class, 
Heidi Rimke observes that moral insanity was applied to people in the ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ 
classes, but for different reasons: “moral insanity in the working classes […] was often explained 
as the result of coming from ‘bad stock’” (2003, 254). The working classes, Rimke notes, were 
also seen as “’filthy’, ‘unruly,’ and ‘disorderly’ or naturally predisposed to moral madness” 
(254). When moral insanity was seen in the middle or upper classes, on the other hand, the roots 
of their pathology differed; for them it was an external force (e.g. “a fever or blow to the head”; 
254) that resulted in a corrupted sense of morality.  In terms of gender, both men and women 
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were diagnosed as morally insane or psychopaths when they transgressed the norms of their 
gender (e.g. women who behaved in ways that were considered more masculine; men who acted 
in more feminized or effeminate ways; Lunbeck 1994; Rafter 1997a; Rimke 2003). Sexuality 
was also important. Tied to conceptions of gender, those who transgressed heteronormativity and 
thus the sexual expectations of their gender were also diagnosed as psychopaths (Chenier 2003; 
Lunbeck 1994).  Finally, we have the question of race. While in theory anyone could fall victim 
to moral insanity race was an exception (Rimke 2003, 254). Racialized groups were 
“categorically disqualified” from moral insanity because it was believed that they, unlike their 
white counterparts, did not possess a moral sense that could be adulterated by moral insanity 
(Rimke 2003, 256; see also Lunbeck 1994).  
 
Central Objectives and Arguments 
 
 This dissertation departs from the idea that identity, difference and the body are central to 
how we imagine (un)criminality. Because of the body’s visibility, we imagine that its signs or 
marks are meaningful determinants of who someone is (S.Hall 1997c; Alcoff 2006). Although 
this way of thinking is problematic and misleading, it is precisely this way of thinking that 
enables the normalized subject to be rendered unimaginably criminal or un-criminal in 
popular/news discourse, as others have noted.  In the chapters that follow, I explore how the 
unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject becomes imaginable as such through 
psychopathy.  
Departing from the observations of others who have explored the pathologization of the 
normalized subject in the contemporary context, historical representations of psychopathy/moral 
insanity, as well as contemporary critical research on psychopathy, I think seriously about the 
relationship or association between news representations of psychopathy and the otherwise 
normalized transgressor in the contemporary context.  In doing so, I try to get a handle on this 
relationship by exploring the cultural and sense-making work that psychopathy does in 
representations. In other words, I am interested in how psychopathy figures in representations of 
crime and criminality; the contingencies of its deployment (i.e. when is it/not deployed); and 
what makes it amenable for representing the normalized subject as transgressive or criminal.  To 
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this end, I explore news media representations of five criminal cases12, most of which are cases 
of serial murder and most of which involve the murder of women at the hands of men. 
 While I was analysing the various cases that I used for this study, it became apparent to 
me that this project was as much about psychopathy as it was about the assumptions and 
expectations about bodies, identity and difference that we make manifest every time we convey 
ideas about (un)criminality. I was thus exploring how psychopathy figures in representations and 
imaginings of criminality as well as how our imagining of (un)criminality remains tethered (in 
truly profound ways) to the body. As we move through each chapter, I attempt to convey what I 
saw happening in each case at the level of representation and the continuities or divergences 
between the cases. While there are many nuances to my analysis and sub-arguments in each 
chapter, the central argument is relatively simple and based on what I saw happening in the cases 
that I analyzed for this study (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of how I chose these cases): 
psychopathy is one of the ways that the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject 
becomes imaginable in news representations. I also make the related argument that 
representations of criminality and psychopathy are bound to a series of interlocking bodily 
contingencies. What I mean by this is that whether psychopathy will be deployed and how it is 
deployed is contingent on an interlocking reading or understanding of bodies and subjects.  For 
instance, how and if psychopathy will be deployed depends on how each individual offender is 
imagined in relation to their interlocking subject positions.  In some instances, as we will see, 
criminality is more easily or readily representable because interlocking discourses of identity 
already constitute certain subjects as potentially criminal—discourses of race, as I will show, are 
particularly meaningful in this regard. In these instances, psychopathy does not operate in the 
same way for racialized subjects that it does in instances where the offenders are white, middle-
class and heterosexual. From my reading of the cases, I saw a number of interlocking bodily 
contingencies unfold in the representations and I explain these nuances throughout. It is my 
contention that psychopathy is still not a neutral, innocent or apolitical category.   
                                                 
12 All of the cases that I explore are Canadian cases and the news representations are from Canadian newspapers. I 
initially planned to do a cross-national comparison between Canada and the United States, but mid-way through my 
research this appeared to be untenable given the wealth of information that I had collected and the nuances that 
required attention. I reasoned that because research on the links between representation, psychopathy and identity 
had never been undertaken in a Canadian context (or in any other contemporary context) I decided to focus on the 
Canadian context exclusively before branching out to other national contexts.  
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 Each of the chapters in this dissertation, in its own way, tells a story about psychopathy in 
a way that is fundamentally different from the way it has been spoken about in the contemporary 
context, especially in the scientific literature (see Chapter 1).  I tell a story about how 
psychopathy fits into how we think about or imagine bodies, criminality and un-criminality. This 
story has been informed by the following questions:  How do we imagine criminality? How do 
we imagine the un-criminality of the normalized subject? How does psychopathy render 
unimaginable criminality (or un-criminality) imaginable? How are contemporary imaginings of 
(un)criminality as psychopathic connected to historical representations of psychopathy? How 
does the body, as a text that purportedly offers an assemblage of meaningful signs, figure into 
this form of representation? 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter 1 situates this project in the relevant scholarly literature. I begin the chapter by 
providing a brief history of the “pathologification of crime” (Foucault 1978, 6), and I explain 
how psychopathy is positioned in relation to this shift in thinking about crime and criminality. I 
then provide an overview of secondary historical works that analyze historical representations of 
moral insanity/psychopathy in relation to identity, difference and the body. In the following 
section, I move into the contemporary context and begin to paint a portrait of the contemporary 
psychopath—the features or symptoms of psychopathy, the nature of the psychopath, how 
psychopathy is identified/diagnosed and its prognosis. Once we have a general understanding of 
psychopathy, I move on to detail two specific research areas where I see this project making a 
significant contribution.  The first area I review consists of a small and eclectic group of social 
science scholars that have analyzed psychopathy using a critical and qualitative approach. The 
second area that I explore pertains to research that discusses the links between representation, 
criminality and identity.  In particular, I examine works that have begun to “unpack the centre” 
(i.e. whiteness, hegemonic masculinity and femininity, heteronormativity, etc.) by focusing not 
on the relationship between criminalization and marginalization per se, but rather on the systems 
of power which radiate from the centre to produce the margins as such (Brock, Raby and 
Thomas 2012).  In other words, while I am very much interested in criminalization and its 
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relation to power and identity, I do not enter this conversation by exploring its marginalizing 
effects. Instead, I explore its privileging effects: its normalizing or un-criminalizing effects.   
Chapter 2 details the conceptual tools that I use throughout. I begin by providing an 
overview of the constructivist paradigm or world view from which I enter into this project, and 
the poststructuralist approach in particular (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 6). Poststructuralism 
has coloured the kinds of questions that I have come to ask about criminality, psychopathy and 
the body and it is my intention to bring my reader into this view. I then explain how I use Alison 
Young’s (1996; 2008) imagination approach to representations of crime and criminality. This 
poststructural criminological approach to understanding representations is helpful for thinking 
about the founding logics or discourses which structure how we think about crime and how these 
are inseparable from how we imagine ‘the criminal’ in relation to the body and identity. I also 
explore key theoretical ideas which are implicitly associated with such an approach such as 
discourse, meaning and power as elaborated by Foucault (1972; 1977; 1978ab) and Stuart Hall 
(1997abc) as well as the body, identities and the visual. I then move on to explain the research 
design: the sites of inquiry, methods of data collection and methods of analysis.  
Chapter 3 begins with the news representations of Paul Bernardo and Russell Williams 
and explores how their criminality becomes imaginable through psychopathy.  As I read through 
the news media of these two cases, there were a couple of similarities.  The first is consistent 
with the observations made above: that in instances of white criminality there is always a 
backstory or a biographical-like account that is told about who the perpetrators are (Heitzeg 
2015). We explore these backstories, the forms they take and how they help facilitate the 
formation of a narrative of pathology. The rest of the chapter is spent exploring the specific 
iteration of pathology that was woven into the coverage: psychopathy.  In this chapter, I am 
curious to understand why and how psychopathy was amenable to representing the criminality of 
these subjects and how it was able to reconcile their assumed un-criminality with the fact they 
were the perpetrators of violent crimes. I argue that one of the reasons why the unimaginable 
criminality of the normalized subject becomes imaginable through psychopathy is because of the 
“paradox of appearance and reality” that is embedded in the disorder itself (Weisman 2008, 199).  
In Chapter 4, I continue exploring the bodily contingencies of psychopathy by turning my 
attention to the way that the (un)criminality of women are imagined through psychopathy.  I 
begin this chapter by reviewing contemporary research on “gender” (read: women) and 
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psychopathy. In this section, I offer a feminist reading of this research and I note how 
contemporary scientific representations of psychopathy contain specific gendered stereotypes 
about masculinity and femininity. I then turn to the case studies. I begin my analysis with how 
Karla Homolka was represented as unimaginably criminal and how psychopathy was used to 
render her criminality imaginable. Like Bernardo and Williams, Homolka was represented as a 
psychopath in order to reconcile her normalized feminine appearance and the reality of her 
crimes. However, psychopathy did a different kind of interpretive work in this instance and it 
had to. If we are able to imagine some men and women as criminal, imagining a woman who 
occupies multiple and interlocking normalized subject positions—white, middle-class, 
heterosexual—as criminal and violently so, is a bit more difficult for reasons I discuss. 
Psychopathy then, not only accommodates these dual representations of Homolka as normative 
and transgressive, but it partially masculinizes her as well thus, making her criminality legible.  
I then turn to a fundamentally different case, that of Lisa Neve. Neve is not a serial killer, 
or even a murderer.  She is an Aboriginal woman who was deemed a dangerous offender. 
Interestingly, her criminality was never represented as unimaginable; instead she was represented 
as only criminal. No backstory is offered, no shock or disbelief is expressed, no attempts are 
made to understand who she is. All that is conveyed is a story about her criminality. As such, 
psychopathy is not used to allow us to understand or imagine her criminality, rather it is used to 
allow us (the readers of the news) to determine just how dangerous she is and how severely she 
should be punished. When we place these two different cases beside each other, what we are able 
to see is the different representational and constitutional work that psychopathy does, and how 
this work is contingent on interlocking readings of identity and difference. In the Homolka case, 
psychopathy makes the unimaginable criminality of Homolka, a white, heterosexual, middle-
class women imaginable, not only because it reconciles her appearance with reality, but because 
it is a masculine and masculinizing disorder. Whereas for Neve, an Aboriginal, working class 
lesbian, psychopathy does not render her criminality imaginable; she is already imagined as 
such. Instead, psychopathy (among other identity variables) allows her to appear as more 
dangerous than she is thereby enabling a serious injustice to occur.  
 In Chapter 5, I continue to explore how the unimaginable is rendered imaginable and the 
bodily contingencies of psychopathy by reading the case of Robert Pickton, a serial killer 
convicted for the second-degree murder of Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, 
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Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe. This case is different than the others for a few 
reasons.  Although Pickton’s criminality was unimaginable, it was not for the same reasons that 
we see in the Williams or Bernardo/Homolka cases. Unlike Williams and Bernardo who 
occupied interlocking normalized subject positions, and whose bodies were constituted in this 
way, Pickton was seen as embodying a subjugated or subordinate masculinity; a white, working 
class pig farmer, who was a ‘oddball’ and the “village idiot” (N. Hall and Culbert 2007b). As a 
result, Pickton was at first imagined as un-criminal because he was seen as intellectually 
incapable of committing these crimes and to get away with them for so long; he was represented 
as ‘feebleminded’. Psychopathy was not generally used to reconcile this image with the reality of 
his crimes. Instead a discourse of ‘white trash’ was summoned to allow us to imagine his 
criminality, which I argue is the criminalizing other of ‘feeblemindedness’. I begin this chapter 
by providing a detailed picture of how Pickton was represented as un-criminal and how this 
representation mutates into one of criminality in the absence of psychopathy. This chapter 
reveals the bodily contingencies of psychopathy and specifically, the significance of normalized 
identities in imaginings of psychopathy.    
Chapter 5 also explores the question of victimhood and the imagination of (un)criminality 
through psychopathy. Until this point, I explore the offenders exclusively, but the way the 
victims of each offender are imagined, as we will see, very much informs how the offender is 
represented and if psychopathy will be deployed at all. In her research, Anne-Marie McAlinden 
(2014) borrows the concept of the “indissoluble dialectic” to capture the conceptual interactions 
between offenders and victims (i.e. who the offenders are influences how the victims are 
understood and vice versa) (Rock 1998 quoted in McAlinden 2014: 182). I also use this concept 
to explore how the reading and interpretation of the offenders’ and victims’ bodies as texts are 
always in conversation, informing and contouring how the other is understood and placed in a 
hierarchy of victimhood or offenderhood. I also point out the differences in how the victims are 
represented in each of the cases explored up until this point and how this informed how 
psychopathy was deployed (if at all).  
 Chapter 6 is where I discuss the final case: the case of Charles Kembo. Kembo is also a 
convicted serial killer. In this chapter, I continue to think about the bodily contingencies of 
psychopathy, the question of relative absence and the “indissoluble dialectic”. If it is my 
contention that psychopathy is a discourse that is amenable for imagining the otherwise 
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unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject specifically, it is necessary to explore serial 
murder cases where the offender is not constituted as a normalized subject to see if psychopathy 
is structuring the representation. The Kembo case is used to this end.   
 Charles Kembo, a Black “Malawian national” and a “refugee” that landed in Canada in 
the 1990s, was convicted in 2010 of murdering four people: Margaret Kembo, Sui Yin Ma, 
Ardon Samuel and Rita Yeung. In this case, Kembo’s criminality is not unimaginable because he 
is always already seen as outsider of the nation; a national stranger (Ahmed 2000). This image of 
Kembo as a national stranger is constantly reiterated throughout the news coverage, by referring 
to him as a “refugee” and “Malawian national”, and it is these features which allow him to be 
imagined as suspect and potentially criminal. Discourses of nation and race thus form the master 
criminal frame, not psychopathy. The conceptual work that psychopathy does in the other cases 
does not fit here, nor is it needed.  
 In the final analysis, I turn to the representation of Kembo’s victims. Much like the 
discursive struggle that characterized the news representations of Mona Wilson, Sereena 
Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe—Pickton’s 
victims—the representations of Margaret Kembo, Sui Yin Ma, Ardon Samuel and Rita Yeung 
also reveals how ideas about victimhood, identity, difference and ‘grievablity’ (Butler 2004) 
shape how we imagine people. In this final section I explore the (lack of) representations of 
Margaret Kembo, Sui Yin Ma, Ardon Samuel and Rita Yeung and I argue, as I did in Chapter 5, 
that the deployment of psychopathy is not only contingent on who the offender is, but who his 
victims are imagined to be as well.  
Significance  
  
 While rooted in my own particular reading of these cases, the story I tell here is 
significant for reasons that extend beyond empirical generalizability, validity and reliability. In 
popular representations of crime, crime often appears as a problem, a fact, a thing that simply 
exists in society. This kind of representation encourages us to buy-in to the idea that crime is an 
‘ontological reality’, or has a basis in reality apart from human intervention/invention (Stubbs 
2008: 6). Critical criminologists have disrupted this view of crime by inviting us to see crime 
through the lens of criminalization. Criminalization, helps us to see crime as a distinctly social 
process where something (e.g. act, behaviour or omission) is defined as a crime and then 
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regulated accordingly (Kramer 2011; Mirchandani and Chan 2002). By examining 
criminalization, it becomes possible to see how crime is defined according to normative 
standards of a specific social and historical context and through power relations (Mirchandani 
and Chan 2002; Kramer 2011; Chan and Chunn 2014).  In doing so, it also invites us to see 
crime not only as a social problem to be solved, but as a process that can be harmful in and of 
itself. Likewise, we are encouraged to see criminality in the same vein; not as a condition that 
simply exists (in one’s biology, for example), but as a subject position that is produced through 
processes of criminalization, which are always linked to historical context, social structures, 
social institutions and social inequalities. This approach has been especially useful for explaining 
and denaturalizing the links between marginalization and criminalization and it paints an 
essential picture of the constraints that shape lives of people who are socially disadvantaged in 
interlocking ways in a context saturated by power relations (Russell 1998; Mirchandani and 
Chan 2002; Jiwani 2002; Comack 2006ab; Chan and Chunn 2014).   
Since the turn to criminalization, as well as the poststructural and cultural turn in 
criminology, critical criminological inquiry has focused on exposing the very logics upon which 
social structures and processes function (McLaughlin 2001, 219).  Among the many things that 
this turn invited critical criminologists to think about, a critical awareness about representations 
of crime, knowledge production and power stands out (Young 1996; 2014; Carrabine 2012; 
Biber 2006; 2007). Eamonn Carrabine, citing the call of cultural criminologists, Ferrell and Van 
de Voorde, urges us to end “the distinction made between ‘real’ crime and the ‘unreal’ image” or 
representation (2012, 463).  This perspective, encourages us to not see crime as ontologically 
real and representation as false, but rather as constitutive of each other (Young 2014); how we 
come to ‘know’ ‘real’ crime is a product of how we imagine it to be and such imaginings cannot 
be divorced from representation (Young 1996; see Chapter 2 in this manuscript for an overview 
of this idea).  If what is ‘real’ is constituted by representation, and is thus apprehended only 
through representation (i.e. those structures of thought that make reality thinkable and knowable 
in particular ways) then we cannot simply reduce, or worse, dismiss, representations of 
(un)criminality in the news as a certain kind of journalism, which exists partly in reality and 
partly in the fantastical world of newsworthiness. Nor can we impute a direct or causal effect of 
representations of crime and criminality in the ‘real world’.  Instead, the significance in paying 
attention to representations of (un)criminality and the imaginings which make them possible is 
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that they show us the very stuff of thought, of knowledge, of how we come to see, frame, know 
and understand the world and how these ways of thinking organize social relations.  
Deborah Brock, Rebecca Raby and Mark Thomas have explained that one way that scholars 
can “develop a more comprehensive understanding of how social relations are organized” and 
how this organization both propels and sustains oppressive social relations and through power is 
by “unpacking the centre” (2012, 4). They define the “centre” as “taken-for-granted, normative 
features of social organization, distinguished by the ability to confer privilege to those that 
occupy it” (349). To “unpack the centre” then is to learn about how interlocking systems of 
power, like whiteness, patriarchy, heterosexuality, capitalism, and citizenship, work (4). It is 
also, as they note, to focus on the actual problem. That is, how whiteness, patriarchy, 
heterosexuality, capitalism, for example, are central to the organization of the normative social 
order (Razack 1998b). By focusing on the organizing centre, the problem of criminalization and 
marginalization, gets reconfigured. In this view, it is not necessarily racism, sexism, 
homophobia, or classism that are the central problems per se. These are reconfigured as effects of 
a particular way of thinking. The task then becomes to unravel the powerful ways of thinking 
that makes these effects possible (Brock, Raby and Thomas 2012, 4; see also S. Hall 1997c).  
One site where we can unravel these ways of thinking is in news representations. Indeed, as 
Stuart Hall (1997ab) has persuasively argued: representations are never innocent. They are a 
product of power and they are powerful.  
The significance of this project lies in the way that it seeks expose the very logics that 
undergird the ongoing criminalization of the marginalized who continually suffer under the 
weight of criminalization and incarceration, and those who reap the benefits of this way of 
thinking by being seen as ‘normal’ or un-criminal. By focusing on the normative judgements, 
meanings, expectations and assumptions that are inscribed on the normalized and un-criminal 
body specifically (e.g. in terms of race, gender, class and sexuality), and how psychopathy 
reinforces these ideas, we can make these invisible and powerful logics visible and in doing so 
perhaps, diminish their power.   
What I attempt to do in the pages that follow is dismantle the structures of thought—
discourses, assumptions, judgements, expectations— that make some people appear less suspect 
than others and that also make some less vulnerable to criminalization than others (Chan and 
Chunn 2014).  Critical criminologists have done an exemplary job highlighting how racism, 
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sexism and classism interlock to produce the criminal(ized) subject. However, what we must also 
keep in mind is that the imagined criminal body is never imagined in isolation but in relation to 
its opposite—the un-criminal or normalized body (Urla and Terry 1995, 5; Young 1996; Heitzeg 
2015). Criminology, by definition, is concerned with ‘the deviant’, ‘the criminal’, ‘the 
abnormal’. It is their acts, their motives, their nature, their social and historical conditions, their 
representation that concerns the criminologist. But what haunts criminology in its quest for 
knowledge of, in its desire to conquer, the question of crime and criminality, is ‘the normal’, ‘the 
innocent’, ‘the un-criminal’ (Young 1996). This subject is the bearer of the privileges of these 
interlocking systems of power and part of the privileges accorded to those who have been 
normalized is that they are able to appear as invisible and not part of the problem (Dyer 1997).  
Furthermore, the normalized subject, although very much foundational to criminology and 
discourses of criminality, has not, until relatively recently, been taken up by criminology (see 
Chapter 1 for an overview of these works).   
If criminality, or deviance more generally, is continuously being imagined as young, dark, 
feminine, poor and abnormal, as Alison Young (1996) and others have argued, then in the act of 
representing criminality in this way we “ruin our capacity for imagination”, we fail to see 
criminality otherwise:  
in seeing these [criminal] events, we construct frames for their interpretation which 
block out other interpretations, erase other memories, obliterate the nuances.  
Imagination […] is always doubled: in including one vision, it rules out another.  All 
our understandings of crime exist in a tense relation with these other stories, sights, 
voices, which are now beyond the narrative, the frame, the listening ear. (212; 
emphasis original) 
 
As a result of this way of imagining, we fail to be able to imagine Bernardo, Homolka and 
Williams as criminal because they are beyond the criminal frame. And that’s the point. 
Following the lead of Alison Young (1996), Imagining the Unimaginable attempts to see 
“otherwise”, by making the normalized body, which always haunts representations of 
criminality, but is rarely seen within the criminal frame, visible.  When we do see this body as a 
criminal subject, as the representations of Bernardo, Homolka and Williams attest, we are jarred, 
stopped in our tracks, upset, but it also tells us that there is something else to be seen; while 
criminality is constantly imagined on the body as ‘young, dark, feminine, poor and abnormal’, 
this is not all that there is to be seen (Young 1996). We have simply limited our field of vision to 
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confirm how we have already come to imagine ‘the criminal’. Thus, I attempt to shatter our 
frame of vision, by examining and disentangling the very assumptions, characteristics, 
expectations, stories and images that get grafted on to, and constitute the normalized body as a 
body that is innocent, unsuspicious and indeed, seen as un-criminal, so that the criminal frame 
can no longer remain fixed on marginalized bodies.  
From the outset, it should be noted that my intention in focusing on the normalized 
subject is not to imply that it is only this side of the dualism that should retain our focus because 
this would only “invert” the hierarchy of the normal/criminal binary (Young 1996, 112).  Nor am 
I suggesting that our imagining of criminality should be revised so that it is the normalized 
subject who comes to stand as the criminal body—again, this is a mere inversion of an already 
problematic way of seeing and knowing. Instead, I focus on this largely unseen, but always 
present subject, to make visible the two-way flow of meaning—its relationalities and 
contingencies—to make visible the ways that the bodies of the marginalized and criminalized 
constitute the normalized body as un-criminal and vice versa. I do this so that we may begin to 
unfix the way we imagine criminality in terms of identity and difference and to reveal and then 
trouble the ways that criminality is implicated on the body in general, and marginalized bodies in 
particular, so that we may be able to see that no(-)body bears the stigmata of criminality.  
Being seen, understood and thus represented as un-criminal is privilege conferred by a 
racially saturated criminal landscape (Butler 1993; Russell 1998) and a landscape produced by 
power relations more generally. This also makes it political. Part of what I attempt to do here is 
to politicize contemporary representations of psychopathy despite its appearance otherwise. By 
now, it is commonplace to criticize representations of pathology in the context of transgression 
because of the way it depoliticizes social issues by reducing these problems to the individual 
‘deviants’ thereby negating the larger conditions, contexts and dynamics at play (Conrad and 
Schneider 1980, 250).  Furthermore, because these medicalized labels are constructed as 
scientific labels, we often think that they are objective, neutral and value- free because they are a 
product of positive, objective and disinterested science (Conrad and Schneider 1980, 249). Both 
of these ways of thinking effectively divert our attention away from a much more complex and 
historically specific picture. I wish to make this picture visible and to show that representations 
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of psychopathy in the context of violent crime are political13. Taking my lead from historians of 
psychopathy, I suggest that psychopathy in its contemporary conceptualizations structures 
representations of the normalized, un-criminal subject and that its deployment is indeed 
predicated on reading this subject, and his victims, as such. In other words, psychopathy, as a 
way of imagining (un)criminality, as we will see, remains political precisely because it depends 
on the logic that it is “an-Other” (Ritskes, n.d.) who commits crime and not the normalized 
subject. If we are to break the criminalizing frame, we must reckon with the representational 
complicity of psychopathy in reaffirming the devastatingly potent myth that criminality lies in 
“an-Other” (Ritskes, n.d.) and develop a more ethical way of seeing bodies and criminality14.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13Critical social science scholars have begun to politicize psychopathy in different ways. I review these works in the 
next chapter. 
14 It should be noted that this dissertation is not a critique of scientific accounts of psychopathy or the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised per se. Instead it is about how the ‘cultural life’ of psychopathy; that is, how we imagine 
(un)criminality on the body and how psychopathy as it is generally understood is deployed culturally to reconcile 
the un-criminality of the normalized subject.  
38 
 
Chapter 1 
 Making Psychopathy and ‘Normal’ Visible 
 
 This project grew out of my engagement with two research areas: psychopathy and 
cultural and critical criminology.  In my mind, these detached areas of research when combined 
tell an interesting and important story about the relationship between criminality, psychopathy 
and the identity categories (or categories of difference) that “give content” to our contemporary 
criminal imaginings (Razack 2008, 62).   
This project began to develop during the research that I conducted for my Master’s 
degree which focused on criminal sexual psychopath laws in post- World War II Canada.  My 
research objective at the time was to explore how these laws were applied in criminal cases and 
the types of narratives of identity and difference that the application of these laws relied on and 
subsequently reinforced.  During the course of this research, it became apparent to me that stock 
narratives and dominant discourses of gender and sexuality were determining how criminality 
and transgression were imagined as pathological. These findings reinforced the existing critical 
literature on the criminal sexual psychopath and its corresponding Canadian laws.  Over the 
course of the research however, I felt a constant intellectual tug; it felt like the project was being 
haunted by something that was so very present in the cases and in my analyses of the cases, but 
was not explicitly present. By the time I was ready to wrap up the paper, I had realized that the 
ghost was race. 
 In the two Canadian criminal cases I analyzed for the project, there was a striking 
similarity: each of the cases involved white men.  While I acknowledged this, the explanation 
which I borrowed from Estelle Freedman (1987) seemed to miss something for me.  Freedman, 
writing in an American context, suggested that Black men were not regularly labelled criminal 
sexual psychopaths or held in mental health institutions unlike white men, because as the racist 
reasoning went, “white men who committed sexual crimes had to be mentally ill; Black men who 
committed sexual crimes were believed to be guilty of willful violence” (1987, 98).  While I do 
not reject this explanation, there seemed more to the story. 
Upon beginning my doctoral studies in 2010, I began to read the research of scholars who 
had discovered the same historical ‘whitewashing’ of psychopathy that Freedman (1987) 
noticed; this is when the work of Heidi Rimke (2003; 2005) and Elizabeth Lunbeck (1994) came 
to my attention (I review their work in detail below). Despite the fact that each of their works 
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used different historical sites of investigation, explored different historical periods and employed 
different conceptual frameworks, they arrived at one of the same conclusions—
psychopathy/moral insanity was a disorder applied exclusively to white people. More than this 
however, their work highlighted the ways in which readings and understandings of bodies, 
identity and difference interlocked in the ways that psychopathy was imagined in the clinic and 
in theories of psychopathy more generally. While these works were historical in nature, it 
seemed to me that similar assumptions and expectations about bodies, identities and difference 
were surfacing in contemporary representations of psychopathy in different ways.  
Although these kinds of studies of/approaches to psychopathy are underrepresented in the 
field, they invite us to think about psychopathy in a way that fundamentally departs from 
mainstream academic conversations on the topic (its etiology, the validity, reliability and the 
legal implications of the Psychopath Checklist-Revised, and the alike). In particular, they invite 
us to consider how stock cultural knowledge of bodies, identities, and difference get enveloped 
into the psychopath category and how this is expressed in representations of psychopathy.  
My interest in the kinds of questions and insights that these historical analyses offered 
was complemented by my interest in critical criminological works that examined the links 
between representation, marginalization and criminalization. As I engaged with the research in 
this area it became apparent to me that the field was rife with theoretical and empirical works 
that delineated the intricacies of the criminalization process and the very material effects of these 
processes on the racialized, the colonized, the poor, women, sexual minorities, immigrants, 
refugees and other socially marginalized groups. However, in the course of engaging in these 
works it became apparent to me that critical criminology had not yet fully accounted for the 
normalizing systems of power that have and continue to play a significant role in the plight of the 
marginalized in the Canadian and American criminal justice systems and at the same time have 
and continue to shield very specific (read: normalized) bodies from the force of criminalization. 
Therefore, I began to research criminological works that attended to the relationality between 
marginalization and criminalization and normalization. In other words, I was interested to see 
how critical criminologists conceptualized the normalized subject who offends, but who is 
seldom explicitly discussed in the literature, and how they brought this conceptualization to bear 
on representations or imaginings of criminality.   
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During the course of this research, I found other scholars who also recognized this 
absence in critical criminology and have begun to investigate it. My research joins these scholars 
(whose work I discuss below) who question the processes and practices of normalization and the 
ways that these are implicated in fomenting social injustice and the ongoing disparities that exist 
in criminal justice imaginaries, practices, administration, and institutions. My pathway into this 
conversation is through psychopathy.    
  In this chapter, I take you through my journey through these two areas of research—
psychopathy and critical criminology, especially those works that take a feminist and critical race 
perspective to the question of crime and representation—to show you the cleavages that exist in 
these areas; the points that I think are particularly ripe for intervention; and, to mark out my 
small area of contribution. To get us started, I begin by providing an historical overview of 
psychopathy (or moral insanity as it was called prior to the 1900s). While my project does not 
contribute to the historical literature on psychopathy or moral insanity, I include it here for two 
reasons. First, while I have not undertaken systematic primary research on psychopathy and 
therefore I do not contribute to our historical knowledge of psychopathy, this area of scholarship 
has to a great extent, contributed to and inspired my own thinking about psychopathy in the 
contemporary context. I also include this information because it affords an opportunity to 
understand the backdrop in which psychopathy emerged and the significance it had at the time as 
well as how psychopathy and moral insanity were conceptualized in theory and in practice in 
relation to cultural knowledge of bodies, identity and difference. In the second section, I jump 
into contemporary research on psychopathy. Here, I provide a brief account of some essential 
information about psychopathy (which has largely been developed in the fields of psychology, 
psychiatry and neuroscience) such as the characteristics that psychopaths are said to possess, the 
‘nature’ of the psychopath or the etiology of the disorder and the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, 
which has come to be synonymous with the disorder since its invention (Jalava, Griffiths and 
Maraun 2015).  Again, although I do not contribute to the scientific literature on psychopathy, I 
provide this information to allow us to get a handle on what psychopathy generally means today.  
The third section is where I begin reviewing social scientific research on psychopathy 
and also where I begin outlining where my project fits in. Drawing primarily on the literature in 
sociology, critical criminology, anthropology, and socio-legal studies, I provide an overview of 
how social scientists have subjected psychopathy to critical, social scientific critique. Most of the 
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social scientific studies have analyzed and critiqued how psychopathy is used in criminal justice 
contexts (particularly in the context of sentencing and punishment). However, in the course of 
these explorations, some of these scholars have raised provocative questions about identity and 
psychopathy.  This entire critical landscape has also been essential to my own thinking. In the 
final section of this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the critical criminological landscape as 
it relates to questions of criminalization, representation and identity, and I point to a relatively 
recent shift in the area towards examining the unmarked, normalized centre (especially 
masculinity and whiteness) and how my research contributes to these burgeoning conversations.   
 
Criminality, Moral Insanity and the Origins of Psychopathy: From Demonic Intervention to the 
Science of Transgression 
 
A villain that goes around with crooked speech and winking eyes, shuffling the feet and pointing the 
fingers with perverted mind devising evil and continually sowing discord.  On such a one calamity 
will descend suddenly in a moment damage beyond repair.  There are six things the lord hates and 
seven are an abomination to him. Haughty eyes and a lying tongue and hands that shed innocent 
blood.  A heart that devises wicked plans, feet that hurry to run to evil. (Old Testament quoted in Stein 
2009, 33) 
 
According to George Stein (2009), this passage from the Old Testament raises the question 
of whether the ‘Scoundrel of the Book of Proverbs was a Psychopath?’  Here, the biblical figure 
of the scoundrel is framed as an abomination, a wretched soul who has an affinity for evil. Stein 
cites this passage because of the way that the description of the scoundrel embeds an uncanny 
similarity to the way the DSM-IV describes antisocial behaviour.  For Stein, the passage 
represents both the existence of, and the “major problem” posed by, the ‘psychopath’ in ancient 
Israelite society (33).  However, the passage also represents a distinctly theological way of 
thinking about the psychopath in terms of their ‘being’ (e.g. an “abomination”; a sinner; visibly 
identifiable and as having a “perverted mind devising evil”) and their characteristic behaviours 
(e.g. “lying tongue and hands that shed innocent blood”). 
 This way of thinking about deviant or transgressive behaviour was not exceptional at the 
time. According to Stephen Pfohl (1985), deviance, from the Middle Ages until the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment, was largely recognized as a sign of sinfulness (Pfohl 1985, 33).  During 
this time, religion, and Christianity in particular, structured European imaginaries of deviance 
resulting in what would become known as a demonic perspective of crime and deviance.  As one 
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of the oldest explanations of deviance, the demonic perspective sees all forms of deviance as sin 
or “a transgression against the will of God”, where “the human world is but a battleground for 
the forces of another, more powerful world—the world of the supernatural.  We humans are 
pictured as constantly torn between the supernatural forces of good and those of evil.  When we 
succumb to the influence of evil forces we are drawn into deviant behaviour” (21). Deviance, 
according to this perspective, is the result of either succumbing to the temptations of evil or the 
devil or being possessed by the devil (21-20). In either instance, it is the realm of the 
supernatural is that is the “cause and cure of deviant behaviour” (20) 
As explanations of the world began to shift to a more secularized paradigm in the eighteenth 
century (Rafter 2004; Rimke 2010), so too did conceptions of deviant behaviour.  Rejecting 
religious ideas of transgression, eighteenth century theories of crime and punishment, developed 
by the classical school, turned to utilitarianism and Enlightenment ideas instead (Rimke 2010, 
81). The classical school conceptualized criminals not as sinners who transgressed the will of 
God, but as rational and hedonistic subjects, acting on free will who were guided by a cost-
benefit calculus (i.e. they weighed the risks and benefits of their actions in general and their 
decision to commit crime was no different) (Rimke 2010). The classical school, therefore, did 
not directly study criminality, because it was assumed that the nature of the criminal was no 
different than other humans—all were assumed to be rational actors (Rafter 2008, 76). Instead, 
the school was primarily concerned with crime and punishment and how best to minimize the 
rewards or benefits of committing crimes (Walsh and Ellis 2007; Rafter 2008; Rimke 2010). 
Thus, punishment had to be levelled at the rationality of the (potential) criminal and had to 
operate as a deterrent “by making a lasting impression on the minds of offenders and others, with 
the least necessary torment to the body of the offender” (Rimke 2010, 82). In sum, the classical 
school contended that if punishment was to be effective it must appeal to a calculated rationality 
(i.e. cost must outweigh the benefit); the outcome must be certain (i.e. if you do X, Y will occur; 
think of criminal codes which list not only things that are prohibited but also the punishments 
associated with those transgressions); and, the punishment must be proportionate to the crime 
(Walsh and Ellis 2007; Rimke 2010).  
Built on the insights of the classical school, the legal system was designed to evaluate the 
crime (who is responsible for the crime) and to punish the offender responsible.  However, 
Michel Foucault (1978) draws our attention to how this model of adjudication was troubled by 
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the appearance of particularly heinous crimes that did not fit this model of criminality, criminal 
responsibility and punishment because their crimes appeared to be motiveless, or without reason. 
The cases that Foucault (1978) cites as exemplary all have a number of elements in common; 
they are cases that involve brutal murders directed at someone known to the offender; in each 
case there is no discernible motive for the crime and, each offender seemed to not be suffering 
from insanity, but their acts seemed to (paradoxically) defy rationality.  These cases, where 
offenders committed heinous crimes, where those offenders were not suffering from traditional 
forms of insanity (characterized in large part by delusions or furor; Foucault 1978), where they 
acted without any identifiable reason (i.e. the crime committed “without profit, without passion, 
without motive”, Foucault 1978, 5) and where they did so with full cognition of the acts legal 
and moral wrongfulness, ‘jammed the machinery’ of the legal system (Foucault 1978).  
According to Foucault, the appearance of motiveless crime in the courts was troubling 
precisely because these criminal actors did not fit into the binary of criminal responsibility that 
the legal system rested upon: the offenders were not insane because they did not suffer from 
delusions and therefore could not be considered not criminally responsible by reason of insanity. 
However, their crimes did not fit with the image of the criminally responsible rational actor that 
the legal system was based on (e.g. all humans act on rationality, free will, hedonism).  Prior to a 
decision about punishment being rendered by a judge or jury the unresolved questions of the 
offender’s nature had to be determined, a feat confounded by  motiveless crime. As a result, 
Foucault suggests that psychiatry had to account for the motiveless crime—“the great criminal 
event of the most violent and rarest sort” (5)— in order for penal law to act.  These curious cases 
prompted psychiatrists to get to work redrafting their previous ideas about insanity in order to 
account for those offenders who appear to evade traditional conceptions of insanity in their 
cognitive lucidity, but who at the same time cannot be considered rational actors.  Psychiatric 
disorders like, moral insanity and homicidal monomania were the fruits born from this 
reconceptualization of insanity (Foucault 1978; Weisman 2008).   
While this context is certainly significant for understanding the shifting relationship between 
law and psychiatry in the nineteenth century, it is also significant because it marks what Foucault 
has termed the “pathologification of crime” (Foucault 1978, 6).  It is at this juncture, where 
criminality and pathology are linked and a series of unending attempts are made in psychiatry 
and criminal anthropology to begin to unravel the pathologies that lie behind criminality. It is no 
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longer the crime that is solely of concern in the criminal justice arena, but rather the nature of the 
criminal; the administration of justice requires that the person who committed the act be 
identified, but also that law must come to know the person (their nature, their being) whom they 
are punishing (3).  It is within this context that criminology emerges, armed with the tools of 
positivist science, to unravel the mystery of the nature of criminality (Rafter 2004, 985).  
 
Moral Insanity  
 
The development of moral insanity was, in part, a way to explain the behaviour of seemingly 
rational criminals (i.e. were not affected by insanity) who acted without motive and seemed to be 
lacking a moral sensibility.  Nicole Rafter credits Benjamin Rush, an American physician, the 
founder of American psychiatry, and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, as the first 
person who attempted to explain the origin of madness and immoral conduct as mental disease, 
rather than just sinfulness (2004, 986). According to Rush, humans are born with a moral 
capacity to choose good or evil, and it is our moral faculty that causes us to act one way or 
another (986).  Rush explains that the cause of criminal behaviour lies in some kind of 
impairment to the individual’s moral faculty which then results in “moral derangement” (Rafter 
2008, 24).  For Rush, moral derangement can be an innate “defect” or one that develops later on 
in life because of “fever, poor diet (eating meat or overeating), immoderate consumption of 
fermented liquors, extreme hunger and too much sleep” (22). Rush also, classified moral 
derangement into two distinct types: partial and total.  For those suffering from partial moral 
derangement “the offender remains conscious of wrongdoing” (Rafter 2004, 986).  Whereas, for 
person whose moral faculty is totally absent, “the conscience and sense of deity as well as the 
moral faculty stop operating, producing people who commit crime repeatedly and without 
remorse” (988).  Rush, Rafter (2004) notes, remained torn on the question of criminal 
responsibility.  
 Instead of ‘moral derangement’ representing a complete shift to a scientific paradigm, it has 
been suggested that it might better be understood as an explanation of immoral and criminal 
behaviour that merges or hybridizes science and theology because of the religious threads that 
run through his work (Rimke and Hunt 2002; Rafter 2004). For example, Rafter notes that 
Rush’s work emerged from “18th century concerns and religious premises. Some of his examples 
originated in firsthand experience, but others came from the Old Testament and Shakespeare” 
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(2004, 990). Despite the fact that Rush’s work was not a total reformation of how deviance was 
thought about and discussed, Rafter insists that the significance of his work “lay in the way he 
took insanity, including moral derangement—conditions still widely viewed as signs of sin or 
demonic possession—and redefined them as mental diseases” (2004, 988).  More than this, 
Rafter explains that because Rush was interested in the relationship between immoral behaviour 
and “physical influences”, his theory of moral derangement “can be considered one of the first 
formulations (perhaps the first) of a biological theory of crime” (986).  Therefore, Rush’s work, 
while still relying on a theological sensibility to an extent, was one of the first attempts “to 
remove criminality from the clergy’s hands and incorporate it into the psychiatrist’s domain” 
(988)15. 
Close behind Rush, was Philippe Pinel, a French physician who was one of the first 
“European physicians to insist on treating insanity as a disease” (989).  Pinel remains widely 
cited in the literature on moral insanity as being the founder of the idea of moral madness, 
instead of Rush. One reason for this, as Rafter explains, is that “in contrast to Rush’s approach, 
which had appealed for authority as much to the bible as to direct observation, Pinel’s approach 
was closer to what early 19th-century thinkers defined as science” (989). For Pinel, insanity did 
not necessarily constitute an elision of the intellect or the onset of delirium as then-dominant 
understandings of insanity suggested. Rather he proposed (in a similar vein as Rush) that those 
“maniacs” “who at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding” were suffering 
from manie sans delire (insanity without delirium) (Pinel 1806 quoted in Rafter 2004, 989). At 
the time, this way of conceptualizing madness as distinct from, and without delirium, was novel 
because most “authorities […] taught that mania or madness is always accompanied by delirium 
(hallucinations, delusions)” (989). Manie sans delire was able to account for those cases where 
individuals engaged in otherwise inexplicable and motiveless criminal acts that were otherwise 
                                                 
15 A significant feature of Nicole Rafter’s (2004) argument is that the emergence of moral insanity in the eighteenth 
century is one site where we can locate the origin of criminological thought which she defines as “efforts to study 
crime scientifically that occurred before the discipline took shape” (982).   However, as Rafter points out, it was not 
at this juncture where theological theories were totally replaced by scientific ones.  Instead, these early interventions 
in theological perspectives of crime, were hybridized accounts (see also Rimke and Hunt 2002). Interestingly, 
Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun, in their recently published book on contemporary psychopathy research, suggest that 
the modern conceptualization of psychopathy “has never managed to break free from its roots in the Judeo-Christian 
theory of morality” (2015, 4; see Appendix A, 185-191).    
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beyond legal, psychiatric and cultural intelligibility because the act lacked reason, but where the 
reasoning faculty was intact (Weisman 2008).  
Like most new radical ideas Pinel’s re-drafting of insanity did not escape criticism.  Nicole 
Rafter suggests that James Cowles Prichard, an English psychiatrist who was writing in the 
1830s, criticized Pinel’s formulation because it neglected those cases of insanity where “a 
morbid perversion of the affections [were present] and moral feelings exclusively” (2004, 991).  
As such, Prichard revised Pinel’s manie sans delire in such a way that took into account the 
perversion of the affects and lack of morality that this decidedly ‘insane’ individual experienced 
and exhibited, but where the reasoning and intellectual facilities remained undisturbed.  The 
inability of medical professionals to explain this type of behaviour using the medical taxonomies 
then available “gave rise to a new species of mental disease, one in which the diagnostic focus 
was upon the pathology of the individual’s moral faculty” (Rimke and Hunt 2002, 70).  Prichard 
termed this moral insanity. In Prichard’s rendering of moral insanity, the morally insane 
transgressor was seen as a victim of their affliction (Weisman 2008) who was overcome by 
“irresistible impulses that functioned outside the person’s control led to the moral insanity 
classification [...] it follows that moral insanity reduced criminal culpability” (Arrigo and Shipley 
2001, 331). 
This is an important shift because until the beginning of the 19th century, Hannah Augstein 
notes that explanations of insanity were couched in a “Lockean philosophical framework of 
enlightened rationality” (1996, 311). Accordingly, insanity was thought to manifest in the 
intellectual faculty.  That is, the presence of madness was indicated by some form of total 
delirium—a complete detachment from reality.  However, Augstein suggests that with the social, 
cultural, and scientific changes inspired by the French Revolution and Industrial Revolution, 
there was a shift in how madness was understood (311).  For Prichard, the Lockean based 
understanding of insanity was not applicable in all cases, especially those instances where there 
was a “perversion of the emotive faculties” (316).  This led Prichard to rethink moral insanity in 
a way that accounted for “morally offensive behaviour” (Rimke and Hunt 2002, 70) that did not 
demonstrate a defect in the intellect. Nor did patients “dwell in some delusive state”, rather, they 
seemed to display “deep sullenness, unmitigated fury, utter shamelessness, seemingly without 
purpose or motivation” (Augstein 1996, 311).   
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Prichard’s theory of moral insanity enjoyed an enormous amount of success and became part 
of psychiatric vocabulary after he published A Treatise on Insanity in 1835.  Rafter (2004) 
suggests that the reason that Prichard’s re-working of moral insanity received the acclaim that it 
did was because of the way that he recast questions of mental disease in terms of emotions; 
moral insanity was henceforth considered a type of emotional madness. A theory of disease that 
accounted for moral depravity and transgressive affect, while the intellect remained intact, had 
been created, and it amended the notion of a total insanity into the possibility that insanity may 
be partial and thus only affect certain faculties while leaving the others unscathed. It is also 
notable however, that Prichard’s theorization of moral insanity has not escaped criticism. For 
instance, John Ellard argued that Prichard’s conceptualization of moral insanity as the result of a 
perverted moral faculty was poisoned at its source: “he [Prichard] attributes what he observes to 
a faculty, and asserts that the faculty is deranged.  He offers no proof that there is such a thing as 
an intellectual faculty, and no description of its attributes” (1988, 385).  Ellard continues,  
by the middle of the 19th century or thereabouts the whole disaster had been 
assembled.  Faculties could be invented as causes of any behaviour you choose, 
without assuming the burden of describing where the faculties were, how they came 
to be there and what their qualities were; moral and mental aberrations were 
inextricably mixed; the whole of human behaviour could be encompassed in 
psychiatric classifications, the criteria of which were both imprecise and derived 
from more than one universe of discourse; and above all, the evidence for the 
existence of moral insanity was so subtle that ordinary mortals were unable to see it. 
Only psychiatrists could perceive and unravel its mysteries. (386) 
 
In addition to the critiques levelled against the earliest formulations of moral insanity and 
especially the science that it was based on, scholars have also been critical of the way that moral 
insanity was imagined and applied (e.g. Fee 1978; Freedman 1987; Lunbeck 1994; Rafter 1997a; 
2008; Chenier 2003; Rimke 2003; 2005).  As interest in moral insanity began to proliferate in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century and as experts wrestled with understanding the nature and cause 
of deviant and motiveless acts, iterations of moral insanity and images of the morally insane 
individual were not neutral or innocent.  Rather, moral insanity (and later, psychopathy) was 
distinctly tied to particular bodies and social identity categories and the assumptions and 
expectations that these bodies and identities engendered.  
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Moral Insanity, Class and Whiteness 
 
 Although Prichard’s work on moral insanity was undeniably important for how insanity 
was thought about at the time of his writing (Rafter 2004; 2014), Hannah Augstein (1996) has 
observed that Prichard’s work did more than create a new way to think about insanity: his work 
also decisively constructed moral insanity as “a disorder of the affluent” (339). As such, moral 
insanity was conceived as a condition that was not found among “brute men—savages as well as 
peasant folk” or in “barbarous countries”, but was a disorder that was “characteristic of 
civilization” (340).  Moral insanity, then, was “a polite form of madness” (340), “a disorder 
which was a lot more respectable than other ideas about the unsoundness of mind. In a way, 
moral insanity served to create a class of patients who were not liable to be confounded with 
beastly imbeciles and the debilitated” (339).  
 By the end of the nineteenth century, theories of moral insanity underwent a significant 
transformation on the basis of degeneration theory, evolutionism and somaticism (Rafter 2004, 
997).  Degeneration theory posited that evolution occurred through inheritance or heredity; when 
good traits were passed on, the human species would evolve, whereas, when bad traits, or the 
traits of degeneracy were passed on, the linage would degenerate (Rafter 2008, 98-99). The 
origins of the seed of degeneracy lay in some type of disavowal of virtuous living— “those who 
drink heavily, fornicate frequently, become slothful, or fail to discipline their minds are in danger 
of devolving or going backward on the evolutionary scale” (98). The result of degeneration was a 
“morbid deviation away from normality that leads to criminality, madness, sterility and early 
death” (99).  The theoretical assumptions of degeneration were integrated with moral insanity, 
where the first incarnation of a degenerationist moral insanity is credited to Dr. George Savage, 
though Savage’s ideas were derived from the earlier work of degenerationist psychiatrist, Henry 
Maudsley (Rafter 2004, 997).   
 In Savage’s revision of the concept of moral insanity, there is one notable amendment for 
my purposes here; the origin of the disease.  Moral insanity was no longer simply innate, rather 
“its innateness [was explained] in hereditarian terms” (997). But moral insanity was more than a 
hereditary disease that afflicted numerous members of a specific family throughout generations, 
it was also a degenerative one.  Henry Maudsley, defined degeneration as the “undoing of a 
kind...used exclusively to denote a change from a higher to lower kind” (Maudsley 1884 quoted 
in Rimke and Hunt 2002, 74; emphasis original).  The morally insane were thus seen as inferior 
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biological deviants and degenerates—individuals who had “fallen from grace” and suffered for 
“the sins of the father” (Rimke and Hunt 2002, 74).    
 Heidi Rimke argued that this degenerationist shift in theories of moral insanity led to 
reading the external body as a “representation of abnormal, inferior, dangerous, or deranged 
interiorities” (2003, 249).  In her interpretive analysis of nineteenth century texts on moral 
madness, she suggests that a series of signs were read off the body to both explain and identify 
moral insanity.  Such signs included, but were not limited to gestures, bodily movement, facial 
characteristics and bodily physique. This recourse to the body as a text that symbolized or 
represented an abnormal interior disposition had important implications for not only how moral 
insanity was conceptualized, but as Rimke points out, how it was applied.   
 Many formative figures who generated theories of moral insanity, often noted the 
significance of a change in character and in conduct that was evident in the morally insane 
individual (Rimke 2003, 254; Augstein 1996, 312).  Rimke has explained that when psychiatrists 
were evaluating moral insanity in patients, one criterion that they used was whether they 
“transgressed dominant social codes of conduct and desire” (2005, 284). Whereas, the other 
criterion had to do with what was usual for this subject. In other words, they evaluated the 
subject in relation to the subject herself: “she is no longer herself” (284). When a ‘change’ 
occurred, the once ‘normal’ and moral subject became a subject who is immoral and abnormal 
(284). Rimke’s research tell us that this change was a significant feature of how moral insanity 
was diagnosed (284) and that it involved a “double movement”: “first the subject was 
pathologized in relation to reigning cultural standards and thus rendered socially abnormal, and 
second, the subject was appraised in relation to its established interior because the strongest and 
most reliable form [sic] evidence was the change which took place in the individual’s character 
and habits” (285). Therefore, the ‘change’ is a highly visible and identifiable way that the 
internal disease reveals itself externally, in the form of dispositions, actions, character, 
interactions, expressions, manners and so on (285).  
 What is particularly interesting about the notion of change in Rimke’s (2005) work are 
the conditions of its possibility. Because the ‘the change’ is seen as a negative movement away 
from normalcy towards abnormality, “it presume[es] a ‘normal subject’ prior to the course of 
illness or degeneration” (289). Nicole Rafter (2008) also provides insight on the significance of 
‘the change’ to degenerationist versions of moral insanity. She observes, that psychiatrists 
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explained moral insanity “as a reversion to a primitive state” (97). Degeneration theory generally 
held that certain populations (primarily women and ‘inferior’ races) were ‘less evolved’ and thus 
their ‘fall from grace’ was significantly less than the ‘more evolved’. Accordingly, these ‘less 
evolved’ regressive changes were less perceptible and considered to be less problematic as 
certain forms of deviance were already expected from these ‘inferior populations’. The notion of 
reversion plays an interesting role in theories of evolution and degeneration because it essentially 
provided doctors with a scientifically grounded theory that could account for deviation and 
regression among the most ‘civilized’ members of the society—the white middle-class 
population—to a “savage state” (96). Such a process, it was argued by social Darwinists such as 
Herbert Spencer, was only able to occur in the already cultivated classes where the result is a 
lapse “into a comparative barbarianism: adopting the moral code, and sometimes the habits, of 
savages” (Spencer 1864-1867/1898 quoted in Rafter 2008, 97).  In other words, in order to be 
able to revert back to an earlier evolutionary and ‘savage’ state, it must be assumed that one has 
already experienced the full benefits of evolution and civilization and has, as a result of disease, 
become like the ‘uncultivated’ Others, which Rimke notes was a prominent “bourgeois fear” 
(2003, 254).   
 This understanding of ‘change’ or ‘regression’ had important implications for who was 
able to be diagnosed as morally insane. Thus far, it is rather clear that moral insanity was 
imagined and applied as a disorder that affected the normalized subject who transgressed. 
However, unlike Prichard, who saw moral insanity as a “disorder of the affluent” (Augstein 
1996, 339), Rimke (2003) has shown us that moral insanity, in its degenerationist iterations, was 
no longer only applicable to the affluent and respectable classes. What is significant about class, 
according to her analysis, is how the cause of the disorder or the ‘change in character’ was 
explained (254). For the middle and upper classes, moral insanity was caused by an external 
factor, such as “a fever or blow to the head” (254). In contrast, hereditarian (e.g. “bad stock”) 
explanations were put forth to explain the moral insanity among those of a lower socio-economic 
class: they were seen as “’filthy’, ‘unruly’, ‘disorderly’ or naturally predisposed to moral 
madness, which indirectly also served to legitimate their poorer lot in life” (254).  Therefore, the 
notion of change and the conditions under which moral insanity could affect the normalized 
subject were made quite clearly on the basis of a classist iterations of ‘common sense’ and served 
to further ‘naturalize’ the differences between the classes. 
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 As we have been able to see from this brief overview, moral insanity generally served (at 
least) two important social functions: on the one hand, it was used to explain social and moral 
transgressions of norms, social rules and/or convention (Fee 1978; Lunbeck 1994; Rimke 2003; 
2005), while on the other hand it was also used to explain an otherwise unexplainable 
transgressive change.  The wide net that moral insanity cast posed an important practical 
question about how those deemed morally insane and criminal ought to be treated: should they 
be treated as insane or as criminals?  In her social history of moral insanity in Victorian society, 
Elizabeth Fee (1978) demonstrated that the answer to this question is anything but 
straightforward. According to Victorian bourgeois ideology, which operated as a form of moral 
and social control of both the propertied classes as well as the ‘dangerous’ classes, how moral 
insanity was viewed depended upon the individual’s social location. Fee notes that moral 
insanity as a form of insanity was often a ‘privilege’ (insofar as they were saved from “the 
clutches of the law”; 638) conferred to middle and upper class peoples, where theories of 
evolution helped to justify this preferential treatment:  
The conviction that hereditary patterns of mental organization were inborn and 
inbred provided some rationalization of the fact that, for the same actions, members 
of the ‘lower orders’ were likely to be convicted and sent to prison, while members 
of the ‘higher orders’ were more likely to be acquitted on the grounds of insanity.  
Behavior seen as normal criminality in the working class was seen as aberrant, and 
redefined as insanity, in the upper classes of society. (p. 638)16  
 
 In addition to class, race and racial thinking was also significant for the way that moral 
insanity, and the change it engendered, was imagined.  By presupposing that in order to become 
morally insane one had to first be a ‘normal’ and ‘moral’ subject, the non- white races were 
excluded from moral insanity (Rimke 2003, 256).  Much like moral insanity in its non-
hereditarian form was reserved for the upper classes, moral insanity was generally a disease that 
was said to only befall white people (Rimke 2003, 256). The reason for this exclusion is that 
according to degenerationist conceptualization of moral insanity, in order for one to be afflicted 
                                                 
16 Elizabeth Fee (1978) has also observed that it was women, more than men, that were ‘successfully’ medicalized 
(i.e. rendered insane rather than criminal) through moral insanity: “female crime, especially violent crime, directly 
challenged the familiar characteristics of ‘woman’s nature’, and it was therefore easier to interpret female violence 
as evidence of insanity than as ‘normal’ criminality” (638). Thus, “criminality constituted the masculine form of 
antisocial behaviour, insanity often seemed to be the feminine form.  Both criminality and insanity showed a failure 
of the mental and moral control by the higher centres of the brain [...]” (639). Fee demonstrates that in the Victorian 
era, femininity and criminality were mutually exclusive; unimaginable without a classificatory system that was able 
to explain the abnormal normalcy of female offenders.   
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with moral insanity the individual must first have a moral sense for the perversion of this faculty 
to ensue thus, ‘inferior races’ were pre-emptively and “categorically disqualified” from moral 
insanity (Rimke 2003, 256). In other words, moral insanity was applied to those individuals who 
belonged first and foremost to the white respectable population where morally transgressive 
behaviour was evidenced because for this population moral capacity was assumed.  It was 
believed that because they had such a capacity in the first instance, that their morality could be 
perverted by disease (Rimke 2003).  
 The relationship between reversion and moral insanity, and more specifically the way 
that moral insanity was often articulated by psychiatrists as a form of reversion (Rafter 2008), 
draws our attention to the ways that moral degenerationists tried to account for slippages or 
anomalies within the ‘cultivated’ classes.  The racialized and immoral figure of the ‘savage’ is 
essential to this degenerationist formulation of moral insanity, just as it was for Lombroso in his 
explanation of criminality as atavism (see Chapter 2).  Paraphrasing Maudsley, Rimke highlights 
how the morally insane were likened to ‘savages’ because the morally insane, like the ‘savage’, 
was locked into a process of regression and was on the verge of entering into a more ‘primitive’ 
state (2003, 256). The link being drawn by Maudsley between the morally insane and the 
‘savage’ demonstrates how the white morally transgressive individual becomes not only 
thinkable but intelligible by relying on racist discourses already in circulation.  Importantly, the 
perceived link between immorality and the so-called inferior races was not an idea unique to 
psychiatrists of moral insanity.  David Theo Goldberg (1993) suggests that prior to race entering 
modern and scientific vernaculars and discourse in the 15th century, exclusion, discrimination 
and overall differences between human beings were rooted in morality and not race.  The 
medieval figure of the ‘Savage Man’—a figure represented as “naked, very hairy though without 
facial or feet fur, apelike but not an ape”—was a precursor to the modern racial formation of 
social subjects (Goldberg 1993, 23).  Accordingly, the figure of the ‘savage’ was not first and 
foremost constituted on the basis of race (this would happen later), but on the basis of a 
perceived immorality—violent, sexually promiscuous, and lacking in civility and restraint.  
 The immoral figure of the ‘savage man’ arguably bleeds into, and informs modern 
conceptions of race and sets normative boundaries between racial subjects: the racialized Other 
is a naturally immoral subject, whereas the respectable, middle-class white population are 
credited with morality (Rimke 2003). Rimke’s (2003) reading of Maudsley’s theory of moral 
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insanity highlights, not only the racial and class-based character of moral insanity (e.g. who can 
possibly be morally insane, and in relation to the etiology of the disorder), but also how moral 
insanity, was constituted, in part, by incorporating racialized and classist traits (e.g. immorality, 
primitive emotional capacities, unrestrained behaviour) as well as other social and cultural 
markers of difference as symptomatic of moral insanity itself (Rimke 2003; 2005). Rimke’s 
(2003; 2005) reading of moral insanity highlights how white middle and upper-class subjects 
who deviate from the prescriptions of respectable whiteness are reproduced, not only as 
different, immoral, and Other, but pathologically so; whereas racialized subjects, within the logic 
of moral insanity, are positioned as inherently deviant, inferior and immoral. This production of 
whiteness as pathological is made possible through the integration of racist discourse with moral 
insanity and leads to the explicit assumption that to ‘be’ morally insane is to resemble, in 
character and conduct, the racialized ‘underclass’.  
 What we can conclude from Rafter and Rimke’s respective readings is that Maudsley and 
Spencer left us with two divergent explanations of transgression that are based on an interlocking 
reading of social subjects: transgression is an obvious, innate expectation of Othered groups 
(especially on the basis of race and class) and the pathological exception for normalized groups, 
where race and class were pivotal signifiers of how individuals would get enveloped and 
constituted in the discourse of transgression.  Their work also points to why moral insanity was 
particularly amenable for explaining the transgressions of white subjects. 
 
Gender and Sexual Transgression and Psychopathy 
 
 In her work, Rimke is careful to point out that it was not simply class-based and racial 
readings of the body that informed diagnoses of moral insanity, but it was rather “the intersection 
of ‘race’, class and gender that informed and constituted the visual terrain of moral madness” 
(2003, 257).  In effect then, “anyone who transgressed the limits of (Anglophone) bourgeois 
civility and morality” could be considered morally insane should their conduct warrant such a 
diagnosis (257). For example, Rimke argues that in addition to the role that race played in 
defining the parameters of moral insanity, moral insanity was also “genderized” particularly at 
the level of corporeal interpretation/inspection (255):  
the representations of immoral Others relied on bourgeois appraisals of masculine 
and feminine exteriorities that provided a grid for recognizing pathological 
interiorities. Whereas morally mad boys and men were often inscribed and 
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described with traits such as ‘cowardly’, ‘small’, ‘emasculated’, ‘solitary’, or by ‘a 
want of manliness feeling’, morally insane females were described as ‘vulgar’, 
‘insubordinate’, ‘indelicate’, ‘aggressive’, or ‘obstinate’, or her habits ‘unwomanly 
and offensive’. The feminization of males and defeminisation of females was read 
off the body as symptomatic as moral madness. (255)  
 
This quote indicates that both white men and women who transgressed the acceptable boundaries 
of their gender, were pathologized through moral insanity.  Unfortunately, the significance 
accorded to cultural knowledge and bodily markers in diagnosing moral insanity/psychopathy 
did not abate in early-mid 20th century theorizing.  In fact, many scholars have revealed the 
ways in which dominant understanding of sex/gender and sexuality actually came to be the 
cornerstone of theories of psychopathy in the twentieth century (Lunbeck 1994; Rafter 1997a; 
Chenier 2003). Before detailing this continuity, it bears mentioning that language that was used 
to describe moral insanity shifted in the early twentieth century from moral insanity to 
psychopathy.  Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun (2015) have noted that the construct of moral 
insanity was fraught with controversy from the moment of its emergence.  This controversy 
ranged from what to call the disorder to what caused it (32-33). Despite these issues, Julius 
Ludwig August Koch, a German psychiatrist, is generally credited with introducing the term 
“psychopath(y)” in the late nineteenth century (Arrigo and Shipley 2001, 331-332; Jalava, 
Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 32)17. 
 While psychopathy was conceptualized differently depending on which twentieth century 
text is being consulted18, Elizabeth Lunbeck (1994) told a story of psychopathy that places its 
twentieth century popularity squarely within the ambition of American psychiatry to become a 
discipline and profession of the everyday. In order to secure its professional significance, 
psychiatry refashioned its image and speciality from a profession and discipline solely concerned 
with insanity, into a profession that was concerned with ‘normal’ people, ‘normal’ problems and 
indeed, with normalcy itself—“the psychiatry of everyday life”.  Thus, psychiatrists were no 
longer strictly concerned with insanity and abnormality, but the everyday problems that anyone 
                                                 
17 Neither Arrigo and Shipley (2001) nor Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun (2015) provide an explanation as to why 
“psychopathy” was preferred over “moral insanity”.  
18 See Arrigo and Shipley (2001) for a clear historical overview of the different ways that psy experts conceptualized 
psychopathy (in terms of nomeclenture, cause, treatability and degree and/or type of social condemnation) from its 
early-nineteenth century origins to the present.   
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might experience: “poor marital relations, temperamental oddities, failed ambitions, heightened 
sensitivities, a proclivity for lying, a nervous disposition” (46).   
 Psychopathy played a key role in this sedimentation of psychiatry into the everyday. 
Lunbeck explains that its usefulness lay in the broad and innate defects to which it referred: it 
“encompassed incarcerated criminals and dissipated high-livers, promiscuous girls and lazy men, 
deficiencies so various, so numerous, and, in the end, so elusive that some wondered if it referred 
to anything at all” (65). Although psychiatrists could not, with any precision, define psychopathy 
(save for a number of loosely defined traits—impulsive, irritable, unstable, irresponsible, lacking 
in decency, rule breakers, and so on; 65), Lunbeck makes the case that it was psychopathy’s 
“indeterminacy” and thus “malleability” that allowed psychiatrists to use it to rewrite the discrete 
divide between normalcy and abnormality. More specifically, it was through psychopathy that 
psychiatrists fashioned the notion of “personality” and by extensions, “personality disorders”.  
This entry into the realm of personality helped psychiatrists to secure their everyday necessity 
because everyone has a personality, and personalities can be adjusted (with a little help from 
psychiatrists) (69). Additionally, the psychopath of the early twentieth century much like its 
nineteenth century predecessor, was not wholly abnormal, but straddled the liminal space 
between “psychic health” and “mental disease” (66). In many ways, psychopathy helped 
psychiatrists to ‘pathologize the normal’ and even render normal a rarity (70):     
only with respect to psychopathy did psychiatrists conceive of symptoms as 
quantities, amounts or exaggerations, premising diagnoses on too little of one 
thing—honesty, reliability, emotional control, loyalty—and too much of another. 
And only in psychopathy could they argue that behaviour indicative of the condition 
did not ‘differ strikingly from normal human behaviour’, or, in a similar vein, that 
persons branded by it ‘lie exceedingly near to what we conceive as normal.  
Psychiatrists pathologized the normal, a quantity as ill defined as the psychopathy to 
which it was juxtaposed, in the process of attempting to apprehend it [...]. (1994, 70; 
emphasis mine) 
 
Not only did psychopathy help the profession to enter into the new domain of everyday life, of 
normalcy, the significant role that it played also helps to explain why psychopathy, with all if its 
many issues, was ‘enduringly significant’ (67).  
 Despite the persistent ambiguity of the concept, psychiatrists who wrote about 
psychopathy and who diagnosed individuals in hospitals were remarkably consistent in their 
imagining of who the psychopath was. While the concept first emerged to account for motiveless 
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(unexplainable) crimes and criminal behaviour, and in the twentieth century, to capture those 
more elusive behaviours that were not quite ‘normal’, how the condition is conceptualized and 
applied in terms of identity and difference during this time is similar to the century that preceded 
it.    
 Nicole Rafter observed in her analysis of early twentieth century criminological texts, 
that psychopathy was the preferred theory of crime from about 1915-1920 (1997a, 239).  During 
this time, she notes that psychopathy was often mobilized to characterize individuals who did not 
simply break the law, but also deviated from heterosexual masculinity. Rafter explains that the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century works of two German psychiatrists—Richard 
von Krafft-Ebing and Emil Kraepelin—in developing the concept of psychopathy made distinct 
associations between psychopathy and gender and sexual deviancy and both referred to 
psychopaths as “savages”19 (241). Using an approach termed “anthropological psychopathy” 
which refers to a “body of thought related to criminal anthropology which portrayed the 
psychopath as biologically deviant, a degenerate with physical and mental stigmata” (241), 
Krafft-Ebing and Kraepelin were able to make their observations.  These works, similar to mid-
nineteenth century works on moral insanity discussed above, continue to conceptualize 
psychopathy as a biological and degenerative condition and where the body remains configured 
as a text or a sign of a “transgressive interiority” (Rimke 2003).  
 The works of these German psychiatrists were profoundly influential for American 
psychiatrists and criminologists (Rafter 1997a).  For example, William Healy20, like most 
criminologists and psychiatrists at the time, saw criminality as an expression of an underlying 
degenerative biological condition and mental disorder that was visually discernible by some type 
of stigmata (245). It is important to note that Healy does not differentiate between psychopathy 
and criminality it is as if they are one in the same (245). Despite this, Rafter notes that he focuses 
on social deviance and “sex-gender abnormalities” specifically, rather than law breaking.  
Focusing on juvenile psychopaths, Healy, Rafter reports, observed that the female psychopath is 
                                                 
19 Rafter does not offer a commentary on their use of “savage” and its potential links to dominant racial logics and 
discourse at the time. 
20 William Healy was a trained American neurologist and the first director of the prominent court clinic, the Institute 
for Juvenile Research in Illinois. Because of his extensive clinical work, he was later referred to as a psychiatrist 
(Rafter 1997b, 170).  His book, The Individual Delinquent: A Textbook of Diagnosis for All Concerned in 
Understanding Offenders, published in 1915, “became the period’s most respected criminological treatise, one of the 
switches that rerouted criminology from the explanatory track of feeblemindedness theory onto that of mental 
deviation” (Rafter 1997b, 177).  
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a “relative rarity” because they “are passive and immobile, whereas the more restless male 
psychopaths actively explore the world and hence get into more trouble” (245-246).  His reliance 
on then-dominant sex-gender scripts of heterosexual femininity and masculinity, is quite clear in 
his description of the female psychopath—she is a “sluttish” figure who belongs to the “low 
prostitute class” because of her sexual engagements and living arrangements with a various “low 
class of men” (246).  The logical extension of the female psychopath then, is the effeminate male 
psychopath and the homosexualization of the male psychopath (246).  Rafter cites one case from 
Healy’s text, The Individual Delinquent (1915), that offers us a stark image of who the male 
psychopath was for him.  The case is of a juvenile male psychopath (16 years-old) “whose 
delinquencies include truancy and petty theft” (246). Healy describes him as follows: “voice high 
and weak for his age. Stammers a little. Backward in signs of puberty....very few manly 
traits...got into bad sex habits when he was 10 or 12 years old” (Healy 1915 quoted in Rafter 
1997a, 248).  In another example, he cites the case of a 17-year-old male:  
arrested for truancy and ‘sex perversions’, is physically weak, with ‘unusually long, 
delicate hands’ and prominent hips [...] ‘uses his eyes in most peculiar way; drops the 
eyelids and snaps them in girlish fashion’. Always regarded as a ‘sissy’, as a child he 
played with dolls, loved to sew and iron, and avoided athletics.  In adolescence, he 
adopted the name Hattie and began cross-dressing. Soon he was engaging in ‘the 
most effeminate type of sexual perversions and earning his living by female 
impersonation. (quoted in Rafter 1997a, 247) 
 
Each of the examples that Rafter (1997a) provides, builds a clear picture of the role heterosexual 
gender norms played in imagining who the psychopath was.  
 Similar to both Rimke (2003; 2005) and Rafter (1997a), Elizabeth Lunbeck’s (1994) 
research provides us with additional evidence regarding the links between gender and sexual 
deviance and psychopathy in the twentieth century. Lunbeck notes that the way in which 
psychopathy was applied to both men and women at the Boston Psychopathic Hospital was 
rather consistent when we look to the gender and sexual logics informing the diagnosis: men 
who failed to live up to hegemonic prescriptions of heterosexual masculinity became the “stock 
male psychopath”, whereas the immoral and hypersexual woman was identified as psychopathic 
because of her turn away from virtuous womanhood (238)21.  In sum, for the psychopathic 
                                                 
21 A similar understanding of ‘failed’ masculinity made its way into mid-twentieth century understanding of 
psychopathy and criminality and was evidenced in the hybridized medico-legal concept ‘criminal sexual 
psychopath’.  See for example, Freedman (1987); Kinsman (1993); and Chenier (2003).  
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women, it was her deviant hypersexuality that became a focal point for psychiatrists as “the real 
social menace” and the “spectre of the prostitute” haunted imaginings of the female psychopath 
(188), whereas “the spectre of unachieved manhood haunted” the male psychopath (236).  
 In addition to Lunbeck’s (1994) research highlighting the gender and sexual logics that 
were contouring how psychopathy was imagined, she also draws our attention to the role of race 
and psychopathy in twentieth century conceptualizations and applications of psychopathy. 
Lunbeck notes that this psychopathic image of immoral womanhood was evidently only 
applicable to white women. When Black women came under the gaze of psychiatrists they were 
treated much differently.  For white women and girls, promiscuity, passion, immorality, and 
sexual desire were seen as a pathological departure from normalcy—a symptom of 
psychopathy—while “they [psychiatrists] deemed that of Black girls entirely normal” (204).  
Psychiatrists’ reasons for this are consistent with Rimke’s (2003) observations regarding the 
“disqualification” of racial Others from moral insanity: “the dangerous psychopathy that 
psychiatrists so confidently perceived in the immorality of white girls became, at worst, a 
conduct disorder—a manifestation of conduct that did not match the conduct prescribed by 
society—and at best a manifestation of normality when the girl in question was black” (Lunbeck 
1994, 204).  Thus, Lunbeck highlights that the benchmark for diagnosing hypersexual behaviour 
in females was based not only on dominant narratives of respectable or normative femininity, but 
were also determined by what was “normal for her race” (205).  Here, the sexual behaviour of 
young Black women was not deemed to be inexplicable to the extent that medical or psychiatric 
discourse needed to be introduced to render her sexual behaviour intelligible, for the 
‘hypersexual’ behaviour of the Black young woman was not “symptomatic of disease but [seen] 
as the natural, expected expression of the immorality of the race” (205).  One of the many 
contributions of Lunbeck’s research, is that she allows us to see how, even in the early twentieth 
century, psychopathy remained a disease solely applicable to the white race because of dominant 
racial logics and discourses that posited that immorality was only possible if a moral sense was 
present in the race in the first instance22.  
                                                 
22 Will Jackson (2011) similarly observed this practice of applying psychopathy to white women in the Kenyan 
settler colonial context during and immediately after the Second World War.  He notes that poor white women who 
were single, independent and sexually active were often diagnosed as psychopathic. While their transgression of 
social norms was integral to this diagnosis, it was not the only motivation. Jackson argues that psychopathy was 
used in this context to make manifest an interior flaw in this group of people—poor white women— and to 
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Although the research that I undertake for this dissertation is not historical in nature and 
therefore I do not make any contribution to this literature, I have examined these secondary 
historical works in such detail because the empirical and methodological insights of Fee (1978), 
Lunbeck (1994), Rimke (2003; 2005) and Rafter (1997a) have contributed to this project in a 
number of ways.   
  The first contribution that these texts have made to this project is that they have largely 
informed my own thinking about representations of psychopathy in the contemporary Canadian 
context.  The approaches that these scholars take in studying psychopathy historically as well as 
their empirical observations, are significant to the form and content of this project.  Each of their 
respective works have, in different ways and in different contexts, drawn out the social, cultural 
and political logics that have informed how moral insanity or psychopathy was imagined and 
who was imagined to be morally insane or psychopathic.  Each of their works demonstrate how 
dominant discourses surrounding identity and difference, and specifically around gender, race, 
class, and sexuality played a significant role in who was diagnosed as morally insane and how 
moral insanity became a disease most readily attributed to those who occupied normalized social 
positions and who transgressed the assumptions and expectations of their identities.  The insights 
of each of these scholars encouraged me to think about how ideas about bodies, identity, and 
difference might still be informing how psychopathy and criminality are imagined in our 
contemporary context and their historical contingencies.  
The second way that these scholars have contributed to this project is methodological.  As we 
will see below, much of the contemporary research on psychopathy is largely derived from a 
positivist methodology and seeks to determine the etiology of the disorder, variables which affect 
the disorder, how the risks posed by the disorder might be minimized and so on.  This project is 
differently oriented to the question of psychopathy.  As such, the critical and constructivist 
orientation of these critical historical scholars was incredibly influential in designing this project 
especially in providing me with templates for how research on psychopathy could be done in 
ways that go against much of the other literature that saturates the field. For these two reasons, I 
am very grateful for the contributions that these scholars have made to this project. Indeed, I am 
not sure that this project would have been possible without their work.  
                                                 
segregate/exclude them so as to isolate their potential for contaminating ‘white prestige’, which was formative in the 
development and management of the colony.   
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Contemporary Representations23 of Psychopathy 
 
As conceptions of psychopathy mutated throughout the twentieth century, psychiatrists 
and psychologists became increasingly skeptical of psychopathy. While the disorder first 
emerged to explain immoral and unintelligible heinous crimes, over the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries it came to represent a wide array of socially transgressive behaviours. 
This led to charges that the term had become “an over cluttered wastebasket” (Karpman 1948 
quoted in Genter 2010, 140) that referred to eclectic behaviours and characteristics ranging from 
masturbation and ‘homosexuality’ to petty crimes and excessive violence, and individuals who 
lacked guilt, motive and remorse for their transgressions (Genter 2010, 140). Despite skepticism 
surrounding the concept, Hervey Cleckley (1964), an American psychiatrist, did not give up on 
the diagnostic utility of the concept because he believed that understanding psychopathy could 
ameliorate its negative effects on the social body as well as the experiences of individuals who 
interact with psychopaths. 
 
A Characterological Portrait of the Psychopath 
 
Hervey Cleckley is widely regarded as the founding father of modern psychopathy 
research. His work on psychopathy is still used, for the most part, today (Arrigo and Shipley 
2001, 224).  In his influential book The Mask of Sanity, first published in 1941, Cleckley (1964) 
attempts to grapple with the vagueness accorded to personality disorders and psychopathy in 
particular. Cleckley (1964) notes that where individuals came to the attention of psychiatrists for 
one reason or another, and where these individuals who did not seem ‘normal’ but did not 
demonstrate mental disease, it was often concluded that they were psychopaths.  What he finds 
curious about this clinical practice was its prominence as a diagnosis despite the fact that 
psychopathy was a poorly explained category.  The primary objective of his book is to provide 
modest clarity to the concept.  
                                                 
23 I characterize these conceptualizations of psychopathy as “representations” following the lead of Richard 
Weisman who suggests that the term “representation” draws our attention to “the interpretive work that is involved 
in developing these formulations while bracketing their correspondence to veridical reality” (2008, 197).  
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Importantly, for Cleckley psychopathy does not manifest in visual corporeal signs such as 
stigmata or “gross brain changes” (243). Rather the psychopath is made visible by his actions 
(362).  The psychopath’s actions are said to demonstrate a series of characteristics such as:  
Superficial charm and good intelligence, absence of delusions and other signs of 
irrational thinking, absence of nervousness or psychoneurotic manifestations, 
unreliability, untruthfulness and insincerity, lack of remorse or shame, inadequately 
motivated antisocial behaviour, poor judgement and failure to learn by experience, 
pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love, general poverty in major affective 
reactions, specific loss of insight, unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations, 
fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink and sometimes without, suicide rarely 
carried out, sex life impersonal, trivial and poor integrated, failure to follow any life 
plan. (363)  
 
Robert Hare (1999), one of the leading experts on psychopathy and creator of the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (hereafter PCL-R; discussed below) relied on Cleckley’s traits of 
the psychopath to develop the checklist. For Hare, “psychopathy is a personality disorder defined 
by a distinctive cluster of behaviours and inferred personality traits, most of which society views 
as pejorative” (ix). More provocatively, he describes them as: 
Social predators who charm, manipulate, and ruthlessly plow their way through life, 
leaving a broad trail of broken hearts, shattered expectations, and empty wallets.  
Completely lacking in conscience and in feeling for others, they selfishly take what 
they want and do so as they please, violating social norms and expectations without 
the slightest sense of guilt or regret. (xi)   
 
The modern representation of psychopathy hinges on two general facets: “emotional 
deficits”/ “personality traits” as well as behaviours that are largely considered deviant by society 
(Glenn and Raine 2014, 3). Because the psychopath is understood to be lacking in “moral 
emotions” which enable people to engage in ethical interpersonal relationships with others 
(Weisman 2008, 198), they often, and with greater ease, engage in socially transgressive 
behaviour (to varying degrees). Together, these two facets of the psychopathic profile form a 
“comprehensive picture of the psychopathic personality” (Hare 1999, 57).  Hare (1999) 
organized the PCL-R based on these two general symptom clusters which he explains in his 
book. In terms of emotional deficits, the psychopath is said to possess the following traits:  
- Glib and superficial: Psychopaths are able to present themselves as articulate, 
‘smooth’, charming, intelligent, knowledgeable and agreeable. However, these 
presentations of self are superficial and insincere as the psychopath is merely 
“mechanically reading their lines” (Hare 1999, 35). A true, authentic self is thus 
presupposed (Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 185). 
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- Egocentric and grandiose: “Psychopaths have a narcissistic and grossly inflated 
view of their self-worth and importance, a truly astounding egocentricity and 
sense of entitlement, and see themselves as the center of the universe, as superior 
beings who are justified in living according to their own rules” (Hare 1999, 38).  
Additionally, Hare notes that psychopaths will often appear as “arrogant, 
shameless braggarts—self-assured, opinionated, domineering, and cocky” who 
love power and control (38). 
- Lack of remorse or guilt: Psychopaths lack ‘real’ remorse and guilt for their 
misdeeds.  Not only can they not feel these emotions, but they often try to 
rationalize their misdeeds, blame their victims for their ill fate or think of 
themselves as the victim and not the perpetrator (40-44).  
- Lack of empathy: Psychopaths “seem unable to ‘get into the skin’ or to ‘walk in 
the shoes’ of others, except in a purely intellectual sense.  The feelings of others 
are of no concern to psychopaths. In some respects they are the emotionless 
androids depicted in science fiction, unable to imagine what real humans 
experience” (44). In essence, they are indifferent to the suffering of others, often 
seeing others as simply objects (44-45).  
- Deceitful and manipulative: Related to their glib and superficiality, psychopaths 
are con artists, liars, cheats and swindlers and they are able do so because of their 
impeccable ability to deceive and manipulate their victims by appearing to be 
otherwise (46-51; see also Weisman 2008).  
- Shallow emotions: Psychopaths are cold, calculated and generally unemotional.  
They are unable to feel that which they purport or perform.  They “seem to suffer 
from a kind of emotional poverty that limits the range and depth of their feelings” 
(Hare 1999, 52).  While they may be able to leave some (naive) people with the 
sense that they can deeply feel a range of emotions, this is mere (inauthentic) 
performance for “they are play-acting and […] little is going on below the 
surface” (52).    
 
In terms of social deviance (or lifestyle traits), the psychopath is said to possibly exhibit 
the following according to Hare (1999):   
- Impulsive: Psychopaths are spontaneous, focused only on the present and are 
pure behaviour, all of which is guided by self-interest (satisfaction, pleasure, or 
relief; 58). They are, as Hare notes, “unlikely to spend much time weighing the 
pros and cons of a course of action or considering the possible consequences” 
(58).  The psychopath, in other words, is the antithesis of the rationally calculated 
actor that the classical school imagined.  This is further evidenced in the words of 
a convicted murderer that Hare cites “[…] the murders were without reason. 
Don’t try to understand murder by using reason” (Gilmore quoted in Hare 1999, 
58).  
- Poor behaviour controls: This basically refers to the psychopath’s inability to 
control their behaviour (lack of inhibitions), and in particular their high level of 
reactiveness (especially in the form of anger or verbal abuse) to “insults or 
slights”, failure, punishment, disapproval, blame among other things (59). As 
such, psychopaths “take offense easily and become angry and aggressive over 
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trivialities, and often in a context that appears inappropriate to others. But their 
outbursts are short-lived, and they quickly resume acting as if nothing out of the 
ordinary has happened” (59).  
-  Need for excitement: Related to impulsivity and poor behavioural control, 
psychopaths need excitement, which often involves some kind of social or legal 
transgression (e.g. drug use, crime, engaging in risk taking etc.; 61) 
- Lack of responsibility: Psychopaths are both ‘irresponsible and unreliable’, 
“obligations and commitments mean nothing […]” (62-63).  
- Early behaviour problems: “Psychopaths begin to exhibit serious behavioural 
problems at an early age. These might include persistent lying, cheating, theft, fire 
setting, truancy, class disruption, substance abuse, vandalism, violence, bullying, 
running away, and precocious sexuality” (66).  What differentiates the psychopath 
from the non-psychopathy, is that in the psychopath these misbehaviours will be 
more frequent and more serious than their ‘normal’ counterparts. Early 
behavioural problems, especially antisocial behaviours, are considered to be a 
“good predictor of adult behavioural problems and criminality” (68).  
-  Adult antisocial behaviour: Antisocial behaviour refers to illegal, unethical, 
immoral and/or harmful behaviours (i.e. those behaviours which run in contrast to 
social norms, rules, laws and/conventions).  “Psychopaths consider the rules and 
expectations of society inconvenient and unreasonable, impediments to the 
behavioural expression of their inclinations and wishes” (67).  
 
Consistent with earlier accounts of psychopathy and moral insanity, Hare clearly states 
that psychopathy is not a mental illness24, and that psychopaths are not insane for “their acts 
result not from a deranged mind but from a cold, calculating rationality combined with a chilling 
inability to treat others as thinking, feeling human beings” (5). As such, this transgressor remains 
“intellectually cognizant” but morally and emotionally inept (Weisman 2008, 198).  Therefore, 
psychopaths are generally regarded as acting on free will despite the presence of the personality 
disorder (Hare 1999, 22). Because the intellectual abilities of the psychopath remain intact and 
their theoretical ability to differentiate right from wrong unadulterated, when they do commit 
crimes they are held to be fully culpable for their actions and in some instances, psychopathy 
may even operate as an aggravating factor at sentencing (see below).  
Hare decouples psychopathy from insanity as his predecessors did, but he is also clear to 
point out, as Cleckley did, that the psychopath, need not be a criminal either (although these are 
                                                 
24 Geoff Hamilton (2008) explains the distinction between illness and disease in the context of psychopathy nicely. 
He notes that one of the things that differentiates psychopathy from other forms of mental illness is that the ‘patient’ 
does not experience distress, emotional suffering or “subjective discomfort”, but rather they are usually at ease—“it 
is from wounded others that complaints arise” (232).  The absence of subjective suffering disqualifies the 
psychopathy from the definition of illness since it refers to “the subjective response to suffering”.  Whereas, disease 
or disorder refers to “the objective classification of suffering” (232). Hence, “psychopaths are apparently diseased 
but not ill” (232).  
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the ‘types’ of psychopaths that readily come to the attention of the public). He also distinguishes 
psychopathy from antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). The latter he suggests “refers to a 
cluster of criminal and antisocial behaviours” whereas psychopathy “is defined by a cluster of 
both personality traits and socially deviant behaviours” (Hare 1999, 25).  Moreover, ASPD is 
regarded as a more general category and more readily affected by environmental factors, whereas 
psychopathy is seen as a more specific manifestation of ASPD, largely biologically based and a 
more severe condition (Pickersgill 2009; 2011; Freedman and Verdun-Jones 2010; Jalava, 
Griffiths and Maraun 2015).   
 
 “Who are you?”: The Nature of the Psychopath 
 
As noted above, Michel Foucault (1978) observed that a significant feature of the modern 
criminal trial is the need to know who an offender is in advance of punishment. The answer to 
this question can dramatically affect how offenders are subsequently treated by the criminal 
justice system.  In the context of guilt, this question—who are you?—is usually framed within 
the mad or bad binary, where the presence of ‘madness’ will likely result in some kind of 
differential treatment and vice versa.  The way that this question is answered in relation to the 
psychopath is therefore of enormous significance.   We have already seen that the psychopath is 
generally regarded as having certain traits and behaviours that characterize their disordered 
personality and that they are generally credited with free will. However, we have not yet 
explored the very nature of the psychopath—what are the roots or causes of the disorder (e.g. 
nature versus nurture; or an interplay of both)? And, by extension, how might the disorder be 
remedied? 
  According to Hare (1999), psychopathy is caused by a complex interplay between 
biological and environmental factors.  Despite his view that psychopathy is the result of an 
interplay of biological and environmental factors, Hare is much less convinced that environment 
(i.e. familial context, upbringing, childhood trauma etc.) plays a primary role in the development 
of the disorder: “I can find no convincing evidence that psychopathy is the direct result of early 
social or environmental factors” (170).  However, he does note that “social factors and parenting 
practices help to shape the behavioural expression of the disorder, but have less effect on the 
individual’s inability to feel empathy or to develop a conscience. No amount of social 
conditioning will by itself generate a capacity for caring about others or a powerful sense of right 
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and wrong” (174; emphasis original).  In other words, the environment may ameliorate or 
exacerbate how psychopathy will express itself in the individual person, but the fact remains that 
the individual is a psychopath by birth25.  
Furthermore, Hare notes that there are several biologically grounded theories of 
psychopathy that try to locate or isolate the biological bases of the disorder. The most favoured 
of these theories speculates that the origin of the disorder lies in the abnormal development of the 
brain structure (168).  This understanding of psychopathy as located in the brain is consistent 
with, or rather characterizes the contemporary literature on the etiology of psychopathy derived 
from neuroscience (Pickersgill 2009).   For example, James Blair suggests that the source of 
psychopathy lies within a dysfunctioning amygdala (which helps to process emotion) and this 
helps to explain why psychopaths do not experience anxiety (see Pickersgill 2009)26.     
The focus of contemporary research on psychopathy remains firmly rooted in the body. 
However, the specific site of psychopathy is no longer written on or discernible on the external 
body, but rather “within the body” (i.e. the internal body), and especially within the brain (46; 
emphasis mine; see also, Freedman and Verdun-Jones 2010).  While earlier theories of 
psychopathy attempted to account for the disorder in terms of biology, heredity and somaticism, 
contemporary understandings take a modified approach.  Unlike degenerationist accounts that 
posited that psychopathy could be revealed from physical appearances (Rimke 2003), the 
contemporary psychopath “shatters our complacency that comes from not knowing that 
dangerousness cannot be detected by body type or by a psychological interview; psychopathy 
reveals itself by a sudden eruption of the will that exists in a hybrid mental state between sanity 
and madness (but not insanity or mental illness)” (Federman, Holmes and Jacob 2009, 40). The 
approach that neuroscientists take to research on personality disorders is characteristic of 
“contemporary scientific research into psychiatric disorders” more generally (51).  Pickersgill 
                                                 
25Martyn Pickersgill’s (2009) study affirmed that although neuroscientists suggest that personality disorders, like 
psychopathy, are a result of the interplay between biology and environment, they emphasize the salience of 
biological and genetic factors (51).  What is significant about the how neuroscientists discuss the role of biology, is 
that their explanations are usually “couched in risk” rather than biological predisposition, meaning that the presence 
of certain genes makes individuals more “vulnerable to personality disorder, rather than determining it” (51). 
26 Freedman and Verdun-Jones (2010) make the case, citing the Canadian legal defence of “not criminally 
responsible by reason of mental disorder” and Canadian case law, that because contemporary neurobiological 
research on psychopathy suggests that the condition is beyond the willful control of the individual, the disorder 
should serve as a mitigating factor at sentencing and not an aggravating factor. 
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terms this somatic/biological perspective (the brain is considered within the realm of the soma) a 
“techno-somatic ethic” which  
engenders, for instance, a perspective on psychiatric research that privileges studies 
into neurotransmitters and genes over epidemiological and sociological 
investigations into the social determinants of psychopathology. Such an orientation 
both legitimizes, and is legitimized by, an understanding of psychiatric disorder as 
being in some way localizable within the body (including the brain). (46)  
 
This shift from the exterior body to the interior body as the way in which psychopathy is 
identified—made visible—requires the use of special technologies that are able to render the 
interior body visible, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron 
emission tomography (PET) (Pickersgill 2009, 46).   
The emphasis of the biological in contemporary understandings of psychopathy is 
perhaps most significant for the reason expounded by Richard Weisman (2008).  In his work on 
the role of psychopathy in building a case for the death penalty at the penalty phase of capital 
trials, he chronicles the conceptual shift from moral insanity to psychopathy.  As discussed 
above, moral insanity emerged in the nineteenth century to account for the motiveless crime of 
an offender who appeared to not be suffering from an intellectual impairment and where the only 
evidence of insanity was the ‘insanity’ of the brutal crime itself (192). Within this early 
understanding of moral insanity, the change in character that this otherwise normal individual 
evinced became a sign that some type of pathology had set in because of the discrepancy 
between the individual’s character and their crime (192).  Weisman points out that this way of 
thinking about the role of pathology (and moral insanity in particular) in the criminal act 
suggests that the onset of pathology was alone responsible for the crime and not the offender’s 
being, character and/or personhood: “the act, however despicable, does not define the person 
[…] the perpetrator’s being is still separated from their doing” (194).  However, twentieth 
century representations of moral insanity paint a much different picture of the lucid, but insane 
transgressor. Drawing largely on biological and degenerationist understandings of behaviour, 
psychiatrists like Richard von Krafft-Ebing, suggest that moral insanity is the result of either 
heredity or neurological defects (195). Significantly, Weisman observes that within this 
redefinition of moral insanity as a biologically-based disorder, “the wrongful deeds of the 
morally insane have become an expression of their essence.  In this new approach to moral 
insanity, act and person are now shown to correspond” (195). In this context, the pathology of 
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immorality is “a congenital abnormality that penetrates to the nucleus of the person”, 
adulterating their entire being, their “essence”—their emotions, their personality, their character 
(195). As such, criminal acts are transformed into a powerful signifier of not only, pathology, 
but also of personhood; indeed, as Weisman puts it, “[f]or the psychopath, action is a reflection 
of being” (198; emphasis mine). It is perhaps for this reason why psychopathy, in our 
contemporary context, has more “cultural appeal” than the DSM’s antisocial personality 
disorder. It has come to “signify identity: you have an antisocial personality disorder, but you are 
a psychopath” (Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 14). 
In addition to psychopathy being represented as a biological disorder, it also represented 
as an incurable one. Among the many debates that characterize the field of psychopathy research 
there seems to be relative consensus that psychopaths are resistant to treatment. For example, 
Hare writes: “Indeed, many writers on the subject have commented that the shortest chapter in 
any book on psychopathy should be the one on treatment. A one-sentence conclusion such as 
‘No effective treatment has been found,” or, ‘Nothing works,’ is the common wrap-up to 
scholarly reviews of the literature” (1999, 194).  
The nature of the psychopath is therefore unequivocally characterized as biologically 
‘bad’ and is fated to remain that way. The inherent ‘badness’ or evil of the psychopath is 
something that Janet Ruffles (2004) provides insight on in her study which explored how 
Australian criminal courts characterize offenders who committed heinous crimes. She notes that 
there is an important distinction to be made between mad offenders and bad offenders: “the 
concept of evil is much more likely to be evoked when confronted with an individual who 
understands the difference between right and wrong, yet proceeds to commit a heinously 
wrongful act without any clear motivation and which, therefore, defies rational explanation” 
(116).  On occasions, such as these, where the courts are confronted with this intellectually 
unimpaired offender, the courts are not able to resort to the language of evil as such terminology 
runs counter to the rational logic the legal system is predicated on.  Instead, she notes that 
psychopathy (and antisocial personality disorder) accomplishes the same ends in the legal 
context—psychopathy is a “legal synonym” for evil (117).  Ruffles makes this claim, based on 
the ways that evil and psychopathy in essence do the same conceptual work and have very 
similar legal implications: they are labels of moral condemnation. Both terms connote that the 
person behind the deed is, in their very essence, fundamentally different and therefore destined to 
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a life of evil or criminality (i.e. recidivism); and, both the evil individual and the psychopath are 
irredeemable (i.e. untreatable). We could also add that defining behaviours through psychopathy 
or as evil has become, as McKeown and Stowell-Smith have noted, indicative of “our 
powerlessness to adequately explain: evil becomes shorthand of incomprehension” (2006, 110).  
 
Identifying Invisibility: Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
 
 Psychopathy, in a sense, makes evil visible by reducing it to a psychopathic individual. It 
allows us to transform the abstract, metaphysical concept of evil, and reconfigure it in such a 
way that it may be located within the psychopathic individual’s biology—the psychopath is 
inherently evil.   However, as discussed above, psychopathy remains invisible to the naked eye.  
Unlike traditional forms of insanity, which were exclusively defined by delirium or furor which 
manifested in highly visible signs and symptoms of insanity (so much so, that Foucault notes that 
doctors were rarely summoned to diagnose or “authenticate” what was being witnessed; 1978, 4) 
and unlike early biological and degenerationist accounts of moral insanity which read internal 
moral pathologies on the external body, modern accounts of psychopathy locate the disorder in 
the internal body (e.g. the brain).  This modern biological rendering of psychopathy results in 
psychopathy being largely invisible without ‘technological aids’ (Pickersgill 2009; Jalava, 
Griffiths and Maraun 2015), the PCL-R, and/or through transgression (legal or otherwise; 
Weisman 2008).  
According to contemporary representations of psychopathy, the psychopath, like the origin 
or cause of the condition itself, is notoriously difficult to identify.  In fact, it is likely that the 
psychopath will not be identified as such until they have done something to someone that raises 
suspicion into their mind-state (Federman, Holmes and Jacob 2009). The Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised (PCL-R) was developed by Hare to respond to a diagnostic need to be able to identify 
psychopaths reliably—or as he puts it, “to help clinicians and researchers distinguish with 
reasonable certainty true psychopaths from those who merely break the rules” (1993, 32; 
emphasis mine).  Prior to the advent of the PCL-R psychiatrists and psychologists relied 
primarily on psychological tests that used a ‘self-report’ style survey.  Hare notes that these types 
of tests are ineffective when dealing with psychopaths because of their ability to ‘mold and 
distort the truth’ and engage in impression management (1999, 30).  Indeed, this is something 
that Cleckley, too, observed:  
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little or nothing of this sort that is reliable [oral testimony from the patient that can 
provide clues about the disorder] can, by ordinary psychiatric examination, be 
obtained from the [psychopath].  Only when we observe him not through his speech 
but as he seeks his aims in behaviour and demonstrates his disability in interaction 
with the social group can we begin to feel how genuine is his disorder. (1964, 40)   
 
 The psychopath cannot, with certitude, be revealed by what he says but rather by what he does: 
“action is a reflection of being” (Weisman 2008, 198).  Hence, the PCL-R does not rely on what 
the suspected psychopath says to identify them as such, but on their (allegedly more 
reliable/truthful) case file (e.g. court transcripts, police reports, psychologist reports, and victim-
impact statements) and detailed interviews done by those who are trained in forensics and in the 
assessment tool specifically. Using Cleckley’s litany of emotional/interpersonal traits and 
deviant social behaviours that characterize the psychopath, Hare developed a checklist that 
enumerates these criteria. In order to diagnose someone as a psychopath, trained professionals 
use the above data to rate each of the twenty characteristics on a scale of 0-2, if the overall score 
is 30 and above, the individual, according to the checklist, is a psychopath.   
 
Psychopathy and the Social Sciences 
 
 Psychopathy has been regarded as a “truly interdisciplinary” research area (Jalava, 
Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 5). Transcending its ‘home’ in the psy disciplines, psychopathy is 
now a concern for a number of different community safety practitioners (e.g. social workers, 
psychologists, forensic nurses, correctional officers and the like), applied researchers as well as 
academic researchers in the fields of neuroscience, criminology, biology, law, sociology, history, 
the humanities, among others. Given the widespread interest in psychopathy it is not surprising 
that psychopathy and the PCL-R have been subject to sustained critique across these fields. 
These conversations, debates, and critiques are ongoing and prolific. However, instead of 
reviewing the conversations internal to the psy disciplines, I would like explore how the social 
sciences have approached psychopathy (namely, sociology, criminology, socio-legal studies and 
anthropology) since this project will be primarily contributing to these conversations and not to 
conversations about the ontology of psychopathy, its construct validity, issues with definition, 
concerns about PCL-R criteria, the science behind the disorder nor the causes of the disorder 
(and the like).   Instead, I am interested in the idea of the psychopath, how this idea/discourse 
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informs how we think about and represent crime and criminality and what representations of 
criminals as psychopaths can tell us.  
Part of what differentiates the work of social scientists from their scientific/positivist 
counterparts, is their critical interest in both the context under which psychopathy as a crime 
category and cultural category continues to flourish, as well as a deep curiosity and concern 
about the social, legal, political and cultural implications of psychopathy and the PCL-R.  Social 
scientific research on psychopathy, especially works that take a critical and qualitative approach 
to the topic is relatively modest in comparison to the abundance of psy research (especially 
post/positivist and quantitative studies) that exist in the field. In fact, in 2009, Federman, Holmes 
and Jacob observed that within the field “few have looked at psychopathy from a critical and 
discursive standpoint” (2009, 37).  In my view, this remains accurate.   
Departing from a Foucauldian and discursive approach, Federman, Holmes and Jacob, 
approach psychopathy with a poststructuralist ‘suspicion’ which is well-suited to “any idea that 
tries to prove that concepts (or persons) exist in an unmediated space, without reference to 
context, language, and social effects” (2009, 39). Their critique of the field highlights the lack of 
critical scholarship which engages in a “discussion of the social, legal, and historical elements 
that constitute the core meaning of psychopathic behaviour, as developed by Hare and Hervey 
Cleckley” (39). To attend to this gap, the authors conceptualize the psychopath as a discursive 
artefact: the psychopath is a “reality created by certain discursive contexts based on shifting 
behavioural classifications that try to meet criminological theories of deviance and 
dangerousness” (38).  By focusing on psychiatric texts on psychopathy, they demonstrate how 
psychopathy is a product of historical shifts, professional, discursive/epistemic contexts and 
biopolitical power relations which ultimately produced the psychopath.   
Similarly, in their recent book The Myth of the Born Criminal: Psychopathy, 
Neurobiology and the Creation of the Modern Degenerate, Jarkko Jalava, Stephanie Griffiths 
and Michael Maraun (2015) argue that psychopathy is a construct made possible by the context 
in which it has flourished. Since the 1990s, psychopathy has also been a rather popular term with 
both lay and expert audiences and they attribute its popularity to a combination of social and 
cultural factors as well as a number of changes within the field of psychopathy itself: the 
publication of the PCL-R in 1991; neuroimaging techniques became available; violent and 
property crimes increased in both Canada and the United States from the 1960s-early 1990s; 
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growing cultural interest in serial murder; the reappearance of biological theories of crime; the 
rhetoric embedded in psychopathy discourse; and, an all around fear of crime which psychopathy 
research purports to solve by ameliorating the effects of the psychopath and thus, crime (see 
Chapters 4 and 7 in their book especially). What made psychopathy so popular within this 
climate, according to the authors, was the way that it “offered an intuitive and empirically 
feasible solution to a set of serious social problems” (5).  
What the respective works of Federman, Holmes and Jacob (2009) and Jalava, Griffiths 
and Maraun (2015) reveal is that psychopathy is socio-cultural and discursive artefact or 
construct specific to its historical, geopolitical, intellectual and social context. It is psychopathy 
as a construct, that I am interested in exploring here.  
 
The Discourse of Psychopathy and Punishment  
 
 The dearth of critical social science research on psychopathy is particularly striking given 
the deterministic and moral undertones that are fundamental to psychopathy and which run 
counter to critical social scientific and qualitative sensibilities. For example, Jalava, Griffiths and 
Maraun (2015) reveal not only the biological thinking that characterizes modern psychopathy 
research and how it is a distinct construct born from a ripe context, but they take this a step 
further.  They argue that contemporary psychopathy theory and research is “a modern theory of 
born criminal theory” which primarily emerged from nineteenth century degeneration theory and 
is indebted to Lombroso. According to the authors, the parallels between degeneration and 
psychopathy are most clearly seen by focusing on the five basic tenets of degeneration theory, 
which are: “1. different types of disorder and deviance are interconnected; 2. These connections 
are caused by a biological ‘defect’; 3. The biological defect is inheritable; 4. Individuals afflicted 
with degeneration are evolutionary throwbacks; 5. The degenerate may be identified by physical 
and psychological signs, which are often subtle” (41).  Accordingly, the modern psychopath fits 
each of these basic tenets.  Psychopathy, they argue, satisfies the first tenet in two ways. The first 
is the way that the criteria for psychopathy relies on a series of moral and social deviations, 
whereas the second, relies on the comorbidity of psychopathy (i.e. studies have shown that 
psychopathy coexists with other disorders such as, mood disorders, schizophrenia, alcoholism, 
among others; 42). The second tenet is satisfied by virtue of psychopathy largely being 
conceptualized as a biological ‘defect’ (43).  Third, the authors note that psychopathy has 
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recently been studied in relation to heredity and genetics in particular (43). Fourth, the authors 
note that while modern psychopathy research does not use the language of ‘atavism’ explicitly, 
some researchers, such as Robert Hare and J. Reid Meloy, have represented psychopaths as 
“throwbacks” or “as evolutionary less evolved species” (44).  Finally, psychopaths, like the 
‘degenerate’ is a “type” of person that may be challenging to identify without the use of 
identification techniques (45).  
An additional parallel that we might draw between Lombroso’s born criminal and the 
modern psychopath is the way punishment is conceptualized and enacted based on these theories.  
Nicole Rafter has shown that Lombroso believed that punishment should be determined by a 
psychiatrist or forensic expert’s evaluation of the offender’s degree of dangerousness (2008, 83).  
Thus leading Lombroso to argue “for probation, juvenile reformatories, and other intermediate 
punishments that would keep offenders who were not particularly dangerous out of ordinary 
prisons” (83). Since the born criminal, according to Lombroso, was both incorrigible and the 
most dangerous of the criminal types, it was this kind of criminal that was suitable for the most 
profound form of punishment: “lifelong incarceration in special institutions for the incorrigible” 
(83).  Moreover, Rafter notes that it was in the context of the born criminal and punishment 
where Lombroso espoused a eugenic solution to the problem of criminality (which was rare for 
Lombroso): these special prisons “would gradually reduce that not inconsiderable proportion of 
criminality that stems from heredity factors… there would be a return to the process of natural 
selection that has produced not only our race but the very justice that gradually came to prevail 
with the elimination of the most violent” (Lombroso 1878 quoted in Rafter 2008, 83). Below, I 
review the work of number of social scientists who argue, in different ways, that the modern 
psychopath category has similar punishment effects on those so designated. Arguably, the most 
significant social science contribution to the interdisciplinary field of psychopathy has been by 
those scholars who have revealed, in no uncertain terms, that the psychopath designation has 
detrimental affects on how offenders are treated by the criminal justice system (especially at the 
level of sentencing).  While this is the main thrust of the works that I explore, what is particularly 
relevant for this research is how these scholars provide us with an opportunity to understand how 
psychopathy comes to structure how crime and criminality are thought about and acted upon.  
Richard Weisman, in his analysis of the role of remorse and psychopathy at the penalty 
phase of the capital trial in the United States, illustrates how offenders’ performances of 
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remorse(lessness) can help paint them as “someone worthy of life in spite of his grievous crime 
[or] someone for whom only death is the appropriate penalty” (2008, 202).  Psychopathy as 
pathologization of remorselessness, operates as a discourse which structures and instructs how 
the character of capital offenders is represented and interpreted by the jury (201). Since 
psychopathic offenders enter into the penalty phase of the capital trial under the weight of 
assumptions and expectations that psychopathy carries with it (e.g. habitual offenders who are 
resistant to treatment; as individuals who are fundamentally/biologically different from non-
psychopaths; and, as individuals who can perform expectations and emotions they do not truly 
experience), Weisman reveals that performances of remorse(lessness) and, by extension, the 
offenders’ character, are interpreted in light of the designation.   
For example, an ‘authentic’ demonstration of remorse by the non-psychopathic offender 
might represent to a jury that the offender is not, in his very essence, his heinous deed. However, 
in the context of psychopathy, “action is a reflection of being” whereby the wrongful deed is 
synonymous with who one is (198). Remorse, in a context coloured by psychopathy is tricky 
business, because the performance is interpreted in light of pathology. For instance, a suicide 
attempt in a non-psychopathic offender can be interpreted as an unequivocal sign of suffering 
and mental anguish. In the context of psychopathy however, this expression is “reinterpreted as 
‘gestures’ that are variously ‘feigned’ or designed to ‘manipulate their environment’ or to ‘gain 
sympathy’” (209). Through this interpretation, and others like it, Weisman demonstrates that the 
psychopath is expelled not only from the moral community, but also from humanity more 
generally because he lacks the very moral emotions that enable ethical human connection and 
bonds. By recasting the offender as fundamentally different from and outside the moral 
community, the offender becomes worthy of death27.  
Similarly, Lorna Rhodes (2002), in her ethnographic study of psychopaths in a maximum 
security prison in the United States, explores the effects of the psychopath designation (officially 
or informally designated as such) on how offenders’ behaviours are interpreted and how they are 
treated in prison. The crux of her argument is that “psychopathy complements the exclusionary 
logic of control” upon which maximum-security prisons rely (443). Her ethnographic 
observations and analysis reveals that psychopathy is used to justify the exclusion, segregation 
                                                 
27 John Edens (2001) in his case study also notes that psychopathy can be used as an aggravating factor at the 
penalty phase of the capital trial depending on how the clinician represents the information derived from the PCL-R.  
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and confinement of psychopaths in solitary cells for extended periods of time. Psychopathy 
rationalizes these practices by positing that danger lurks in the individual’s essence (where this 
essence punitively places him outside the bounds of ‘the human’) and can erupt at any moment.  
Furthermore, danger resides in the psychopath because of his ability to present himself in a 
fictive manner.  When combined these presumably immutable personality traits warrant punitive, 
indeterminate preventive punishment/separation from the general prison population. The effects 
of this form of segregation are weighty; confinement to solitary cells consists of remaining in the 
cell for 23 hours per day without contact with other inmates. Many inmates who have lived in 
this kind of unit “speak of feeling ‘broken’ or ‘dead’” (445).  
Rhodes concludes her analysis by arguing that prison expansion relies on rhetoric and 
public opinion concerning crime and criminality where the psychopath plays an important role in 
“naturalizing long-term confinement” (457). The image of the psychopath stands as “the proper 
target of a punitive individualism” which serves to justify the creation of more prisons to contain 
the threat of crime, where the exclusionary logic of prison (especially maximum security prisons 
which are said to house the “worst of the worst”; 443) also shapes how we think about this ‘kind’ 
of prisoner/criminal contributing to an image of the psychopath as exceptionally dangerous 
(Rhodes 2002)28.  
In addition to psychopathy justifying highly punitive and inhumane punishment and 
treatment within prisons, scholars have also considered another function of “dangerous 
personality” designations (McKeown and Stowell-Smith 2006). Mick McKeown and Mark 
Stowell-Smith argue that although psychopathy and other “dangerous personality” disorders 
have had their “clinical value called into question”, they continue to serve collective 
psychological functions (2006, 109).  Not only do they explain the otherwise unexplainable 
through “authoritative explanatory devices”, dangerous personality categories along with high 
security institutions which these conditions justify, separate and contain those whom are 
considered dangerous, while at the same time containing and moderating our collective anxieties 
about the abject (i.e. those things or experiences that “threaten the integrity of the self and 
engender feelings of horror, abomination and revulsion”; 109-110).  Together, they purify and 
                                                 
28 There are a number of other scholars who have also supported the claim that a diagnoses of psychopathy warrants 
exceptionally punitive forms of punishment.  I discuss some of these studies in Chapter 5 (e.g. Zinger and Forth 
1998; Lloyd, Clark, and Forth 2010) and others in Chapter 6 (e.g. Ruffles 2010).  
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reconstitute our sense of ‘us’ by reaffirming the symbolic and material boundaries between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  
When taken together each of these works highlight a number of significant aspects of 
psychopathy: it is a socio-cultural and discursive artefact and it is well suited to justifying and 
legitimizing dehumanizing methods of punishment based on the assumption of inherent 
dangerousness and public good/safety. They also raise significant ethical, political and moral 
questions about the use of psychopathy in criminal justice contexts. In effect, each scholar 
demonstrates the effects that our thinking/imagining of who people are can have on how we treat 
them. Indeed, as Deborah Brock has pointed out, citing Judith Butler: “ ‘how shall I know you?’ 
implies ‘How shall I treat you’” (Brock 2012, 24). As we have seen thus far, who we imagine the 
psychopath to be, is largely based on the criteria set out in the PCL-R (Jalava, Griffiths and 
Maraun 2015; Edens, Skeem, Kennealy 2009, 189): someone who, in their very essence, is 
manipulative, conning, criminal, remorseless, etc.; in short, someone who is fundamentally bad 
or evil.  We, as a society, see these traits as dangerous and ourselves (the ‘normal’, non-
psychopathic population) as particularly vulnerable to the dangers wielded by ‘their’ nature.  
Henceforth, they are criminalized and punished.  This is not because punishment will operate as 
a deterrent or as a remedy to their disorder/potential dangerousness, but because it moderates and 
contains societal fears (McKeown and Stowell-Smith 2006). In this way, psychopathy operates 
as a discourse, that provides us with a way to make sense of and talk about evil and 
transgression, while also constructing a particular kind of subjectivity (i.e. someone who is 
beyond human, evil by nature, and worthy of moral condemnation, segregation and punishment) 
all of which provide us with grounds on which we can act to solve the problem of both the 
dangerous individual and crime (Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015).    
We might then ask who are these people whom we imagine to be dangerous, born 
criminals?  This is not to repeat what I have outlined above, but it is to ask a different kind of 
question.  I am not asking what personality or character traits we imagine to be dangerous or who 
we imagine embodies this dangerousness (i.e. psychopaths), but rather I am asking: how do they 
appear to us? What do we imagine they look like? As I have mentioned in passing above, and as 
I will expand on below (and throughout this project), the psychopath is imagined as a split 
subject: a person who is at once normal (appearance) and abnormal (reality). Below I review 
works that have begun to flush out this distinction.   
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Imagining Invisibility and Normalcy: Research on the Social Identity of the Psychopath 
 
The psychopath is not just a chameleon but a kind of Janus figure, disrupting the 
factual certainty of everyday life […]. (Hamilton 2008, 236) 
 
The fiction of ‘homicidal mania’ entails that the spectre of dangerousness 
permanently inserts itself into social life in that visible normality ceases to be a 
guarantee against the presence of monstrous pathology. (Owen 1991 quoted in 
McKeown and Stowell-Smith 2006, 127) 
 
 The literature on psychopathy is peppered with implicit and explicit references to the 
apparent normalcy of the psychopath (e.g. the spectre of the ‘normal’ always haunts the 
psychopath as a ‘biological other’; Weisman 2008, 199); indeed, normalcy is constitutive of the 
disorder, insofar as it is a “psychopathic fiction” (Babiak 2007 quoted in Hamiliton 2008, 236). 
If we return to Cleckley for a moment, he too noted the apparent normalcy of the psychopath.  
Echoing the title of his book, Cleckley, explains that:  
The observer is confronted with a convincing mask of sanity.  All these outward 
features of this mask are intact; it cannot be displaced or penetrated by questions 
directed toward deeper personality levels […] The thought processes retain their 
normal aspect under psychiatric investigation and in technical tests designed to bring 
out obscure evidence of derangement.  Examination reveals not merely an ordinary 
two-dimensional mask but what seems to be a solid and substantial structural image 
of the sane and rational personality. (1964, 405)   
 
The metaphor of the mask is, as Richard Weisman has observed, “grounded in the paradox of 
appearance and reality” meaning that while the condition manifests as normalcy, it hides a deep 
seated affective and personality abnormality (2008,199).  Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun suggest 
that the very way that psychopathy is conceptualized actually resolves this paradox by making 
normalcy a symptom of the disorder itself; the problem or the paradox is made into a “partial 
explanation—it is the nature of psychopaths to pretend normalcy” (2015, 132). Henceforth, the 
psychopath is a “consummate social performer” (Weisman 2008, 200); “a simulacrum of 
emotion and connection” (Rhodes 2002, 254) who uses his skills of impression management to 
put on a performance of normalcy.  If the psychopath is characterized by a mask or a facade then, 
he is simply a one-dimensional copy, an image of a ‘real’ human being where the appearance of 
‘normalcy’ is but a “misleading surface” (Cleckley 1964, 411).  
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When normalcy is invoked in the context of psychopathy, it is largely in reference to 
character.  Character, in this context, is used in reference to those moral or mental traits or 
qualities that constitute one’s personality and individuate a person (Oxford English Dictionary).  
These internal qualities are often signified through behaviour, allowing us to make links between 
human exteriors and interiors to ‘know’ who someone really is on the inside (Rimke and Hunt 
2002, 62). The psychopath appears in character to resemble normalcy in their ability to manage 
the impressions of their audience through performance: “they have charming smiles on their 
faces and a trustworthy tone to their voices, but never—and this is a guarantee—do they wear 
warning bells around their necks” (Hare 1999, 104).  Additionally, appearance is also 
significant; Hare notes that psychopaths possess “universal door openers—good looks and the 
gift of gab” (110) and when coupled with their social or professional status, their connections, 
education, and their unique skills they are able “to construct a façade of normalcy” to carry out 
their will to the detriment of others (113). In the parlance of psychopathy, this is called charm, 
manipulation and deceit.  
While psychopaths are able to superficially adopt the socially accepted rules, conventions 
and scripts and act these out, they are unable to truly understand, feel and experience the 
emotions that are central to ethical human interaction and connection (Hare 1999; Weisman 
2008): the psychopath “knows the words but not the music” (Johns and Quay 1962 quoted in 
Hare 1999, 53). These traits when coupled with the psychopath’s intelligence, enable his 
pathology to remain concealed until it’s not; until their behaviour (crimes, social transgressions) 
reveals their ‘true’ nature. A passage cited by Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun, captures this 
sentiment perfectly: 
For many of us in law enforcement, psychopaths are an enigma. They walk like us 
and talk like us, and sometimes cry during an interview or laugh with us as though 
they were our best friends.  Their kids appear normal, and their wives seem to love 
them.  If they are really good actors, they seem to be offended by violent crimes as 
we are. It is their appearance of normalcy that is so unsettling (FBI special agent, 
O’Toole 2007 quoted in Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 71). 
 
Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun trouble this paradox by drawing our attention to the production of 
the abnormal normalcy of the psychopath:  
 
At the root of the problem is the classic mythological assumption—and guiding 
principle of much of Lombroso’s work—about moral deviance and its reflection in 
78 
 
outward appearance: the moral deviant should look and sound like a moral deviant, 
whether by physical deformity or by visible insanity.  However, since there is no 
necessary relationship between appearance and evil, there really is no puzzle to solve 
either.  Psychopaths blend in not because they have a superior ability to fake normal, 
but because they look and sound normal by definition (that is why only trained 
personnel can make psychopathy diagnoses).  The appearance-reality puzzle, in other 
words, is a pseudo-problem.  In rhetoric, it is called a red herring […] Hare produced 
a paradox by looking for obvious signs of evil—as Lombroso had done—but not 
finding them. Although there is no evidence that evil people look anything but 
normal, the paradox idea is rhetorically powerful.  It reproduces and updates 
mythological assumptions about signs of evil by framing the signs as real, yet subtle, 
and detectable only through modern scientific instruments. (2015, 133; emphasis 
original) 
 
One way that we can read the appearance/reality paradox is, as Jalava and colleagues do, being 
derived from an erroneous premise. However, I think that if we follow the appearance/reality 
logic of psychopathy we might be able to think about it differently. For example, if this paradox 
is one of the features that is especially unique to psychopathy, what kinds of things enable the 
psychopath to appear as ‘normal’? The examples I provide above gesture to some of these: 
intelligence; happy marriage; good looks; conversational, trustworthy, friendly and charming 
faces; professional status and the having the same moral principles as ‘normal’ folks. However, I 
think that we could also ask about how interlocking social identities (i.e. race, gender, class and 
sexuality) also enable some people to appear as more ‘normal’ or less threatening than others.  
This is something I will examine in the following chapters by thinking about how this 
appearance/reality logic gets mobilized in representations of certain crimes and how it links up 
dominant discourses around criminality, which make it possible to imagine that some bodies are 
supposedly more suspicious than others.   
 Another thing that I think is particularly interesting to explore is how psychopathy is 
imagined as an invisible disorder that is made manifest through transgression. I think this feature 
of psychopathy is an important pivot point given my interest in how criminality is imagined. This 
way of thinking about psychopathy as in invisible disorder, affirms the idea that people who 
appear ‘normal’ are not suspicious, or criminal until they actually do something to betray this 
imagined idea that we have of them. It is at these two junctures, where I think a critical 
exploration seems most ripe:  psychopathy is a disorder that at once mimics normalcy and is 
visible only through transgression (Weisman 2008). I think that exploring representations of 
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(un)criminality alongside representations of psychopathy can us tell something fascinating and 
unique about how the normalized subject enters into the criminal imagination as a transgressive 
subject. As we move through the chapters, this point will become much clearer. 
Remarkably, the critical social science literature has generally not deconstructed the 
notion of normalcy as it pertains to psychopathy.  This is a rather curious absence since normalcy 
is such a highly contested and theorized term in the social sciences.  In sociology and in critical 
criminology, ‘the norm’ and the process of ‘normalization’ are often discussed and analyzed on 
the basis of both identity and difference; that is, qualities, characteristics and behaviours that 
individuals are thought to possess by virtue of their interlocking identities or social locations. 
Normalcy is defined in relation to how much an individual or the social group to which one 
belongs approximates or deviates from the idealized and normalized subject of modernity. In this 
construction of apparent normalcy, the psychopath and their “cloak of respectability” (Hare 
1999, 109; emphasis mine), and the bodily contingencies of this notion are generally not 
substantively queried.  How character and appearance—normalcy and respectability— are 
understood and evaluated are not done so objectively, but rather in relation to other variables, 
such as the identity of the individual. Critical and historical analyses of psychopathy, as I noted 
above, have drawn our attention to the ways in which determinations of psychopathy were 
usually contingent on how the individuals in question were diagnosed in relation to dominant 
cultural knowledge of their social identities. Often, these determinations of character, personality 
and pathology were based on the traits and qualities that were considered ‘ab/normal’ for 
particular groups of people (Lunbeck 1994; Rimke 2003). In most instances, it was individuals 
who were located in normalized social locations (e.g. white, middle-class, men, with important 
exceptions) that deviated in small or profound ways from the socially acceptable rules, norms or 
laws that were generally pathologized through psychopathy (although, again, with important 
exceptions).  
Contemporary critical social science research has however, gestured towards the double 
meaning of the normalcy of psychopathy which I am attempting to get at: normal in appearance 
and occupying a normalized social position. For example, Lorna Rhodes has noted that the way 
this ‘normal looking’ subject is imagined more specifically is as “white, middle class and 
‘normal” (2002, 257; emphasis mine). Along similar lines, Paulina García-Del Moral (2014) has 
argued that ‘psychopathy’ is deployed in cases of gendered and racial violence against sex 
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workers as means of pathologizing deviant white men and white women.  She suggests that the 
function of psychopathy at the level of representation to “protect the status of whiteness” by 
evicting transgressive individuals from the national and normative community and thereby 
absolving that very community in the commission of violence (51; I discuss García-Del Moral’s 
work further in Chapter 5).  Rhodes and García-Del Moral’s respective works signal that 
psychopathy and the normalized criminal offender are linked in some way at the level of 
discourse and imagination. This signal becomes particularly acute in the work of Stowell-Smith 
and McKeown (1999; 2001).  
  Mark Stowell-Smith and Mick McKeown (1999) begin their article by presenting 
readers with a curious problematic: while Black males are disproportionately represented in the 
prison population in the United Kingdom, the number of Black males diagnosed and thus 
admitted into secure psychiatric facilities as psychopathic are not proportionate to these numbers.  
In other words, the authors seek to render curious why, given the large number of Black 
offenders in the criminal justice system, their representation among the psychopathic 
classification is not commensurate since psychopathy is often mobilized as an explanation of 
criminal behaviour. They suggest that one way this might be explained is by the bleak prognosis 
of psychopathy as generally untreatable (therefore there is little reason to admit these people into 
hospitals). However, they observe that white offenders are often remanded into custody for this 
very reason suggesting that there are other forces at work.  
  Focusing exclusively on psychiatric reports of men confined to a maximum-security 
hospital in the UK, Stowell-Smith and McKeown seek to understand the discursive structure of 
the admission reports of both white and Black men who are incarcerated as psychopaths.  Their 
empirical material revealed two discursive structures that they describe elsewhere as the 
discourse or narration of “white psychopathy” and “black psychopathy” (2001, 162). The first 
discursive structure contoured how white male psychopaths were shaped in the reports and they 
describe this discourse as being “characterized by a narration of the patient’s life events and 
history concurrent with a commentary upon his internal experience of, and relationship to these 
events.  The internal experience is located as something that determines dangerous behaviour” 
(1999, 463). They observe (1999; 2001) that experiences such as trauma, divorce and death and 
the patient’s emotional reaction to these experiences were pivotal in shaping the patient’s reality, 
and, are in large part seen as contributing to their criminality. In this way, criminal behaviour 
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was seen as “the outer expression of the patient’s internal chaos” [read: psychopathy] (1999, 
468).  
In contrast, the discourse of “black psychopathy” is broadly characterized as ‘external’ 
and as focusing on “outer” experiences.  Here, they note, there is very little (if any) concern with 
emotional turmoil brought on by past experience as contributing to their present criminal 
behaviour. Instead Stowell-Smith and McKeown describe these reports as “flat descriptions of 
behaviour”, that do not provide “insight into the patients’ mental life” and especially the 
psychological context that made these Black inmates vulnerable to criminal behaviour (1999, 
465); “dangerous behaviour is made to appear from out of nowhere” (466).  In sum, they argue 
that “with respect to understandings of mental health, the white factors were largely anti-
biological, and tended to emphasize notions of individuality and internally experienced 
psychopathology.  In contrast, the Black accounts de-emphasized the importance of individual 
psychological phenomena, with one supporting a biological understanding of causation of mental 
disorder, linking this with race” (2001, 161).   
The disparity that they observe in the reports of white male offenders and Black male 
offenders is explained by how stereotypical conceptions of race infiltrate forensic and psychiatric 
contexts and inform how patients and offenders are constructed within these types of institutions.  
The emphasis on the “inner chaos” of white male offenders and the pure behaviour of Black 
male offenders, they argue, is part of a “wider cultural tradition within the west in which there is, 
on the one hand, a focus upon the physicality of the Black man and, on the other, a post-
Enlightenment representation of the thinking, rational white male self” (1999, 469).  
 The findings of Stowell-Smith and McKeown are interesting because their research 
doesn’t explore the correlation between race and psychopathy as much of the psychological 
literature in this area does, but rather they use a critical and discursive approach for reading 
psychiatric practices and documents by exploring the differences in how Black and white male 
offenders are conceptualized in relation to psychopathy, with keen attention being placed on how 
race and racial perceptions come to inform this pathologization process. Their study certainly 
sheds light on their opening problematic by acknowledging that racialized offenders, and Black 
offenders in particular, are less likely to be admitted into secure psychiatric facilities under the 
category of psychopathy. Their analysis also invites a certain curiosity about how imaginings of 
psychopathy rely on socio-cultural signposts, visible on the body (i.e. identity and difference), in 
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order for psychopathy to be a consideration in the first instance and how identity and difference 
affect how criminality is imagined in the context of psychopathy.   
Despite the fact that the popular image of the psychopath is “a white man” (Rhodes 2002, 
457), and despite the fact that Hare has clearly noted that psychopathy is not a condition that 
discriminates, rather “psychopathy is found in every race, culture, society and walk of life” 
(1999, 1), there is a paucity of research that investigates how discourses of identity and 
difference are enveloped in contemporary imaginings of psychopathy and ‘the psychopath’ in the 
same way as critical historical scholars have. Stowell-Smith and McKeown’s (1999; 2001) work 
is the only work that I have been able to find that has unpacked how discourses of identity and 
difference affect how contemporary psychopathy is imagined and deployed.  Their work 
provides me with a critical entry point into thinking about a number of different aspects of 
psychopathy that are not readily discussed in the literature.   
The first is that to my knowledge, there are no studies which attempt to bridge historical 
insights about how psychopathy is imagined through the body in the contemporary context. As I 
mention above, there is a small, but significant group of historical scholars who have carried out 
truly eloquent and critical analyses of moral insanity and psychopathy and whose works have 
demonstrated that diagnoses of psychopathy as well as key historical figures in psychopathy 
research have relied on expectations, assumptions, narratives, and discourses about identity to 
constitute the psychopathic subject. As a case in point, Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun’s (2015) 
social scientific critique of psychopathy, which is, to my knowledge, the most recent social 
science work on the topic, does not question how discourses of identity and difference come to 
contour modern psychopathy research.  The authors conceptualize modern psychopathy research 
as an extension, in some respects, of degeneration theory which Lombroso’s born criminal 
theory was based on.  Interestingly the authors highlight that the characteristics of the 
‘degenerate’ and the born criminal were historically defined “in contrast to prevailing middle-
class ideals of conduct, dress, company, occupation and physique” (9).  They also recognize that 
gender and sexuality have been significant for the way in which psychopathy was historically 
diagnosed, where ‘homosexuality’ was considered a symptom of psychopathy in the twentieth 
century and why women who engaged in sexual behaviours that were deemed inappropriate 
according to prevailing early twentieth century middle-class gender norms were diagnosed as 
psychopaths (166-167). Highlighting that “psychopathy and sex is as much of a cultural tradition 
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as the belief in the biological cause of evil is” (166; emphasis mine), the authors have an 
appreciation for the bodily contingencies of psychopathy (at least historically), but they do not 
question how these very same logics/links play out in contemporary representations of 
psychopathy.  
Second, no one has questioned how contemporary psychopathy, as an invisible disorder that 
manifests as normalcy and which only becomes visible through transgressive acts, might already 
imply a certain subject—an otherwise normalized subject— which is not routinely associated 
with crime (Stowell-Smith and McKeown get at something similar in their study, but they do not 
enter the conversation from this standpoint). This is especially interesting given our current 
context where criminality as a sign remains firmly, and sometimes, fatally wedded to racialized 
bodies, and yet racialized subjects, as Stowell-Smith and McKeown (1999; 2001) have 
demonstrated, are rarely labelled psychopaths.  Exploring this cornerstone of the psychopathic 
personality—the psychopath’s deceptive normalcy in relation to the bodily contingencies that 
affect how we come to imagine criminality— is to suggest that the normalcy of the psychopath 
may be conceptualized as having a double meaning: the psychopath does not simply appear 
normal in their character, appearance, intelligence and so on (as the research on psychopathy 
makes abundantly clear), but also occupies a normalized subject location for which dominant 
discourses and stereotypical images of criminality do not apply.  
Finally, and relatedly, psychopathy continues to be the way in which unintelligible 
transgressions, and ‘evil’ are explained (McKeown and Stowell-Smith 2006, 110). Historically, 
as Foucault (1978) has explained and as I noted above, the unintelligible transgression or 
motiveless crime has referred to a transgressor who was/is not ‘mad’ in the ‘proper’ sense of the 
term and who is also not normal because their acts lack reason. This kind of unintelligible 
transgression (i.e. that defied common understandings of insanity and rationality) could not be 
apprehended or explained until the birth of criminal pathologies, like moral insanity, that were 
designed to account for or explain precisely this kind of transgression.  Following this thread of 
thought (i.e. psychopathy as a means of explaining that which otherwise exceeds explanation) we 
might also wonder to what extent, psychopathy is ushered in to explain crimes and criminals 
whose acts do not fit into traditional and problematic narratives or discourses of crime and 
criminality that usually focus on race, gender, class, sexuality and foreignness.  By this I mean 
those subjects, especially those normalized subjects, who do not have stock discourses or 
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narratives of criminality readily available to explain and denounce their transgressions and social 
group(s) to which they belong (e.g. think of the work that the criminalization of race does).  In 
this way then, we can see how criminal acts by normalized subjects can also be relegated to the 
realm of unintelligibility and we can question how psychopathy comes to render the 
unimaginable imaginable.  
In sum, these are some of the gaps that I see in the social science literature on psychopathy 
and therefore, they are the dynamics that I explore in this dissertation.  The contribution that I 
hope to make is to make the imagined invisibility/normalcy of psychopathy visible by exploring 
how psychopathy is represented and the kinds of assumptions and expectations that inform its 
deployment.  
Normalization, Criminalization and Representation 
 
 In addition to this project being born from my interest in research on psychopathy, it has 
also been inspired by a specific strand of critical criminological research that attends to the 
intersections between crime, representation and interlocking identities.  
 In contrast to orthodox criminology which is centred upon the individual and seeks to 
determine the nature and cause of criminality, critical criminology generally emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s as a direct critique of this orientation by looking to the historical, social, 
political and economic context and contingencies of crime, criminality and punishment. While 
critical criminology refers to a diverse collection of theoretical orientations, what binds these 
approaches under the banner of critical criminology are a number of core propositions, namely 
they reject the idea that individual flaws are behind criminality and instead look to the larger 
context whereby crime is defined, acted out, identified and punished (Brooks 2008, 54).  
Of particular salience to the critical school are the linked processes of marginalization and 
criminalization and the power relations on which these processes depend. Thus, identity and 
difference—one’s social positions in the larger social order—informs how these linked processes 
play out and, crucially, how they effect the lived experiences of individuals or groups and their 
interaction with the criminal justice system. Critical criminologists then are interested in 
“examin[ing] how some individuals or groups come to be defined as ‘criminals’—as immoral or 
abnormal or simply ‘bad’—and conclude that this stigma is often not because of what they have 
done but because of who they are and where they fit into Canada’s social and economic system” 
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(Schissel and Brooks 2008, 6; emphasis mine).  This concern with the interlocking nature of both 
marginalization and criminalization has led to studies which have documented the ways in which 
race, socio-economic status, age, sexual marginalization and gender have been criminalized and 
punished for not abiding to legal and social norms and the social structures and systems of power 
that make these experiences possible (e.g. Mirchandani and Chan 2002; Jiwani 2002; Comack 
2006ab; Chesney-Lind and Eliason 2006). 
Of the many things that critical criminological research has shown us are the ways that 
discourses, images, narratives and ideologies come to constitute not only subjectivities but our 
ideas about transgression.  In general, we have learned that definitions of crime are contingent 
upon, not an ‘objective’ criteria of harm, but are sensitive to historical context, social, political 
and economic factors and cultural norms specific to a place and time (Kramer 2011, 4). And, that 
definitions of crime “reflect and reproduce power relations within a given society” and its 
differential effects on individuals and groups based on their positioning within existing power 
relations (4).  Criminalization and marginalization are often intertwined (Brooks and Schissel 
2008).  
 What has not been explicitly attended to (until recently) are the ways in which these very 
same discourses, images, narratives, ideologies and systems of power which criminalize the 
marginalized, also simultaneously, construct other individuals and groups as ‘normal’. Such an 
exploration is important given that “the specter of the normal body, be it a white, heterosexual, 
healthy, or male body, is always simultaneously present—even if in shadow form—in discourses 
of deviance” (Urla and Terry 1995, 5). Taking stock of the mutual contingency of both the 
margins and the centre recognizes that criminalization and normalization are relational processes 
that enable subjectivities to form in particular kinds of ways (Razack 1998b).  
 In recent years, we have seen somewhat of a small, but important, shift in critical 
criminological research concerning gender and race.  Instead of researchers simply focusing on 
how criminalization occurs at the margins, criminologists have begun to question how the 
normalized centre organizes the margins and vice versa. This shift follows the lead of the social 
sciences more generally in an effort to make visible the dominant and largely invisible systems 
and identities that have evaded critical scrutiny because of the normalizing and hegemonic power 
they wield (Brock, Raby and Thomas 2012). Making these systems of power visible is incredibly 
important because it is the norms or ideals of these systems of power (e.g. whiteness, 
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heternormativity, patriarchy, middle-classness) that structure or organize social relations in 
profound ways (Brock, Raby and Thomas 2012). While the focus on marginalized groups and 
identities has long made sense given the ways in which social scientific thought, including 
criminological thought, have suppressed marginalized histories and profoundly contributed to 
experiences of oppression and social injustices, scholars now realize that to exclusively 
investigate conditions of oppression, discrimination, marginalization, and criminalization is to 
miss part of the very conditions that make these oppressive realities possible (S. Hall 1997c) and, 
which keep the criminal frame centred on the marginalized, as though these are the only subjects 
who participate in crime (Brock, Raby and Thomas 2012, 4).   
It is important to recognize from the outset, however, that this intellectual move to the 
centre is not meant to deprioritize the lives, histories and experiences of those who have been 
systematically relegated to the margins or to negate the resiliency of those who struggle to rise 
against the systems of power and conditions that continually render them ‘Other’.  Nor is it to re-
centre the white, middle-class, heterosexual male. Instead, this move is meant to do precisely the 
opposite—to make visible those dominant, taken-for-granted, largely unproblematized identities 
and systems of power which constitute the normalized subject as such, impact social relations 
and ways of seeing/knowing, and which have historically not been subject to examination and 
critique (Brock, Raby and Thomas 2012, 4).  By focusing our attention on the systems of power 
that interlock to produce normalized and marginalized subjects (e.g. whiteness, patriarchy, 
middle-classness, heterosexuality and so on), we can begin to gain a deeper and possibly a more 
comprehensive understanding of the conditions, ways of thinking and relationalities that make 
certain subjectivities and experiences at the margins possible and that give them their form in an 
attempt to dismantle it (Brock, Raby and Thomas 2012, 4; Razack 1998b).  
Below I review some of the literature in critical criminology that has sought to examine 
how these systems of power inform how normalized subjects are represented as criminal and/or 
transgressive. Thus far, these studies have predominantly focused on whiteness and masculinity.  
I pay particular attention to works that have focused on representations since this is how I am 
methodologically oriented to the research (see Chapter 2).  
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Representing Violence and Hegemonic Masculinity 
 
To a large degree the well-documented public ‘fear of crime’ is, in effect, a fear of 
men: of men as potential burglars, of men as physical attackers, of men who steal, 
deceive and kill, men who abuse, injure, harm and maim. It is a fear of the slow drip 
of men’s violences against women, children, and other men, the unforeseen (and 
foreseen) consequences of men’s business and corporate actions. Most crimes 
remain unimaginable without the presence of men (Jefferson 1992). (Collier 1998, 2) 
 
 Men and masculinity have long been a problem for criminology, although this is not 
something that would be immediately apparent.  Despite the fact that men commit the majority 
of crimes and the majority of more serious crimes to the extent that sex (and age) are “the 
strongest predictor of criminal involvement” (Collier 1998, 2; see also Ruthann Lee 2014), 
gender analyses of crime have tended to focus exclusively on ‘deviant’ women (Comack 2006a) 
and have consequently rendered the ‘maleness’ of crime invisible (Collier 1998; Tomsen 2008). 
In other words, the association between masculinity and criminality has become so normalized, 
so commonplace that we often fail to recognize that crime and representations of it are largely 
dominated by men.   
  This is, of course, not to suggest that men in general have been historically ignored in 
criminology. Indeed, quite the opposite. It was on these grounds, among others, that feminists 
intervened in criminology and provided a scathing critique of the “decidedly male-centric” 
discipline in terms of both who was conducting research and who the central research subjects 
were (Comack 2006a, 22). Despite the centrality of men to the discipline and to research, the 
gendered nature of men’s offending had until the 1990s gone unremarked: “criminology has 
failed to address what has been come to be known as the ‘gender of crime’ itself. It has failed to 
address the ‘masculinity’ or ‘maleness’ of crimes, the crimes of men as men” (Collier 1998, 2-3). 
These feminist-inspired critiques of criminology, “hitherto” gave the ‘problem with no name’—
the criminalized behaviour of men—a name at last: the problem of masculinity” (Collier 1998, 
6), thus, marking the beginning of “criminology’s masculinity turn” (5).  
 Feminism was a formative feature of this turn and as such intersectionality became a key 
feature in how masculinity was conceptualized. According to R.W. Connell and James 
Messerschimdt (2005), masculinity is a relational and an historically contingent social construct 
that is never fixed. As a dynamic concept, masculinity may not be embodied or enacted in one 
way; that is, it has different meanings and expressions depending on context.  Intersectionality is 
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particularly important to the concept, as its meaning and expression is contingent upon other 
social locations (i.e. it is relational) and is affected by them. Therefore, to capture the 
contingencies of masculinity as well as the hierarchies between men and the plurality that it 
gives rise to, masculinity is often rephrased as masculinities. Given that masculinities are plural 
and ranked hierarchically, the terms hegemonic masculinity and subordinate masculinities are 
often used. According to the authors, hegemonic masculinity refers to an idealized and 
normalized configuration of masculinity which is usually unattainable (846), whereas 
subordinate masculinities refers to those manifestations or expressions of masculinity which do 
not adhere to the prescriptions of normative or hegemonic masculinity. Exploring masculinity in 
criminology is certainly significant, but can only be reasonably done using an intersectional 
approach that recognizes masculinities because as Tomsen wearily remarks, a “gender-centric 
analysis of criminality […] could overlook a skewed criminali[z]ation process that frequently 
targets, criminali[z]es and punishes men and boys from disadvantaged and marginal social 
settings” (2008, 94). 
 One of the reasons that Stephen Tomsen (2008) has provided to explain why gender in 
the context of masculinity has largely been ignored, is that criminologists, operating from the 
premise of ‘male as norm’, overlooked the question of gender and consequently naturalized or 
degendered male offenders (see also Collier 1998).  What was often prioritized instead, and this 
is the problem that Collier is gesturing at in the above quote, is that criminologists have not only 
failed to address the problem of masculinity specifically, but that it has instead focused on the 
marginalized identities of men who offend instead of discussing gender (e.g. such as male youth, 
racialized men, and poor men; e.g. Collier 1997; Comack 2006a; Tomsen 2008). That is, when 
attention is paid to men’s identities in relation to crime, what is often emphasized is the 
difference of these subjects to the ‘average white male’, while the norm itself seems to escape 
our attention.  The danger posed by criminality has always been and continues to be framed in 
such a way that the potential dangerousness of men is framed in opposition to male-as-norm 
whereby dangerous men are construed as men who are Other (Collier 1997).  For example, 
Elizabeth Comack has pointed out that general theories of crime have not only taken gender for 
granted when studies are primarily about men, but they have also taken the fact that most of 
these studies were about “poor inner-city black men” for granted (2006, 23). While social 
structural theorizing came to replace biological theorizing about crime, the fact remains that the 
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lens changed, but the direction in which criminologists looked remained the same, leaving the 
criminal frame focused on poor, people of colour, and disorganized neighbourhoods.  This 
emphasis on so-called ‘deviant’ or ‘subjugated masculinities’ has left hegemonic masculinity, 
and especially white hegemonic masculinity unacknowledged in criminological conversations 
(until relatively recently) and outside of the dominant criminal frame. This is, of course, not to 
deny the important work that is being done in critical criminology and its emphasis on 
interlocking structural oppressions that contour the lived experiences of marginalized groups in 
profound ways. It is instead to ask that we disrupt the image that these kinds of studies help to 
maintain—an image of criminality focused on the socially marginalized and a recognition that 
crime is phenomenon that exists beyond these peoples and communities. Additionally, this way 
of seeing the criminal potentialities of men is incredibly problematic because it reaffirms 
racialized and gendered stereotypes of criminality as well as white, male middle-class privilege. 
According to Mia Consalvo (2003), analyses focused on how masculinity (especially in 
its hegemonic iterations) is represented in the context of violence has only recently gained 
attention. What unites these scholars’ interest in representation, criminality and masculinity is 
their interest in how hegemonic masculinity as a benchmark from which all men are judged and 
as a structural force is rarely discussed in the news media. Rejecting an essentializing approach 
to sex and gender, scholars like Collier (1997), Consalvo (2003), and Kimmel and Mahler (2003) 
question how hegemonic gender norms structure (but do not determine) action, the ways that 
these actions are represented as well as how gender and hegemonic masculinity is enacted and 
reconstructed through violent crime.  
Richard Collier (1997), in his analysis of press discourse of a spree killing perpetrated by 
Thomas Hamilton in Dunblane, Scotland in 1996, encourages us to think about how masculinity 
is readily absent from popular accounts of crime.  Instead, he notes that in the wake of horrific 
episodes of violence questions surrounding the problem of guns, for example, usually emerge as 
a pressing social problem.  As a result, what is often missed in cases that involve spree killings is 
reporting that appreciates the crime is a “gendered and distinctly masculinized phenomenon” 
(178). It is Collier’s objective then, to re-read press accounts of the crime in light of this glaring 
omission.   
In general, Collier highlights that Hamilton was represented in the press as “inhuman”, 
“evil” and a “monster” and Collier argues that these constructions effectively “robs the act of the 
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murders and the body of the murderer of its sexual specificity” (180). In an attempt to counter 
this individualizing and degendering representational tactic, Collier’s analysis seeks to position 
Hamilton and his crimes in a gendered social context. To anchor his analysis, Collier focuses on 
the how discourses of hetero-masculinity and the “heterosexual familial frame” are contouring 
how Hamilton and his crimes were understood and portrayed.  The notion of the family was 
central in making Hamilton appear as outside the boundaries of the “noncriminal community” of 
Dunblane (182).  Collier explains that Hamilton was regularly referred to as a “loner” and 
constructed with the “iconography of male otherness” as a “single male outsider” who was 
without friends and without a family of his own. Collier argues that the image of the lone 
gunman, spree killer also relies on heavily gendered ideas; that is, discourses of masculinity are 
present but only insofar as they evict him from the noncriminal community through his perceived 
otherness (i.e. single male). Although gender is far from apparent in this construal, Collier 
suggests that it is undergirding it nonetheless.  
Furthermore, Collier argues that gender continues to be erased through psychological 
theorizing or profiling about the killer’s nature.  The psychological profile of the spree killer also 
encompasses ideas of subjugated masculinity by suggesting that there is something about the 
psychic life of subjugated men in particular —“masculine failure or crisis”— that explains their 
murderous rage (185). Gendered notions like “failed man” (i.e. sexually, financially, 
academically, athletically and so on), “resentment”, “angry”, “lonely” explain the cause of their 
behaviour, as well as the effects—“specifically masculinized forms of violence as a response” 
(186). Collier suggests that one of the issues with framing Hamilton’s criminality as a failed man 
is that it “ultimately […] serves to normalize (if not excuse) men’s criminality. It does so 
because it remains within the positivist and modernist crimino-legal frame which seeks causes in 
terms of ‘maleness’ [biological/essentialist]; but it does not make the sexed specificity of crime 
explicit” (186; emphasis original). 
In order to move away from this essentializing narrative that seeks to render biological 
sex as the ultimate explanation of men’s violence, Collier is curious not about what made 
Hamilton different from noncriminal men, but rather what he shared with them. In order to 
account for this, Collier focuses on the “performativity of masculinity” whereby Hamilton 
“sought to constitute himself as a man” (186). This shift brings Collier to highlight the spate of 
activities that Hamilton was engaged in to “masculinize himself within the ideals of heterosexual 
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masculinity”: being a member of a gun club, participating in a boy’s youth club (e.g. “surrogate 
father-figure”; 192) and through his crimes (i.e. murdering sixteen primary school children and 
their teacher where the primary school is seen as the “embodiment of a ‘feminized’ social 
space”; 187).  By drawing our attention to how gender is implicitly structuring how we are being 
made to know Hamilton, and how the performative ideals of gender are structuring Hamilton’s 
life, Collier invites us to ask critical questions of the link between masculinity and crime. For 
instance, what might it mean to look at cases where men perpetrate extraordinary violence as an 
issue of the ideals of hetero-masculinity (and not issues with the so-called inherent deviance of 
subjugated masculinity)? And, what does Hamilton share with other men (194)?  
Similarly, in her analysis of the news coverage of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris 
(Columbine High School shooters), Consalvo (2003) reveals how the two white, middle-class 
boys were represented.  She notes that gender informed their construction as criminals in a 
number of ways.  Similar to Hamilton, Klebold and Harris were generally represented as 
“monsters” or “deviants”. This portrayal, she argues, differentiates them from ‘normal’ or ‘good’ 
boys, where the latter use violence for ‘heroic’ purposes. More than highlighting the ‘kind’ of 
boys that Kleblod and Harris were thought to be, Consalvo suggests that this discursive strategy 
is also employed to individualize the offenders, so as not to implicate or reflect “society at large” 
(33).  Although gender informed why and how the boys were represented as monsters, Consalvo 
also highlights how this representation is distinctly degendered—the boys are made to appear as 
genderless creatures who are importantly beyond human—and thereby “displac[ing] gender and 
its attributes from examination or potential culpability” (33).   In focusing on the two boys, the 
media, Consalvo suggests, ignored the ways in which social hierarchies in high schools 
(especially between ‘jocks’ and ‘geeks’) contributed to their subordinate status without 
unpacking how the ideals of hegemonic masculinity contribute to this school culture. Consalvo 
concludes that this way of representing the boys leaves little room for exploring the problems 
with “school culture, whiteness and the hierarchic structure of masculinities” and instead 
refocuses the problem on individual boys who don’t fit in to idealized standards, and renders 
these ‘kinds’ of misfits potentially dangerous “monsters-in-waiting” (40).     
 Both Collier and Consalvo’s work emphasize a number of common themes: how 
representations of violent men as monsters or evil seek to individualize, degender and remove 
these actors from the realm of the social. They also highlight how profoundly gendered 
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norms/ideals structure how we see, think about and represent criminality.  But more than this, 
they also encourage us to think about how violent transgression (i.e. crime and/or deviance) may 
be caused by an impossibly attainable normative aspiration—hegemonic masculinity (see also 
Kimmel and Mahler 2003).  While hegemonic masculinity is certainly significant for 
understanding how we come to imagine, represent and act on crime (especially violent crime), 
our imagination of crime is never done with gender alone. In the last year or so, critical 
criminologists have turned their attention to whiteness in an explicit and substantive way. 
 
Whiteness, Criminality and Representation 
 
We had to develop a methodology that taught us to attend, not only to what people said about race 
but…to what people could not say about race, it was the silences that told us something; it was what 
wasn’t there, it was what was invisible, what couldn’t be put into frame, what was apparently 
unsayable that we needed to attend to. (Stuart Hall 1992 quoted in Smith 2014, 107)   
 
Racial and ethnic inequality is, after all, a white problem. (Barken 2010 quoted in Smith 2014, 107). 
 
 Race has long been a source of interest, conversation and debate within the field of 
criminology and for good reason. Countless scholars have revealed the historical roots of the 
criminalization of race in the American context (Russell 1998; Davis 2003; Muhammad 2010) in 
addition to explaining how these processes unfold in contemporary criminal justice practices and 
in representations of crime and criminality (Russell 1998; Davis 2003; Rome 2004). If race and 
crime have become inextricably linked in images and imaginings of crime, the young Black 
male, in contemporary North American society, becomes the general, undifferentiated body that 
signifies violent crime— the “criminalblackman” (Russell 1998; Rome 2004).  In our time, 
“talking about crime is talking about race” (Barlow 1998 quoted in Welch 2007, 276).   
 Wendy Chan and Dorothy Chunn (2014) explain the significance of race in a Canadian 
criminal justice context. Drawing on the work of David Tanovich (2006), they note that “the 
colour of justice in Canada is white. To be non-white in the Canadian justice system is to be 
more likely viewed as a crime suspect than a crime victim, to experience higher levels of 
policing and surveillance, to receive harsher penalties if criminally convicted, and most 
alarmingly to be at a far greater risk of being shot by the police” (xiv).  In their book, Chan and 
Chunn (2014) detail the structural and institutional conditions under which social policies and 
criminal justice practices are carried out and how these negatively affect how marginalized 
groups are treated by the criminal justice system and how they, in turn, become seen as ‘the 
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problem’. Importantly, as Chan and Chunn note, the conditions and practices that powerfully 
create this reality, is in no small part due to the normative social order, which is ordered by 
middle-class, neo-liberal sensibilities, whiteness and the “maleness” of the criminal justice 
system (xv-xvii). This order, they note, not only recreates a hierarchy among people and groups 
but it is also used as the measuring rod by which behaviours are judged (xv and 30-32). For 
example, they note that racialized men and women are much more likely to be viewed as 
criminals than victims when variables other than race are controlled for (e.g. class status; 2014, 
28). Furthermore, and as a case in point, they remind us of the case of Donald Marshall, an 
Aboriginal man who was wrongly convicted of murder, even though a white man—Roy 
Ebsary—had admitted to the murder to people other than the police. Here, they note, we have “a 
graphic illustration of how readily criminal justice agents and the general public presume guilt 
when a suspect is racialized” (29).  Additionally, they note how this same racial logic that allows 
racialized individuals to perpetually appear more criminally suspect, translates into being seen as 
uncreditable victims when racialized individuals are victims of heinous crimes (29-30; I discuss 
this in more depth in Chapters 5 and 6).  
Many differently racialized groups have become symbolically and, as a result of implicit 
and explicit racial biases (such as racial profiling policing techniques), physically associated with 
certain crimes. Colin Webster (2007) argues that the persistence of this link between race and 
crime can be explained, in part, by the enduring influence of criminal anthropology.  He states 
that this tradition “assumed that social deviants in general, and criminals in particular, were 
biologically and culturally inferior to ‘normal’ populations, and their inferiority was visible in 
their physical appearance. Comportment, body shape, dress and physical looks continue to have 
popular salience in stigmatizing groups, especially the poor and criminal ‘underclass’, often in 
racialized ways” (12). Thus, the body has been, and continues to be a site where criminal 
imaginaries are grafted, produced and reproduced. These criminal imaginaries are buffered by 
the assumed visuality of race and racial difference.   
Images of crime are but one site where the process of racialization occurs. Images of 
crime and criminality do not simply represent crime and criminality they construct it and in so 
doing they also construct race (Mirchandani and Chan 2002).  Thus, as social processes, 
racialization and criminalization are relational.  This leads to two common representational and 
material practices that Yasmin Jiwani (2002) has termed the “racialization of crime” and the 
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“criminalization of race”.  The racialization of crime refers to “how particular crimes are 
attributed to specific groups” (Jiwani 2002, 69).  As an example, we might variously cite the 
explicitly racial narratives that come to define and render visible certain crimes such as, 
terrorism which is often associated with Arabs and Muslims (Razack 2008) drug trafficking 
which is often attributed to Latino/as, and vice-related crimes with Aboriginal peoples (Rome 
2004). However, it is not simply that the crimes themselves become racialized in representation 
and reality, racialized groups also become criminalized, meaning that these groups are often 
“perceived as being prone to committing crimes” because of some type of imagined biological 
difference that comes to characterize the racialized group as fundamentally different from, and 
more predisposed to committing crimes, than “us”, the dominant racial group (Jiwani 2002, 69).  
Importantly, whites are often left out of, or their actual and potential criminality is abated 
in representations of crime (Russell 1998) and in how we think about crime more generally 
(Delgado 1994). Katheryn Russell notes that this is an interesting occurrence:  
Interestingly, as a group, whites have managed to escape being associated with 
crime.  This would not be so odd if whites were not responsible, in raw numbers, for 
most of the crime that is committed [...] When the media does connect someone 
white with a crime, for example serial murderer Jeffery Dahmer, it does not implicate 
the entire white race. It is notable that phrases such as ‘white crime’ or ‘white-on-
white’ crime are not part of our public lexicon on crime.  (1998, xiv) 
 
In critical iterations of criminology and critical sociological accounts of race and crime, there 
seems to be an implicit bias in the use of the term ‘race’ in that the invocation of the term seems 
to refer exclusively to racialized populations (Smith and Linnemann 2015).  This practice of 
prioritizing the derogated term of the race binary is an important critical practice and one that 
must continue.  However, it is similarly important to have an understanding of the ways in which 
the dominant term of that opposition—white/ness—structures how criminal imaginaries picture 
racialized subjects as perpetually criminal and white subjects as pre-emptively ‘innocent’ 
(Eastman 2015). In other words, it is imperative that we understand how the racialization process 
both criminalizes and normalizes certain subjects.  
In recent years, sociologists and criminologists who are interested in representations of 
race and crime have highlighted this practice of white erasure from discussions of race and crime 
as Delgado (1994), Russell (1998) Rome (2004) do. However, until recently, none have seriously 
or systematically attended to it.  In 2014, Justin Smith published an article entitled Interrogating 
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Whiteness Within Criminology and called for critical criminologists to do just as the title of his 
article suggests, interrogate whiteness and to de-normalize and de-naturalize whiteness in how 
we think about crime, criminal behaviour and the administration of justice (108).  Grounded in a 
critique of the discipline for failing to integrate the theoretical insights of critical whiteness 
studies into criminological research, Smith argues that criminologists must examine the ways in 
which “White identities and whiteness shape and are shaped by perceptions of justice, crime and 
social control” (107). The integration of whiteness in criminology is “necessary” given the 
significance of race in the way that crime and criminal are imagined as well as the ways in which 
criminal justice is carried out (Smith 2014) because “we are less equipped to explicitly address 
the causes and consequences of white privilege and how they are wrapped up in criminal justice 
processes and the social construction of crime” (Smith and Linnemann 2015, 102).  A critical 
attentiveness to whiteness does not suggest that, as Smith and Linnemann note, whiteness should 
be “push[ed] to the forefront of criminological analysis—far from it” (2015, 101). Instead it 
means to recognize that race is “a dialectically constructed social phenomenon in order to 
apprehend the ways in which whiteness and white identity help to perpetuate disparate social 
relations” (p.101).   
Since Smith’s call to critically interrogate whiteness in criminology, there has been a 
slight increase in the scholarship in this area (namely a special issue on the topic in the journal 
Contemporary Justice Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative Justice). Thus far, 
there seem to be at least two themes that continuously emerge in critical studies of whiteness and 
crime.  The first theme makes manifest the widespread dis-association between normative 
whiteness and criminality. That is, unlike the uniform criminalization of Blackness for example, 
whiteness confers the privilege of not being seen/known as criminally suspect. “White 
innocence” engenders the assumption that (normalized) white people, in general, do not usually 
engage in criminal activities and positive prejudices are imputed (e.g. morally upstanding, 
professionals, successful, benevolent, considerate and so on; Eastman 2015).  However, this 
assumption also implies that when normalized white people do commit crimes they are seen as 
individuals, as exceptions to the norm. In these instances, Jason Eastman has argued that the 
frame of “white innocence” is used “to rationalize, excuse and overlook the white deviance that 
occurs” by attributing it to a “few bad apples” (2015, 239).   
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The second theme is connected to the first.  Whiteness in the context of crime is pre-
emptively imputed with innocence and this assignment protects or shields normalized white 
bodies from the stigma of criminality.  What follows then, are discursive strategies that explain 
and reconstitute the subjectivities of normalized white subjects so as to render them deviant, but 
also as exceptions. This process facilitates their eviction from the normative white un-criminal 
community so as to secure the symbolic boundaries of normative whiteness (Webster 2008; 
Mingus and Zopf 2010; García- Del Moral 2011; Linnemann and Wall 2013; Eastman 2015; 
Heitzeg 2015; Dirks, Heldman and Zack 2015). This has been shown to happen in a couple of 
ways: through ‘white trash’ and pathologization. As we will see, both of these discursive 
strategies—‘white trash’ and pathologization—can be considered what Danielle Dirks, Caroline 
Heldman and Emma Zack have called “white protectionism” which refers to “the work that 
whites engage in to protect the ‘set of social and symbolic boundaries that give shape, meaning 
and power to the social category white’(Wray 2006, p.6)” (2015, 162). ‘White trash’ and 
pathologization both work, in different ways, to not only explain white criminality, but also to 
guard and protect the boundaries of whiteness by expectionalizing and evicting those groups or 
individuals who threaten its normative image and dominance.  In so doing the ‘social and 
symbolic boundaries’ of whiteness are re-inscribed and reaffirmed through the process of 
differentiation and expulsion.  
 
‘White trash’ 
 
 One of the earliest critical studies of whiteness in criminology which dealt with whiteness 
explicitly and substantively, to my knowledge, is the work of Colin Webster (2008).  Webster, in 
his article, questions why whiteness has not been taken up by criminologists in their discussions 
of race and crime, given that “whites disproportionally offend compared to other ethnic groups 
and obviously commit the vast bulk of crimes” (294).  In postulating a potential reason for this 
omission, Webster notes that the issue has largely been how to think about whiteness as 
something other than “privilege, power and superiority” (294). Although he does not deny that 
whiteness confers privilege, this does not hold true in all instance as was/is the case for Jews, 
‘Gypsies’ and the Irish; therefore, he asks what could be gained from understanding whiteness in 
a less reductionistic way (i.e. as only conferring privilege) (294)?  Thus, Webster focuses on 
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instances where white identities intersect with working class identities, to construct a 
marginalized white ethnicity, and how these ‘marginalized white ethnicities’ are seen as both 
deviant and criminal.  
Tracing what he terms “marginalized white ethnicity” through the racial sciences that 
emerged in the nineteenth century, which were mostly influenced by theories of degeneracy and 
heredity, Webster highlights the precariousness of whiteness, using ‘white trash’ as a case in 
point.  ‘White trash’, which includes whites who are seen as far from the image of respectability 
that is idealized as characterizing the race, emerges as a figure who embodies “pollution, excess 
and worklessness” (298).  Importantly, this discourse combines and resolves two seemingly 
contradictory characteristics: being “both white and degenerate” (298).  In order to distance this 
group of ‘degenerate’ whites from their more respectable white counterparts, Webster notes that 
racial scientists ‘got around this’ conundrum of being similarly characterized as ‘white’ by 
suggesting,  
That despite the fact that these families were obviously white; poor whites were ‘the 
worst of the race’ through their hereditary.  Hereditary degeneration was seen in the 
physical markers of race—although emphasizing ‘stature’ and ‘comportment’ rather 
than skin color—ensuring that class distinctions were encompassed by racial 
discourse. (298) 
  
This process of differentiation on the basis of class and comportment helped scientists to explain 
why poor (marginalized) whites were more prone to deviance and criminality.   
Turning to the contemporary context, Webster argues that these same stereotypical 
images of poor and ‘degenerate’ whites (‘white trash’) remain firmly intact. While part of his 
argument is to demonstrate the hierarchy of whiteness (whiteness does not always simply signify 
privilege or power), he also demonstrates that the ways in which marginalized white men are 
criminalized in ways that are distinct from, but also similar to, the criminalization of Black men.  
The policing of white youths in Edinburgh, is an example of the ways in which “the police make 
distinctions about the respectable and the unrespectable based on social class status—that do not 
always take account of serious and persistent offending—to construct a population of permanent 
suspects” (306).  In this example, and characteristic of Webster’s argument on the whole, is a 
confluence of class contempt and racism which he argues enables the “drawing [of] distinctions 
between different sorts of ‘whiteness’ deemed inferior or superior according to attributions of 
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‘degeneracy’, ‘respectability’, anti-social behaviour, criminality, the body, appearance, 
hereditability, class contempt is shown to be social and racial” (308).   
Travis Linnemann and Tyler Wall (2013) also explore representations of whiteness and 
crime through the trope of ‘white trash’.   Focusing exclusively on a contemporary anti-meth 
campaign called ‘Faces of Meth’, which relies principally on mug shots of offenders who are 
known to use meth (i.e. crystal methamphetamines), the images depict the physical changes that 
bodies undergo while on meth which is depicted by using before and after images. Linnemann 
and Wall characterize this as a “pedagogical policing” tactic for the way in which it combines 
powerful and grotesque visual imagery of the effects of drug use on the body’s physical 
appearance as well as the intention of deterrence (317). An important feature of the mug shots 
that are used is that they all represent white bodies, helping to bring visibility to white crime 
(323).  However, the authors are critical of the representational association made between ‘white 
trash’ and meth, arguing that such a link works to “provide penal spectators very specific 
photographic evidence of the criminality lurking in their community—threatening its stability” 
(324).  Here, the producers of the campaign seek to use the images as a punitive spectacle to 
elevate anxieties (intended as a mechanism of deterrence) not only about meth, but also, racial 
anxieties about the ‘white underclass’ and their ability to defile hegemonic whiteness.  Their 
study, like Webster’s (2008), highlights the precariousness of whiteness in the context of this 
specific campaign.   
While these were some of the earlier studies which sought to critically examine whiteness 
in criminology, what remains to be seen from these discussions of representations of whiteness 
and criminality, is how normative or hegemonic whiteness fits into questions of criminality.  
While I would not deny that these kinds of analyses are certainly revealing of the limits or 
precariousness of whiteness, I simply wonder why it is so difficult to speak of crime and 
whiteness without recourse to other historically marginalized social identities that question the 
status of whiteness (e.g. class). Yes, Webster’s attempt to treat whiteness in a less reductionistic 
way more accurately represents the lived realities of specific white ethnic communities in 
specific places and at specific points in time, but I think a glaring issue remains. Studies, like 
Webster’s and Linnemann and Wall’s, while they bring whiteness into conversation with 
criminology and they tell an important aspect of the larger, more complex story of race in the 
west, the issue remains: the dominant/ ‘normative’ or the white, heterosexual male subject 
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remains largely invisible in criminological discourse and discourses of criminality. 
Consequently, this is also how this subject position remains both privileged and a powerful 
signifier of normalcy.  It is precisely at this juncture that the next ‘wave’ of research arguably 
seeks to intervene.    
 
Pathologization 
 
  Another discursive strategy that is often used to explain white criminality is by 
pathologizing the individual behind the crime. This is a cultural practice highlighted by William 
Mingus and Bradley Zopf (2010) in their study of mass shootings in the United States. Their 
research is a comparative study of four cases of mass shootings where two shootings were 
perpetrated by whites and two by non-whites. Their argument is that in the instances where the 
perpetrators were white, race undergoes a type of systematic erasure in the representation of the 
event.  The perpetrators, instead of being racially identified, or race serving as an explanation for 
their actions, they are rendered pathological or anomalies within the white racial community. 
They argue that this individualizing move, allows the white community to distance themselves 
from the violence as well as the perpetrator. In explaining/representing criminality in this way, 
race (i.e. whiteness) is not implicated as a relevant or causal factor and the hegemony of 
whiteness is sustained (see also García- Del Moral 2011).  They place this practice in stark 
contrast to representational practices of racialized offenders.  In this context race is not erased, 
but is hyper-visible.  Here, the entire racialized community is implicated in the violence and to 
some extent are held or made to feel culpable.   
Similar to Mingus and Zopf’s study, Nancy Heitzeg (2015) has also observed the 
different ways that white and Black criminality are constructed and represented and how these 
differences are mutually constitutive, where the former is usually pathologized.  In her 
intersectional analysis, Heitzeg highlights quite clearly how normative white offenders are 
regularly constructed as mentally ill, while Black people (whether they have committed a crime 
or not) are habitually criminalized. Her explanation for these divergent accounts of transgression 
is summed up in the concept of the “white racial frame” (198) which she suggests operates as a 
“cultural lens” (200) for how we see crime and criminality.  Accordingly, this way of 
seeing/knowing “largely denies white criminality” and as a result, when confronted with it, it is 
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largely explained through the individualizing narrative of pathology (i.e. the criminal act only 
represents the person who committed the crime, not the community to which they belong). Not 
only do narratives of pathology individualize white criminality, they also help to “divorce 
suspects/offenders from normative whiteness”, thereby maintaining the denial of white 
criminality in general (201). In contrast, the white racial frame has, for centuries, recycled and 
revised the powerful figure of the “criminalblackman”, criminalizing entire racialized groups by 
virtue of race:  
Post slavery, the criminalizing narrative has been a central cultural feature of 
ongoing efforts at oppression; from convict lease/plantation prison farms to the 
contemporary prison industrial complex, the control of Black bodies for profit has 
been furthered by the criminal justice system. ‘Slave codes’ became Black Codes, 
Black Code became gang legislation, three-strikes, and the War on Drugs. This is an 
uninterrupted centuries-old project devoted to the Condemnation of Blackness. (202) 
 
The crux of Heitzeg’s argument is that these constructions of criminality—medicalized vs. 
criminalized— made possible by the white racial frame, leads to very different outcomes (or 
modes of social control) for these two groups in general: for Black offenders, this helps to 
explain their overwhelming incarceration, whereas for white offenders they are often redirected 
to treatment centres for illness/disorder or addiction. This highlights the contingency/relationality 
between (the pathologization of) normative white criminality and (the criminalization of) 
Blackness in the context of crime: the dis-association between whiteness and crime is made 
possible by the very association between racialization and crime and vice versa—“it is the 
normalized, ‘invisible weight’ of whiteness that provides meaning for the differences and crafted 
inferiority of the other” (Smith and Linnemann 2015, 101). Thus, the normalized white subject is 
largely rendered innocent or their criminality is mitigated through discourses of pathology 
(Heitzeg 2015; García- Del Moral 2014).  These representational practices affect not only the 
differential treatment of offenders on the basis of race, but also serve to secure and protect the 
boundaries of normative whiteness. 
 Additionally, Kimberley Tyrell (2007) has explored how stereotypes of (un)criminality 
are both represented and reinforced in movies involving serial killers and she focuses specifically 
on the white, male, heterosexual, middle-class subject. Exploring representations of monstrosity 
in particular, Tyrell argues that while representing the normalized offender as a deviant subject is 
no easy task, she has observed three modes of representation that transform the normalized 
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subject into a deviant and monstrous figure (139).  The first way is by creating a serial killer 
character that has features or characteristics that have already demonised or marginalized in 
contemporary culture, such a femininity, racialized and/or ‘foreign’ signifiers, or someone who 
is gay or a lesbian (140). In this instance, discourses of difference along identity lines allow us to 
imagine the deviancy/criminality of the normalized subject. The second way that the normalized 
subject is represented as deviant is by “fracturing and demonis[ing] conventionally valorised 
categories of dominant identity such as whiteness, heterosexuality, or masculinity” (141). 
Examples of this strategy might include, portraying men as “effeminate” or, as discussed above, 
as “poor white trash” (141).  
The third and final way of representing the normalized subject as deviant “involves the 
hyperbolisation of the killer’s very ‘normality,’ of his remarkable unremarkability and seeming 
blandness; paradoxically, it is precisely this quality of normativity that marks him as monstrous” 
(144).  What is significant about this representation, according to Tyrell, is that the serial killer of 
cinema “do not look like killers, both in the sense of broad stereotypes concerning criminals 
(which tend to be class and race-based), and in terms of their overwhelming apparent 
ordinariness as individuals” (149). This third monster-figure then, is the person that no one 
expected, whose criminality was totally concealed under the banner of his normalized identities 
and is only revealed at the end of the movie (145). Importantly, however, and as Tyrell points 
out, there are specific normative assumptions that inform the representation of the serial killer 
both in the literature and on screen. The image of the serial killer as a white, middle-class, 
heterosexual male—“someone who can hide in plain sight”— according to Tyrell, has become a 
“recurrent trope” that is often seen in serial killer movies (145). However, this subject, she notes, 
is never particularlized even though it is these qualities that allow him to be seen as ‘normal’ (i.e. 
normalized, not a serial killer and not suspicious) and as “anyone, anywhere” (150). As a result, 
Tyrell, similar to those discussed above, points out that the hegemonic, interlocking identities are 
reaffirmed as invisible, normative and thus, meaningless or inconsequential in the representation 
of crime.  
What makes Tyrell’s insights relevant to this study, even though she focuses on fictional 
representations, is the way that she thinks about the normalized subject in relation to serial killer 
discourse, and how the idea of the serial killer as both abnormal and normal or banal is given 
expression in representation through the normalized subject. Additionally, what I found 
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particularly interesting about her argument is how, following the lead of Judith Halberstam, she 
encourages us to think about this form of cinematic representation in more abstract terms by 
seeing the “norm as monstrous” (63; emphasis original):  
The serial killer, then, may be seen to function as a critique or comment on 
contemporary standards or forms of representation, particularly of racial 
stereotyping. The depiction of the serial killer as banal offers an implicit criticism of 
the identity that has been enshrined as normative through its capacity to approximate 
it so closely. The way in which the serial murderer serves to reinscribe certain types 
of identity as normal, even when violet and homicidal […] offers a chilling account 
of broader societal tendencies and standards. (164) 
 
For Tyrell, not only does this mode of representing the serial killer function as a way to make the 
norm visible, strange and open to critique it also, “undermines the notion of whiteness as neutral 
and invisible” which is so often taken for granted in serial killer discourse as well as discourses 
of criminality more generally (i).  
Tyrell’s typology is not only helpful, in that it highlights specific techniques used to 
represent the normalized subject as a criminal subject and how this relies on identity and 
difference, but her argument also sheds light on the importance of shifting our perspective, which 
is, in part what I am trying to do here. Instead of focusing on the socially marginalized as 
criminal and monstrous, her analysis encourages us to think critically about the normalized 
subject position and the norms, assumptions and expectations that make certain forms of 
criminality more shocking, and more difficult to imagine than others.  
In sum, what unites scholars who have examined whiteness critically in the context of 
crime is that in one way or another they have revealed (1) the notion of ‘white innocence’ that 
undergirds criminal imaginings and practices as well as (2) the ways in which criminal white 
subjects are individualized, differentiated and exceptionalized from the normative white 
community through ‘white trash’ (Webster 2008; Linnemann and Wall 2013) or pathologization. 
(Mingus and Zopf 2010; García- Del Moral 2014; Heitzeg 2015; Tyrell 2007). I use these two 
themes, drawn from the literature, to structure this study. 
There are a couple of things that are worth mentioning in terms of what I have found to 
be absent from these works and where my research will make a significant contribution. The first 
is that all of these studies are based in the American context (excluding Stowell-Smith and 
McKeown’s work which was based in England), while the Canadian representational terrain has 
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yet to be thoroughly explored (although, García- Del Moral does examine the Canadian context 
and compares it to the Mexican context; see Chapter 5 for an overview of her work).  Second, 
each of these studies approach the discourse of pathology generally. That is, they do not focus on 
the specific ways that pathology is represented29. Given that pathology has become one of the 
dominant ways in which the criminality of the normalized subject is represented and explained, 
and indeed one of the ways that the normalized subject enters into criminal imaginaries, a more 
detailed study of these processes and practices is warranted.  It is for this reason, along with the 
reasons that I expounded earlier in this chapter, that I focus on psychopathy specifically.30 
Psychopathy represents a critical entry point for thinking about the normalized, un-criminal 
subject in relation to criminality  
To summarize, my hope is that this project will contribute to critical social scientific studies 
on psychopathy and to conversations among critical criminologists interested in the relationship 
between criminalization, representation and identity.  In terms of the former, I hope to bring the 
methodological insights of critical and historical analyses of moral insanity/psychopathy to bear 
on the contemporary context and to bring greater nuance to the ‘normalcy’ that is embedded in 
contemporary representations of psychopathy.  In terms of the latter, I hope to join others who 
have begun to examine how the centre shapes imaginings of criminality at the margins.  As a 
whole, what is particularly unique about my project, is not that I discover something new, but in 
the way that I braid all of the threads (observations, arguments and points of discussion) that 
already exist in the literature to create a space for each of them to be explored and discussed 
together (see Figure 1).  
 
                                                 
29 The only exception to this would be García- Del Moral’s research which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5. However, 
her study, like the others, does not detail why psychopathy is particularly well suited to representing normalized 
offenders.  Instead, she simply points out that Robert Pickton was labelled a psychopath in the news and that this 
served to protect the boundaries of whiteness, although, again, why psychopathy specifically was able to do this 
work was not discussed.  
30 Although Tyrell’s (2007) study resembles my own work in her focus on the normative assumptions that enable the 
serial killer to be constructed as both monstrous (i.e. pathological and aberrant) and “anyone, anywhere” (i.e. 
normative; 150), she does not focus on psychopathy in particular, which has been so closely associated with serial 
murder (Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015). 
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Figure 1. A visual rendering of the insights from the literature that I braid together for thinking 
about contemporary representations of psychopathy and un-criminality.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
current project: 
how is the 
normalized 
subject imagined 
as criminal 
through 
psychopathy?
Historically, psychopathy/moral 
insanity ascribed to white, affluent 
bodies who transgressed norms or 
laws (Rimke 2003; Rafter 2008; 
Lunbeck 1994; Freedman 1987; 
Chenier 2003; Fee 1978; Augstein 
1996)
Central characteristic 
of psychopathy is that 
it presents as 
normalcy; "paradox of 
appearance and 
reality" (Weisman 
2008; Hare 1993)
1. "White Innocence" 
(Eastman 2015)
2. White male criminality 
treated and representated as 
pathologcial (Heitzeg 2015; 
Mingus and Zopf 2010; 
García- Del Moral 2014)
Contemporary 
context psychopath is 
imagined as white 
male (Rhodes 2002; 
Stowell-Smith and 
McKeown 1999; 
2001)
Psychopathy is 
invisible and reveals 
itself only through 
transgressions; "action 
is a refelction of being" 
(Weisman 2008: 198; 
Hare 1999)
105 
 
Chapter 2 
 Imagination as Methodology 
 
How do we imagine criminality? How do we imagine criminality which is unimaginable? How 
does psychopathy render unimaginable criminality, or un-criminality, imaginable? How are 
contemporary imaginings of (un)criminality as psychopathic connected to historical 
representations of psychopathy? How does the body, as a text that purportedly offers an 
assemblage of meaningful signs, figure into this form of representation? 
 
 In the last chapter, I ended by providing a rather simple image of the strands that I weave 
together in this research so that we might be able to see something new. In this chapter, I attempt 
to explain the approach that underwrites how I am thinking about the relationship between 
psychopathy, (un)criminality and the body, on what grounds I brought these strands together, and 
how I came to ask the questions that I do (reproduced above). This way of thinking has allowed 
me to think differently about psychopathy and criminality in comparison to other critical 
researchers who explore contemporary psychopathy (see Chapter 1) and it is this way of thinking 
that I try to make as transparent as possible in this chapter.   
 When researchers bring together different research strands and tools to form an integrated 
whole, this practice/process is often called interdisciplinarity or bricolage (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000; Kincheloe 2001). Using this kind of an approach for thinking about psychopathy involves 
wrestling it away from post/positivist research designs that dominate the field, and then using 
different tools and different kinds of thinking that are at hand to create something new(ish).  
Bricolage implies this practice (Lister and Wells 2000 quoted in van Leeuwan 2005, 8). The 
bricoleur “describes a handyman or handywoman who makes use of the tools available to 
complete a task” (Kincheloe 2001, 680); “a kind of professional do-it-yourself person” (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000, 4). Interdisciplinarity or bricolage, is one of the artefacts of what Joe 
Kincheloe  has termed “the great implosion” of modern science: 
Once understanding of the limits of objective science and its universal knowledge 
escaped from the genie’s bottle, there was no going back. Despite the best efforts to 
recover ‘what was lost’ in the implosion of social science, too many researchers 
understand its socially constructed nature, its value laden products that operate under 
the flag of objectivity, its avoidance of contextual specificities that subvert the 
stability of its structures, and its fragmenting impulse that moves it to fold its 
methodologies and the knowledge that they produce neatly into disciplinary drawers. 
(2001, 681) 
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 As an approach to knowledge production and a characteristic of qualitative research 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000, 4), interdisciplinarity rejects the idea that disciplines are autonomous, 
having their own distinctive theory, methods and subject matter (van Leeuwan 2005); it “refused 
disciplinary claims to political neutrality and objectivity” (Parker and Samantrai 2010, 6); and 
powerfully challenged the Truth claims that were born from systematic scientific study (Parker 
and Samantrai 2010). As a result, qualitative research no longer needs to take place within the 
disciplines, make claims to truth, or parade as objective, apolitical or neutral.  Instead, it is now 
possible to bring an assortment of perspectives, theories, methods to bear on a diversity of 
subjects—like psychopathy—which have been largely dominated by discipline-specific research 
programs. It is through this fusion that the object of study may be understood and constructed 
anew (van Leeuwan 2005) in a way that would have not been possible “within the terms of the 
modern disciplines” (Parker and Samantrai 2010, 14).  
 To approach psychopathy and criminality through an interdisciplinary approach is to 
approach knowledge and knowledge production as “inherently political” (Parker and Samantrai 
2010, 1) and bring it into “productive crisis” by asking how we have come to know and make 
sense of the world as we do (11). Such an undertaking is in alignment with the current landscape 
of qualitative research which “ask[s] that the social sciences and the humanities become sites for 
critical conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation-states, globalization, freedom, 
and community” (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, 3).  
 This chapter is not intended to be a procedural manual that will detail step by step how 
this research was undertaken (although, at times I will do something that resembles this). Instead, 
this chapter should be seen as the conceptual machinery behind this research where I detail not 
only what I did and how I did it, but the thinking that was undergirding these practices. I have 
organized this chapter into three major sections. In the first section, I explain the paradigm that 
structures my own world view and, consequently, how I approach the subject matter of this 
project. I detail Alison Young’s (1996) imagination approach to crime and criminality, and how 
this approach links up with general ‘tenets’ of Michel Foucault (1972; 1978b; 1979) and Stuart 
Hall’s (1997ab) approach to discourse, representation and power. I also discuss the works of 
Stuart Hall (1997c) and Jacqueline Urla and Jennifer Terry (1995) among others to explain how 
they have used these kinds of approaches to think about the body as a text.  In the following two 
sections I turn to ‘method proper’—methods of ‘data’ collection and analysis. I first explain my 
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research design and in particular, why I focus on news representations as my site of 
investigation, how I selected the cases, and how I gathered the textual materials.  In the final 
section, I explain how I read the textual material, reviewing the tools that guided my reading as 
well as the questions that these approaches invited me to think about in my analysis of 
representation.  
The Approach 
  
 Theory has thoroughly informed my orientation to this project from the kinds of works 
that I have read, to the kinds of questions I have asked; my thinking has never left theory to the 
wayside, only to be returned to once I was ready to begin my analysis as the conventional 
research process (based on the scientific method) implies (Guba and Lincoln 2004). Theory has 
been entangled with every aspect this research. Sometimes this entanglement is explicit and at 
other times it is implicit, in either instance my research is informed by a constructivist paradigm, 
and a poststructuralist31 approach in particular (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 6). This view 
understands that questions of ontology and epistemology are blurred. Ontologically, 
poststructuralists do not reject the existence of a material reality, but argue instead that this 
reality is only knowable through language and discourse (i.e. epistemology; Hall 1997b; 
Jørgensen and Phillips 2002).  Stuart Hall, in my view, explains the blurring or interrelationship 
between ontology and epistemology best:  
 
Let me try and make a very simple distinction about two statements which sound as 
if they’re exactly the same, which in my view are absolutely different. The first 
statement is, ‘Nothing meaningful exists outside of discourse.’ I think that statement 
is true. On the other hand, ‘Nothing exists outside of discourse,’ in my view, that 
statement is wrong. The statement, ‘Nothing exists outside of discourse,’ is a sort of 
claim that, as it were, there is no material existence, no material world form, no 
objects out there, and that is patently not the case. But to say that ‘Nothing 
meaningful exists outside of discourse’ is a way of summing up what I think I’ve 
been trying to say to you. As far as meaning is concerned, you need discourse, i.e., 
the frameworks of understanding and interpretation to make meaningful sense of it. 
(1997b, 12) 
 
                                                 
31 The definition of poststructuralism that I am working from is borrowed from Ben Agger (1991) who differentiates 
between poststructuralism and postmodernism in the following way: “poststructuralism […] is a theory of 
knowledge and language, whereas postmodernism […] is a theory of society, culture and history” (112).   
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 One of the methodological implications of this view is that when poststructuralists study the 
world they do not seek to uncover ‘truth’ or ‘reality’, but instead the ways of thinking that have 
created reality in a particular way (S.Hall 1997ab; Rosenau 1992).  Indeed, as Foucault (1981) 
has suggested: “We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we 
would have only to decipher.  The world is not an accomplice of our knowledge; there is no 
prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour” (quoted in Mills 2004, 47).   
 
Cultural Criminology 
 
 Imagining the Unimaginable is about teasing out and making visible some of the ways 
that we think about and come to know (un)criminality—both criminality and normalcy. One of 
the ways that these ways of thinking can be made visible, is by exploring and unravelling 
representations of crime and criminality and paying attention to the kinds of logics and 
assumptions that help to construct them as such.  Those familiar with cultural and/or 
poststructuralist criminology will recognize, straightaway, that the interests that propel this 
research can be loosely located within these criminological approaches.  
Cultural criminology emerged as a theoretical and methodological orientation to 
criminology in the 1990s that “situates crime, criminality, and control squarely in the context of 
cultural dynamics” (Hayward 2010, 3). This approach, while broad in name, in practice, it tended 
to refer to a much more specific orientation to crime and culture.  As I engaged with this 
literature trying to find the language to explain my own work, I was immediately disappointed to 
find that their32 orientation was actually quite specific. I, apparently, am not alone in this 
frustration. Alison Young has pointed out that this approach to culture and crime was actually a 
concern with “sub-culture” and crime (2008, 19; emphasis original):  
[…] subsequent elaborations of the paradigm constitute more of a nostalgia for 
radicalism in place of any wholesale theorisation of culture as a signifying process 
and the imagination of crime. Thus, contemporary sub-cultural criminology writings 
tended to fall into one of two genres: first, the ethnographic documentation of a sub-
cultural group, event or activity; and, secondly, the manifesto, in which terrain is 
staked out and terms of engagement specified. (20)  
 
                                                 
32 It appears that the founders of cultural criminology are a small group of colleagues such as Jock Young, Jeff 
Ferrell, Keith Hayward among others. 
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 Since ‘cultural’ criminology’s inception, other criminologists have also explored the 
relationship between culture and crime and have not solely focused on sub-cultures (e.g. Young 
1996; Yar 2010; Hayward 2010).  Instead, they have widened their approach to consider how 
images, the visual, textual and media meditations of crime might also be a ripe site to explore 
questions of meaning, representation, power, resistance and subject positions (e.g. Young 1996; 
2008; Hayward 2010; Yar 2010). “Opening the lens” of the cultural criminological approach, as 
Keith Hayward (2010) has remarked, invites us to engage with different cultural products and 
poststructural methodological tools “[…] to keep ‘turning the kaleidoscope’ on the way we think 
about crime, and importantly, legal and societal responses to rule-breaking” (Hayward and 
Young 2007 quoted in Hayward 2010, 4). From this perspective then, it is essential that we 
understand “the various ways in which crime and ‘story of crime’ is imaged, constructed and 
framed within modern society” (9). This attentiveness to the way that crime is constructed and 
framed is essential, as Majid Yar points out, because it call tell us about the ways that 
“collective, socially shared understandings of crime and deviance, justice and punishment are 
generated and sustained through the practices of mediated meaning-construction and textual 
reading” (2010, 68). It is only once we have developed an understanding of how these deeply 
cultural meanings or understandings contour how we think about crime and criminality that we 
can also begin to understand how they are linked to the “matrix of domination”, 
power/knowledge and the punitive social order itself (P. Collins 1990).  
 Stuart Hall (1997c) oriented himself to his research in this way as well.  Sut Jhally has 
noted that while Hall was keenly concerned with questions of racism, he entered into the fight 
against racism by “first understand[ing] the logic of how it works. He wants to understand how 
racism is cultivated in our imaginations, of how it works in our heads, so that we can better 
combat it on the streets” (quoted in S. Hall 1997c, 1).  It is for these reasons, that I use an 
approach to crime that can help us get at imagination and discourse, or how come we come to 
‘know’ or think about crime and criminality.  
 
The Imagination of Crime 
 
 Imagining the Unimaginable is indebted to Alison Young’s (1996) work, especially her 
book, Imagining Crime. Young’s work, in no uncertain way, structures and informs how I am 
thinking about and approaching crime and criminality through representation. Throughout her 
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book, Young (1996) writes against the realist assumption that crime is objectively knowable and 
solvable.  She cites endeavours to objectively know, understand, predict and solve the problem 
of crime to no avail as the centre of a crisis that is occurring within which she terms the crimino-
legal complex. The term crimino-legal complex, is what Young uses to refer to  
the knowledges, discourses and practices that are deemed to fall under the rubric of 
criminology, criminal justice and criminal law […as well as] the popular discourses 
that are manifested in the media, cinema and advertising, in order to convey that 
‘crime’ has become (been made?) a potent sign which can be exchanged among 
criminal justice personnel, criminologists, politicians, journalists, film-makers and, 
importantly (mythical) ordinary individuals. (1996, 2) 
 
Within criminology, criminal law and criminal justice, this crisis, the inability “to solve the 
conundrum of criminality”, has affected how crime is imagined (3).  
For Young, and in contrast to a realist position, crime and criminality cannot be made to 
appear in an unmediated way. In order for them to enter into meaning they have to be interpreted 
as such (112) by filtering the event through an array of sense-making devices such as language 
and discourse to make sense of the event as crime. Every time we represent crime as crime to our 
self or to others, we are actually constituting crime, making it meaningful and knowable in some 
ways while excluding others (16)33. However, every representation of crime relies on imagining 
it in a particular kind of way. We do not represent or communicate about crime and criminality 
as it is, but rather as it appears to us and how it appears to us will depend on the subject position 
that we occupy (Young 2014, 60). This poststructural rendering of crime, approaches crime not 
an as an objective fact, but as a product of imagination, a particular way of thinking or 
conceiving of crime. Young defines imagination as “the process by which we make images [or 
other kinds of representations] of crime” (1996, 15). The result from this process is not an 
objective representation of crime, but a limited, partial representation; a product of how we have 
come to imagine it to be. Her objective in her book then is to understand “how crime is 
imagined” by paying attention to “the written and pictorial: the linguistic turns and tricks, the 
                                                 
33 This move is characteristic of poststructuralism more generally. For example, a positivist position holds that that 
appearance is not reality and reality is not reducible to appearance; reality is ‘real’ and it can be represented as such. 
Here, reality is seen as prior to representation: “that something was there already and […] has been represented” (S. 
Hall 1997b, 6). It is in this context where we can make claims about whether a representation distorts or 
misrepresents the reality it purports to depict (S. Hall 1997b, 6-7). Young’s approach, in contrast, troubles this 
opposition or distinction by abolishing it: “reality is an appearance and appearance is our reality” (Young 1996, 20). 
In this poststructuralist move, “representation doesn’t occur after the event; representation is constitutive of the 
event”; it is the only way that the event becomes meaningful (S. Hall 1997b, 7-8; Young 1996, 16). 
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framing and editing devices in and through which crime becomes a topic, obtains and retains a 
place in discourse” (16). 
 How crime is imagined is never innocent for Young; not in the kinds of logics it rests on 
nor in its effects. For instance, Young notes binary oppositions are a central to the representation 
of crime: “Crime’s images are structured according to a binary logic of representation. 
Oppositional terms (man/woman, white/black, rational/irrational, mind/body and so on) are 
constructed in a system of value which makes one visible and the other invisible” (1). The 
premise here is that meaning is accomplished through difference and Otherness (see also S. Hall 
1997a, 234) 34. This view of meaning suggests that things—words, sounds, images—only 
become meaningful in relation to another thing that is thought to be opposite or different from it 
(S. Hall 1997a, 234). Moreover, binaries are rarely neutral; they involve a ranking and value-
based system that holds one in higher esteem (i.e. dominant, hegemonic or commonsensical) 
than the other: “there is always a relation of power between the poles of a binary opposition” 
(235).  As a result, and as Elizabeth Grosz has put it: “the subordinated term is merely the 
negation or denial, the absence or privation of the primary term, its fall from grace; the primary 
term defines itself by expelling its other and in this process establishes its own boundaries and 
borders to create an identity for itself” (1994, 3). While this way of thinking is crude, 
oversimplified and reductionistic (S. Hall 1997a, 235; Grosz 1994, 7), it is on precisely this kind 
of thinking that the imagination of crime relies (Young 1996). The logics that form the basis of 
our imagining of crime are thus conceived by Young as a form of violence in the way that it 
makes certain ways of thinking, and certain people visible as criminal and victims, and others 
invisible (1). As a result, another crime is committed: “the crime embedded in representations of 
crime is always one of sacrifice” (16; emphasis original).  
The notion of sacrifice is the foundation of community and its maintenance in Young’s 
approach. Young defines ‘community’ in broad terms, referring to a spatially delimited area 
and/or as a group of law-abiding people who need to be protected from crime/victimization (9). 
It is this ambiguous definition of an imagined community that plays a significant role in how 
crime is discussed and imagined in the crimino-legal nexus (e.g. ‘community safety’ and 
’community policing’). The criminal is thus always imagined as a “threat to the community”, 
who must be plucked out from the community and represented as outside of the community. 
                                                 
34 For those unfamiliar with these ideas, I cite Stuart Hall’s work (1997a) for an accessible overview of them.  
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Once the criminal is identified as a threat to, and outside of, the community they are “represented 
as deserving violence in some way, as having brought the community’s violence upon it through 
some fault or flaw of its own. For these purposes, the designation of some individuals as 
‘criminals’ enables them to viewed as outside the community, and thus outside the law” (9). The 
community is imagined as law-abiding and potential victims of crime (this is the “commonality” 
that brings them together), a community from which the criminal has been expelled (10-11). The 
communal fear or experience of victimization is a precondition to being part of the community; 
“a criminal cannot be offended against” (10). Necessarily, the criminal is expelled from and 
sacrificed by the community in order to maintain its imagined sense of itself as un-criminal 
victims (11).   
In Young’s approach, the victim can be understood in two ways: the fear or experience of 
the community’s victimization and the violence (e.g. expulsion and sacrifice) inflicted on the 
criminal who becomes “the victim of our desire for community” (9). Importantly, as Young 
notes, the victim of the community’s sacrifice or ‘the criminal’ is already predetermined or 
identified—the criminal is always “sexed, aged and raced” (17): “The body of crime is 
continually being reconfigured as feminine, Black, young, homosexual, maternal and so on.  
Such a process does not and cannot end” (19). In examining the ‘common sense’ conflation of 
bodies and criminality in the imagination of crime, we are able to begin to unravel the language 
and imagery (‘written and pictorial’) that are used in sense-making, the stories that get told, the 
points that are highlighted, the labels deployed in the creation of the representation of crime 
itself.  In doing so, what we are also doing is denaturalizing, unfixing the representation and 
suggesting that it could be “imagined otherwise” (Young 1996).  
 
Discourse, Power and the Subject 
 
 As discussed above, one of the ways that crime becomes meaningful is through 
imagination.  How crime can be imagined or represented is determined by the discourses that are 
available to conceptualize it in a particular way.  In this dissertation, when I use the term 
‘discourse’ I am using it in its Foucauldian sense.  In his book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Michel Foucault encourages us to look beyond what is literally said or represented and to look at 
what is “never said” (1972, 27). By focusing on what is not said, Foucault is not interested in 
discovering the intentions, meaning or unconscious motivations of the subject who uttered a 
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particular statement or as he puts it: “what was being said in what was said?” (30). Instead, he is 
interested in discourse, that silent relationship (i.e. the “never-said”) that links statements 
together. For Foucault, as Stuart Hall has explained, discourse supplies meaning, it provides us 
with a way to think about and represent a topic (1997a, 44; see also Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; 
Cheek 2004).  In providing us with a way to think about and represent that topic, discourses are 
constitutive of the very thing that they have made thinkable, knowable or representable (S. Hall 
1997b): “[discourses] systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972, 54). 
By providing us with a particular way of thinking about a topic, discourses serve as a structure 
which defines and delimits what is thinkable and sayable in relation to a topic; it “rules in” a 
particular way of thinking at the same time as it “rules out” or excludes other ways (S. Hall 
1997a, 44). This operation of discourse brings us squarely within the field of power.   
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault explains how he conceptualizes power.  For him, 
power is not “possessed” or “appropriated” by a particular person or a cluster of people who are 
dominant, instead he encourages us to look at the “micro-physics of power” (Foucault 1977, 26). 
This “micro-physics of power” Foucault argues, is the effect of domination. This effect can be 
attributed to “dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings” that do not emanate 
from a single source but are circulated throughout the social body (1977, 26). In this way, 
Foucault does not think of power as “[…] obligations or a prohibition on those that ‘do not have 
it [power]’”, instead power is something that “invests them, is transmitted by them and through 
them; it exerts pressures on them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the 
grip it has on them” (26). In this sense, power is dispersed and it is akin to a silent or invisible 
domination which is not easily perceived because it has been naturalized. 
 Additionally, Foucault insisted that power was not simply repressive, negative or a 
system of prohibitions, it also had a productive role (1978b, 94). He is able to make this 
argument about the productive function of power by linking power to knowledge and discourse 
(Foucault 1978, 100-101). As I mentioned above, discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, does not 
simply provide meaning or knowledge about a topic it also constitutes that very topic in a 
particular kind of way. In providing this meaning, discourse links power and knowledge 
together: “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together […] discourse 
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault 1978, 100-101).  Power, therefore, cannot be 
114 
 
separated from discourse or knowledge. If discourses allow topics to become meaningful, and it 
is only through discourse that knowledge about a topic can be produced, how we come to ‘know’ 
a particular topic (i.e. the ‘Truth’ about that topic) is linked to power.  This is how power 
manifests as power/knowledge. For example, if we represent/imagine some forms of criminality 
as being a product of biological vulnerability to crime, it does not matter whether this is true or 
not.  Stuart Hall (1997a) has said that the power of this discourse, this knowledge, this way of 
thinking or understanding, lies in its effects: in using this discourse to come to know criminality, 
it will come to bear on our actions. It will also block out other ways of thinking and doing (Hall 
1997a, 49). Therefore, we cannot separate the way we come to 
understand/know/represent/imagine the world from power and vice versa.   
 Stuart Hall (1997a) has noted, that because power does not reside in a specific person or 
groups of people, and because knowledge and meaning are not produced by, and cannot be 
guaranteed by, an individual person (e.g. the author of a text, an utterance, or the author of some 
another form of representation), but through discourse, Foucault does not centre the subject (54-
55).  However, Foucault was concerned with the subject insofar as “the ‘subject’ is produced 
within discourse. The subject of discourse cannot be outside discourse, because it must be 
subjected to discourse” (Hall 1997a, 55; emphasis original).  Hall (1997a) suggests that, for 
Foucault, there are at least two ways that the subject is produced in discourse.  The first focuses 
on how discourses produce subjects: “[…] figures who personify the particular forms of 
knowledge which the discourse produces.  These subjects have the attributes we would expect as 
these are defined by the discourse: the madman, the hysterical women, the homosexual, the 
individualized criminal, and so on” (56). We should also add those who are ‘personified’ or 
come into being in opposition to these figures of discourse such as, the rational man, the normal 
woman, the heterosexual, the law abiding/un-criminal and so on. The second way that discourse 
produces subjects is by “produc[ing] a place for the subject (i.e. the reader or viewer who is also 
‘subjected to’ discourse)” (56). What Hall means by this second discursive practice is that 
because we only gain understanding, knowledge and meaning through discourse we must be 
subjected to the very discourses that constitute meaning.  If we are not subjected to discourse, 
then we will not be able to access understanding or meaning, and the representation will not 
make sense to us. Therefore, Hall suggests that “all discourses, then, construct subject-positions 
from which they alone make sense” (56).  
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If we return to Alison Young’s work for a moment, we will realize that her imagination 
approach also takes into account how the way that crime is imagined also constructs specific 
kinds of subjects. As efforts to ‘crack the code’ or ‘find the source’ of crime and criminality are 
carried out by politicians, criminal justice personnel, criminologists, and other crime-related 
individuals and/or agencies, the fact remains that crime persists (1996, 8).  Rather than seeing 
these efforts as futile, Young offers a different perspective. In the process of ‘fighting the battle’ 
over crime, something productive is occurring; the battle reproduces a split between the 
noncriminal community (who are broadly conceived of as the victims of crime—those whom 
crime effects at the level of fear, experience, trauma etc.) and the criminals or outlaws who have 
been sacrificed or expelled from the community (9). As noted above, the imagined criminal(ized) 
subject is always imagined in bodily terms, especially in relation to identity and by extension so 
too is the imagined law-abiding community.  
The imagination of crime and criminality thus becomes central not only in the 
maintenance of community, but it also constructs subjectivities and subject positions: “in looking 
at or for the other (the criminal), we represent ourselves to ourselves” (15).  In process of 
representing crime (i.e. talking about it, studying it, visualizing it, writing about it and so on) we 
are not only reaffirming the status of the criminal as outside of ‘our’ community, but we are also 
differentiating ourselves from the criminal. Young notes that because the self is never finally 
accomplished, this exercise must be constantly repeated (15).  Conceptualizing the relationship 
between subjectivity, subject positions and the imagination of crime in this way, rests on the 
notion of aesthetics and affect.  Young (2008) sees the “imagination of crime [as] an affective 
process, which does things to the bodies of individuals […]” (22).  When we engage with or 
respond to images of crime (broadly defined to included the ‘written and pictorial’) we are being 
connected to other bodies in the way that we share a common experience in our engagement (e.g. 
disturbed, fascinated, condemnation, empowered, etc.) (23).  In this process, subjectivity, subject 
positions and community are being reconstituted.  
It is important to keep in mind that these images and imaginings of ‘suspect’ or ‘criminal’ 
bodies and the discursive and historical conditions which make these images or subjects possible 
in the contemporary context are also derived from a particular subject position. For example, 
Franz Fanon (2008) has shown us how the racialization process relies on a visual encounter 
between a white gazer, and the ‘object’ of their vision—the Black body. This visual encounter 
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simultaneously produces a white subjectivity as well as Black subjectivity, or more accurately 
constructs the Black body into a “crushing objecthood” (2008, 109). The process of racialization, 
as Fanon explains it, is an example of the ways in which subjectivities are discursively created 
through specific subject positions. Fanon’s work also highlights how subject positions are 
relational:  “for not only must the black man be black; he must also be black in relation to the 
white man” (110). It is the white gaze that structures the field of vision, (re)producing the Black 
man as a symbol of danger and nonbeing, and it is this same gaze that (re)produces the humanity, 
anonymity, invisibility and un-criminality of the gazer—their subject positions (see also Butler 
1993 and Alcoff 2006).  The white gaze, or the “white eye”, as Stuart Hall (1990) has termed it is 
“the unmarked position from which all these ‘observations’ and from which, alone, they make 
sense [...] the ‘white eye’ is always outside the frame—but seeing and positioning everything 
within it” (14). Perspective is important, not least because it was and remains white imaginaries 
that continue to reproduce the racialized male body as a criminal body, but it is these same 
imaginaries that have enabled and continue to allow white people to “escape being associated 
with crime” (Russell 1998, xiv). Indeed, as bell hooks (1992) has noted, violent, terrorizing, and 
terrifying representations of whiteness have, since colonialism, slavery, apartheid, Jim Crow, 
mass incarceration and so on, been part of the Black imagination35.  However, representations of 
whiteness have taken on (been given) a different form in white imaginations.  As Richard Dyer 
(1997) has noted, whiteness has been used to signify goodness, light, purity, innocence and by 
association white people have taken on the symbolic content of whiteness as representative of 
their racial character.  Importantly, the power of whiteness to both appear and be interpreted in 
this way is premised on a particular kind of discourse, representation, imagination and subject 
position. In imagining crime and criminality in racial, gendered, and class-based terms, not only 
                                                 
35 Bobby Wright (1984), a self-identified Black clinical psychologist, has made a similar point in his book, The 
Psychopathic Racial Personality and Other Essays.  Wright argues that from the Black perspective, whites in their 
genocidal treatment of blacks can be characterized as psychopathic.  He notes that “Europeans (whites) are 
psychopaths and their behaviour reflects an underlying biologically transmitted proclivity with deep roots in their 
evolutionary history” (2).  Wright supports this position by drawing on countless examples of legally sanctioned 
and/or medically rationalized violences that white people have carried out against Black peoples with impunity (e.g. 
colonization, slavery, lynching, underfunding of community mental health programs as well as lack of Black 
professionals working in these centres, ensuring the lack of educational opportunities that keep Black peoples out of 
powerful and influential positions).  For Wright then, the racial perspective from which one sees and experiences 
and thus comes to know the world is fundamental. Accordingly, the psychopathic personality is not racially neutral: 
psychopathy is a racial personality that both characterizes and explains the immorality of the white race in their 
relationship with black people.   
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are subjects produced through these discourses in our imagining of them as such, but these 
representations only make sense when we are “subjected to” the discourses in which they rely (S. 
Hall 1997a, 56).  Therefore, when I discuss imaginings of (un)criminality I am referring to the 
dominant or hegemonic view, which is constructed by/in the normative imagination. 
 Thus, discourse—the way we come to imagine—not only produces the ‘reality’ of crime 
and criminality, but it also constructs subjects, subject positions and the community. These 
productive practices are political, sacrificial, and wedded to bodies and identity/difference. The 
way that Young’s approach is able to braid all these ideas together, has provided me with a way 
of thinking through the processes by which crime and criminality are imagined, the effects of this 
imagination, as well as how the marginalized, the excluded, the demonized, are vital to the 
imagination of crime and criminality. This approach is also particularly well-suited for my own 
interest in exploring what happens when someone from this imagined community of victims/un-
criminal becomes the perpetrator of crime: how is their criminality imagined? In what ways does 
this representation help to maintain the imagined community? Such a concern, pays attention to 
the ‘other side’ of the criminal binary—the unsuspicious, law-abiding, un-criminal, normalized 
subject—and by doing so, it invites us to consider who, in the midst of ongoing sacrifice in the 
name of the community, is not pre-emptively sacrificed? Who is refused or held on to in the 
imagination of crime? And, how is this reconciled at the level of representation, when a crime 
has been identified as being perpetrated by this un-criminal subject? 
 
Bodies, Identities and the Visual 
 
The body is a text. And we are all readers of it. And we go around, looking at this 
text, inspecting it like literary critics. Closer and closer for those very fine 
differences […]. (S. Hall 1997c, 15) 
 Since the emergence of criminal anthropology in the nineteenth century, the body has, 
and continues to play an important role in how criminality is imagined (Urla and Terry 1995).  In 
this section, I provide, using the works of Lombroso scholars, a look at how Cesare Lombroso 
(popularly referred to as the ‘father’ of criminology) imagined criminality on the body and the 
significance that discourses of race and gender had in his work. Using these works to historically 
contextualize contemporary myths about the body’s ability to tell us about who someone is or is 
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not, I then explain how contemporary scholars have approached the body as a text in a way that I 
think is methodologically useful.   
 Lombroso believed that criminality was inherent or biological and that this internal 
difference expressed itself on the external body.  More than this however, Lombroso believed 
that the born criminal was atavistic or a throwback, “a revival of the primitive savage” 
(D’Agostino 2002, 322; see also Horn 2003; Rafter 2008).  In attempting to prove this notion, 
Lombroso illustrated the connections between the body, criminality and atavism by constructing 
the body as a text that that could be read as evidence of their inner criminal essence (Horn 2003). 
He did this by isolating the peculiar features that these ‘kinds’ of criminals were thought to 
possess such as “jug ears, thick hair, thin beards, pronounced sinuses, protruding chins, and 
broad cheekbones” (Lombroso 2006, 53).  Essentially, these markings or stigmata were said to 
reveal the roots or origins of criminality and they were also said to provide a means of detecting 
it (Rafter 2008; Horn 2003).  
 
Lombroso, Race and Gender 
 
 The criminal body that emerged from Lombroso’s work was not based on simple 
“looking and seeing” (Horn 2003, 32). Far from a ‘natural’ product of objective and disinterested 
positive and empirical science, David Horn persuasively argued that Lombroso’s thinking and 
seeing was structured by the “political and historical context” that “[made] it possible to see in 
certain ways and not others” (2003, 33). Lombroso’s thinking was informed, in large part, by 
“popular prejudices of his day”, particularly along the lines of race, gender and class (Gibson and 
Rafter 2006, 15):  
 
Instead of breaking traditional stereotypes of criminals, criminal anthropology tended 
simply to give supposedly scientific support for popular prejudices, as expressed in 
adages. Lombroso admitted as much when he boasted that ‘the knowledge of a 
criminal physiognomic type….is often instinctive among the common people,’ 
giving rise to epithets like ‘a thief’s face’ and ‘the look of an assassin’. (Gibson 
2002, 29) 
 
Race was a significant feature of Lombroso’s understanding of criminality especially in his view 
of the born criminal as atavistic (Gibson and Rafter 2006; Gibson 2002).  To understand the 
racial significance of this way of thinking about criminality, we need to address how race was 
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conceptualized in both biological and evolutionary terms at the time. In terms of a biological 
understanding of race, Lombroso used a definition of race that was usual in accounts of scientific 
racism where race is defined as “an inherited and measurable trait that determined the biological, 
psychological and intellectual profiles of discrete human groups” (Gibson 2002, 98-99).  
Additionally, Mary Gibson suggests that Lombroso’s understanding of race was also influenced 
by Darwin, who explained race through monogenesis (i.e. all humans can be traced back to the 
same ancestry; 2002, 99). Although this view of race suggested that all humans originated from 
the same ancestors, Lombroso also believed that through the course of evolution, humans 
became racially differentiated on the basis of how far they evolved from this origin point: “from 
monkeys descended the Negro […] As it migrated, the Black race evolved into the yellow and, 
finally white races” (99). The white race thus represented the most fully evolved in his eyes.   
        The born criminal that appeared in a modern European context was perceived by Lombroso 
as an anomaly, a failure of evolution.  As an evolutionary throwback, the born criminal was 
imagined as being akin to “savages living in the middle of flourishing European civilization” 
(Lombroso 1876 quoted in Gibson 2002, 25).  Lombroso came to this conclusion because of the 
distinct similarities that he supposedly observed between born European criminals and the 
‘inferior races’ or ‘savages’36 of the past and present who, according to his understanding of 
race, had not evolved. Those ‘resemblances’ which he ‘observed’ between the born criminal and 
the ‘savage’ took a number of forms. I have found David Horn’s (2003) explanation of 
Lombroso’s readings of bodies to be particularly helpful for understanding how he imagined 
criminality on the body through race.  Horn eloquently argues that in Lombroso’s readings of 
bodies and the meaning they were thought to hold, he actually transfers the meanings of one 
‘type’ of body (e.g. the bodies of women, and ‘savages’) to another (i.e. the European criminal; 
33). This transference allowed him to explain born criminality in relation to Othered, ‘less 
evolved’ and ‘inferior’ bodies. For example, one of the ways that Lombroso drew out the 
similarities between the born criminal and racialized others, was by pointing to the similarities 
                                                 
36Mary Gibson and Nicole Rafter (2006) have explained that when Lombroso used the term ‘savage’ he was 
referring to “primitive people” both past and present: “individuals in an earlier state of evolution than white 
Europeans. Conceiving of savages as the ancestors of contemporary Europeans, Lombroso pictures them as dark-
skinned, uncivilized and animalistic in their desires and habits. In the same category, he places contemporary 
peoples—Australian Aborigines, Africans, some Asians, and Native Americans—who in his view continue to 
exhibit these primitive traits” (408-409). 
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between the abnormal skulls of criminal men and the skulls of men from ‘inferior’ or ‘coloured’ 
races (Gibson 2002, 24).  
 In addition to the skull, the body in general was also an important point of comparison as 
Horn notes: “the bodies of savages were imagined to be homogenous and biologically 
monotonous, exhibiting very little variation. By contrast, the body of the modern born criminal 
was distinctive, precisely in its resemblance to the body of the unvarying savage” (2003, 44; 
emphasis original). However, it was not simply the body of the ‘savage’ and the modern born 
criminal that bore similarities. Horn explains that Lombroso compared the modern European 
criminal to the ‘savage’ on the basis of other of similarities as well, such as cultural practices 
(e.g. their use of oral and written language; 46-48) and the way they decorated their bodies with 
tattoos (48-51). These resemblances ‘proved’, according to Lombroso, that the “most dangerous 
criminals”, like ‘savages’, “were atavistic throwbacks on the evolutionary scale” (Gibson and 
Rafter 2006, 1) and the “stigmata of the body were ancient ‘savage’ remnants inherited from an 
earlier stage of development” (D’Agostino 2002, 322; Horn 2003).   
 One of the legacies of Lombroso’s theory of atavism lies in the links he forged between 
race and criminality, and more specifically, as Colin Webster says: “Lombroso’s innovation was 
to equate white criminals with non-white races” (2007, 13; see also Horn 2003, 42). That is, from 
the very inception of the idea of ‘criminality’, which was introduced to the west by the positive 
school, it is intimately tied to ideas about race. Specifically, and as Webster (2007) and Horn 
(2003) works reveal, European criminality could only be accounted for or imagined through 
recourse to racist ideas (e.g. atavism and scientific racism) and pathology (as we will see in the 
following chapters, this way of conceptualizing white male criminality has not changed very 
much).  To put this idea differently, in Lombroso’s work whiteness is only imaginable as 
criminal through the ideological transformation of the white European criminal subject into an 
atavistic figure (which obviously relies on more familiar racial and racist sensibilities)37.   
 In this brief summary of scholars’ readings of Lombroso’s work on the criminal man, it is 
clear that the way Lombroso thought about criminality was not just dependent on anomalous 
bodily signs, his work also relied on specific assumptions about the racial identities of the bodies 
                                                 
37 The absent presence of whiteness in thinking about criminality generally holds true in the contemporary 
criminological landscape as well, although this is beginning to change (see, for example, Webster 2007; Linnemann 
and Wall 2013; Heitzeg 2015; Smith 2014; Dirks, Heldman and Zack 2015; Henne and Shah 2015; Eastman 2015; 
Smith and Linnemann 2015).  
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of the men that he was observing as well as conjecture about ‘deviant’ bodies—characteristics, 
appearance and behaviours—that were deemed different, Other or ‘inferior’.  These assumptions 
helped him to demarcate the bodies of ‘normal’, ‘good’, law-abiding people and those who were 
‘abnormal’, ‘atavistic’, and criminals where difference from the white European middle-class 
adult male was the benchmark from which the normal and the pathological/criminal was 
determined.  While Horn (2003) and others emphasize the racial logics that helped Lombroso to 
construct the theory and image of the criminal, and while there is a plethora of research that 
testifies to the ways in which crime continues to be racialized, we also need to be attentive to the 
ways that the image of criminality was (and remains) gendered in particular ways as well.   
 Lombroso was not ignorant to gender and gender difference in thinking about the origins 
of criminality (Gibson and Rafter 2006, 16). Lombroso had much to say about women and 
criminality and how women’s biological differences from men had import for the way in which 
their criminality manifested.  Like the ‘savage’, the child, and the born criminal, women too 
were atavistic according to Lombroso and Ferrero (Horn 1995; 2003). According to David Horn, 
when Lombroso and his son-in-law Guglielmo Ferrero studied European women in relation to 
crime, the ‘normal woman’ which was so central to their thinking about female criminality, “had 
no real counterpart in Lombroso’s studies of male criminality” (2003, 52), in that Lombroso 
rarely discussed ‘normal’ men (see Horn 2003, 52n118). Perhaps one of the reasons why this 
figurative ‘she’ lacked a counterpart was because the ‘normal woman’ for Lombroso and Ferrero 
was not quite ‘normal’, in comparison to ‘normal’ men. According to the evolutionary hierarchy 
that Lombroso and others used in their thinking, which posited that white, European middle-class 
men were the most evolved, the ‘normal’ woman, unlike the ‘normal man’ was not as evolved 
(52); the ‘normal woman’ was pathological (Horn 1995, 121) and atavistic (115). Horn (2003) 
details the pathological and atavistic qualities that Lombroso and Ferrero said she possessed, 
noting that they “rang[e]d from an underdeveloped moral sense, to a predisposition to cruelty, to 
a ‘physiological incapacity’ for truth” (52).  
 Despite Lombroso and Ferrero’s ‘proof’ of women’s natural inferiority, they were faced 
with a couple of problems when it came to question of female criminality (Horn 1995; 2003).  
The first problem was trying to account for the fact that women committed less crimes than men 
even though Lombroso had already characterized them as naturally atavistic and similar to 
“criminals, savages, primates, and children” (Horn 2003, 52). The second problem had to do 
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with their appearance.  If women were innately atavistic how was he to account for the fact that 
women, in comparison to men, “presented fewer signs of degeneration” (Horn 2003, 53)?  Horn 
(1995) has suggested that Lombroso was able to overcome the first problem by including 
prostitution in his definition of criminality. By widening the definition of female criminality to 
include prostitution (which he defined quite broadly; see Horn 2003, 54), which was apparently a 
much more common form of female criminality, Lombroso and Ferrero were able to account for 
why women appeared to commit less crimes.  Despite the fact that the introduction of 
prostitution helped to ‘resolve’ Lombroso’s ‘female question’, the fact remained that both 
‘normal’ women and criminal women failed to present degenerative markers of criminality on 
their bodies.  
 According to Horn, Lombroso and Ferrero explained that ‘normal’ women lacked 
degenerative markers because women were not as evolved as men, and therefore they, as a 
group, were less diverse (Horn 2003, 53-54). Here, diversity/variability is a key component of 
both evolution and modern civilization (54). Through this interpretive move to account for 
women’s lack of degenerative markers, Lombroso and Ferrero transformed this lack (which, 
according to their logic, could have been interpreted as women being superior; Horn 2003, 54) 
into “a sign of inferiority and weakness” (54). Moreover, they explained that even though 
criminal women appeared to have fewer signs of degeneration, her appearance was a ruse:   
 
In addition to the fact that true female criminals are much less ugly than their male 
counterparts, in prostitution we have women of great youth in whom the ‘beauty of 
the devil’, with its abundance of soft, fresh flesh and absence of wrinkles, masks 
anomalies.  Another thing to keep in mind is that prostitution calls for a relative lack 
of peculiarities such large jaw and hardened stare, which, if present, might cause 
disgust and repulsion; it also requires that such peculiarities be concealed through 
artifice.  Certainly makeup—a virtual requirement of the prostitute’s sad trade—
minimizes many of the degenerative characteristics that female criminals exhibit 
openly [...]. (Lombroso and Ferrero 2004, 143) 
 
This way of explaining the lack of apparent degenerative markers on prostitutes explains why it 
may appear that female criminals have less markers, as it also reinforces the idea that women 
have a supposedly latent immorality and are deceptive (Horn 1995, 120).  
  Apart from the two pathological figures that Lombroso’s work created—the normal 
woman and the prostitute—there was an additional criminal and pathological figure who was “an 
entirely exceptional being”, the born criminal woman (Horn 1995, 120). Unlike the prostitute 
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and the ‘normal woman’, the born criminal woman bore traits that “are almost more marked and 
numerous than in male criminals” (Lombroso and Ferrero 2004, 182). Although the female born 
criminal was rare, their “evil is inversely proportionate to their numbers” (182): she is always a 
prostitute, erotic and lustful (185); she is exceptionally and diabolically cruel and ‘savage’ (183); 
she lacks maternal affection (185), is vengeful (186) and varies in intelligence (189). In short, 
she is a ‘true monster’, a ‘gendered inversion’ who appears to be more similar to men than 
women, and whose criminality is much more disconcerting (Horn 1995, 120). 
 Much like the way that the European criminal was only imaginable by comparing him, in 
body and conduct, to male ‘savages’, the same is also true for the way born criminal women 
were imagined in relation to both ‘savages’ and men to make their criminality legible (Horn 
1995; 2003). Importantly however, women were also imagined to be always already 
transgressive because of their sex (Horn 1995; 2003). All of this is to highlight how historical 
imaginings of criminality centred on the body and social identity/difference in particular.  What 
we can also see from Lombroso’s work and from the insights of those who have rigorously 
studied it, is that the problem of crime was largely framed as a problem of the socially 
marginalized—women and the racialized—where the ‘normalized’ subject (i.e. the modern 
European man) only comes to be imaginable as criminal in relation to already deviant bodies and 
subjects.  
 
Approaching the Body as a Text   
 
 Although Lombroso’s ideas about criminality are no longer adopted uncritically, the idea 
that the body speaks a truth about who someone is still remains a relatively popular (and 
problematic) idea. Colin Webster has noted that this is one of the legacies of biological 
theorizing of criminality which 
assumed that social deviants in general, and criminals in particular, were biologically 
and culturally inferior to normal populations, and that their inferiority was visible in 
their physical appearance.  Arguably, although perhaps less explicitly than in the 
past, comportment, body shape, dress and physical looks continue to have popular 
salience in stigmatizing groups, especially the poor and the criminal ‘underclass’, 
often in racialized ways. (2007, 12; emphasis original)  
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As Webster points out, part of this legacy has resulted in the popular notion that we can tell who 
people are by simply inspecting their bodies: its marks, its gestures, its physical features, its gait, 
means of adornment, and other kinds of meaningful signs, what Rimke calls a “hermeneutics of 
the body” (2003, 247).  
 This way of thinking about the body continues to make its way into various domains.  For 
example, this way of thinking is particularly evident in cultural representations of crime where it 
is assumed that social transgression manifests in and on the body (e.g. think about how fictional 
villains are sometimes represented as biologically different and physically/visually discernable). 
Although, the assumption that the exterior body reflects an interior reality and vice versa is a 
problematic conflation for a number of reasons, it is the persistence of this conflation, which is 
historically specific, that continues to inform how criminality and difference more generally is 
imagined—as something that is visibly reflected on the body and that aligns with specific ideas 
about who one is, their abilities, their character and ultimately their place in the social hierarchy 
(Hall 1997c). One of the objectives of this project is to unravel these kinds of assumptions as 
they are given expression in representations, to show in no uncertain way, how this conflation 
continues to inform how we imagine crime in relation to bodies. To do so, I take an approach to 
the body as a text (Urla and Terry 1995; Rimke 2003; Grosz 1994; S. Hall 1997c). This approach 
engenders an appreciation that the body is significant in reproducing our oppressive social order 
because of its signifying power, and not because of it’s ability to reveal the ‘truth’ about who 
someone is in terms of criminality or otherwise. To approach the body in this way, is to work 
from the premise that the body is a discursive artefact that only becomes meaningful when 
subjected to discourse (Urla and Terry 1995; S. Hall 1997c). Let me briefly explain.  
Many scholars have pointed out how the body has and continues to not only operate as a 
meaningful sign in the context of crime, but in our culture more generally. In fact, the stubborn 
persistence of racism and sexism, for example, can be traced (at least in part) to our ideas about 
bodies and identity and difference (S. Hall 1997c; Alcoff 2006). For example, Stuart Hall 
(1997c) has explained how human classification, like sex/gender and race more specifically, 
historically relied on physical or bodily differences that were alleged to be tied to biology. It is 
through classification that things become meaningful in any human culture (2). However, in the 
context of race and gender, these classifications also “become objects of the disposition of 
power” (2) whereby those classifications invite different understandings of who people are. Hall 
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terms the additional meanings that classifications produce “equivalences”, which he uses to refer 
to the ascription of  
[…] characteristics to these different groupings [racial and ethnic] and to assume a 
kind of normal behavior or conduct about them. Because they are this kind of person, 
they can do that sort of thing […], Everything is kind of inscribed in their species 
being, their very being because of their race. So, I think that ones seeing there [sic] is 
a kind of essentializing of race and a whole range of, diverse characteristic ultimately 
fixed or held in place because people have been categorized in a certain way, 
racially. (3)  
 
The essentializing thrust of racial classification on the basis of biological and/or physical or 
visible difference is at the centre of scientific racism.  Despite the fact that racial difference at the 
level of biology has been proven to have no scientific currency, these ideas have not disappeared 
from our culture (S. Hall 1997c). One of the reasons for this, Hall explains, is that racial 
difference although not biological, remains visible on the body—“as a badge, a token, a sign” 
(7)— and therefore remains discursively meaningful.  
 Hall (1996), in his reading of Franz Fanon, has explained the process by which the body 
and the skin in particular becomes racially meaningful (i.e. racialized), by using the term 
“epidermalization”— “literally the inscription of race on the skin”. This term is meant to 
highlight that there is nothing inherent or stable about the concept of ‘race’, nor are there 
natural—‘genetic or physiological’— racial characteristics (S. Hall, 1996, 16). Instead, he draws 
our attention to the cultural weight and significance of the body and skin in particular by arguing, 
as Fanon does, that human skin embeds a cultural and discursive ‘corporeal schema’ (S. Hall, 
1996,16) that transforms skin into a racial signifier, a ‘uniform’ (Fanon 2008), that covers the 
body and is perpetually imbued with meanings. However, it is not only the corporeal schema that 
structures how racialized bodies are seen and imagined, there is also “a historic-racial 
schema...woven...out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” (Fanon 1952 quoted in S. Hall 
1996, 16). The body is thus a text constituted within a discourse of race. The meanings which 
come to be ascribed to bodies will rest on using the body as sign of difference to figure out how 
to classify people and then using a whole regime of knowledge (e.g. stories, images, metaphors) 
to know who that person is, what they are good at, what they aren’t good at, what we can expect 
from them and so on. It is these logics or grammar—racial, bodily—that allow racism to 
continue to function (Hall 1996; 1997c). Indeed, as Fanon notes “I am given no chance. I am 
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overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the ‘idea’ that others have of me but of my 
own appearance” (2008, 116).     
 For Fanon (2008) and for Hall (1996; 1997c), epidermalization is a corporeal process of 
attributing meaning to Black skin in particular, transforming Black skin into a marker of both 
difference and ‘savagery’, a denigrating process that seals Black bodies into a “crushing 
objecthood” of “nonbeing” (Fanon 2008, 109).   Take for instance Fanon’s oft- cited encounter 
with a white child: “Look, a Negro! [...] Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” (112). In her 
reading of Fanon along side the case of Rodney King, Judith Butler says that the white child or 
the “infantilized white reader”, when confronted with a Black body, has already identified 
himself as being in danger and “helpless in relation to that Black body, as one definitionally in 
need of protection by his/her mother, or perhaps, the police” (1993, 18). If the white child is 
positioned as being in danger, the “racist indicative” also circumscribes the Black body “as 
dangerous, prior to any gesture, any raising of the hand” (18). Furthermore, Fanon (2008) argues 
that this perceptual encounter and the epidermalization that results from the white child’s 
‘(mis)recognition’ of the Black body as dangerous is made possible by a ‘historical-racial 
schema’. This schema traps the Black body in system of signification that posits the Black body 
as singular and homogenous, as a signifier of danger, violence and aggression in the white 
colonial imagination (Fanon 2008, 111). It is important to note that for Fanon the process of 
racialization is a dehumanizing process as well as a dialogic process, as Yasmin Jiwani has 
explained, “for the Black body to be constructed as different and inferior means that the white 
body retains its pristine, innocent and valorized status [... racialization] rests on the centrality of 
whiteness—its normativity and invisibility” (Jiwani 2006, 6).  This understanding of 
racialization as a dehumanizing (for those read as non-white) and dialogic social process is one 
that I share and apply in this study.  
 Fanon’s insights draw out the important relationship between race, racism, the body and 
the visual.  This example highlights how our seeing is never simple or innocent vision. It is a 
tainted racial vision, tainted by what we imagine we see (Butler 1993; Biber 2007)38.  In the 
                                                 
38The idea that bodies are a privileged site of sight in relation to race has also been explained by others. For 
example, Katherine Biber has argued that ‘Race [is] a visual genre’ (2007, 45) and, Judith Butler has noted that the 
visual field is a racial formation (1993, 17).   
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context of crime, race is an integral optic in our collective imaginings of crime (Russell 1998; 
Welch 2007; Chan and Chunn 2014).   
 Sex/gender work through the body in a similar way. Bodily differences have long been 
used to render the sex/gender binary natural, but also the perceived differences between the two 
sexes/genders and their place in the social hierarchy. In western culture, humans come to be 
persons/subjects, according to Judith Butler (1990), through normative classifications based on 
sex. Such classifications, Butler argues, work on the body, sexing it and constituting it as an 
intelligible subject.  According to the normative, regulative and punitive functions of gender 
intelligibility (or gender discourse), this sexed subject is coerced into enacting gender in a way 
that is congruent with the binary system (e.g. male= masculine; female=feminine) (Butler 1990). 
Although this system compels us to believe that sex and gender (and sexuality) are aligned, 
Butler has famously shown us that gender and sex are an effect of discourse not nature. As an 
effect of discourse, and not a thing that is intelligible outside of discourse, gender needs to be 
repeatedly enacted on and through the body and in doing so it propels the fiction of gender as 
natural. The body plays a significant role in legitimizing the argument that sex/gender 
differences are natural, and it does so “ […] through a stylized repetition of acts. The effect of 
gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the 
mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the 
illusion of an abiding gendered self” (191). Although I do not believe that Butler explicitly 
characterizes the body as text, I do think that her way of thinking about gender invites us to 
consider the ways in which bodily ‘gestures, movements and styles’ are read and enacted in 
gender specific ways within dominant and hegemonic conceptions of gender intelligibility.  
These things which constitute gender are meaningful signifiers which are enacted on and through 
bodies to produce (the illusion) of sex/gender.  
 When taken together, each of these works show us how the body becomes meaningful in 
relation to discourses of identity and difference. When bodies are constituted through these 
discourses, bodies and identities become signs that summon, as Hall (1997c) suggests, a series of 
“equivalences” within human classificatory systems. It is this idea—the body as a text—that is 
central to how I think about the way that criminality is imagined39. I also follow this line of 
                                                 
39 To be clear: I am not suggesting that bodies are biologically meaningful, but that they are, as Hall (1997c) and 
others have noted, discursively and culturally meaningful. 
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thinking—that we can know what people are by their bodies or appearances— in contemporary 
representations of crime and criminality to explore how the outward appearance of the body 
remains meaningful for how criminality comes to be ‘known’ or understood. This way of 
approaching the relationship between the internal and external body in the imagination of 
criminality is borrowed from Jacqueline Urla and Jennifer Terry (1995) who trace  
 
the idea of embodied deviance, which we define as the historically and culturally 
specific belief that deviant social behaviour (however that is defined) manifests in the 
materiality of the body, as a cause or an effect, or perhaps as merely a suggestive 
trace. In short, embodied deviance is the term that we give to the scientific and 
popular postulate that the bodies classified as deviant are essentially marked in some 
recognizable fashion. (3; see also Rimke 2003)   
 
Conceptualizing the body as text rejects the essentializing logic that posits the body’s signs as 
Truth and that has pervaded representations of the body and which has justified and legitimized 
the inferior status of women, racialized groups, indigenous peoples, differently abled, and the 
LGBTQ+ community among others. Instead of tethering the body to Truth, this approach 
emphasizes how bodies are not pure matter—innocent, ahistorical and neutral—but rather 
artefacts, effects or products of constitutive, regulatory, discursive and punitive regimes of power 
that construct bodies in particular ways (Urla and Terry 1995, 3; S. Hall 1997c).  To recognize 
that the body does not merely exist but undergoes representation to become meaningful, is to 
also recognize as Young (1996) has noted, that we cannot differentiate between a ‘real’ body and 
a representational body, to do this would negate the fact that “the body is both real and a sign.  
These are not two separable conditions but rather they demonstrate the corporeality of the sign 
and the significatory powers of the body. As Grosz states: ‘representations and cultural 
inscriptions quite literally constitute bodies and help to produce them as such’” (18). To 
approach bodies as sites of cultural inscription is to recognize the significance of the body as a 
sign as well as some of the most significant matter which informs the imagination of crime 
(Young 1996).  
When discussing bodily inscriptions, we can be referring to a number of socially and 
culturally significant signs, symbols, and markings that are etched into bodies through social and 
cultural practices. For my purposes, I will be focusing on bodily inscriptions of identity, mainly 
because imagining deviance and criminality—transgression—has historically and continues to be 
centred on interlocking readings of identity and difference on the body (Rimke 2003; Urla and 
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Terry 1996; Young 1996).  Additionally, the identities which are read onto bodies often 
structure, in a profound way, how the body is perceived and people judged (S. Hall 1997c; 
Alcoff 2006). This is particularly true in the context of crime (Biber 2007).  
Linda Martín Alcoff has noted that the term “social identities” or simply “identity” bear a 
visual meaning insofar as “they operate through visual markers on the body” (Alcoff 2006, 6). 
This is not to suggest that identities like gender and race are Real in a biological sense because 
we can see them, nor is it to suggest prioritizing the visual in determining one’s ‘actual’ identity. 
Instead, to prioritize the body as a visual text is it to assert that gender and race have been made 
to carry significant visual signs and these signs carry context specific meaning. Often, in the 
representation of subjects, bodies come to play a key role in telling us about the person, and 
identities aid in representing people in particular kinds of ways.  Importantly, in the imagination 
and interpretation of bodies, it is not simply one identity that is informing who we think they are, 
but it is an interlocking reading of bodies that guide our understanding within a “matrix of 
domination” (P. Collins 1990; Rimke 2003). Certainly, some identities will be more visible than 
others in some instances, and thus might carry greater weight in the moment, but it is also the 
case that even when these others identities/signs are not present we make certain assumptions or 
conceptual leaps based on those identities which are not explicitly present. For example, and as I 
expand on throughout this dissertation, scholars have used an interlocking approach to reveal the 
ways in which subjects come to be produced as Other depending on a reading of their identities 
and how this affects how we understand victimhood and whose body is read/legible as a victim 
(Razack 2000; Jiwani and Young 2006; Chan and Chunn 2014; Kilty and Frigon 2016) and 
criminal (Russell 1998; Biber 2007; Chan and Chunn 2014; Kilty and Frigon 2016).  
In addition to approaching bodies discursively and as a text, I am also interested in how 
bodies gain meaning in relation to other bodies (Sekula 1986; Razack 1998b). If we return to 
Young’s suggestion that the criminal body is constantly being imagined in specific bodily 
terms—young, Black, feminine, ‘homosexual’ and so on—undergirding this representation are a 
series of largely absent, but implied, oppositional terms which these identities are formulated in 
relation to—masculine, white, middle-aged, heterosexual (Sekula 1986). Scholars have referred 
to this naturalized, universalized, normalized, idealized homogenous and general body as the 
centre of humanism’s conception of ‘the human’ (Grosz 1994, 20; Urla and Terry 1995, 4). One 
of the effects of this idealized template is violence; those bodies who ‘deviate’ from this norm or 
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who cannot or do not want to aspire to it are rendered Other, inferior, marginalized, 
pathologized, criminalized and so on, while the “bodily fiction” of the normalized subject  
maintains its invisibilized and idealized position (Urla and Terry 1995, 6; Rimke 2003).  
 
The Research Design 
 
 So far, I have sketched out how I am thinking about the relationship between 
imagination, criminality and the body as well as the constructivist underpinnings of this 
approach. If Young’s approach (and a poststructuralist approach more generally) holds that 
knowledge and reality cannot be divorced from one another in that knowledge constitutes how 
we come know (imagine) reality, the ‘methods’40 that I use to understand/analyze the ways that 
criminality comes to be represented in particular ways (e.g. through psychopathy) must respect 
that knowledge and reality blur. Additionally, in the context of poststructuralist research, the 
purpose of research is to unravel or ‘deconstruct’ knowledge itself; to show the “radical 
contingency” of how things are (or, have been made to be) and how they might be otherwise 
(Haraway 1988; Young 1996). In the process of unravelling how things have come to be, what is 
present is just as important as what is absent or “never said” (Foucault 1972, 27). It is for these 
reasons that I turn to discourse, imagination and representation. In this final section, I turn to the 
more technical questions that I had to attend to in designing this research. Ultimately, these 
questions stemmed from the much more general question: what kinds of materials are suitable 
for exploring questions of imagination, (un)criminality, psychopathy and the body?  
 
Textual Materials: Crime News 
 
 This was the first question I had to answer.  When we begin from the premise that “our 
understanding of crime is a consequence of our imagination of crime” (Young 1996, 48), the 
‘proper’ site of exploration becomes one that can tell us something about how crime is 
understood and the ways of thinking/imagining that make this understanding possible. Out of the 
many possibilities that exist to explore the way crime is imagined, I use news representations of 
                                                 
40 I bracket this term because as Pauline Marie Rosenau (1992) argues, this is not the preferred term to use because 
of its grounding in foundational and positivist epistemologies—Truth about the world is attainable as long as the 
researcher abides by the rules and procedures (i.e. methods) of modern science— which is precisely what 
poststructuralism attempts to subvert (116-117).  
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crime as my textual material41.  I focus on news representations because of the important role 
that the news media plays in the representation and imagining of criminality. Following the lead 
of Foucault, Lindsay Prior (2004) notes that although qualitative researchers often prioritize the 
‘knowing subject’ as a way to access the social world, this is not always necessary. Qualitative 
social researchers are usually not interested in what individuals say and then replicating this 
point of view, instead they are interested in how this point of view fits into some “broader 
target”, like discourse or cultural imaginings (Prior 2004, 318). This “broader target” is 
important for the critical and sociological researcher (among others) because studies which 
centre the knowing subject can sometimes take for granted the discursive conditions that enable 
the subject to speak in a particular way by getting caught up in the intention or motivations of the 
subject. In this way then, the larger context and conditions of the utterance can easily be ignored 
(Prior 2004).  
Additionally, Foucault, as Prior (2004) points out, showed qualitative researchers that 
research can be focused on “the investigation of things (rather than persons), but can also 
examine links and connections between objects that cannot speak, yet nevertheless bear 
messages” (332). Texts42 are a useful site for an exploration like this one because they offer us 
one site where we can investigate how a specific representation of reality was made possible by 
teasing out the kinds of thinking that were brought to bear on a situation or event (Prior 2004; 
Hesse-Biber 2004). Thus, we can turn to texts, like crime news, as representations of the social 
order in which they were constructed and to account for the way the text has come to represented 
in the way that it has and to think about how the texts embeds, reflects a reinforces a particular 
way of seeing and knowing (Prior 2004).   
As “public texts” (Jiwani 2006), news representations are one of the sites where we gain 
information about the happenings around us.  As an important site of information, news 
                                                 
41 This method is considered ‘unobtrusive’ which refers to using materials that pre-exist the research process and 
thus do not depend on direct researcher-participant interaction (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2004, 303; Raymond Lee 
2000). I mark this concept as problematic, because of the distinction that this term gives rise to. The term 
‘unobtrusive’ methods is used to distinguish itself from ‘obtrusive’ methods whereby the latter is defined as such 
because it requires the researcher to insert herself or ‘intrude’ into one’s life for the purposes of research.  While, the 
‘unobtrusive’ researcher does not directly or physically insert herself into the lives of others, she still, arguably, does 
so by virtue of discussing, theorizing, describing or analyzing the cases in which someone’s life is being represented 
in some kind of fragmented form. And so I wonder, to what extent is this form of ‘unobtrusive’ research differently 
obtrusive and how might we account for this in ethical terms? I thank James Williams for encouraging me to trouble 
this dualism.  
42 Broadly defined to include anything that is meaningful (see, for example, Rosenau 1992, 35). 
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representations, like all texts, are communicated through language and discourse and “provides a 
framework with which its consumers may construct representations of the world in which they 
live” (R. Collins 2014, 2). The frameworks used to encode the meaning(s) of the event are what 
gives representations an aura of intelligibility.  For example, Yasmin Jiwani (2009) notes that 
news media often rely on ‘common sense’ to represent crime news stories because this form of 
knowledge is often more “intelligible than others”, it “makes sense” (2). In order for the event to 
make sense, representations “entai[l] selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, 
and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, 
and/or solution” (Entman 2003 quoted in Jiwani 2009, 2).  
One way that mass mediated events are represented ‘commonsensically’, according to 
Stuart Hall (2000), are through dominant discourses. The use of dominant discourses in 
representation encodes the representation in such a way that it relies on “dominant and preferred” 
meanings (57); it relies on and further sediments ‘common sense’ knowledge (Jiwani 2011). This 
is not to imply that only one meaning exists and that this meaning is always hegemonic.  Instead, 
it is to suggest that not all meanings are equal: “the different areas of social life appear to be 
mapped out into discursive domains, hierarchically organized into dominant or preferred 
meanings” (S. Hall 2000, 57). These kinds of encodings and the representations which they 
make possible, may appear natural and sensible, but for Hall they represent or are constitutive of 
the “dominant cultural order” (57). It is always possible for the reader to reject and reassemble 
this meaning in their decoding or interpretation of the representation because meaning is always 
tenuous in poststructuralism. However, it is also possible that the dominant, preferred or 
hegemonic meaning/discourse will guide the reading, especially since these meanings/discourses 
have likely become naturalized through repetition and institutionalization (e.g. 
power/knowledge; 57).   
I look to crime news representations to gain a deep understanding of the dominant 
discourses that are being used to render each crime event meaningful.  In exploring the 
discourses that circulate in the news representations, I do not make claims that my reading of the 
representations are Truth or that my reading of the representations are the only possible 
interpretations. I would argue, though, that the way I am reading/interpreting news 
representations can tell us something about the way that crime, criminality and the body are 
being imagined in these specific instances. Surely, others may interpret these representations 
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differently, and the inclusion of other cases which are not presented here may trouble the kind of 
reading I am putting forth.  Therefore, I make no claims to objectivity, finality, Truth or 
generalizability.  I am simply offering a partial and situated account based on what I see and 
understand happening in these representations based on the materials I assembled as a corpus of 
data.   
 
Selecting the Cases 
 
 The second decision that I had to make was more specific: how would I limit the vast 
terrain of ‘crime news representations’ while also ensuring that the materials I used were able to 
help me to think through my research questions? In order to help me narrow down this terrain, I 
employed a case study strategy. That is, instead of exploring crime news representations in 
general, I chose to focus on specific cases for specific reasons (see below). Linda Mabry (2008) 
argues that the case study approach is particularly well suited for deep, qualitative investigations 
that are concerned with complexity, meaning and contingency (Mabry 2008). This research 
strategy seemed to complement the kind of detailed and nuanced readings that are necessary for 
getting at the kinds of research questions that interested me. Although there are different ways 
that case study research can be designed and there are many ways that case studies can be used, I 
thought that a contrastive approach would be the most valuable.  Indeed, as Mabry suggest, 
contrastive case studies can provide a “fuller picture” of what is being studied because attention 
is being directed at the many contexts and circumstances that have a bearing on the cases and 
how these, when taken together, might be meaningful for the larger topic of study (2008, 217).  
 When it came to selecting the cases, I did so ‘purposefully’, meaning that I included 
cases because of specific features of the story, its popularity, how its features linked up with my 
central research questions, and what they could tell us when they were read along side each other 
by way of comparison. Below I detail how I came to select the cases.  
From the outset, it should be acknowledged that I focus on cases of serial murder, not 
because I am interested in serial killing as a specific type of crime phenomenon, but because this 
is one site where we can examine how psychopathy is used as a discourse that structures how we 
imagine certain forms of criminality. Given that the terms “serial killer” and “psychopath” are 
often used interchangeably in both popular and academic representations of serial killers and 
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given the extensive coverage that is given to these kinds of crime, I assumed that this would be a 
good place to begin to understand how psychopathy structures our imagination of criminality.  
The other reason I think that these kinds of cases are well suited for this particular project is 
because the victims are identifiable and play a more or less significant role in the representations 
of these crimes.  This provides us with an opportunity to explore not only the contingencies of 
the offenders’ identity in representations of psychopathy and criminality, but also how the 
victims’ identities inform these representations.   
When I was selecting the cases, I began by gravitating to popular or iconic Canadian 
criminal cases where psychopathy was a significant feature in the representation.  I began with 
the case of Russell Williams. This case was unfolding as I began my doctoral studies. I followed 
it closely and engaged with it in different ways through course work. In many ways, my earlier 
engagement with this case was one of the starting points of this project and inspired many of the 
questions that I have come to ask about psychopathy and the imagination of un-criminality more 
generally. It is also a relatively recent case and one that garnered a lot of media attention.  The 
second case that I looked into was the Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka case. Despite the fact 
that this case is relatively dated, it is one that is still seared in the memories of Canadians 
(including my own).  Moreover, Paul Bernardo is usually imagined as the archetypical 
psychopath.  I assumed that by placing this case alongside the Williams case, conceptual and 
representational commonalities in the way that psychopathy is represented would be revealed as 
would the gender contingencies of psychopathy.  
One of the issues with focusing almost exclusively on serial murder to understand the 
relationship between (un)criminality, psychopathy and the body is that women are, by design, 
almost completely written out of such conversations. To avoid this, the third case was chosen to 
give more space to the question of gender. To do so, I needed to move away from serial murder 
since women are very much underrepresented as perpetrators in this type of crime. To find such 
a case, I began investigating cases where women were deemed dangerous offenders because of 
the links between psychopathy and this designation (see Chapter 4).  In Canada, there have been 
five women designated as dangerous offenders: Lisa Neve, Renee Acoby, Krista Walker, 
Marlene Moore, and Michelle Erstikaitis. Out of these five women, two were labelled as 
psychopaths: Neve and Acoby. I chose to include only the Neve case because there was very 
little coverage of Acoby’s case in the news (my search returned only 10 results and many of 
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these were duplicates). Neve’s case was also significant because she is not only a woman, she is 
an Aboriginal woman and a lesbian.  This case provided me with an opportunity to explore 
different dynamics of representations of psychopathy and (un)criminality.  While psychopathy is 
generally not attributed to women or racialized groups (Stowell-Smith and McKeown 1999), 
how psychopathy and criminality were imagined through Neve’s signifying body seemed 
important to explore.   
 The next two cases were chosen because they were “atypical” in comparison to the 
Williams and Bernardo/Homolka cases (Mabry 2008, 217). In many ways these cases ‘defied 
expectations’ and ‘conflicted with the ordinary’ because of psychopathy’s absence in 
constructing the serial killer’s criminality (Mabry 2008, 217). The fourth case that was chosen 
was the Robert Pickton case.  During my doctoral studies this case was widely discussed in both 
popular media and in academic circles because it highlighted the violent realities that many 
women of colour, and Aboriginal women specifically, face in a white settler society like Canada.  
I followed this case carefully, and having done some research on it for a course paper, the 
absence of psychopathy (when compared to the representation of Williams) was one of the things 
that I found particularly interesting, especially in light of the sheer horror and magnitude of 
Pickton’s crimes. At the time, I explained these divergent representations of Williams and 
Pickton in relation to motive and constructions of Pickton’s victims as ‘disposable’ (Jiwani and 
Young 2006) and Williams’ victims as ‘ideal victims’43, but upon doing a closer and more 
extensive reading of the news representations for this study, it appeared that something else was 
also happening here (see Chapter 5), specifically when each of the cases explored are read across 
each other.   
Finally, in order to build my argument that psychopathy is the means by which the 
unimaginable criminality (or un-criminality) of the normalized subject is rendered intelligible, I 
wanted to explore cases of serial murder where the offenders were racialized to see if 
psychopathy played a role in these cases. In order to find such a case, I consulted Lee Mellor’s 
(2012) encyclopedia of Canadian serial killers.  It appears that from 1979-2012, Sukhwinder 
Dhillon and Charles Kembo were the only non-white convicted serial killers in Canada.  
                                                 
43 I still maintain this position in this dissertation (see Chapter 5), however, I offer a more nuanced reading of 
psychopathy’s absence based on a closer and much more comprehensive reading of the news landscape than I was 
able to provide at the time.  
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Interestingly, both of these cases were not extensively reported, and neither were regularly 
referred to as psychopaths. Because the Kembo case did receive more coverage than the Dhillon 
case, I decided to select the Kembo case.   
The news media’s representation of these five Canadian criminal cases constitute the 
textual materials that I use for this study. Choosing the cases, for these reasons, allowed for a 
deep exploration of the central questions of this project as they relate to these specific 
representations.  They also provided an opportunity to explore and compare many different 
dynamics and bodily contingencies that are at play in the way that criminality and un-
criminality/normalcy are imagined and the different, context specific work that psychopathy 
does. In sum, these cases provided an opportunity to explore more deeply the ‘context’, 
‘complexity’ and ‘conditionalities’ of representations of psychopathy (Mabry 2008, 217).  
 
Collecting the Texts 
 
 Because all of the cases are Canadian cases, I used the “Canadian Newsstands” database 
to retrieve the textual materials. The collection of these texts took place at different times, but all 
of the texts were collected at some point between April 2015-October 201544. To collect the 
texts, I searched each offenders’ full name. The Williams, Bernardo/Homolka and Pickton cases 
were extensively reported so I searched for news articles that were published from the date when 
the offender became a suspect to about a month after a conviction was rendered45. For the 
Charles Kembo and the Lisa Neve cases, I did not use date parameters because there were 
comparatively fewer articles written about these two cases, so I wanted to collect as many 
articles as possible. For the Kembo case, I attempted to collect additional articles by using a 
different search strategy. I searched each victims’ name and imposed date parameters in my 
search—from the time each were reported missing until Kembo was arrested46—to see if 
                                                 
44 At some point after I finished collecting these texts, York University stopped subscribing to this database and 
replaced it with “Canadian Major Dailies” which ProQuest says is the “core of the Canadian Newsstand”.  I am not 
sure why this change occurred. However, I did have issues retrieving the same number of articles each time I 
conducted the same search when using the Canadian Newsstand database. 
45 In addition to searching Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka’s full name, I also searched the term “Scarborough 
rapist’ as this is how Paul Bernardo was referred to before he was identified. The date parameters of this search 
began when the first ‘Scarborough rape’ occurred.  
46 Margaret Kembo date parameters: December 1, 2002 (she is suspected missing)- August 1, 2005 (a couple days 
before Kembo was arrested) 
Ardon Samuel date parameters: November 1, 2003 (month when he was found dead)- August 1, 2005 
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additional news articles were written47. These four separate searches returned only one hit when I 
searched the only male victim—Ardon Samuel.  
 For some of the cases my search returned an overwhelming number of articles, so I 
imposed additional restrictions on my search to pare down the results. For example, the 
Bernardo/Homolka search returned almost 2900 results. To limit the number of articles I focused 
only on the Toronto Star’s coverage because this newspaper had the most number of hits48 and it 
is the major daily newspaper of the area.  Because I was using only the Toronto Star, I retrieved 
the articles from their database directly so I would also have access to news images, which are 
not available through the Canadian Newsstands database. I also did an additional search using 
Canadian Newsstands for the Bernardo/Homolka case where I searched their names, along with 
“psychopath”, with no date parameters to ensure that in the process of excluding so many articles 
I was not excluding articles directly related to psychopathy. I pared down the results that were 
returned for the Pickton case using this same logic. The Pickton case returned over 3000 results, 
so I focused on newspapers that were local to Vancouver (The Vancouver Sun and The 
Province) and the Toronto Star because this was the only news source that I consulted for the 
Bernardo/Homolka case.  I summarize the final searches I performed and the results of these 
searches below49: 
Russell Williams Case 
Database: Canadian Newsstand 
Search term: Russell Williams 
Date parameters: Jan 1, 2010-Jan 1, 2011 (identified as a suspect in February 2010; trial ended at 
the end of October 2010) 
Newspapers included: All 
Number of hits: 333 
 
Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka Case (search 1) 
Database: Pages of the Past (Toronto Star database) 
Search term: Scarborough rapist OR Paul Bernardo OR Karla Homolka 
Date parameters: May 4, 1987 (date that the first rape by the Scarborough rapist occurred)- 
October 1, 1995 (Bernardo convicted on September 1, 1995) 
Newspapers included: Toronto Star 
                                                 
Sui Yin Ma date parameters: October 1, 2004 (month when she was found dead)- August 1, 2005 
Rita Yeung date parameters: July 1, 2005 (month when she was found dead)-August 1, 2005 
47 I did not search beyond the arrest when conducting this second search because my first search would have covered 
articles written about the victims after this point. 
48 The Toronto Star returned 769 results; the next leading newspaper was the Ottawa Citizen with 284 results. 
49 The final number of articles that I report for each case does not necessarily represent the number of articles that I 
used in my analysis. I skipped over articles that were duplicates or appeared to be irrelevant to the case. 
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Number of hits: 55850  
 
Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka Case (search 2) 
Database: Canadian Newsstand 
Search term: Paul Bernardo OR Karla Homolka; “search within results”: “psychopath” 
Date parameters: none 
Newspapers included: All 
Number of hits: 8851 
 
Robert Pickton Case  
Database: Canadian Newsstand 
Search term: Robert Pickton 
Date parameters: February 1, 2002- January 1, 2008 (the Pickton brothers first came under police 
suspicion in February 6, 2002 for possession of firearms; sentenced on December 11, 2007).  
Newspapers included:  The Vancouver Sun, The Province and the Toronto Star 
Number of hits: 1089 
 
Charles Kembo Case 
Database: Canadian Newsstand 
Search term: Charles Kembo 
Date parameters: none 
Newspapers included: All 
Number of hits: 77 
 
Lisa Neve Case 
Database: Canadian Newsstand 
Search term: Lisa Neve 
Date Parameters: none 
Newspapers included: All 
Number of hits: 199 results, of those 105 were directly relevant to her case 
 
Reading the Texts 
 
 My reading of the textual material was premised on the theoretical approaches that I 
outlined in the first section of this chapter. In this final section, I provide a loose sketch of the 
                                                 
50 The Pages of the Past database returned scanned newspaper pages. This means that some of the hits contained 
more than one article.  
51 I should point out that I had a number of issues with ProQuest’s databases (i.e. Pages of the Past and Canadian 
Newsstands) especially returning the same number of hits for the same search parameters. For example, when I 
performed an open search of the terms: Paul Bernardo OR Karla Homolka AND psychopath I received over a 1,000 
hits.  Once I began reading through the articles many of them did not contain the word psychopath. This is why I 
turned to the “search within” function.  I consulted the research librarian and showed her how I was performing the 
search and she said that there must be a problem with the database. I did not investigate this issue further and used 
the information that I collected from these searches.  
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kinds of questions that informed my interpretation or reading of the cases. Before moving on, 
however, I would like to make a few important comments about how I approaching the analysis.  
 
Interpretation and Ways of Seeing 
  
Making the many meanings that reside in the text visible through interpretation is a key 
methodological strategy for poststructuralists. However, because meaning is always polysemous, 
subjective and context specific, interpretations of the text will not be objective: “every reading of 
a text will be to some extent a misreading, a version that selects certain details, meaning or 
structural features at the expense of other details which could just have well figured in the critic’s 
account” (Norris 1988 quoted in Rosenau 1992, 119). Not only does this view reveal the 
impossibility of revealing the objective meaning of the text, but feminist poststructuralists have 
also fictionalized of the objective gaze of the researcher/observer. Donna Haraway famously 
argued in her critique of modern science, that the notion of an objective, innocent and impartial 
researcher is nothing more than a “God trick”: “the conquering gaze from nowhere. This is the 
gaze that mythically inscribes all marked bodies, that makes the unmarked category claim the 
power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation. This gaze signifies the 
unmarked positions of Man and White […]” (1988, 581). Instead of reproducing this ‘gaze from 
nowhere’, Haraway calls for a different kind of objectivity, that does not claim to see the world 
as it supposedly ‘is’, but as it appears to the embodied and subjective viewer: “feminist 
objectivity is about limited located and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting 
of subject and object.  It allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see” (583). 
This epistemological move towards situated knowledge production, allows us to see the world 
from our critical positioning within it, and in turn, makes this way of seeing open to 
conversation. Such a position does not prioritize relativism, but partiality; every line of vision 
provides us with access to the world, but this access is limited.  
What follows in the forthcoming chapters is a product of my own vision—partial and 
limited— born from my own position as a white, heterosexual woman who sees the world from 
the standpoint of her experiences, history and training. I make no claims that what I see is 
‘Truth’, but is truthful from my partial vision. This is a point that Laurel Richardson (1994) made 
nicely by noting that this way of seeing: 
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 […] does allow us to know ‘something’ without claiming to know everything.  
Having a partial, local, historical knowledge is still knowing.  In some ways, 
‘knowing’ is easier, however, because postmodernism recognizes the situational 
limitations of the knower.  Qualitative writers are off the hook, so to speak.  They 
don’t have to try to play God, writing as disembodied omniscient narrators claiming 
universal, atemporal general knowledge; they can eschew the questionable 
metanarrative of scientific objectivity and still have plenty to say as situational 
speakers, subjectivities engaged in knowing/telling about the world as they see it. 
(518) 
 
It is through this lens that I offer my analysis, and it is my hope that the reader, will read my 
work with this in mind.  
Textual Analysis: Discourse and Imagination 
 
 As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, theory figured heavily throughout this 
project. Throughout this chapter, I have explained how theory informed my way of approaching 
this research, and now I would like to explain how theory has coloured my analysis. Instead of 
generating a theory from my ‘findings’, I have instead used theory as method of reading, seeing, 
interpreting.  I have done this with the intention of making representations and imaginings of 
(un)criminality and psychopathy visible.  This approach to theory and methods transcends the 
either/or dichotomy, and implies that the entire research process is a product of particular way of 
thinking and doing.   
As I have elaborated on throughout, I approach representation through imagination. The 
term ‘imagination’ captures the relationship between appearance and reality.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines imagination as “An inner image or idea of an object or objects not 
actually present to the senses; often with the implication that the idea does not correspond to the 
reality of things”. In this definition of imagination, there is no assumed correspondence between 
appearance and reality. While this may be interpreted as imagination being distinct from and 
separate from reality, we could also interpret this lack of correspondence in a poststructural 
sense—whereby knowledge or what we (think we) know of crime/reality will never reflect the 
other. There is only imagination, and that is the closest that we can come to knowing crime.  
To construe representations of crime as imagination is significant because imagination 
draws our attention, not only to the content of what is said about crime or ‘criminals’ or what 
appears in images of crime or ‘criminals’, but the form of the representation itself—“the process 
by which we make images of crime” (Young 1996, 15; emphasis mine).  The emphasis on the 
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process by which crime and ‘criminals’ becomes representable, prioritizes the ways of thinking 
that go into the representation, that structure it, and that make it appear in one way and not 
another (Young 1996). By emphasizing how crime and ‘criminality’ is imagined we are focusing 
on the conceptual machinery that makes crime appear in all of its many guises—discourses, 
images, narratives, language, and the assumptions or expectations that these ways of thinking 
give rise to.  
I have also discussed how I am approaching discourse through a Foucauldian lens.  This 
approach to discourse fits well with a more general poststructuralist approach in that it 
understands discourse as constitutive of the objects, subjects and reality to which it refers. It 
maintains that discourse not only makes the world meaningful to us, but also structures our 
knowledge in profoundly important ways; and, it recognizes the inseparability of discourse and 
power. Therefore, in my analysis of the texts, I focus on specific questions that are guided by the 
insights I have discussed above regarding imagination, discourse, subjectivity and the body: 
 How is the story being written or framed? What kinds of information is (re)presented? 
What kind of information is comparatively absent? 
  How do the texts represent the crime and criminality? How are we being made to think 
about this crime and the people involved? In other words, what discourse(s) are 
structuring these representations?  
 Are these same discourses operating across all of the texts? How does this affect how the 
crimes or criminality is imagined? 
 How are subjects constituted throughout the representations (i.e. victims and offenders) 
and in relation to each other? How are discourses of identity and difference operating 
here? 
 How is the body (i.e. the body of the specific perpetrator, the bodies of the specific 
victims, and the template of ‘The Criminal Body’) constructed as a meaningful text? How 
are their appearances talked about? What kinds of assumptions on the basis of 
interlocking identities are underwriting the representation? How does this inform how we 
come to see/know/imagine them?  
 How has the social and historical context helped to construct the utterance/text (Cheek 
2004)?  What historical traces of meaning are surfacing in this representation? What are 
the historical contingencies of the representation? 
 What continuities, contingencies, and departures are taking place across the cases? How 
does discourse facilitate this? 
 
 What I hope to accomplish by asking these kinds of questions is a productive political 
challenge and intervention into how we think about (un)criminality, the body and psychopathy 
by ‘laying bare’ the textual underpinnings of this form of imagination.  
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Chapter 3 
Psychopathy and Imagining the Unimaginable 
 
 If the discourses of criminality that circulated in the news coverage of the cases 
(re)produce Williams and Bernardo as always already un-criminal, and once they were identified 
they were seen/known as unimaginably criminal, then the question becomes: how did the news 
media make their normalized bodies legible as criminal? Or, in other words, how did the news 
represent the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject in such a way that their 
criminality becomes imaginable? This is the question that this chapter takes up.  
 Once the extent of their involvement in the crimes became known and the nature and 
scope of the crimes revealed, we see two popular understandings of criminality informing 
attempts to make Williams and Bernardo’s criminality legible.  The first, following the insights 
of the classical school of criminology, is to locate the motive and/or rationale behind the act.  
According to this school of criminological thought, criminals are calculated, utilitarian actors.  
What was quickly surmised by journalists is that each of these actors did not act with a 
discernible motive—they did not act out of revenge, greed, provocation or any other rational 
response to some external stimuli; the crimes were motiveless and therefore senseless. In the 
absence of a discernible reason for the act, their acts were doubly transgressive—transgressive of 
law and transgressive because they stood outside of and exceeded classification—and were thus, 
“culturally unthinkable” (Seal 2010).  
 In an attempt to make these crimes and their criminality thinkable and explainable, the 
news relied on a second popular understanding of criminality which presupposes that their acts 
were guided by some type of pathology (i.e. a “pathological approach”; Rimke 2010). 
Accordingly, if their acts were not guided by reason or motive, they must have guided by or 
motivated by some internal mechanism, a ‘sickness’—biological, psychological or a combination 
of the two—that was opaque or invisible to those around them. Whether the pathology lay in 
their biology or psychology, it was clear that the only possible explanation was that Williams, 
and Bernardo, are not ‘right’; they are sick.  
 For instance, on the day that Williams was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences, the 
presiding judge in the case is quoted saying that Williams is “sick and dangerous” (Cobb 2010; 
co198).  Family members of the victims shared this view of Williams’ acts being the product of 
illness as they were listening to the damning evidence against him; one is quoted as straight 
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forwardly saying that “he’s sick” (Rankin and Contenta 2010e). When journalists interviewed 
forensic experts about Williams, their postulations where much more specific. Journalists, 
Rankin and Contenta (2010d) suggest that “Williams is what experts call a paraphilic — a sexual 
deviant. He stole lingerie and took pictures of the women he sexually assaulted, and of those he 
tied up, raped and murdered. He forced Lloyd to put on lingerie and pose for pictures before 
killing her”. To buttress this postulation, they consult Vernon Quinsey, professor emeritus of 
psychology at Queen’s University, who locates the root of Williams’ pathology in his 
psychology: “Deviants like Williams [...] get ‘turned on’ by ‘hyper-dominance, sexual coercion 
and rape.’”  (Rankin and Contenta 2010d).  Quinsey goes on to suggest that Williams is likely 
ego-dystonic—“someone who finds his own impulses distressing and unacceptable” (quoted in 
Rankin and Contenta 2010d).   
 Similar sentiments surfaced in the Bernardo case, although the search for a 
pathologically-grounded explanation was not as prolific as it was in the Williams case. Unlike 
Bernardo, Williams was a high-ranking and well-respected military official; his career success 
and his ‘normal’ private life do not suggest violent criminality52. In addition to his violent crimes 
not fitting who he appeared to be, Williams was also a secret cross-dresser.  His ‘gender 
transgressions’ together with his crimes not only shocked the public, they also inspired a deep-
seated curiosity about him and his nature.  Bernardo, on the other hand, was not an esteemed 
figure in the same way Williams was. As a result, once Bernardo was found guilty, the 
pathological mechanisms that were allegedly guiding his behaviours are not ‘brain stormed’ in 
the same kind of way they are in the Williams case.  Instead the answer is assumed: Bernardo is 
a sexual sadist who belonged to a more general group of ‘sick’ and predatory offenders (e.g. 
Duncanson and Rankin 1995b; Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b; Steed 1995). We might 
assume, based on the research of others, that one of the reasons why there was not much interest 
in disentangling Bernardo’s nature was because journalists and, presumably, the public, were far 
more captivated by Homolka and unraveling her psyche (McGillivary 1998; Comack 2006a; 
Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016).  
 The representations of Homolka were far from clear-cut. Although one thing was certain: 
her actions, too, were guided by pathology, but what that pathology was remained unclear and a 
                                                 
52 The news coverage readily explained that while Bernardo appeared to be successful, he was not.  He was in fact, a 
cigarette smuggler (and was unemployed beyond that), in debt and eventually went bankrupt.  
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source of ongoing discussion and speculation. Indeed, as Dr. Angus McDonald, one of 
Homolka’s psychiatrists wrote in his report: “Karla Homolka remains something of a diagnostic 
mystery [...] Despite her ability to present herself very well, there is a moral vacuity in her which 
is difficult, if not impossible, to explain'' (quoted in Blackwell 1995).  I discuss the ‘curious’ case 
of Homolka in the following chapter.  
 In the absence of the ‘usual’ clues of criminality, visual or otherwise—such as ‘deviant’ 
identity markers or difference—the criminality of each offender remained concealed and 
imperceptible from an external reading of the body; they appeared to be ‘normal’, un-criminal 
subjects. Scholars, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, have argued that when normalized subjects 
(read: white, middle-class, heterosexual men) commit violent crimes discourses and images of 
mental pathology are ushered in to explain their transgression (Mingus and Zopf 2010; Garcia- 
Del Moral 2011; Heitzeg 2015). Based on my reading of these two cases I think that this 
argument must be pushed further and nuanced.  I make this argument because it was not the case 
that pathology was invoked in a generic form (e.g. they are ‘sick’), their motiveless acts coupled 
with their apparent normalcy (apart from their horrific crimes, of course) set the stage for a 
specific kind of pathological representation: Williams and Bernardo were represented as 
psychopaths.  In this chapter, and in the ones that follow, I begin to build my central arguments: 
that psychopathy is one of the ways that the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject 
becomes imaginable; and, that this form of representation is bound to interlocking bodily 
contingencies.  However, I also put forth a chapter-specific argument: that the logic of 
psychopathy (i.e. the way that it is imagined in contemporary psy-literature) makes it amenable 
to representations of criminality where the subject behind the act appears ‘normal’ (not just in 
their biology and psychology, but also in that they inhabit a normalized subject position on the 
basis of identity).  In short, this chapter tells a story of how the unimaginable criminality of the 
white, middle-class, heterosexual male subject becomes imaginable through psychopathy53. 
 The first section of this chapter explains how the discourse of pathology structured the 
news narratives and made it possible to see the offenders as sick and their criminality as a 
product of sickness. Of particular significance were the biography-like stories that were spun 
                                                 
53 This chapter explores Bernardo and Williams almost exclusively.  Homolka is discussed in this chapter insofar as 
her biography and criminality are intertwined with Bernardo’s in the representations.  I discuss the particularities of 
psychopathy and the female offender in the following chapter. Bernardo will also be present in the following chapter 
for the same reasons that Homolka is present in this one.  
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about Williams and Bernardo that encourage an interpretation of their criminality as 
pathological. I present these biographies and I explain the significance of them to constituting a 
pathological criminal subject.  The following section and the remaining sections all focus on 
psychopathy specifically.  In the second section, I explain the contemporary understandings of 
psychopathy, while underscoring the cornerstone of the psychopathic personality—“the paradox 
of appearance and reality” (Weisman 2008, 199)— and I provide a series of examples of the 
ways that psychopathy was literally ascribed to Williams and Bernardo (and Homolka). In this 
section, following the lead of scholars who have critically analysed psychopathy in its historical 
and contemporary formulations, I also make the argument that each offender was also 
symbolically represented as a psychopath through the linked notions of duality and change (e.g. 
Rimke 2003; 2005; Rhodes 2002; Weisman 2008).  These notions are not only central features of 
the psychopathic personality, but they are also, I suggest, what makes psychopathy amenable for 
imagining the normalized subject as criminal.   
 
Pathology, the Biographical Inspection and ‘The Change’ 
 
 As I read through the coverage of the cases, one of the first things that jumped out was 
the biography-like stories that were told about each offender.  The level of detail and space that 
were given to these stories was notable, as was the effort that went into writing them so that we 
might begin to understand who they were before they committed their crimes and to see if there 
was something peculiar or, retrospectively, a clue hidden in the condensed story of their life. For 
the sake of simplicity, I call this practice the biographical inspection54 which, in a crime-news 
context, is conducted by journalists who research the offender’s past to try to make sense of the 
current crimes. As we will see, the story(s) that results from the biographical inspection are 
structured by a discourse of pathology and constitute the offender as pathological. The 
‘biography’ is able to do some of this conceptual work because it encourages the reader to try to 
make connections between the offender’s life history (e.g. their experiences, internal life, 
traumas, upbringing, behaviours and so on) and their ‘criminal nature’ so we might be able to 
comprehend how the unimaginable offender becomes criminal.  
                                                 
54 I use this term as a shorthand for a process that Michel Foucault (2003) explained in his Abnormal lectures.  I 
discuss his work below.  
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 It should be noted, that the media does not always provide this in-depth historical 
information in all crime narratives. Nancy Heitzeg (2015) points out that this practice (e.g. 
consulting family members, neighbours, friends, and other people who have an opportunity to 
engage with the offender to learn about who the offender is) is a practice that occurs most often 
in instances of white criminality.  In other words, it is a practice of the unimaginable. There are a 
couple of assumptions that underpin this practice.  The first assumption is that the offender’s 
criminality is unimaginable because the image of normalcy does not fit the reality of their violent 
criminality.  The second, which follows from the first, is that if the image does not fit reality then 
there is a belief that these normalized subjects turned criminal offenders “have a story” beyond 
their criminality (Heitzeg 2015; Daniels 2015). Furthermore, by presenting their history, their 
story, through quotes and an eclectic compilation of pictures (such as graduation photos, 
childhood images, images of the offender with family and friends and so on) the media also 
accomplishes the task of “humanizing them”, showing that they are not only their 
criminality55(Heitzeg 2015, 201).  This is a practice, as Heitzeg notes, and as we will see in 
Chapter 4 and 6, that does not generally occur in cases where offenders are racialized.    
 The biographical inspections that I saw taking place in the news reminded me of Michel 
Foucault’s (2003) observations about psychiatric expert opinions at trial. Foucault (2003) 
suggested that when psychiatric discourse enters the domain of criminal justice, particular and 
peculiar things occur. In his Abnormal lectures, he discusses the function of psychiatric expert 
opinion at trial.  Of particular significance is the way that psychiatric expert opinion rests on 
ushering in biographical elements “that do not in any way explain the action in question but are 
kinds of miniature warning signs, little scenes of childhood, little childish scenes that are 
presented as already analogous to the crime” (33). Foucault terms the effect of psychiatric expert 
opinion at trial doubling because it “allows the offense, as defined by the law, to be doubled with 
a whole series of other things that are not the offense itself but a series of forms of conduct, of 
                                                 
55 For an example of how racialized peoples are criminalized even when they are the victims of crimes committed by 
white men, look up the recent use of the hash tag #ifiwasgunnedown.  This hash tag was used to criticize how 
mainstream media criminalizes black men who are victims of crime by drawing on hegemonic racial imagery of 
these individuals.  Often the images that are used depict young black men in singular and stereotypical ways by 
using images that connotatively portray the victims as ‘thugs’ or ‘gangsters’.  This type of portrayal not only makes 
it clear that images of victimhood do not easily assimilate to young, black men, it also does not represent them in a 
way that accurately captures the complexity of their personhood. The creation of this hash tag can be seen as a 
political intervention in this all too common practice of criminalizing racialized victims of crime (see also Heitzeg 
2015).  
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ways of being that are, of course, presented in the discourse of the psychiatric expert as the 
cause, origin, motivation, and starting point of the offense” (15). What the discourse of 
psychiatry produces is a second character (in addition to the offender or the ‘author’ of the 
crime), an individual who must be known and accounted for in his way of being, “to show how 
the individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it” (19). 
 Henceforth, any oddity, abnormality or misdeed found in the biography will come to 
stand in as a sign of the offender’s double, their biological or psychological predisposition to 
criminality, a sign of the crime itself (Foucault 2003).  In bringing in this information, what is 
trying to be made clear is that the offender has always been possibly dangerous in their nature, 
that they have a criminal potentiality: “the value of psychiatric expertise is often, if not always, 
that of demonstrating potential criminality, or rather, the potential for the offense the individual 
is accused of” (22). As we will see below, when the potential for criminality is made to exist in 
the biographical representation, what we see is a kind of slow, gradual or incremental transition 
into criminality. While Foucault’s objective in discussing psychiatric expert opinion is different 
than my purpose here, I think that his way of thinking about the belief that criminality is a 
potentiality that is discernable through one’s biography is helpful for thinking about the ways 
that the unimaginable criminal becomes imaginable as such.  If the crimes and the criminal who 
committed them are shocking and unfathomable, constructing a biography of the individual’s 
criminal potentiality allows their criminality to be imaginable by inserting the offender and the 
crime into discourse of pathology.  The incremental criminal biography then, is the first type of 
biography that can begin to make unimaginable criminality legible. 
 A second form that a biography might take is to show how the otherwise normalized 
subject abruptly shifts into criminality. That is, the biographical information that is presented is 
used to show how the offender did not always resemble the crime, but rather that ‘something 
went wrong’ for this individual (Foucault 2003, 124; Daniels 2015). This ‘something’ could be a 
triggering event like a trauma, fight, unemployment or the onset of an illness. We might call this 
second biography, the transformative criminal biography.  Underscoring this biographical 
representation is the belief  that the crime committed does not represent who they are and who 
they have always been (or at least how they have appeared to others). In other words, at some 
point something was assumed to be right about this individual and then something went wrong 
(Daniels 2015); there was a profound change in their way of being. Within this understanding, 
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the crime itself is the only sign or symptom of pathology (Weisman 2008, 192). Indeed, as 
Foucault (2003) explains: “a crack appears and there is no resemblance between the act and the 
person. Even better, one person does not resemble the other; one phase of life does not resemble 
the other. There is a break, the onset of illness” (Foucault 2003, 127).  As a result, this 
biographical narrative pictures the offender as undergoing a sudden transformation from ‘good’ 
to ‘evil’. 
  It also bears mentioning that while both of these biographical forms are amenable to 
building a representation of psychopathy, the transformative biography is consistent with the 
historical and contemporary logic of psychopathy. First, and in regards to historical 
representations of moral insanity (as discussed in Chapter 1), Heidi Rimke (2005) observed how 
diagnoses of moral insanity were premised on a ‘normal’ subject and individuals diagnosed with 
moral insanity were seen as undergoing a negative and transformative change from normalcy to 
abnormality (285-289). The change, evidenced by the subject’s transgression(s), was seen as “an 
indicator” of moral insanity (286). In the contemporary context, psychopathy is largely construed 
as an invisible disorder because it “resembles normalcy” (Weisman 2008, 199). Within this 
context, transgression(s) are similarly seen as evidence of a condition— psychopathy—that was 
present, but concealed all along (Weisman 2008). In a sense then, the transformation implied in 
this biography is not necessarily a ‘true’ change, but a ‘making visible’ of a condition that had 
otherwise remained hidden.   
 The biographical inspection is central to writing a narrative of pathological criminality.  
In the first biographical narrative—the incremental criminal biography — the crime is slowly 
woven into the nature of the person, because it is believed, as Foucault (2003) noted, that the 
crime and the person are one, insofar as the person who carried out the crime is seen as 
biologically similar to the crime itself; that criminality is an attribute that one is born with.  In the 
second type of biography—the transformative criminal biography—the biographical information 
is used to demonstrate that this is not who the individual always was, ‘something’ went wrong 
for this individual (e.g. “the onset of illness”; Foucault 2003, 127), or that the transgression made 
an invisible condition—psychopathy—manifest (Weisman 2008). While I have presented these 
biographies as separate, in practice they are much more fluid (e.g. the way that the biographical 
information is presented may be congruent with one or both of these forms). Regardless of how 
the biographical information is presented, in essence, both forms of biographical representations 
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enable us to begin to imagine Bernardo and Williams’ criminality as psychopathic by 
representing them as changing (incremental) or changed (transformative) figures. In either 
instance, and as Rimke (2005) has noted, the notion of a negative change relies on a normalized 
subject (289).   
 
Williams’ Biographical Inspection 
 
 Journalists scoured Williams’ biography for motives, causes, clues that could either 
explain his behaviour or that could have predicted his criminality. Underpinning this 
biographical search was the belief that was expressed in one of the articles, and which echoes 
Foucault’s point about the role that psy experts play in the trial: “People don’t just wake up one 
day and say, ‘I’m going to abduct someone and murder them’ [...] I’m sure there’s a history.” 
(Dale 2010). As media, along with military personnel, psychologists and psychiatrist relentlessly 
canvassed his biography, his military record, interviewed old friends, peers, colleagues, and 
neighbours they did not find behaviours or misdeeds that could have operated as ‘warning signs’ 
of Williams’ way of being. No such “history” was found.  There was no motive, no trauma, no 
history of mental illness, no discernible or definite reason. This however, did not stop journalists 
and the various individuals that they consulted from speculating why Williams committed these 
crimes. Speculations which ranged from the death of Williams’ cat to his struggle with chronic 
pain (McArthur 2010). Despite these attempts, no concrete explanation was provided in the news 
and Williams’ criminality remained beyond intelligibility: How could the man that “would 
reportedly examine the lawn for frogs, dragging his feet through the grass so he wouldn’t harm 
them” (Yang et al. 2010), now be confessing to the most heinous of crimes? How could a man 
who occupied a position of status and prestige in the military, who also excelled at his job and 
who was reported as friendly, kind and compassionate, suddenly commit crimes of the most 
violent sort? 
 The asymmetry between his biography and his crimes was evidently puzzling. More than 
this however, it was the sudden change in Williams’ behaviour, marked by Williams’ first crime 
(i.e. the “fetish home burglaries”; Rankin and Contenta 2010d), which he committed not long 
before his quick escalation to sexual assault and murder, that some journalists and experts found 
particularly baffling:  
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‘This guy is quite unusual,’ says psychologist Vernon Quinsey […] ‘We're learning 
from this case,’ adds an informed source, who requested anonymity. ‘We haven't 
seen guys like this in the past and we don't expect to see a lot of them in the future.’ 
Williams had a successful career and a long, apparently loving marriage, and didn't 
embark on a life of crime until he began a series of fetish home burglaries in 
September 2007, at the age of 44. ‘It's very unusual for a guy who's got his act 
together like that ... to all of a sudden start committing crimes at a late age,’ says 
Quinsey […] ‘The guys you typically see start earlier,’ he adds. ‘Almost nobody 
starts a life of crime when they're in their 40s.’ Equally unusual was his escalation 
from panty fetish to sex assault to murder. Most serial killers assault and kill in 
tandem, right from the start. (Rankin and Contenta 2010d) 
 
In focusing on, and trying to make sense of this sudden change (i.e. his apparently sudden turn to 
crime), the sentiment quoted above—that people do not simply wake up and decide to start 
committing crime—was reiterated in pathological terms. One journalist, quoting the former 
RCMP behavioural sciences director, suggested that “It’s kind of like some forms of mental 
illness or depression, it’s lying dormant and either a physical or psychologically traumatic event 
occurs that provokes someone who is predisposed to start acting out” (Glenn Woods quoted in 
MacLeod 2010).   Implied in this construal of Williams is that the onset of pathology or the 
‘awakening’ of a predisposition is responsible for his shift in behaviour, morality and character 
and the only ‘solid’ evidence of pathology is “the crime itself” (Weisman 2008, 192; Foucault 
2003). The other way we can read this representation is that at first, Williams’ criminal 
pathology was invisible, hidden by his normalcy whereas it is now apparent through his crimes.  
A representation of psychopathy is beginning to form.  
 
Bernardo’s Biographical Inspection 
 
 The journalists’ biographical inspection of Bernardo (and Homolka) is a bit more 
complicated.  The coverage of Bernardo’s biography was very detailed and oscillated between 
accounts that represented his childhood and familial context as ‘dysfunctional’ and completely 
average. In one of the articles that explores these differing accounts, journalists capture this 
sentiment in their headline: “Bernardo a Man of Many Faces” (Boyle and J. Hall 1993).   
 As a young child, journalists report that Bernardo had speech difficulties; first, he was 
tongue tied and then later he developed a stutter. The latter, was something that he was teased 
about: “he got tagged with the moniker ‘barnyard’, a play on his surname.  Other children always 
found it fun to pick on the stammering young boy with a baby face” (Pron, Duncanson and 
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Rankin 1995b; see also Boyle and J. Hall 1993).  Journalists also note that although the Bernardo 
family looked idyllic from a distance, upon closer inspection there were “smudges in the 
Bernardo family portrait” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b): “Marilyn [Bernardo’s mother] 
had put on weight from her child-rearing days.  When it stayed on, her husband began to ride her 
out about it in front of the children.  While the Bernardo children often played at neighbours’ 
houses, neighbourhood children seldom came to their home especially when Paul’s father was 
around” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b).  Furthermore, journalists note that when 
Bernardo was as young as 5, Bernardo’s father began sexually assaulting a woman.  Although 
the family tried to keep these ‘troubles’ a secret, in 1993 the woman came forward about the 
assaults and he was convicted. When his father’s “sexual deviations” began, Bernardo had no 
idea, but he would find out by the time he was 10. In addition to learning about his father’s 
proclivities to sexual assault, Bernardo also learned from his mother, during a fight, that the only 
father that Bernardo had ever known was not his biological father; he was a “bastard”: “The 
effect was devastating. Bernardo ran out of the house crying [...] the cruel disclosure drove a 
wedge between mother and son” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b; emphasis mine).  
Emphasizing the psychological context of Bernardo’s hatred towards women because of his 
“cruel” and inadequate mother, this article attempts to demonstrate how a sexual sadist whose 
desire to dominate, humiliate and torture women is made through bad mothering.   What follows 
from this information, is evidence of Bernardo’s mounting hate towards his mother:  
 
Bernardo never had anything good to say about her, telling friends he hated her 
cooking and didn’t like how she treated him, yelling at him for even the slightest 
boyish mistake. The strained relationship with his domineering mother only 
solidified what Bernardo was secretly feeling about women as early as age 16.  They 
were all lying, contemptible creatures, not worthy of his respect. ‘We are all 
organisms,’ he once told a friend, ‘and some are more superior than others’. (Pron, 
Duncanson and Rankin 1995b)   
 
As a narrative of a misogynistic, sexually deviant serial killer is beginning to take form, 
Bernardo’s mother stands as being the trigger for an already present predisposition.  It was her 
bad mothering—domineering and cruel—that was responsible for his acts of femicide. Once we 
are clear on the role that Bernardo’s mother played in his life and in his abnormal psychological 
development, we are then told that Bernardo’s deviant sexuality began to “explode”.  
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  In proper narrative succession readers are encouraged to read one set of events as 
causing the latter. The news account tells us that Bernardo’s deviant sexual acts began with 
voyeurism and then “homosexuality”, but as his “prowess” developed in high school he turned 
his attention back on women: “he referred to himself as a ‘Stud’, and in his graduating yearbook 
he said his main ambition in life was to meet women” (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b). 
One of Bernardo’s high school girlfriends recalls that their sexual relationship was anything but 
normal, which included being strangled by twine and sodomized. However, Bernardo’s first 
love, Nadine Brammer, said that was not how she knew Bernardo.  She tells journalists that 
Bernardo was a normal guy, “I’ve spent intimate time with him there is nothing abnormal about 
him [...] you don’t go out with someone and not know what they’re capable of”(quoted in Boyle 
and J. Hall 1993). A former neighbour, Barbara Boorman, shares Brammer’s impression of 
Bernardo:  
 
He had lots of girlfriends, he was good-looking and he was smart. He was a nice, 
clean-cut young fellow... he was quiet and polite [...] He was the kind of guy most 
mothers would be quite pleased to see their daughters bring home, [...] he was an all-
round nice-looking guy who kept himself dressed up really well at school. He was a 
lovely boy. It comes to us as a dreadful shock. (quoted in Boyle and J. Hall 1993) 
 
Other neighbours, however, counter this representation of Bernardo and his family:   
 
‘All of the kids played together on the street, but the Bernardos were losers. They 
didn’t always play with us [...] no one wanted to go to their house to play.  We rarely 
got invited into their house and when we did it was dirty’ [...] the family was odd and 
kept to themselves. ‘They were all kind of strange.  The father was passive, 
submissive.’ And far from being proud of her son, Bernardo’s mother was mean and 
overbearing, the neighbour said.  ‘She never talked nicely to them or about them,’ 
she said. ‘You could hear the mother screeching 20 houses away for her kids’. (Boyle 
and J. Hall 1993) 
 
Part of what these representations are attempting to do is to constitute the thing that they are 
representing—Bernardo’s criminality.  As biographical information surfaces, journalists re-
present it in narrative form attempting to demonstrate that these divergent accounts of ‘who 
Bernardo is’ all testify to the potential or inherent criminality embedded in his biography. For the 
most part however, the elements that are highlighted in the news are non-serious transgressions 
so they do not tell us much by way of explaining why Bernardo escalated to rape and murder.  
Much like the techniques used by journalists in the Williams case, the journalists in the Bernardo 
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case also focused on the change in his behaviour—the moment where understandable routine 
familial oddities and sexual curiosity became unintelligible violence. 
 The moment of irruption or change—when Bernardo is identified as becoming 
aggressive, sexually demanding, domineering, controlling and self-serving—is often located by 
journalists as being after his relationship with Homolka began.  During her testimony at 
Bernardo’s trial, Homolka made the change in his behaviour abundantly clear, noting that at the 
beginning of their relationship everything was good, and their sex life was “normal”. He treated 
her “like a princess”, buying her flowers and visiting her in St. Catherines a couple of times a 
week, even though he lived in Toronto (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995a):      
 
The change in his attitude toward her started slowly, Homolka said. She wasn't 
allowed to wear a mini-skirt to school or talk to other boys. He wanted her to dress 
more preppy and she was no longer allowed to change her hairstyle, Homolka said. 
When Houlahan [prosecutor] asked why she didn't refuse his demands, Homolka 
replied: ‘They didn't seem important to me.’ Bernardo didn't like her friends, so she 
stopped associating with them, court was told. He encouraged her to drink more and 
then began making sexual demands, such as making her perform fellatio. ‘He wanted 
me to perform fellatio and I didn't want to,’ she testified. At times he wanted her to 
pretend she was someone else or say degrading things during sex. (Pron, Duncanson 
and Rankin 1995a) 
 
It is at this point that the facade cracks, and we are made to see how all the little details of his 
biography connect to this moment where everything changes—his illness has surfaced and its/his 
full criminal potential begins to unravel.  While Williams’ pathology is made to appear as though 
it lay dormant until 2007, in the case of Bernardo we see both types of biographies being 
intertwined.  In the first instance, we are made to think that the pathology revealed itself at 
telling moments—similar to a whack-a-mole game—and then retreated and the guise of 
normalcy restored at least on the surface, while Homolka’s account tells that the there was a 
significant change in his behaviour that did not match up with the man that she had initially met.  
The notion of change—whether construed as an abrupt change or as a more gradual change that 
occurred over time— in relation to both Williams’ and Bernardo’s biography, is an important 
point of similarity. As we will see in the following sections, the idea that an individual can move 
between ‘abnormal’ and normal’ is a significant feature of representations of psychopathy in 
general and Williams and Bernardo in particular.   
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Enter Psychopathy  
 
 In the process of attempting to identify the biological, psychological and/or 
environmental variables that could have precipitated the behaviour of Williams and Bernardo, 
one specific iteration of pathology surfaced—psychopathy56.  
 References to Williams as a psychopath57 peppered the media coverage of his crimes. 
Heather Mallick (2010c) in her news article, “A Psychopath’s Monotone Act of Contrition” says 
bluntly that “Williams is a psychopath. Humans are mere digits to him. He’s told what he’s 
supposed to feel about them so he does a passable rendering, a sketch”. In a number of articles, 
certain features of psychopathy are used to characterize Williams such as a lacking empathy, 
remorse, or emotion (Rankin and Contenta 2010b; Appleby and McArthur 2010; Mandel 2010b; 
Cobb 2010; Monster Has No Answers 2010).  Others draw attention to his anti-social behaviour, 
an important element of contemporary understandings of psychopathy (MacLeod 2010; Rankin 
and Contenta 2010d). In other articles, the premise is that Williams is a psychopath and the 
question becomes one of treatment—how can Williams’ psychopathy be treated, if at all (Kirkey 
2010)?—or of prevention—how can psychopaths, like Williams, be screened out from the 
military (Khan 2010; Hurley 2010c)? 
 Bernardo and Homolka too were labelled psychopaths by psy-experts that were 
interviewed by journalists: “some experts suspect that both Karla Homolka and Paul Bernardo 
are psychopaths—people who aren't mentally ill but lack any conscience and single-mindedly 
pursue their own pleasure” (Blackwell 1995).  Psychiatrist and leading scholar of psychopathy, 
Robert Hare (he was not involved in the trial) said that Homolka and Bernardo have 
psychopathic tendencies, he says:   
What bothers me about him, and her, too, is the casual way these horrific things are 
described on the witness stand [...] When a psychopath commits a violent act, they're 
                                                 
56 It is perhaps significant that, in both the Williams and Bernardo/Homolka cases, the offenders are generally not 
labelled psychopaths until they either confessed or were found guilty of the crimes. 
57 It their recent book on psychopathy and in Chapter 3 specifically, Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun (2015) discuss the 
Russell Williams case and note that psychopathy was a regular feature of the Canadian news coverage of the case. 
They also observed the strategies of duality that I outline below. Despite these similarities however, our arguments 
are fundamentally different.  Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun use the Russell Williams case to demonstrate the 
significance of psychopathy in the case and to the public (49-50), the implicit assumptions that are embedded in how 
psychopathy was used to try to explain Williams’ behaviour (e.g. it allowed Williams to be transformed into a 
‘object of moral condemnation’; it was deterministic; it reduced his central identity to psychopathy; 51-52); and 
finally, they used the case to demonstrate both the power and the problems associated with biological accounts of 
behaviour.  
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not doing it because they're malicious or malevolent or evil.  They're doing it because 
they don't give a damn. (quoted in Blackwell 1995) 
 
While the “horror-show Barbie and Ken” are often labelled psychopaths together, Bernardo is 
also labelled a psychopath as an individual (King 1996). For example, that Paul Bernardo is a 
psychopath is sometimes suggested as something that is obvious or a matter-of-fact: “Paul 
Bernardo. Jeffrey Dahmer. Clifford Olson. Ted Bundy. All serial killers. All psychopaths. They 
are the heart of darkness. They have no moral conscience. They show no anxiety, no guilt, no 
fear, no remorse. They want, therefore, they act” (Black 1995). In another news article, the label 
is applied and its suitability for Bernardo explained by Robert Hare: 
Psychopaths tend to be egocentric, lack remorse or guilt and constantly seek 
excitement, said Hare. They're also unable to empathize with others and tend to be 
deceitful and emotionally shallow. Only a small percentage are physically violent, he 
said. ‘They are predators -- emotional and physical and sexual predators’. Bernardo's 
cool, confident and sometimes condescending demeanor in the witness box was 
typical, Hare said. ‘A psychopath who has committed a crime and is caught is now 
on stage. He doesn't see himself as any sort of pariah, he sees himself as a victim of 
the system . . . He's on stage, he's enjoying it, he's loving it [...]’. (Blackwell 1995) 
 
Interestingly, Homolka is usually labelled a psychopath with Bernardo during the news coverage 
that my research covered (which spanned from the first ‘Scarborough rape’ to the end of 
Bernardo’s trial). However, in later years it seems that the psychopath label became more 
pronounced. For example, Donna French’s (Kristen French’s mother) sworn affidavit is quoted 
once Homolka is released from prison. In the passage from her affidavit, Homolka’s behaviour is 
interpreted as being congruent with psychopathy:    
Ms. Teale's [Homolka’s] inability to apologize or express any remorse to us confirms 
that she takes no responsibility for her conduct, has no insight into her culpability, 
and remains dangerous. Some had described Ms. Teale [Homolka] as having a 
borderline personality disorder. One doctor concluded that she was a psychopath, 
while most doctors agree that she is narcissistic. Whatever the description, Ms. Teale 
[Homolka] is extremely intelligent, incredibly strong-willed and a master at deceit 
and deception. (Hanes 2005) 
 
I discuss the representation of Homolka as psychopath in greater detail the next chapter58.  
 Each of these literal ascriptions of psychopathy is telling of how Bernardo and Williams’ 
unimaginable criminality came to be imagined through a discourse of pathology, and 
                                                 
58 Although the psychopath label was not as prominent in its literal sense with regards to Homolka, symbolically it 
was quite explicit. I discuss this in the next chapter. 
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psychopathy in particular. What I would now like to consider is how and why psychopathy 
became the way that their criminality was explained and represented in the news.  In other 
words, what makes psychopathy amenable to representations of otherwise normalized subjects as 
criminal? 
 
The Vicissitudes of the Psychopath  
 
 As I discussed in Chapter 1, in the contemporary context, psychopathy is generally 
defined as “a personality disorder describing individuals with a specific set of traits” (Glenn and 
Raine 2014, 3).  More specifically, a psychopath is the combination of a series of 
emotional/interpersonal features (e.g. deceitful and manipulative, egocentric, glib and superficial, 
lack remorse, empathy etc.) as well as features that lead to social deviance (e.g. impulsivity, the 
need for excitement, the repeated violation of social norms etc.) (Hare 1999, 34). What is 
particularly interesting about this formulation of psychopathy is that many of the interpersonal 
traits that Hare cites as symptomatic of psychopathy are circumscribed around deception or 
duality: the psychopath has “chameleon-like abilities” (Hare 1999, 2); psychopaths are conning 
and manipulative, presenting themselves as charming but this is superficial and representative of 
his/her glib charm; and, the psychopath is also a pathological liar.  These traits all allude to the 
duality of the psychopath in their ability to appear as someone other than who they really are, 
which is accomplished by the various traits that they possess.  While most researchers are of the 
view that psychopathy is caused by both biological and environmental factors (Hare 1999; Raine 
and Glenn 2014), the biological factors which contribute to the disorder are often favoured 
(Pickersgill 2009).    
 Richard Weisman has described this modern representation of psychopathy as the 
embodiment of the “paradox of appearance versus reality” (2008, 199; emphasis mine). When 
using this phrase, Weisman is referring to the commonly held belief that psychopaths, because of 
their very condition, are able to mimic normalcy in their outward appearances—the psychopath 
is a “consummate social performer” (200; emphasis mine). However, this appearance of 
normalcy is easily disrupted because in the context of psychopathy “action is a reflection of 
being”; that is, deviant acts reveal the psychopath’s biological condition that is otherwise masked 
by their social performance of normalcy (198). Therefore, the psychopath is characterized by 
duality, a paradox, that is not immediately perceivable to the layperson because the disorder 
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manifests through an impeccable ability to manage one’s impressions and “contro[l] the 
impressions of their audience” (200).  
 Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun have also commented on this paradox, which has been so 
important for how psychopathy has been thought about since the nineteenth century (2015, 132). 
They make the argument that the very basis of this paradox or problem is, following Lombroso, 
based on the myth that people who do immoral things must look different as well (132). What 
makes the psychopath different from the born criminal is that they do not immediately appear 
different or evil, but rather ‘normal’ and this, they note, is made part of the condition itself “it is 
the nature of psychopaths to pretend normalcy” (132).   
 This is also a characteristic that Hervey Cleckley observed in The Mask of Sanity (note 
how the title also alludes to masked or alternative appearance; Weisman 2008): 
 
 [...] we are dealing here not with a complete man at all but with something that 
suggests a subtly constructed reflex machine which can mimic the human 
personality perfectly.  This smoothly operating psychic apparatus reproduces 
consistently not only specimens of good human reasoning but also appropriate 
simulations of normal human emotion in response to nearly all the varied stimuli of 
life.  So perfect is this reproduction of a whole and normal man that no one who 
examines him in a clinical setting can point out in scientific or objective terms why 
or how, he is not real.  And yet we know or feel we know that reality, in the sense 
of full, healthy experiencing of life is not here. (1964, 406) 
 
Robert Hare (1999) also sees the psychopath as a performer of normalcy.  In the epigraph to his 
widely read and cited book, Without Conscience, he cites a passage from William March’s 
(1954) novel, The Bad Seed. The passage reads: 
Good people are rarely suspicious: they cannot imagine others doing the things they 
themselves are incapable of doing; usually they accept the undramatic solution as the 
correct one, and let matters rest there. Then too, the normal are inclined to visualize 
the psychopath as one who’s as monstrous in appearance as he is in mind, which is 
about as far from the truth as one could well get....these monsters of real life usually 
looked and behaved in a more normal manner than their actually normal brothers and 
sisters; they presented a more convincing picture of virtue than virtue presented of 
itself—just as the wax rosebud or the plastic peach seemed more perfect to the eye, 
more than the mind thought a rosebud or a peach should be, than the imperfect 
original from which it had been modelled. (William March quoted in Hare 1999) 
 
For Hare and for March, the psychopath presents themselves as more perfectly normal, virtuous 
than the ‘normal’ person. They have the chameleon-like ability to appear as normal, to blend in 
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but, they are not normal or virtuous. Their “mask of sanity” hides their condition. This passage 
is, however, also saying much more than this. Hare’s book was written for a lay audience so that 
they could understand and identify psychopaths in their everyday dealings and not fall victim to 
their predatory ways. This epigraph could therefore also be read as speaking to the sensibilities 
and assumptions of ‘good people’ (in contrast to ‘bad’ people or psychopaths), the reader.  The 
‘good people’ that are referenced at the outset are those who are honest, innocent and who 
assume that others are also honest and innocent—they cannot see the truth behind normal-like 
appearances. ‘Good people’ are thus innocent to a fault in their perceptions of others; they are 
naive, unable to see the monstrosity that lies under the appearance of normalcy. We could also 
read this opening line in a different way to mean, not that good people rarely question the 
‘normal’ or ‘good’ appearance of others, but that normal/good people rarely appear as suspicious 
to others; for it is assumed that they too are un-criminal.    
 As I discussed in Chapter 2, binary thinking is central to meaning (S. Hall 1997a), and 
part of the poststructural project is to disrupt binary thinking.  Interestingly, the way that 
psychopathy is characterized as a paradox seems to, in some ways at least, shatter dualistic 
thinking by paying attention to the fluidity and interaction between the two terms of the binaries 
it calls forth: appearance/reality; real/fake; normal/abnormal; good/bad. The psychopath is not 
either/or but is both at the same time. Additionally, the terms in each of these pairs are mutually 
constitutive. For example, if we take the appearance/reality binary, the psychopath’s appearance 
of normalcy is constitutive of the reality of their condition and that reality is only possible if the 
appearance of normalcy is present.  
 This highlights the significance of duality and dualisms for imagining psychopathy. 
Psychopathy relies on two conflicting images of personhood—one where the offender appears 
absolutely normal, unsuspicious as well as an image that forsakes the former. This latter image 
or representation seeks to fracture a veneer of normalcy found in their appearance and in so 
doing, reorganizes meaning so as to pathologize (and, in some cases, criminalize) the very 
appearance of normalcy.  Given that psychopathy is a condition grounded in these dualisms, and 
the “paradox of appearance versus reality” (Weisman 2008, 199) in particular, the fact that the 
psychopath, according to the logic of psychopathy, is only a ‘clone’, ‘copy’ of a ‘normal’ human 
in the way that s/he can ‘mimic the human personality’ then it might be useful to think of 
159 
 
psychopathy as a condition that pathologizes those who appear ‘normal’ 59 (Lunbeck 1994, 70) 
and transgress.  That is, to appear ‘normal’ and yet to do things that transgress social convention 
or law, is to be psychopathic; for it is action that is a reflection of being in the contemporary 
understanding of psychopathy, not appearance (Weisman 2008).  The ability of psychopathy to 
rewrite apparent normalcy as abnormality is how a narrative of criminality of the normalized 
subject is formed in these cases.  
 Taking all of this into consideration then, symbolic representations of psychopaths (in 
contrast to the literal representations discussed above) rely on presenting the individual as a dual 
figure or a changed/changing figure in written and/or pictorial representations.  This observation 
does not only come from the very structure and logic of psychopathy itself, but was one of the 
themes that was apparent in my analysis of the cases: each offender was represented as two, 
normal and abnormal. The images of Williams and Bernardo as good, respectable and so on is 
mere appearance; the image of them as sex offenders, serial killers and criminals reveal is the 
hidden reality of who they are—morally and sexually transgressive psychopaths. It is this second 
image that enables their performance of normalcy to be seen and known as a fabrication of 
normalcy. It is through these dual/duelling images that an image of psychopathy is formed and 
the criminality of the normalized subject revealed. Indeed, as one journalist wrote: “[...] he was 
Jekyll and Hyde. Psychopaths can seem normal, it’s part of the sickness” (Mcrae 2010).  
 Lorna Rhodes has discussed the ab/normal duality of the psychopath in a different 
context.  She suggests that the idealized image of the psychopath is a split image; on the one 
hand, the image depicted is of a ‘predatory’, ‘savage’, and ‘monstrous’ criminal, while the other 
image betrays the former by representing psychopaths with much more humanity—as 
embodying a “deceptive normalcy”, able to blend in/be anonymous everywhere he goes because 
he is “white, middle-class and ‘normal’” (2002, 457).  These two images, Rhodes argues are 
contradictory but converge to produce the image of the psychopathic criminal as predator and 
‘normal’ human.  Importantly then, in the context of psychopathy representing an offender as a 
double or a changeable figure implies that the subject is able to appear as normal, unsuspicious, 
                                                 
59 In order to understand the argument that I am making in this chapter it essential for me to note that I am using the 
terms ‘normal’ and ‘normalized’ to refer to on the one hand, to the fictive subject that the psy-disciplines use to 
construct notions various conditions, illnesses and diseases—the ‘normal’, healthy subject.  But, I am also using the 
words ‘normal’ and ‘normalized’ to refer to those subjects who do not figure as criminal or suspicious in criminal 
imaginaries. In the context of my analysis in this chapter, this means the white, middle class heterosexual man.  
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and un-criminal in the first instance (Rimke 2005). Psychopathy relies on this presupposition 
insofar as it is one of the cornerstones of psychopathy is that the psychopath must be able appear 
as ‘normal’ (with everything that this entails, including a normalized social location) all the 
while having the most violent criminal proclivities. The ability of the psychopath classification to 
envelop both normalcy/humanness/goodness and abnormality/savagery/criminality through 
duality and change is what I would argue makes the deployment of psychopathy both possible 
and sensible in the representation of normalized offenders who are not often imagined as 
criminal.  
 One of the things that was most distressing about Williams and Bernardo was that they 
were complex figures that did not easily map on to our moral taxonomies of good and evil, 
because they embodied both simultaneously; they were able to appear as normal because of their 
social location (i.e. ‘normal’ white, heterosexual, middle-class men) in addition to the fact that 
they were known as good people.  But, they were also “imposter[s] of a man”, violent serial 
killers and rapists (Mandel 2010a).  The inability to pigeon hole these men led to a technique of 
representation that would enable journalists to capture their contradictory character and 
appearance—psychopathy.  
 The idea that Williams and Bernardo can be characterized as a modern-day, real-life 
double was a prominent feature in the news coverage.  In the Williams case, we see the 
following sentiments routinely emerge:   
 
Stunning double life. Williams has been portrayed by his comrades as an upstanding, 
bright and focused commander and loving husband by day. The legal saga that is 
unfolding in Belleville, a short drive from the Trenton base he ruled until early 
February, has cast him as a serial killer and sexual predator by night. (Woods 2010b) 
 
Williams seems a walking Jekyll and Hyde: by day, commander of CFB Trenton, the 
biggest air force base in Canada; by night, a sexual predator. (Rankin and Contenta 
2010d) 
 
The terrifying ease with which the murderous colonel could resume his pose as a 
normal human being on the heels of committing two savage sex killings only 
underscored hours of searing court evidence so graphic and disgusting that it left 
many in the packed courtroom weeping. (Appleby and McArthur 2010) 
 
Canada’s prince of darkness; the Jekyll-Hyde pilot who jetted the prime minister, 
governor general, and even the queen of England to and fro when he wasn’t on his 
quick march to hell lived at the zenith of human nature’s duality, the fine line 
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between good and evil. (Leave ‘Sick’ Out of It 2010; see also Duffy 2010 for 
references to Williams as a Jekyll-Hyde figure) 
 
The imagery here is clear.  Not only is Williams being represented as a double, but the double 
metaphors rely further on analogies and imagery of good and evil; this is racially significant. By 
day, Williams is light/good/human/bright/normal and by night, Williams is dark/evil/sexual 
predator/serial killer/savage/abnormal. Richard Dyer in his seminal text, White, notes that white 
people are categorized as white despite the fact that “white people are neither literally or 
symbolically white” (1997, 42).  To call a group of people white, means to “ascribe a visible 
property to a group” (42). This racial ascription does not only rely on skin colour, but on the 
collection if visible bodily signifiers that have come to help people categorize people into racial 
groups, such as, lips, nose, hair, eyes and skin. However imprecise it is to classify people in 
terms of physical features, like skin colour, the racial ascription process remains a significant 
social process because of the symbolic capacity of colours. Dyer notes how the colours white and 
black are often seen as opposite colours with opposing meanings, but in both instances, the 
colours are intimately linked to ideas surrounding morality.  The symbolic meaning of whiteness 
as a colour and the symbolic meaning of whiteness as a racial attribute are readily able to slip 
into one register and seamlessly back again into the other, so much so that “for a white person 
who is bad is failing to be ‘white’, whereas a black person who is good is a surprise, and one 
who is bad merely fulfils expectations” (63).  If we return to the dual image of Williams; when 
Williams is ‘good’ (a good neighbour, a good commander, intelligent, white, middle-class, 
respectable, and un-criminal man) he is represented by the light of day; “the shining bright star”.  
Whereas, the metaphor of darkness conveys his criminality, his ‘tainted whiteness’, his 
‘savagery’ and ultimately darkens his light/white by likening him to evil; “Canada’s bright 
shining lie” (Mandel 2010a).  Or as Mallick (2010a) puts it: “for everything about Williams is 
dark and disgusting, from the black zip ties he used to tie them up to the grey duct tape that 
silenced them to the dark cloth that covered Comeau’s eyes to the grey blanket that wrapped 
Lloyd’s corpse”. 
 Bernardo too, is represented within the “paradox of appearance versus reality” (Weisman 
2008, 199).  For example, and as I discussed in the introductory chapter, when Bernardo was 
finally apprehended and his identity revealed to the public, the public expressed surprise that 
Bernardo was in fact the perpetrator.  One woman noted that: 
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 The one thing that keeps dancing around in my mind (and it scares me to death) is at 
the time I was attending school there, this ‘monster’' would not have appeared that 
way to me or to my friends. If they were walking home from class, walking to a party 
or hanging out at a local pub or club and this guy approached them and began talking 
and batting his ‘baby-blues,’ a lot of girls wouldn't think twice. Or, if his sidekick 
began talking to you in a mall or at the bus stop, again, you wouldn't think twice 
about being friendly back. That is the part that scares so many of us to death, the fact 
that these two are a lot like you and me - on the outside. (quoted in Tucker 1995) 
 
 Of import is that the stark appearance of normalcy of both Bernardo (and Homolka) operated as 
a guise of sameness which carried the assumption that they, and people like them (‘us’), could 
not have committed the crimes. But more than their normalcy concealing their criminality, their 
normalcy becomes part of the representation of criminality itself.  That is, the representation of 
Bernardo (and Homolka as we will see in the following chapter) is premised on these two 
seemingly conflicting images, where the figures of Bernardo as “boy-next-door type” or the 
“monster” are positioned together—he is both.  However, the former is only mere appearance, 
the latter image tells us this within the context of psychopathy.  Indeed, as one journalist notes, 
Bernardo is “A man seen differently in the eye of each beholder”:  “A quiet, failed accountant, 
who is remembered by some Scarborough neighbors as a helpful, lovely boy. A self-described 
stud and heartthrob. A California dreamer. A cub scout. A chameleon. The boy next door. A 
suspect in two grisly murders, charged with a string of brutal sexual assaults” (Boyle and J. Hall 
1993).  The ability to appear as normal, unsuspicious, or, to appear as a dynamic person in the 
flat representations that are usually constructed in news formats is a product and a privilege of 
being read as a normalized subject (Stowell-Smith and McKeown 1999; Heitzeg 2015).  
Furthermore, the ability of psychopathy to account for appearances of normalcy and 
transgressiveness is part of its discursive power in these types of instances. 
 The connection between psychopathy and Bernardo’s duality is further sedimented in the 
coverage. In addition to the following examples constructing Bernardo as a dual figure, they also 
use terms that are commonly associated with the disorder like: ‘no conscience’, ‘anti-social 
personality’, ‘charm’ and ‘chameleon’. Journalists describe Bernardo as:  
 
Showing one face to public, while hiding the demons in his head that had driven him 
through most of his then 28 years.  The man with a choir boy face had deceived 
everybody into believing he was nothing more than a fun-loving, skirt chasing ‘party 
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animal,’ probably a bit wider than most men, but otherwise normal.  His overly-
polite manner, his boyish good looks and easy charm were traits he used like a 
cloaking device to hide his true character: a depraved and merciless predator with an 
insatiable sexual appetite, and, of course, no conscience. (Pron, Duncanson and 
Rankin 1995b) 
 
While the experts had trouble analyzing Homolka, apparently they had no problem 
labelling Bernardo as someone with an anti-social personality disorder.  To the 
outside world, he looked normal and successful. It was an image that would keep him 
out of jail, for almost a decade. (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b) 
 
After French’s murder, detectives questioned Bernardo; journalists describe this encounter 
thusly:  
 
Bernardo showed the two detectives the face that he had shown the world, the polite, 
friendly, respectful accountant. It was an image he had perfected over the years. The 
detectives questioned him for 20 minutes and left, convinced he couldn’t be their 
man.  Once again, Bernardo, the smooth-talking chameleon, had charmed his way 
out of trouble. (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b)  
 
It is important to keep in mind how specific ideas of normalcy are underwriting this dual 
representation.  That is, a collection of social, cultural and political assumptions about bodies, 
identity and difference are being shored up in the invocation of normalcy60.  Indeed, the terms 
‘polite’, ‘respectful’, ‘boyish good looker’, ‘successful’, ‘friendly’, and ‘charming’ all summon 
the image of the normal, unthreatening and idyllic image of the white, middle-class man.  
Psychopathy is able to disrupt and reconcile these two differing readings of the same normalized 
subject because of the very premise of the condition itself.  Furthermore, because Bernardo and 
Williams’ criminality is being imagined in the individualizing terms of pathology, the normative 
communities to which they belong are not implicated in their criminality (as is so often the case 
when racialized offenders commit crime; Nourbese Philip 1995; Russell 1998; Jiwani 2006) and 
the non-association between these normative communities and criminality is subsequently 
reinforced (Heitzeg 2015).   
 
Imag(e)ining Psychopathy 
 
 In the representations of Williams and Bernardo, it was not simply the use of the written 
word that helped to construe them as double figures, images were also an important feature. The 
                                                 
60 Kilty and Frigon (2016) make a similar observation in relation to how Homolka was represented. 
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use of visual ‘evidence’ has long been a mode of representation used in criminology.  David 
Horn, for example, discusses the use of photographs in Lombroso’s criminal anthropological 
writings noting that Lombroso’s objective in publishing masses of photographs was to “offer the 
reader the means to verify, on his own, the truth of [his/Lombroso’s] assertions” (2003, 17). 
Indeed, as Nicole Rafter notes: “seeing can lead to believing.  We do not believe everything we 
see, but persuasive images can encourage us to accept the validity or reality of the object that is 
being represented” (2001, 73).   
  According to this sensibility, it is believed that images are objective, truth-speaking 
artefacts of the things that are being captured.  It is thus commonly believed that the image 
speaks truth about reality and that reality is knowable through the image (i.e. what is visible or 
observable). The relationship between the body and crime-news images is an important one. If 
one of the ways that we think about criminality is on and through the body, we often expect 
criminality (or the offender’s difference) to be discernable on the body. Terrance Wright (2011) 
has argued that one of the ways that we gain information about our world is by looking at 
someone’s face; we believe it can tell us something about who they are and this affects how we 
make sense of the story: “the face in western culture…is central to building a picture of who one 
is, and it is through expressive features of the face that we gain access to a perception of who 
someone ‘really’ is” (Howson 2004 quoted in T. Wright 2011, 319). This is why images of faces 
and people are often used in news sources: it is believed that images of faces and bodies tell a 
story about who someone is. For example, Wright notes that when something terrible happens, 
like a mass murder or an act of terrorism we want to know “what kind of person could do such a 
thing?”, The image of the offender is a response to this question: “this sort of person” (319).  
While the photograph is only a remnant of a moment captured in time, we expect the 
photograph to do important work for us. The image and the response to it, reveal the belief/hope 
that there is something in the body that differentiates ‘us’ from terrorists/criminals/’them’, and 
this ‘something’ can unquestionably be seen on the body. The images that I explore below of 
course do not tell us the Truth about the offenders’ being, but rather the choice of including 
certain images can tell us something about the ways that ideas about their normative 
identities/appearance, criminality, and alleged psychopathy were connected and visually 
expressed.  For instance, Kathryn Fraser (1998) has noted the significance of the dual image in 
visual representations in the context of madness. Referencing the visual representation of 
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Christine and Léa Papin (they were domestic workers and employees of one of the people they 
murdered in 1933) who were depicted using before and after pictures, Fraser argues that the 
choice of images “are intended to represent the sisters at a time first, of mental stability, and 
then, of extreme psychic trauma.  The interval between the two images is therefore supposed to 
designate a transformation from apparent normalcy to visually perceptible deviance” (140). 
Fraser notes that what was particularly interesting about these images is that they were used to 
suggest that the insane are visually different from sane individuals.  But if this was the case, 
Fraser asks, then why weren’t the victims of the sisters able to prevent their murders?  The 
answer to this is that the images do not represent madness itself, but the “photographic code or 
schema of madness” (141).  Similarly, in the images of both Bernardo and Williams, what is 
being represented is not psychopathy, but rather how we imagine psychopathy to ‘look’—its 
aesthetic.  
  With this sensibility in mind, the duality and psychopathy of Williams was not just 
present in the way that the media represented him through their written descriptions, but also in 
the way that Williams was visually represented in the images that the press chose to use. In fact, 
images of Williams played an enormous role in the media’s construction of him as a psychopath.  
On October 19, 2010, the day after Williams confessed to his crimes, The Toronto Star (hereafter 
‘the Star’) published two seemingly telling images of Williams on their front page61. The image 
that was placed to the left (hereafter referred to as ‘the image on the left’) is a self-portrait of 
Williams wearing a hot-pink, floral print bikini; he is standing agilely with his arms at his side 
posing for the camera.  Williams’ white skin enables a perceivable contrast between his skin and 
his dark body hair; his facial expression is lock-jawed and stern. The image on the right 
(hereafter referred to as ‘the image on the right’) is of Williams saluting (the recipient of the 
salute is not captured in the image) in a navy blue, decorated military uniform.  His military 
colleagues are faintly visible in the background; again, Williams’ facial expression is stern.  
Above the images and the accompanying news article is a headline that reads: ‘Depraved Double 
Life’. 
 Despite the extraordinary amount of controversy that the ‘graphic imagery’ (read: gender 
transgressions) of the image on the left elicited in the Star’s readership, the Star defended their 
                                                 
61 The images/front page can be viewed here: http://torontolife.com/city/should-graphic-russell-williams-photos-go-
on-the-front-page/ (last accessed December 10, 2016).   
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decision to publish the images on their front page because of the story that the two images, when 
combined, told about who Williams was (English 2010). Following the publication of the images, 
Kathy English (2010), public editor for the Star and member of the Canadian Journalism 
Association Ethics Panel published an article reflecting on the newsroom debates about whether 
to publish the images on the front page. She concludes that the publication of the images was 
ethical and provided the “most honest portrayal of the story”, despite the fact that the images 
were “shocking, disturbing and deplorable” (English 2010).  She remarks that “[t]aken together, 
the photos depicted the monster in our midst, a predator who snuffed out the lives of two women, 
raped two others and terrified dozens of other women and girls whose homes he broke into, 
photographing himself posed in their most intimate garments” (English, 2010).  
  Interestingly, narrating the crimes through written text could not tell the same story of 
criminality that the images could; the images were needed because they, as English (2010) notes, 
“conveyed the stark truth of the savage sickness of the serial killer who has dominated Canadian 
news this week [...] what Canadians were confronted with was the horrific truth about the 
‘depraved double life’ of the former commander [...]” (emphasis mine).  The images were not 
simply ‘needed’ to tell the story of the crimes, but more than this they were needed because they 
spoke the truth of who Williams was. They provided visual evidence of his difference, of his 
criminality; and more importantly that he was, in mind and body, adulterated by a “savage 
sickness”. In other words, it was assumed that by reading the juxtaposed and seemingly 
contradictory images of Williams’ body, a lucid story of Williams’ character, motive and 
criminality would become intelligible as being caused by a “savage sickness”62.   
 I would argue that representing Williams as a psychopath, without always explicitly 
using the term, relies on the use of two images instead of just one. The images of Williams are 
not simply used for identification (i.e. to provide the ‘face’ of the crime; T. Wright 2011). The 
images are also used to help anchor an interpretation of criminality. Williams disrupted dominant 
criminal discourses. So, in order to answer the question of who Williams was, a discourse of 
difference—like pathology and psychopathy—was ushered in via the crime-images to render 
                                                 
62It is also important to note that the images that were used both in the Toronto Star and in other Toronto news 
sources all relied on similar iterations of these images—representing Williams in his ‘regular’ ‘normal’ life and 
publishing the self-portraits of Williams in women’s lingerie and swimming attire. These dichotomous images 
generally represent the visual landscape of the news’ portrayal of the case. To get a general idea of this landscape 
perform a basic Google Image search of “Russell Williams”.  
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criminality both visible and intelligible where meaning and understanding were seemingly 
absent. The juxtaposition of the images accomplishes this by representing a movement between 
Williams’ normalcy and his embodied abnormality, all of which is assumed to be revealed by 
capturing his body and his ‘gender transgressions’ in the images. Williams is not who he appears 
to be.  
 The image on the left of Williams wearing a women’s bikini immediately connotes 
gender transgression. Williams’ physical masculinized characteristics— his chest, leg and groin 
hair distends beyond the fragmented cloth; his stance is agile; his muscles bulge through his skin; 
and, he looks sternly at the camera—when coupled with an image of his body adorned with 
unequivocally feminized garments disrupts the normative image of Williams as a hyper-
masculine military commander. This image of ‘gender transgression’ can be read as an attempt 
to make visible, in bodily terms, his ‘deviance’. That is, it invites us to notice and then conclude 
that Williams was not as ‘normal’ as he seemed. This visual ‘evidence’ or construal allows for 
Williams’ ‘abnormality’, and transgressiveness to be imaginable in the normative imagination by 
appealing to punitive and normalized/binary sex/gender logics (Butler 1990).  
 The visual representation of Bernardo was not as stark as it was for Williams. The reason 
for this is that the most telling visual evidence of Bernardo’s criminality were the videotapes that 
recorded him sexually assaulting his victims, but the public was banned from viewing these tapes 
out of respect for the victims and their families.  Despite this, journalists did still rely on the 
visual in representing Bernardo. What I found to be interesting about the visual strategy of 
representation of both offenders is how both techniques are congruent with the ways that their 
biographies tried to convey their pathology.  For Williams, the change in his ‘way of being’ was 
abrupt and dramatic marked by the onset of pathology, a “savage sickness”; the use of two 
highly contrasting images depict this abrupt change. Whereas for Bernardo his transition into 
criminality was sometimes represented as slow and gradual and then after meeting Homolka, 
abrupt; the images of him convey this gradual change.   
 Throughout the coverage, the Star publishes many different types of images of Bernardo 
ranging from images of him smiling as a child, to images of him handcuffed.  The nuances of the 
visual representation of Bernardo are neatly summarized in one of the last articles that was 
analyzed for this project.  The images come from a five-page spread that chronicled Bernardo’s 
life and crimes (Pron, Duncanson and Rankin 1995b).  As I moved through the pages, it 
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appeared that the journalists were attempting to tell a visual story about Bernardo that coincided 
with the written narrative.  At first, a small image of Bernardo from his grade 8 school picture is 
provided; he appears to have a sweet, child-like smile on his face.  Below this image, is a photo 
of Kenneth Bernardo (Bernardo’s father) being taken to a detention centre after he was convicted 
of sexual assault in 1993.  To the right of the images, there is another picture of Bernardo, but 
this one is from his high school yearbook.  Bernardo has long hair, a faint smile and a direct 
stare. The image appears sinister, odd. On the following page there are two images, one of 
Bernardo smiling, holding “Bunkie” the teddy bear that Homolka would give to Mahaffy to hold 
before she was murdered and the other picture is of Homolka and Bernardo sitting next to each 
other with their arms around each other, smiling.  On the following page, we see images of 
Homolka and Bernardo on their wedding day—Bernardo is looking at Homolka admirably while 
she looks ahead.  Above this picture is a photograph of the couple’s picturesque home. On the 
final page, is an image of Bernardo in a sweater with the hood covering his face; at the bottom of 
the page is a handcuffed Bernardo being walked into a police transport van; he is wearing a suit 
and his head is down.    The images when taken together depict the precise moments, as the 
journalists understood it, that led to the present.   
 Of all the photographs of Bernardo that were recycled in the news coverage, there are two 
types of images that predominated: images that highlighted either his normalcy or criminality. In 
terms of the former, we are shown images of Bernardo from his childhood, of him ‘dressed up’ 
at special events, and of him with Homolka appearing happy and in love63. In terms of the latter, 
there were many different photographs that conveyed his criminality, for example, images of him 
handcuffed, attending court in a suit, and an ubiquitous head shot that seemed to have been taken 
from different angles64. Interestingly, none of these photographs capture his face head-on (i.e. his 
head is either bowed or his face slightly off to the side65). Additionally, once Bernardo was found 
                                                 
63 There were a few different types of images that were used to convey this: their wedding pictures, photos of the 
couple kissing or with their arms around the others’ shoulders smiling for the camera. This last image can be found 
here: http://www.allthingscrimeblog.com/2013/03/08/canadas-most-notorious-serial-killer-case/ (last accessed on 
December 10, 2016). I have not been able to find links to the other images that the Star published, however, a 
Google Image search of “Paul Bernardo” will provide a general idea of the visual landscape of the representations.  
64 The head shot that was used can be found here: http://www.mississauga.com/news-story/3922082-schoolgirl-
killer-paul-bernardo-won-t-get-cushier-cell-public-safety-minister/ (last accessed December 10, 2016).  
65 This is in stark contrast to the iconic headshot that was recycled of Homolka. This one image was constantly used 
and it pictures her looking directly at the camera with ‘dead eyes’. This image is visually significant from the 
perspective of psychopathy. According to Robert Hare it is often the “predatory stare of the psychopath” and the 
169 
 
guilty the Toronto Star published a photograph of Bernardo handcuffed with shackled legs in a 
police van. The caging in the van, that separates the police officer(s) who is driving from 
Bernardo, dominates the photograph. Bernardo is faintly visible in the background, behind the 
cage66.  It seems that the image is taken from the perspective of someone who is front of/not in 
the cage. This image appears to be a ‘perfect’ ending to a narrative which began with a faceless 
“animal” and “savage”67, and whose danger has been neutralized through capture and 
confinement.  
 Taken together, this entire visual landscape coveys a similar sentiment as psychopathy: 
‘normal’ appearances can be deceiving. They can hide criminality and psychopathy.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this chapter, I have sought to build the first piece of my central argument 
which is that psychopathy is one of the ways that the normalized subject becomes imaginable as 
a criminal subject and that this form of representation is contingent upon interlocking identities. I 
built this argument in a few ways. First, I explained how a discourse of pathology was 
structuring the representation of both Williams and Bernardo by looking to how their 
‘biographies’ were written in the news. While these in-depth backstories are not written for all 
criminalized subjects, especially those who are racialized (Heitzeg 2015), the presence of these 
stories in these contexts were significant for representing them as pathological figures. Both of 
the biographical forms we saw emerge out of the ‘biographical inspection’ —the incremental 
criminal biography and the transformative criminal biography— alluded to a notion of change. 
Underpinning the notion of change, was the idea that the subject underwent a profound change 
caused by pathology, evidenced by their atrocities or that the individual was underwent a slow 
and gradual change over time because of a latent pathology that escalated to rape and murder 
                                                 
discomfort it engenders, that alerts laypeople to the possibility that this person may not be as ‘normal’ as they seem 
(1999, 208). It seems that her eyes reveal something fundamental about who Homolka is. This image can be viewed 
here: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/karla-homolka-a-mom-of-3-living-in-caribbean-ebook-says-1.1159838 (last 
accessed on December 10, 2016).  
66 This image can be found here: http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/families-of-bernardo-victims-devastated-as-day-
parole-hearing-set-1.3140852 (last accessed on December 10, 2016). 
67 These terms did not simply operate as nouns throughout the coverage, they also operated as adjectives used to 
describe Bernardo’s actions and crimes (e.g. “savage slayings”; “savage attacks”; “savage assault”; “savage killing”; 
“savage crimes”). Even when these terms operate as adjectives for his actions, they are still, within the ambit of 
psychopathy, also describing his being (Weisman 2008). 
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over time. This is a crucial framing device because it suggests that a force was acting on the 
otherwise normalized individual in order for them to commit their violent crimes.  As I’ve noted, 
the notion of change has long been an important feature of moral insanity/psychopathy (Rimke 
2003; 2005; Rafter 2008; Augstein 1996, 312).   
 I then moved on to demonstrate how psychopathy literally and symbolically figured in 
the representation.  While the literal ascription of psychopathy to Williams and Bernardo may 
seem insignificant insofar as serial killers and psychopaths are often imagined to be closely 
related (Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 66-71), as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, 
psychopathy does not surface in all instances of serial murder, especially when the offenders are 
constituted outside of the bounds of a normalized subject position.  This difference is key to my 
central argument—that psychopathy is the way in which the normalized/un-criminal subject 
becomes imaginable as criminal as well as the bodily contingencies of psychopathy. Once we 
established that psychopathy was one of the specific ways that Williams and Bernardo were 
pathologized, I then explored how the logic of psychopathy—especially the “paradox of 
appearance versus reality”—was used in the representation to render their criminality 
imaginable. Here, I made the argument that the psychopathy’s recourse to duality is what renders 
it particularly amenable to representing the normalized subject as criminal because it can 
accommodate for the offenders’ normalcy, abnormality and criminality without disrupting the 
hegemonic status of their interlocking normalized subject location. This is what I think makes 
psychopathy unique. 
 In their explorations of general representations of pathology (see Chapter 1), many 
scholars pay attention to how discourses of pathology individualize the violent transgressions of 
the normalized subject and that this way of representing the offender as different and as an 
aberration reaffirms the hegemonic status of normative communities to which they belong—
masculinity, whiteness, middle-classness, and heterosexuality.  While we can make the argument 
that psychopathy does the same work, such an argument would miss what I think is specific 
about psychopathy, which is a condition that embeds a logic of duality and more importantly a 
logic that can accommodate and explain the transgressions of the normalized subject because the 
condition is predicated on the presence of an apparently normal(ized) subject. In other words, it 
is able to explain their criminality in light of their apparent normalcy.  
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 In addition to the work that psychopathy was able to do in rendering Bernardo and 
Williams’ criminality imaginable, there are also some continuities in how psychopathy was 
represented in these news representations and how it was historically imagined. The first is the 
significance of the notion of change, and regressive change in particular.  Much like how the 
morally insane were imagined as a changed subject—a normalized subject, turned ‘bad’— 
(Rimke 2005), both Bernardo and Williams are similarly understood within this frame.  Such a 
frame, as I have tried to demonstrate throughout this chapter, presupposes a normalized subject 
and places this subject on a pedestal. As a result, the conceptual machinery of psychopathy is 
deployed to help resolve the conundrum of their criminality, while also accommodating for their 
normalized appearance.   
 This rendering of criminality fractures and doubles—it fractures the white criminal 
subject from the community and then doubles that subject so that he appears as a changed figure: 
both normal/civilized/respectable and abnormal/’savage’/immoral.  This doubling is what 
enables the normative imagination to reconcile their assumed normalcy and sameness to the 
community, as well as their fundamental difference from that community.   Notably, even in this 
historical context, the normalized and especially, middle-class, white bodies are rendered not 
inherently transgressive, and when their acts betray this ‘Truth’ moral insanity becomes the way 
to imagine the unimaginable transgressions of this normalized population (Lunbeck 1994; Rimke 
2003; 2005).   
 Just as this historical work enables us to see how the notion of change was and continues 
to be significant to imaginings of psychopathy, I would suggest that this is historical research is 
meaningful in a different way as well. The research of Rimke (2003; 2005) and Lunbeck (1994) 
has shown us that historically, dominant gender, race, class, and sexual logics informed how 
psychopathy was diagnosed. For example, and as I discussed in Chapter 1, many scholars have 
pointed out that psychopathy has long been used pathologize individuals who transgress gender 
and/or gender norms (e.g. Lunbeck 1994; Rafter 1997a; Rimke 2003; 2005; Chenier 2003). The 
link between gender transgression and psychopathy in the Williams case was made quite clear 
and visible (i.e. texts labelling him as a psychopath and the visual landscape being saturated by 
photographs of him in women’s attire). Within the written and visual news representations, not 
only does Williams appear to be ‘normal’ while he is really a sexual offender and serial 
murderer, but he is represented as perfect image of hegemonic masculinity—a married, high-
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ranking, powerful, respected military commander. On the other hand, he is also represented as a 
‘failed man’, a man who finds ‘perverse’ pleasure in adorning himself in women’s lingerie. He 
stands as the ideal image of historical imaginings of psychopathy—white, inadequately 
masculine, middle- class, transgressive, normal, but abnormal.  
 In terms of race, Rimke’s (2003; 2005) work has highlighted how the morally insane 
individual was likened to the racialized Other, but that the non-white races were exempted from 
moral insanity diagnoses. Given the racial/racist logics that have historically informed moral 
insanity, it is perhaps unsurprising that denigrating and racially charged language was used to 
describe Bernardo (e.g. “predatory”, “animalistic”, “savage”) and Williams (e.g. “savage 
sickness”). This point—that moral insanity was infused with racial logics that enabled the white 
transgressor to be seen as pathological, like the racialized Other—is not only a logic that we saw 
to be incredibly influential in how Lombroso explained European criminality, but it is also a 
point that Nourbese Philip (1995) makes in relation to the representation of Bernardo. In her 
critical analysis of the news coverage, she observes that the representations were void of race for 
the most part. The only time that Bernardo’s middle-class (normative) whiteness was mentioned 
was in relation to his aspiration to become a white rap musician (Norbese Philip 1995, 8). For 
this to be the only context in which his whiteness was articulated is significant to Philip’s 
analysis for at least two reasons. First, the absence of whiteness is based on a racist ideology 
which equates whiteness with ‘normal’, not criminality (9). Whiteness is thus not significant for 
understanding the criminality of white people in the same way race and culture are significant for 
understanding crimes committed by people of colour. Second, by identifying Bernardo racially 
only in relation to rap music, which has its roots in Black culture and is often used as technique 
of resistance to, and critique of whiteness and racism, his whiteness is further concealed (8). 
Philip explains that not only does this veil his whiteness, it repositions the racial frame on Black 
culture as a contaminant of whiteness:  
in suggesting that it is only through rap that we come to understand Bernardo’s 
crime’s the media foster an image of whiteness whose qualities of innocence, 
wholeness and purity are contaminated only when they come into contact with Black 
life, in this case rap music […]. Once again Blackness is pathologi[z]ed: it becomes 
the contaminant of whiteness—Bernardo himself—as well as the only way into his 
disturbed mind. (11) 
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Through Philip’s analysis, we see that representations of Bernardo are infused with an all too 
familiar and racist logic whereby his white criminality is only imaginable in relation to 
difference and Blackness in particular.  
 Psychopathy, in its contemporary iterations, does not necessarily contain an explicitly 
racist logic as it did historically. However, this does not mean these logics do not still circulate 
within the construct implicitly.  If one of the central touchstones of psychopathy is the “paradox 
of appearance versus reality” and if, as I have shown here, this depends on the presence of a 
normalized subject who is seen pre-emptively as un-criminal, to what extent does a racist logic 
still circulate in how psychopathy and the psychopathic subject are imagined in the research? 
While I do not explore this question in this project, I think it is an important question for further 
investigation.   
 In sum, what I hope to have accomplished in this chapter is to have shown how, in these 
specific cases, where the normalized subject perpetrates extraordinary violence against 
‘undeserving’ victims (I discuss this in Chapter 5 and 6), they and their crimes are configured 
anew in the absence of interpretive schemas that, in other situations, would allow us to make 
sense of violence (e.g. the victims precipitated the attack; this type of behaviour is expected by 
the perpetrator because of his character; discourses of  identity/difference that have been made to 
link up with criminality; there is a discernible and understandable, although not agreeable, 
motive and so on).  Because the normalized subject is not represented as a criminal within the 
discourse of criminality (the normalized population is already seen as un-criminal or 
unimaginably criminal in the normative imagination), their criminality must be represented in a 
way that can capture their perceived normalcy as well as their ‘evil nature’.  The logic of 
psychopathy fits this end well. What I am suggesting then, is that whiteness along with our 
normative and hegemonic assumptions about gender, class, physical appearance and sexuality 
are all privileges that operate to block and conceal the normalized body from being seen as 
potentially criminal in cultural criminal imaginings and instead enable this subject to materialize 
in the normative imagination as ‘normal’, unsuspicious, un-criminal. Psychopathy is then made 
to enter these representations to render the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject 
imaginable in the normative criminal imagination. What follows from reconfiguring normalized 
subjects as psychopathic through representation is that their behaviours and ‘being’ become 
explainable because of the psychopath’s purported ability to change or to appear as other than 
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what they appear to be. The way that psychopathy relies on duality to explain the behaviour and 
appearance of the psychopath, also relies on a normalized subject—a subject that first appears 
normal and un-criminal and then, transgressive, criminal because of that very psychopathy.  
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Chapter 4 
 (Un)Criminal Women and Psychopathy: The Cases of Karla Homolka and Lisa Neve 
 
 In the previous chapter, we saw similarities in the ways in which the unimaginable 
criminality of Bernardo and Williams was rendered imaginable through psychopathy.  I argued 
that the “paradox of appearance and reality” (Weisman 2008, 199), which is linked to notions of 
change (Rimke 2005) and duality, make this kind of representation both possible and sensible.  
In this chapter, I continue to explore the interlocking bodily contingencies of psychopathy, but I 
change my focus from criminalized men to criminalized women by reviewing two cases where 
we see psychopathy emerge as a routine feature of the news coverage: Karla Homolka 
(Bernardo’s accomplice in the crimes) and Lisa Neve (an Aboriginal woman and ‘prostitute’ 
who was labelled a dangerous offender in 1994).  My central concern in this chapter is to gain an 
understanding of the representational work that psychopathy does in these two cases, and what 
similarities and differences we can discern between these two cases and in the representations of 
Bernardo and Williams.   
 To this end, I begin by exploring the contemporary research on “gender” (read: women) 
and psychopathy. In the next section, I turn to the case of Karla Homolka and I explore how 
Homolka’s criminality was rendered imaginable (much like Bernardo, but with important 
differences) through psychopathy. Following the Homolka case, I explore the very different case 
of an Aboriginal woman named Lisa Neve who was designated a dangerous offender in 1994 
and was labelled a psychopath in the news. In contrast to Homolka, Neve’s criminality was never 
represented as unimaginable; instead, she was represented, from the very beginning of the 
coverage, as only criminal.  As the representations continually criminalize Neve, psychopathy is 
used to create an image of her as particularly dangerous. While the inclusion of this case might 
seem to trouble the central argument of this project—that psychopathy operates as a mode of 
representing the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject68—what I will demonstrate 
is that while psychopathy was deployed in the Neve case and although she was not constructed 
nor read as a normalized subject ‘gone bad’, psychopathy does different work in constructing her 
criminality than it does in the Homolka (/Bernardo and Williams) case.   
  
                                                 
68 I am including Homolka in this categorization insofar as apart from her gender, she occupies interlocking 
normalized subject positions. I account for the gendered specificity of the representations of her in this chapter.  
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Contemporary Psychopathy Research and Gender 
 
 Despite the fact that historical medical texts had much to say about women and 
psychopathy, contemporary research on psychopathy has only recently come to take up the 
question of “gender” (read: women) (Rogstad and Rogers 2008, 1474).  It is widely 
acknowledged in the scientific literature that modern psychopathy research has attended 
exclusively to the male population, although this has begun to change (Rogstad and Rogers 2008, 
1474; Wynn, Høiseth, and Pettersen 2012, 257). Thus far, research on men, women and 
psychopathy has consistently revealed that psychopathy is more prevalent in men (Rogstad and 
Rogers 2008, 1475; Wynn, Høiseth, and Pettersen 2012, 259-260). However, what is not 
‘known’ is whether research on psychopathy can be applied to women without modification and 
to what extent the differences in frequencies of psychopathy between men and women can be 
explained in relation to ‘actual’ gender differences in the disorder itself (i.e. is psychopathy more 
likely in men) or in the male/masculine biases of the psychopathic construct (including the PCL-
R) because men have been the principal focus of research (Rogstad and Rogers 2008, 1474; 
Wynn, Høiseth, and Pettersen 2012, 259).    
 These questions have led researchers to consider the kinds of assumptions and biases that 
have contoured psychopathy research, the PCL-R and how this impacts how psychopathy is 
diagnosed in men and women. For example, in their often-cited article, Elham Forouzan and 
David Cooke have observed that most studies that have investigated the relationship between 
women and psychopathy operate on “the implicit assumption that the male template of the 
disorder can be superimposed upon females: studies have evaluated the core traits and the 
behavioural expression of psychopathy as recognized in men in an attempt to understand the 
disorder in adult females. Potential gender differences in traits and expression of the disorder 
have been ignored” (2005, 766).  Operating on this masculinized template of psychopathy, they 
argue can be misleading when applied to women.  
 To gain an understanding of the relationship between psychopathy and women, Forouzan 
and Cooke (2005) explore how clinicians interpreted the symptoms of psychopathy in female 
detainees.  In their analysis of 25 clinicians’ notes of psychopathy in incarcerated women in 
Canada, the researchers argue that there is reason to believe that psychopathic traits may express 
themselves differently in men and women. They observe, that the “behavioural expression” of 
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psychopathy differs for men and women.  For example, the researchers report that manipulation 
in male psychopaths is generally linked to conning behaviour; however, in women this trait is 
‘expressed’ as flirtatious behaviour (768). They also observe that impulsivity and misconduct in 
women is expressed in behaviours like running away, self-harm, manipulation, and committing 
theft and/or fraud, whereas in men impulsivity and misconduct are generally manifested in the 
commission of violent crime (768).  Differences in psychopathy not only exist in the behavioural 
expression of the condition, but also in relation to the interpersonal expressions of psychopathy. 
For example, interpersonal traits like, glibness, superficial charm and grandiose are “more 
muted” in female psychopaths, which can be explained by cultural norms around gender (768). 
Finally, Forouzan and Cooke note that gender norms may affect how psychopathic traits are 
assessed in men and women: “some material dependency may be socially and culturally 
acceptable for women, whereas similar behaviors are perceived as “parasitic” in men” (768). As 
a result of these gender norms, certain traits may be ranked differently and can affect how 
diagnoses of psychopathy are made.  In sum, the crux of their argument is that psychopathy may 
express itself differently in men and women.  Because psychopathy has been masculinized, this 
may lead to women being over or under diagnosed, which is as they note, an important ethical 
question (774).  
 While Forouzan and Cooke are attentive to the ways in which culture and norms affect 
the behaviours of men and women, what remains odd to me about this study is that they do not 
reflect on how psychopathy also structures how the behaviours of men and women are 
interpreted.  That is, they take the observations (or interpretations or better yet, the “contestable 
construals”; Butler 1993) of the clinicians as incontrovertible evidence that psychopathy 
manifests differently in men and women, particularly in its behavioural and interpersonal 
expression, and that clinicians need to be attentive to these differences. What they do not ask, is 
how clinicians are reinterpreting the masculinized symptoms of psychopathy to make them fit the 
female population.  The ontology of these women as psychopaths is both assumed and 
constructed by the clinicians.  Psychopathy is assumed in how the women’s behaviours are being 
interpreted in light of the PCL-R.  They are not simply flirtatious women, they are manipulative; 
they do not simply engage in various ‘mis-behaviours’, they are impulsive and exhibiting a 
conduct disorder. They also rationalize the more muted characteristics of psychopathy in relation 
to gender norms.  For example, they rationalize the absence of a ‘parasitic lifestyle’ in women as 
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a product of social and gender norms, not as an indication of an absence of psychopathy.  
Therefore, it becomes easy to see how psychopathy is already structuring the clinicians’ 
observations and interpretations.  These discourses (psychopathy and gender) are being made to 
congeal in such a way that although these women do not exhibit traditional/masculinized signs or 
symptoms of psychopathy, their behaviours can still be made to appear as psychopathic by 
relying on stereotypical renderings of the behaviour of men and women.  
 Although psychopathy is a masculinized template of pathology, it is still able to 
accommodate women, but not only for the reasons that Forouzan and Cooke (2005) point out.  
As a sign, ‘woman’ often appears as always already deviant and pathological in relation to the 
masculinized average person (recall, for example, Lombroso’s construction of the ‘normal’ 
woman). In this sense, women are already imagined as embodying the ‘malady of being female’. 
While her difference from the male norm positions her as deviant, white, middle-class women 
are not often imagined as the criminal Other of this norm (Chesney-Lind and Eliason 2006). 
Instead, violent criminality in normalized women remains, at least at first sight, unimaginable. 
This does not mean that women have not been made to figure in criminal imaginaries. 
Importantly, gender stereotypes which inform discourses around femininity and womanhood also 
inform discourses of women’s criminality.  Within these discourses, women are often positioned 
as not only pathological criminals, but as uniquely feminized ones—liars, manipulators, cunning, 
and sexual provocateurs—who have the ability to conceal their criminality under the pretense of 
normative femininity (Kilty and Frigon 2006, 56).  These negative and stereotypical sensibilities 
about, on the one hand, the so-called inherent deviance of womanhood and femininity, and 
female offenders on the other, reverberate in modern representations of psychopathy in that the 
‘malady of being female’ embeds the characteristics so central to psychopathy (and vice versa; 
e.g. liars, manipulators, cunning, and sexual provocateurs). In other words, while psychopathy 
remains a disorder usually applied to men, it also engenders a series of ‘deficiencies’ that 
already exist as alleged ‘deficits’ of femininity.   
 For example, this link between negative stereotypes of women and psychopathy is 
reinforced by forensic clinician and researcher, Dr. Caroline Logan (2011) in her exploration of 
psychopaths in fiction. She begins her article by telling us that female psychopaths are generally 
not a point of discussion or concern because she is not as feared as the male psychopath (118-
119), her potential harm appears to be less, and she is often more readily seen as a victim than a 
179 
 
perpetrator (120). The lack of concern over the female psychopath, according to Logan, is due to 
the fact that her condition results in important differences.  Women in general, she notes, are not 
as physically aggressive or violent as men and when they are violent, it is usually self-directed 
instead of being directed towards others (120). Additionally, when women do express anger 
towards others there are two important characteristics: 1. It is directed at people who are closest 
to them (e.g. children, partners, friends) (120); and, 2. Their aggression is more likely to be 
relational, “that is the deliberate manipulation of or damage to relationships such as by actual or 
threatened withdrawal of love or friendship, refusing to talk to the other person, excluding or 
banishing the other person from the in-group […] (e.g. the family, circle of friends), telling lies 
about the other person to promote their rejection by other members of the in-group, and so on” 
(120). Logan concludes her explanation of psychopathy in women by suggesting that “the 
principal tools of domination among psychopathic men are physical mastery and control while 
among psychopathic women, it is the manipulation of the minutiae of their close relationships” 
(120; emphasis mine).  
 In light of these differences, she then reads fictional accounts of ‘bad women’ and 
observes that while women in fiction are usually not directly referred to as psychopaths, upon 
closer inspection the ways in which women are described link up to psychopathy. She argues that 
characteristics such as “a pattern of relationships with others that demonstrate a lack of care and 
empathy regardless of their closeness; a tendency to dominate and manipulate others in order to 
get one’s own way; the presence of deceitfulness and insincerity; an absence or a deficiency of 
remorse for hurting others; self-centredness; a sense of entitlement; and a pattern of self-
justification” (121) are often used to describe ‘bad women’ and are psychopathic traits. Logan 
suggests that scientists of psychopathy can use these fictional portrayals to begin to understand 
psychopathy in females and the “subtle ways in which the genders differ in the expression of the 
core features of the disorder” (124). One of the problems here is that Logan is merely 
perpetuating stereotypical representations of transgressive femininity (e.g. the ‘sneaky mean girl’ 
that Chesney-Lind and Eliason (2006) have critiqued especially for the way that it erects a binary 
between the white ‘sneaky mean girl’ and the dangerous and violent woman of colour) and 
pathologizing these behaviours by linking them to psychopathy. Despite the very real issues with 
this, what I think she makes visible (perhaps unintentionally) is how psychopathy, within 
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contemporary understandings of the disorder, engenders stereotypical sensibilities that often 
circulate around femininity (e.g. women are naturally deceptive, liars, manipulators).  
 If the majority of individuals that have been diagnosed as psychopaths are men, and the 
question of whether the criteria of psychopathy can be applied to women is still up for debate, it 
makes the actual labelling of certain female offenders as psychopaths curious: if we are not sure 
that psychopathy can be applied to women in its current form, why is it sometimes applied to 
women?  While I cannot answer this question definitively, I have found the observations of 
Boysen, Ebersole, Casner and Coston (2014) interesting.  In their recent study, they explore how 
gender stereotypes get applied to mental disorders, resulting in some disorders being generally 
perceived as more masculine or more feminine than others (see also Forouzan and Cooke 2005, 
766-767).  Their study revealed that anti-social personality disorder is often stereotyped as 
masculine.  However, what I found to be particularly interesting about their research was the way 
in which stereotypes are correlated to the prevalence of the disorder among men and women.   
For example, antisocial personality disorder is seen as a more masculine disorder and it is also 
more prevalent in the male population69. To this observation we might ask: is psychopathy 
ascribed to women who are seen as more masculine in their behaviour? Additionally, given the 
gendered (and racial) entanglements of psychopathy—it is a masculinized disorder, that also 
contains negative stereotypes about femininity—we could surmise that when psychopathy is 
deployed in representations of (un)criminal women, it brings all of these sensibilities (and others) 
with it and it might end up doing a different kind of work. 
 
“Her Transgressions Do Not Stain Her Skin”:  
Karla Homolka, Un-Criminality and Psychopathy 
 
 The insights of feminist criminologists allow us to speculate that one of the reasons why 
Bernardo’s criminality was more straightforwardly represented and understood in comparison to 
                                                 
69 Another thing that is particularly interesting is that there exists a personality disorder, that is usually referred to as 
the ‘female version of psychopathy’. For example, Hamburger et al. (1996) note that antisocial personality disorder 
(ASPD) is more common in men and histrionic personality disorder (HPD) is more common in women and  both 
disorders pathologize traditionally gendered-specific deviations; ASPD refers to those individuals which have “a 
history of antisocial, criminal or otherwise irresponsible behaviours” (42) and HPD is more feminized: “HPD is 
defined by such features as self-centredness, self-dramatization, attention seeking, emotional liability, reactivity to 
minor events, shallow affect and sexual provocativeness” (43).  See also Boysen et al. (2014).  
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Homolka, is that Homolka seemed to defy dominant criminal imaginings and assumptions more 
so than Bernardo.  That is, while white masculinity does not often appear directly as criminal or 
transgressive in cultural representations, we are more willing/able to accept the potential dangers 
and criminality that can arise from extreme embodiments of hegemonic masculinity (e.g. 
toughness, aggression, anger, repression of ‘soft’ emotions, etc.). This suspicion of masculinity is 
supported by the statistical reality that men are responsible for the vast majority of violent and 
sexual crimes (Collier 1998; Ruthann Lee 2014). As a result, our collective criminal 
imaginations cannot easily accommodate the violent and sexual criminal transgressions of white, 
heterosexual, middle-class femininity. This is why, at least in part, it was Homolka that was 
rendered the enigma of the couple, not Bernardo70 (Kilty and Frigon 2016). Indeed, as Lizzie 
Seal has observed: 
 
All types of murder by women are relatively unusual, but when women do kill, the 
victims are most likely to be their own children or a male partner.  Other sorts of 
killing by women are rare and arguably have the potential to be even more shocking 
[...] whereas ‘violence is an accepted attribute of most recognized masculinities’, 
killing by women violates norms of femininity, such as nurturance, gentleness and 
social conformity. It disrupts culturally held notions not only of how women should 
behave, but also of what a woman is. (2010, 1) 
 
Perceptions of white, middle-class, heterosexual femininity centre on gendered myths and 
stereotypes of women as nurturers, compassionate, self-sacrificing, maternal, passive, 
submissive, unthreatening, and indeed, un-criminal. Faith and Jiwani have suggested that the 
“the closer a woman is to the ideals of femininity, the more shocking it is when she violently 
betrays her gender role” (2008, 143). Female-perpetrated violence is thus unimaginable to the 
extent that it is unexpected based on these misguided and sexist assumptions about women’s 
nature.  According to the gender binary, it is men that stand as aggressive, violent and criminal.  
Patricia Pearson has noted that: 
 
Women from all walks of life, at all levels of power [...] have no part in violence. It 
is one of the most abiding myths of our time.  The notion that women are a 
homogenous species of nurturant souls has myriad wellsprings, but the deepest, 
perhaps, has to do with our basic conception of the body. Violence [...] is implicit in 
the construction of the male: the chest-beating ape evolved into a soldier, the rapist.  
                                                 
70 This is holds true for both public and academic discourse on the case (e.g. Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016; 
McGillivray 1998; Comack 2006a; Faith and Jiwani 2008).  
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Men are propelled into conquest by a surge of testosterone, and build their blocks of 
power on the strength of their physique. [...] Literature rejoices in the docility of 
female flesh, its yielding form, its penetrability.  The female body fosters life itself. 
Women do not physically thrust and strut and dominate, to picture women’s 
aggression, men would have to picture women’s bodies bereft of the erotic, the 
maternal, the divine. No such sacrifice is required in conjuring male aggression.  
Muscle and hormone are the twin pillars upon which all our darkest human urges 
stand: lust, rage, jealousy, revenge, the craving for power, the quest for control. 
(1997, 8) 
 
In the coverage of the Bernardo/Homolka case we see these tensions regarding mutual 
exclusivity of white, middle-class, heterosexual femininity and criminality play out and attempts 
are made to reconcile them. As a result, news images of Homolka’s criminality are a bit more 
complicated than the image of Bernardo (and Williams).  While Bernardo plays an important 
role in the narratives and representations of Homolka (and vice versa), it was Homolka that 
became truly captivating (McGillivray 1998; Comack 2006a; Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016).  As 
one journalist put it:  
 
At the core of the incomprehensibility is Karla Homolka. The psychiatrists agreed 
that Paul Bernardo was a psychopath, but as one said in 1995, Karla is ‘something of 
a diagnostic mystery. Despite her ability to present herself very well, there is a moral 
vacuity in her which is difficult, if not impossible, to explain.’ Partly it's her 
appearance: Except for that one photo with the dead eyes, Homolka's mask of 
wholesome beauty never slipped (Robson 2000). 
 
For Robson, it is not necessarily Homolka’s acts (or failure to act) that makes her a cultural and 
diagnostic mystery; it is this along with her feminized, beautified and normalized appearance that 
renders her violent criminality incomprehensible. Homolka’s physical appearance was a 
distinctive feature of the news coverage (Fullerton 2006), and it was her appearance (i.e. her 
‘mask’) that allowed her to ‘willfully’ appear as ‘wholesome’.  Interestingly, a point of 
discussion in the news coverage focused on the courtroom artists’ inability to visually represent 
her in an accurate way:  
 
There are, among the multitude of journalists covering the Paul Bernardo trial, five 
courtroom artists. And they all have the same complaint: They cannot draw Karla. 
Intent on capturing not just the physiological, but some suggestion of character, they 
valiantly put pen or pencil or chalk to blank sheet of paper, each day hoping to 
convey the essence of the person in the witness stand. But she eludes them. There are 
no distinguishing qualities, they say, no shadings of personality etched on her 
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delicate, symmetrical features, no detail of emotional permutation, no hint of the 
internal life on the external countenance. It is as if Karla Homolka is beyond 
definition or description or the one-dimensional depiction of an illustrator. If not for 
the infamous videotapes and the dozens of photographs already submitted into 
evidence, one might actually suspect that Homolka - like the poltergeists who spook 
haunted houses - cannot be arrested on film. Most significantly, this convicted killer, 
this self-admitted sexual predator - a woman who assaulted not just strangers but her 
own youngest sister - does not wear her crimes like a stigmata. Her transgressions do 
not stain her skin [...]. (DiManno 1995g; emphasis mine) 
 
Homolka’s body thus exceeds representation.  She is a spectre-like figure who cannot be pinned 
down or visualized as criminal. More than this, her body does not bear signs or stigmata that can 
be used (or exaggerated) to re-signify her “delicate, symmetrical features” that signal her internal 
criminality—“her transgressions do not stain her [white] skin” (DiManno 1995g). Homolka’s 
criminality remains unseeable, unthinkable, and resistant to artistic renderings because her 
normalized body cannot signify the types of crimes in which she was complicit—sex crimes and 
murder.  Surely there is something questionable about her; her crimes and more importantly the 
videotapes of her crimes tell us this, but her body does not relay this ‘truth’.  Instead her body 
conceals, providing “no hint of the internal life on the external countenance” (DiManno 1995g).   
 In the face of her known, but unimaginable criminality, the news media engages in 
similar representational practices as I highlighted in Chapter 3— a discourse of pathology comes 
to structure the way Homolka is written into the crime.  While there was much ink spilled telling 
readers about Bernardo’s life history, there was much less interest in Homolka’s biography71.  
Apart from learning that Homolka’s primary aspiration was to create a picture-perfect family-life 
with Bernardo, what we learn about Homolka’s past are a series of very specific things that 
occurred while she was dating Bernardo (not before). The emphasis on this stage in her life is 
not necessarily strange, because up until she met Bernardo, she appeared to be an idyllic, cis-
gendered, heterosexual female—an attractive, white, blond woman that aspired to be both a wife 
                                                 
71 One explanation for this is that we do not learn of Homolka’s full involvement in the crime until she begins 
testifying in June 1995, whereas as Paul was the primary suspect in the murders from the time of his arrest in May 
1993 for rape-related offences.  Interestingly, we don’t learn anything about her childhood (e.g. her upbringing, her 
childhood familial context, what she was like etc.) from the coverage as we do with Bernardo (and Williams).  
Similar, to the way that Bernardo’s history was presented in such a way as to highlight how he always contained 
criminal and violent potentialities, Homolka’s (much shorter) narrative was structured in a similar fashion. From 
what is written about her it is clear that journalists had a more difficult time connecting the crimes (via the 
biographical inspection) to Homolka than they did with Bernardo.   
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and mom. Additionally, one of her high school teachers echoes Homolka’s ordinariness: she was 
“just a regular kid nothing outstanding” (Brazao 1993). Homolka’s boss, the veterinarian who 
hired her to be his assistant at the animal clinic, notes that she “was a pleasant, quiet young lady 
[...] She got on well with the staff and did a very competent job. She was quiet and kept to 
herself but she wasn't a recluse in any sense” (Rankin 1993).  Journalists also note that for 
Homolka “there had been no shortage of boyfriends for the attractive blond” (Pron, Duncanson 
and Rankin 1995b). 
 Before Homolka met Bernardo and in the early months of their relationship, she is 
generally described as ‘cheerful’ and all-around ‘normal;’ however, soon after things began to 
change. The cause of this change is generally described in two ways.  The first, which was 
generally present in the earlier coverage of the case (before the videotapes were shown and 
before the full extent of Homolka’s involvement was known), explains that Homolka’s change in 
character was the result of her being severely abused by Bernardo. While in another, later 
interpretation, her change is really not a change at all; her appearance is all a performance—the 
result of her psychopathy and especially here feminized proclivity to lie, deceive and manipulate. 
Below I will outline how each of these interpretations, when combined produced an image of 
Homolka as pathologically criminal and psychopathic in particular. 
 
Homolka as a Muse and Battered Woman 
 
 Once she began testifying at Bernardo’s trial, and the full extent of her involvement in the 
crimes revealed, meditations on Homolka’s character, nature and appearance took centre stage.  
The way that Homolka was represented in the news has also been the subject of much scholarly 
interest (e.g. Morrissey 2003; Fullerton 2006; Comack 2006a; Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016; 
Faith and Jiwani 2008; and, Seal 2010).  Many of these works highlight the two competing 
narratives that were present at Bernardo’s trial and in the news: Homolka as a “woman in 
danger” and Homolka as a “dangerous woman” (Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016; Faith and Jiwani 
2008). Additionally, Lizzie Seal (2010) has argued that one of the most prominent discourses 
that frame women who are complicit in murder with their male partner is the “muse or 
mastermind dichotomy”.  Within this discourse, “women are open to dichotomous construction 
as either assistants heavily under the influence of their husbands or boyfriends, or as cunning, 
dominant women who are able to make men do their bidding” (38).  Importantly, Seal notes that 
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the dichotomy relies on the “constitution of femininity according to the norms of 
heterosexuality” (38).  What this means is that, when the woman is constructed as a muse, she is 
being constituted within the ambit of normative (white, middle-class, cis-gendered, 
heterosexuality) femininity which suggests that women are less powerful, less intelligent and 
unable to protect themselves, and also that women are also more passive and supportive than 
men.  The muse construction supports this widely approved and hegemonic version of 
heterosexual femininity (39). When these muse-like women do commit violent crimes with their 
male partners, they are often represented as ‘normal’ women (as opposed to deviant) because 
they “are frequently perceived as either having been duped, brainwashed or coerced into 
participation” (39). According to Seal’s (2010) reading, this is how Homolka came to be known 
(at least at first).  
 Prior to the trial, Homolka is often spoken about sympathetically.  For example, upon 
hearing of Bernardo’s arrest, Homolka’s boss says that she was a “compassionate animal lover” 
and a victim, incapable of the cruelty Bernardo was capable of: “Somebody who works with 
animals, and particularly, someone who wants to make it a profession - I think one can use that 
as a measure of her sense of caring for life. Regardless of what happened, Karla Bernardo is 
another victim.” (quoted in Rankin 1993).  A long-time family friend also shared this sentiment, 
stating that it is Karla who she really feels sorry for (Rankin 1993). At trial this muse/victim 
construction was also significant. The news’ abstracted version of the Crown’s case, showcases 
how the Crown, in an attempt to secure a conviction against Bernardo, sought to construct 
Bernardo as the sole mastermind behind the crimes and Homolka, although his accomplice, as 
his helpless, passive victim suffering from battered woman syndrome. The Crown held that 
while Homolka was involved in the sexual assaults of Mahaffy, French and Homolka’s younger 
sister, Tammy, she was forced into it by Bernardo.  For Homolka’s defence went that, if she 
didn’t do as she was instructed, Bernardo would beat her because he was the one that was 
“calling the shots” (DiManno 1995d).   
 Journalists, Duncanson and Pron (1995b), note that on the seventh day of the trial, 
photographs and videotapes played an important role in painting two different portrayals of 
Homolka that were key to the Crown’s case. On the one hand, Homolka is depicted as cheerful, 
happy—denoted by images and videos of her joking around with her family and other tape of 
Homolka and her sister, Lori, dressing up in Homolka’s wedding dress. At this point in her life, 
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Homolka’s mother, Dorothy, said that the couple appeared happy, bubbly, and Homolka had a 
glow about her that she had never had before (Duncanson and Pron 1995b). Dorothy then tells 
the court that in June 1992, she began to notice that things may not have been as they seemed, 
something had changed: “her daughter appeared to have a broken finger, claiming she suffered 
the injury after being bitten by her dog, Buddy. Shortly after, she said, Karla had what looked 
like a black eye” (Duncanson and Pron 1995b).  Despite Homolka’s parents attempt to remove 
her from Bernardo’s house in June 1992, they were not able to convince her to leave.  This image 
is darkened by the growing severity of the abuse that she endured; the effect being a hospital 
image of Homolka with “racoon-like bruises around her eyes, and welts on her neck, back, arms 
and legs” (Duncanson and Pron 1995b). DiManno (1995e) summarizes these dual(ing) images of 
Homolka:  
 
On the outside she [Homolka] was this gay, cheerful, love-besotted bride-to-be, 
attending bridal showers and Jack-and-Jill parties, moving out of her parents' home 
in solidarity with Paul […] But she said she was hiding her emotional and physical 
abuse, the bruises on her arms covered by longsleeved shirts, her degradation hidden 
from family and friends. The pretence of happiness, normalcy, entailed scribbling 
love-notes and apologias to Bernardo in her cramped, loopy script; smiling and 
pretending to be Tammy while sexually pleasing her fiancé, again captured on 
videotape. Because, she says, he had punished her already for ruining his ‘Tammy 
tape.’ She had resisted his specific commands to sexually assault her sister, to put her 
mouth here and her finger there, she had called it ‘f-----g disgusting.’ He'd hit her in 
the head, she said […] She slept on the floor, because Bernardo wanted the bed all to 
himself. […] She ate his excrement.  
 
Homolka’s testimony, as it was portrayed, buttressed the victim image as she told countless 
stories of the physical and psychological abuse that she endured, as early as four months into 
their relationship. At the same time, she outlined in vivid detail the role that she played—
recounting every moment with lucidity and an explanation (i.e. ‘it was Bernardo’s idea’; ‘I didn’t 
have a choice’; ‘he would beat me’).   This image of Homolka as Bernardo’s muse/victim, Seal 
(2010) notes, helped to support the notion that she had little control over the crimes that were 
transpiring and in which she was allegedly reluctant to play a part.  The fact that she was 
portrayed as less responsible for the crimes, and that she did not gain any gratification (sexual or 
otherwise) from her participation, helps to paint Homolka as a pathological figure. She was a 
battered woman, but not a criminal one (Seal 2010).    
 
187 
 
Homolka’s Appearance is Not ‘Reality’, She is a Psychopath 
 
 Constructing Homolka as a victim was an important feature in the Crown’s case because 
it not only justified or legitimized her plea bargain, but it also fits well within a discourse of 
normative femininity (e.g. woman as victim, not aggressor; McGillivray 1998; Seal 2010; Kilty 
and Frigon 2016). This legal narrative of victimhood was accepted, at least initially, and its 
discursive force was laid bare. The defence, on the other hand, deployed a different rhetorical 
strategy in an attempt to persuade the jury that there was reasonable doubt that Bernardo was the 
mastermind and thus, guilty of first degree murder. Here the defence argues that Homolka was 
just as, or more, sadistic than Bernardo. John Rosen, Bernardo’s defence attorney didn’t ‘buy’ 
Homolka’s battered woman narrative.  It was generally surmised that Homolka cleverly and 
manipulatively spun this story to evade responsibility for the crimes: “Homolka schooled herself 
on new terms: battered spouse syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder. They fit her nicely, the 
Crown psychiatrists agreed. They were terms usually applied in court to women who, feeling 
they had no way out of an abusive relationship, had taken the life of their batterer. They were 
“defence” terms.” (Duncanson and Rankin 1995b).  Seal (2010) also observes that while 
Homolka was never portrayed as the mastermind of the crimes, she was regularly represented as 
deceptive and manipulative in the way that she navigated the criminal justice system (i.e. not 
providing any information about the crimes until she secured her plea deal and the way she spun 
her narrative of the crimes within a battered woman frame).  
 These duelling representations of Homolka as “woman in danger” and Homolka as a 
“dangerous woman” (Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016; Faith and Jiwani 2008) are significant for 
how her criminality became imaginable through psychopathy. Within the ambit of psychopathy, 
(re)constructing Homolka’s narrative of abuse as a defence tactic and not the reality of her 
experience is reasonable because psychopaths are generally manipulators, pathological liars and 
experts in impression management as well as intelligent, self-serving narcissists.  Because these 
are core features of psychopathy, the construct of psychopathy allows for everything that is 
presented in its wake to be transformed and/or re-interpreted as a symptom of the psychopathic 
condition itself. We might call this interpretive practice the psychopathic construal which 
transforms the communications and actions of an alleged psychopath into a symptom itself.  
More than this, in transforming the utterance into a symptom of psychopathy (as a lie, deceit and 
the alike), the utterance, whether true or false, can only be possibly understood as a false 
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statement within the parameters of psychopathy (e.g. they do not really think or believe X, they 
are just telling us this because they believe this is what we want to hear).  Because the 
psychopath is believed to be a “consummate social performer”, every act, every utterance, every 
gesture is believed to be a contrived performance (Weisman 2008).  This inauthentic 
performance is at once not a reflection of their ‘true’ being as well as a reflection of their ‘true’ 
being. In terms of the former, within the scope of psychopathy any well-intentioned act, 
utterance or gesture is not a reflection of their personhood, for they (psychopaths) are actors on a 
stage performing for all those who care to pay attention. While in terms of the latter, their false 
and contrived performance, when taken as such, is a display of who they ‘really’ are (Weisman 
2008).  In his book The Psychopath Test, Jon Ronson (2011) also observes the workings of this 
interpretive practice.  In an interview with a man (Ronson names him Tony) who has been 
labelled a psychopath and who is serving time in the infamous Broadmoor hospital, Tony 
articulates the way in which a diagnosis of psychopathy structures others’ perceptions of him: 
“They say psychopaths can’t feel remorse [...] I feel lots of remorse.  But when I tell them I feel 
remorse, they say psychopaths pretend to be remorseful when they’re not. [...] it’s like witchcraft 
[...] they turn everything upside down” (62).  
 Robert Hare (1999) cites an interesting passage which includes an ‘ex-con’s’ opinion of 
the PCL-R.  In the passage, the ‘ex-con’ notes how the checklist transforms common and 
sometimes positive traits into evidence of psychopathy:  
“deceitful and manipulative—“why be truthful to the enemy? All of us are 
manipulative to some degree. Isn’t positive manipulation common?” [...] Impulsive— 
“can be associated with creativity, living in the now, being spontaneous and free”. 
Poor behavioral controls—“violent and aggressive outbursts may be defensive 
mechanisms, a false front, a tool for survival in a jungle.” Need for excitement—
“courage to reject the routine monotonous, or uninteresting.  Living on the edge, 
doing things that are risky, exciting, challenging, living life to its fullest, being alive 
rather than dull, boring and almost dead.” Lack of responsibility—“shouldn’t focus 
on human weaknesses that are common.” (69) 
 
Hare does not take this opinion as a legitimate critique of the subjective nature of the checklist. 
Rather, Hare takes this opinion to be evidence of psychopathy, a construal which is made 
possible by signalling his ‘ex-con’ status and thus his self-motivated words.    
 If we return to Homolka, we can see how the introduction of psychopathy at Bernardo’s 
trial and in the news coverage enables Homolka’s narrative to be re-interpreted in light of the 
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condition. The interpretive flexibility or the ability for psychopathy to capture and reorganize the 
meanings that are provided as an additional symptom of the condition itself is partly how 
Homolka’s battered woman narrative was represented at trial and in the news. In the coverage of 
the case, Homolka’s battered woman narrative is interpreted through the lens of psychopathy as 
not being the ‘real’ reason why she acted as she did, but as a plausible rationalization uttered by 
a psychopath.   
 Rosen also latched on to the interpretive flexibility of psychopathy and used it as a tactic 
to counter the details of Homolka’s narrative by suggesting that every failure to act to help or 
protect the women or to report the crimes to police was followed by an act that was both rational 
and self-serving (signs of her psychopathy, not battered woman syndrome). For Rosen, Homolka 
was not, as she claimed: fearful, irrational, helpless or the like; she was just as criminally 
responsible for the crimes.  In an attempt to diminish Homolka’s passivity he highlights her 
hypersexuality. In doing so, Rosen draws on iterations of “bad femininity” which “will permit 
the demonization of some girls and women if they stray from the path of ‘true’ (passive) 
womanhood” (Chesney-Lind and Irwin 2008, 14).  As a journalist who was present at the cross-
examination notes:  
 
He [Rosen] drew a portrait of Karla Homolka as immoral and unperturbed by the 
odious crimes to which she had been witness and participant: Karla Homolka, the 
hussy; Karla Homolka, the slattern; Karla Homolka, the sexual provocateur. [...] As 
the day wore on, Rosen continued to paint Homolka as a sexual predator, dating back 
to even the early days of her relationship with Paul, a man she bedded with within 
hours of their meeting [...] it is perhaps a quaint Victorian image of womanhood—
that only bad girls would be so sexually bold.  But Rosen hammered away at Karla as 
horny and rutting. (DiManno 1995f) 
 
Drawing on familiar cultural stereotypes surrounding deviant sexuality which have been 
historically significant in pathologizing and criminalizing women, Rosen and DiManno use 
Homolka’s sexuality to disrupt her feminine appearance and the assumption of innocence and 
victimhood that it engenders.  Homolka’s ‘abnormal’ sexuality became an important discussion 
point in constructing her as a severely pathological woman, and a psychopath in particular.   
Terms like ‘hussy’, ‘slattern’, ‘horny’, ‘rutting’ and ‘sexual provocateur’ and the images they 
give rise to are used to disparage and slut-shame Homolka.  More than this, they are offered here 
to allow us to begin to see Homolka as a ‘bad woman’ and make the logical leap that the same 
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sexually ‘immoral’ behaviours that she engaged in with Bernardo would have enabled her to 
participate in rape and other forms of sexual torture. Interestingly, although not surprisingly, 
Bernardo’s prior consensual sexual encounters with his wife and other consenting adults are 
never problematized. In fact, they are normalized as not being unusual for young men.  What is 
also enacted in this representation is the old-age ritual of applying gender stereotypes to the 
actual behaviour of women, and using their deviation from this ‘norm’ as the benchmark for 
which they are understood and subsequently, condemned. This gendered double standard is what 
aids the shift in the representation of Homolka as a feminized, passive, battered woman to a 
dangerous and masculinized criminal psychopath72.   
 Rosen’s defence tactic, then, didn’t rest on the same dual and criminally sanitized images 
that the Crown relied on—happy, cheerful Homolka versus Homolka the severely battered wife.  
Instead, Rosen insisted that the victim image that she tried to present was part of her criminal 
pathology; it was a facade, a role that she played to get a plea deal. The image that she presented 
of herself was thus further evidence of her psychopathy: “A woman could hide behind the guise 
of a battered wife to cloak her role in the rapes and murders of her sister and two schoolgirls, 
Paul Bernardo's defence lawyer has suggested” (Rankin and Pron 1995). The logic of 
psychopathy is all but literally present. 
 In another article, the image of Homolka as psychopathic is similarly accomplished by 
describing Homolka’s testimony of her abuse as a performance of victimhood, which Rosen uses 
to mold her into a psychopath:  
 
After the morning break, Rosen continued to question Homolka's credibility. He 
called her an actor in the ‘first order who can play the victim, deliver the lines.’ What 
you see, he told the jurors, is ‘an enigma.’ He asked them to think back to the first 
time they saw her on the stand - a nondescript, good-looking woman. And then asked 
them to remember her ‘crocodile tears’ during her examination-in-chief. But there 
was something was missing: she was flat, low-key, showing no real emotion during 
                                                 
72 To buffer this image of Homolka as a sick, sexual sadist, Rosen employed the biographical strategy I discuss 
above to show that even before Homolka met Bernardo she had morbid proclivities: “Homolka then admitted she 
took a discarded puppy tail, cut from a four-day-old schnauzer, and cat claws from the clinic and sent them with 
letters to one of her friends. ‘Debbie was a real animal lover and I told her it was a joke,’ Homolka said of the claws 
from a declawed cat she enclosed in the letter. In another correspondence, Homolka included the puppy's tail and 
wrote: ‘Boy, you thought the cat claws were gross, here's a tail from a puppy.’ The tail was taped to a picture of a 
dog, court was told. ‘What's this attached to the dog, a real tail?’ asked Rosen. Homolka again replied: ‘It was just a 
joke.’ Rosen read out the rest of the letter in which Homolka writes: ‘God, they (your friends) must think I'm sick. 
How am I going to top this one?’” (Rankin and Duncanson 1995).  
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prosecutor Houlahan's ‘pre- printed’ question-and-answer period, Rosen said. Then a 
different Homolka emerged when he began his cross-examination, Rosen said. It was 
the real Homolka - cold- hearted, callous and calculating - he said. (Duncanson and 
Rankin 1995a; emphasis mine) 
 
In this passage, interpretations of Homolka as a psychopath and a pathological woman are 
weaving in and through each other endlessly. Homolka used her femininity, her display of 
emotion, her good looks to seduce those around her into sympathy.  The instrumentaliztion of 
her femininity in accord with well-established and accepted cultural scripts allows her to hide her 
‘real’ self.  The way in which her actions are interpreted are therefore inserted within a discourse 
of psychopathy, and enable her symbolic transition into the antisocial, masculinized ontology of 
the psychopath: 
 
Yesterday's decision summarized some of the most chilling aspects of Homolka's 
case and offered some revelations. The board said Homolka's crimes demonstrate 
‘your difficulty in controlling your violent sexual impulses to the point of putting in 
danger the safety of others.’ The board said Homolka had an ‘elevated degree of 
indifference when it comes to the consequences of [her] acts,’ and noted how she and 
Bernardo referred to the planned Christmas rape of Homolka's sister, Tammy, that 
led to the girl's death ‘as a real Christmas present’ offered to ‘your partner 
[Bernardo].’ According to her psychological reports, Homolka is described ‘as an 
intelligent person, polite, courteous, but superficial ... with a tendency to control.’ 
Some specialists said Homolka had ‘battered woman’ syndrome, but some were 
concerned about her ‘superficiality and indifference to her victims.’ While her abuse 
may have played a role in her participation in her crimes, more recent analysis points 
to Homolka possessing either ‘an antisocial personality or that of a psychopath.’ 
(Mofina and Aubry 2001; emphasis mine) 
 
 The way that psychopathy is deployed in this case resonates with the way that 
psychopathy was historically applied to white women who strayed from normative femininity, 
especially in their sexuality. More than this however, my reading of how psychopathy plays out 
here to render Homolka’s criminality imaginable, confirms what others have observed about the 
way in which violent femininity is represented in two ways. First is that it has generally been 
observed that there is very little space in discourses and narratives of female criminality for 
woman to stand as an agent (Morrissey 2003; Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016) and psychopathy is 
no exception.  As a condition, foremost rooted in biology, the pathologization of criminalized 
women through psychopathy removes the subject from the social, and denied an active subject 
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position, insofar as their violence is guided (determined) by their biological penchant to 
antisocial and criminal behaviour73.    
 Second, gender stereotypes of women have and continue to render them harmless, 
innocent, victims, passive and generally un-criminal. This is why, as Kilty and Frigon note, the 
construction of Homolka as a “woman in danger” was largely accepted until the videotape 
evidence was released (2006, 51). Importantly, they argue that it was through Homolka’s 
endangerment that her criminality became imaginable insofar as it was understandable why a 
woman who endure abuse and live in fear might comply with her husband’s wishes (49-50). For 
Kilty and Frigon the duality that characterized the construction of Homolka—“woman in 
danger” and a “dangerous women”—cannot be seen as mutually exclusive because they were 
informing each other: her endangerment/victimization impacted her dangerousness/criminality 
(see also Kilty and Frigon 2016).  However, they also note that when the videotapes were 
released, “Homolka’s construction as a battered woman was transgressed and even erased by her 
definitive dangerousness” (2006, 51). Her narcissistic and manipulative tendencies came to 
construct her criminality and her endangerment was forgotten (54).   
 Psychopathy is able to cradle both of these duelling constructions of Homolka at the same 
time and in a certain sense it has to, since part of the psychopath’s dangerousness is their very 
sameness to the normative community, their invisibility. In joining these constructions together, 
psychopathy does more than just construct Homolka as a dangerous and pathological figure, it 
allows her to be seen as both dangerous and ‘normal’ or perhaps even ‘dangerously normal’. In 
other words, psychopathy is able to reconcile Homolka’s liminality because of the “paradox of 
appearance and reality” the category relies on. Although Homolka appears like a ‘normal’ 
woman—white, middle-class, heterosexual, passive, a victim and innocent—her appearance and 
the ‘reality’ of her crimes do not ultimately fit; she ‘is’ a psychopath. Much like the 
representations of Williams and Bernardo relied on dual and changing images of their 
personhood and their criminality, so too did Homolka’s, with an important difference. Bernardo 
and Williams wavered between normalcy and abnormality, whereas for Homolka, these binaries 
unleashed additional chains of signifiers: normal/victim/’good’/passive/in danger/feminine/un-
                                                 
73 This point may be contentious because it has, until recently, been suggested that psychopaths break the law or 
social convention wilfully because they are affectively impaired, not intellectually impaired. However, contemporary 
psychopathy research coming out of neurobiology is suggesting that this might not be the case (See Freedman and 
Verdun-Jones 2010). 
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criminal and abnormal/criminal/evil/active/dangerous/hypersexual/masculine. In the construction 
of Homolka as a psychopath, these dichotomous images of Homolka circulate at the same time, 
and are what enable her to be represented as a psychopath.  
 However, psychopathy did additional work in constructing Homolka, that it did not do in 
the constructions of Bernardo and Williams. Ascribing a psychopathic personality to Homolka 
partially re-genders her. As a woman who occupies normalized and interlocking subject 
positions—normative femininity, whiteness, middle-classness and heterosexuality— it was at 
first difficult to imagine her as all of these things and violent. Women who have been Othered in 
relation to the template of ‘normal’ women, namely racialized women, poor women and lesbians, 
are constructed more easily as criminal because they are also masculinized in relation to 
interlocking stereotypes (and are more likely to be sentenced harshly because of these 
interlocking stereotypes; Chesney-Lind and Eliason 2006). In order for us to be able to imagine 
Homolka as a violent criminal figure, she was transformed into a masculinized figure through 
psychopathy. In the context of psychopathy, anti-social characteristics which are regularly 
ascribed to criminal men are transferred on to her, thus allowing her to stand as a severe threat to 
public safety. In the representation of Homolka, traditionally masculinized traits are ascribed and 
problematized for the way they manifest in Homolka. For example, she is often described as 
calculated, intelligent, strong, disingenuous, emotionless, unwilling to accept blame, sexually 
perverted, and self-serving (especially in how she chose to protect herself rather than helping her 
own younger sister or Mahaffy and French; Kilty and Frigon 2016).  Each of these characteristics 
are not only masculinized traits, they are also psychopathic traits.  So while, psychopathy helped 
to recuperate the unimaginability of Homolka’s criminality (in a way similar to Bernardo and 
Williams)—that is, it made her imaginable as a criminal—psychopathy also masculinizes her 
actions. Importantly however, as we saw in Chapter 3, this representation of psychopathy 
requires her external appearance (with all that this entails) to be read as ‘normal’. So, while 
scholars have discussed the ways in which violent female offenders have historically and 
continue to be masculinized in their appearance and their conduct when they transgress 
normative femininity, especially when they are women of colour, do not conform to the norms of 
heterosexuality and are working or of a lower socio-economic class (e.g. Aileen Wuornos; 
Chesney-Lind and Eliason 2006; Seal 2010), this is not the way that masculinization worked in 
this case and in the context of psychopathy.  Instead of transforming Homolka into a completely 
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masculinized figure (and a lesbian which is so central to masculinized representations of violent 
women and girls; Chesney-Lind and Eliason 2006), she is constructed as a normalized/feminized 
figure with masculinized proclivities, behaviours and personality.   
 Once Homolka completed her 12-year sentence, the “media frenzy” around her 
“reignited” (Kilty and Frigon 2016, 86) and in the process, psychopathy became more literally 
pronounced in the news coverage (as opposed its symbolic or discursive presence outlined 
above). In this context, however, instead of psychopathy being used as a conceptual and 
representational tool to resolve her unimaginable criminality and contradictory constructions her, 
it is situated within the context of remorse and whether she felt genuine remorse for her role in 
the crimes (Kilty and Frigon 2016).  
 Remorse, as Kilty and Frigon (2016) among others (e.g. Weisman 2008) have noted, is an 
important emotion for an offender to show after the commission of a serious misdeed, but it is 
also a difficult one to evaluate. Because remorseful performances are heavily weighted and can 
have (dis)advantageous outcome for the offender (e.g. a remorseful performance can be a 
mitigating factor at sentencing or the absence thereof, an aggravating one), the ‘truthfulness’ of 
the emotions shown versus those which are actually felt are often a source of suspicion or doubt 
(Weisman 2008; Kilty and Frigon 2016). Complicating evaluations of remorse is the fact that 
such evaluations go beyond the mere presence of an apology (or lack thereof), and often evaluate 
other performatives which are connected to remorse such as paralinguistic cues, admitting guilt, 
taking full and unmitigated responsibility for one’s actions, cooperation with authorities, and 
evidence that the offender is committed to change or “self-transformation” (Kilty and Frigon 
2016; Weisman 2008). 
 Homolka’s behaviour, in certain respects, did align with “traditional signifiers of 
remorse” such as, providing information about Bernardo and providing key evidence against 
him, admitting to her involvement in the crimes, apologizing and conveying the internal distress 
she will continue to experience for the rest of her life because of what she did (Kilty and Frigon 
2016, 91 and 95). However, Kilty and Frigon (2016) contend that because Homolka’s criminality 
was often situated and contextualized within a narrative of victimization, this impacted how 
remorse was evaluated and was one of the reasons why it was so difficult for her to be seen as 
remorseful (91-93). The implicit requirement of remorse to take full and unmitigated 
responsibility for one’s actions is gendered in instances like this one, where the criminalized 
195 
 
woman’s actions cannot be separated from their ongoing abuse (93). Although Homolka’s 
experience and narrative of victimization significantly influenced how people came to judge her 
as remorseless, other factors also played an important role in constructing her as a remorseless 
subject such as “the categorical heinousness of the facts and details of the case—namely, the 
taboos that were broken and the disgust they elicited amongst the collective moral public” (93) 
as well as postulations that she was a psychopath (96).    
 According to Richard Weisman (2008), in order to fully understand the significance of 
remorse in a crime context, we must first recognize that the remorseless offender is not simply 
seen as someone who has transgressed the emotional and moral norms of the community by 
failing to express remorse for a heinous deed. Instead, the absence of remorse—understood as a 
feeling that the individual does not feel and/or a social performance that suggests that the 
emotion is not present or not genuinely felt—is interpreted as evidence or a symptom of 
something that is much more foundational to who that person ‘is’ and which separates them from 
the ‘normal’ and moral community: psychopathy (190). Because psychopaths are said to not be 
able to genuinely feel remorse and can only do a superficial rendering of the emotion (Hare 
1999), psychopathy became a powerful way to interpret Homolka’s ‘true’ personhood (Kilty and 
Frigon 2016). Recognizing the discursive power of the psychopathic construal, Kilty and Frigon 
(2016) observe how Homolka was transformed into a ‘performer’ of normalcy and her 
demonstrations of remorse as insincere and a self-motivated attempt to elicit sympathy from the 
public (98). Homolka’s expressions of remorse where also evaluated against other modes of 
expression that supposedly revealed her remorseful performance as fraudulent. For instance, in 
addition to Homolka’s victim narrative aiding in the discrediting of her as a remorseful subject, 
the way that she was able to “hold her own” during an intense cross-examination by Rosen, 
revealed that she was much less passive and helpless than the victim image she (and others) 
presented of herself suggested (99). This interaction showed “the ‘real’ Karla, whose ‘true’ self 
was emotionally invulnerable, strong-willed, independent-minded”, clever, and “defiant toward 
hostile men” (99)—an image that clashed with that of a ‘battered woman’ and called it into 
question. Moreover, Kilty and Frigon (2016) note, in a similar way as I do above, that 
Homolka’s ‘beautiful’ appearance and enactment of hegemonic femininity was presented in the 
news in such a way that she used her appearance conceal her dangerousness. The duplicity, 
instrumentalization of her appearance and her apparent narcissism (i.e. caring more about herself 
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than her victims; e.g. Kilty and Frigon 2016, 100) is also what enabled to her to be seen as 
remorseless and psychopathic (100).  
 If women are assumed to be “more emotional, compassionate, and nurturing than are 
men”, the apparent absence of these gendered emotions and characteristics, coupled with her 
violent sex crimes, signify Homolka’s personhood, her psychopathy (100). Importantly, it is also 
her psychopathy that explains, albeit tautologically, her emotional ineptness and her 
transgressions. In reading Homolka’s performative of remorse(lessness) through the gendered 
lens of psychopathy74(100) and the psychopathic construal, Kilty and Frigon (2016) demonstrate 
that Homolka is only able to stand as a remorseless subject, a subject who is transgressive of law 
and social norms, a subject who is duplicitous by nature, a woman who lacks core femininized 
characteristics and as someone who is ultimately biologically dangerous. We will never know 
who Homolka ‘really’ is and what she ‘truly’ feels, however, cases like this one can reveal how 
normalcy, identity, the body and (un)criminality are entangled with psychopathy and remorse.    
 
How Bad is She?: Psychopathy and the Case of Lisa Neve 
 
 Thus far, I have tried to demonstrate the way that psychopathy was used (in a similar 
fashion as it was used for Williams and Bernardo) to render Homolka’s (un)criminality 
imaginable.  What is particularly interesting about the news media’s construction of Homolka as 
a psychopath is the way in which discourses of normative and transgressive femininity along 
with duality/change were used to construct Homolka as a criminal, pathological and 
masculinized figure through psychopathy.  I would now like to turn to a Canadian criminal case 
where an Aboriginal woman, named Lisa Neve was designated a dangerous offender and was 
also labelled a psychopath. It is important to keep in mind, as Elizabeth Comack (2006b) and 
Faith and Jiwani (2008) have reminded us, Homolka is an anomaly among criminalized 
women—most criminalized women have not committed violent crimes (and when they do it is 
usually common assault), but property crimes, prostitution and/or drug offenses and most 
criminalized women in Canada are racialized (i.e. women of colour or Aboriginal women) and 
                                                 
74 Kilty and Frigon (2016) suggest that psychopathy’s reliance on the absence of traditionally feminized traits in 
psychopaths (e.g. empathy, emotional, nurturing, and an overall “ethic of care”) “genders” psychopathy (100). To 
render this same idea more specific, we could also say that the disorder engenders masculinized characteristics (e.g. 
lack of empathy, shallow emotions, antisocial, criminality, narcissism and generally lacking an “ethic of care”), as 
well as traits of deviant femininity (as I discuss at the outset of the chapter).  
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economically marginalized (Comack 2006b, 58). The case of Lisa Neve more closely resembles 
the reality of criminalized women in Canada (Comack 2006b).  Importantly though, Neve also 
departs from this reality in one important respect—the severity of the punishment she received 
(Comack 2006b).     
 From a ‘basic’ keyword search, it appears that out of the five women who have been 
designated dangerous offenders in Canada to date, Lisa Neve and Rene Acoby are the only two 
who have been labelled psychopaths in the media. However, at the time of Neve’s (i.e. 1994) 
trial, she was only the second woman in Canada to be designated a dangerous offender; the first 
woman was Marlene Moore. At first, it might seem curious to include this case since on the 
surface it seems to fly against the central argument of this dissertation since Neve is in many 
ways, and as I will show below, is not constructed as a normalized subject. She is a woman that 
did not have the same class privilege as Williams, Bernardo and Homolka, she is a racialized 
woman, a ‘prostitute’ and she is a lesbian. However, I would still contend that the Neve case is 
significant insofar as how she was represented as a psychopath.  As a woman who is 
marginalized in interlocking ways, she is not afforded the representational privileges that 
Williams, Bernardo and Homolka were, specifically in regards to the one-dimensional image of 
her we will see surface.  This flies in the face of the complex, and variegated images of the 
others.  Including Neve’s case in this present study then, adds to the central argument.  As I will 
show below, while Neve was labelled a psychopath, the way that psychopathy is deployed in this 
construction of her personhood is very different than what we have seen in the construction of 
normalized offenders. That is, psychopathy is not deployed to construct an otherwise 
unimaginably criminal subject imaginable as such, but rather, the news constructs Neve as 
always already criminal, and psychopathy enters the representation as a means to determine the 
extent of her criminality and ultimately the severity of punishment she ‘deserves’. Thus, I 
continue to build the argument that the way that psychopathy is used is contingent upon an 
interlocking reading of identity and difference.   
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Dangerous Offender Legislation in Canada 
 
 Before moving on it is necessary to provide some context and to explain Canada’s 
dangerous offender provisions as they pertained to Neve’s case75. Dangerous offender 
legislation, which are sentencing provisions, emerged in Canada at two distinct junctures in 
Canadian history.  In 1947, the habitual offenders provision (HOP)76 was introduced into the 
Canadian Criminal Code, Part XXI77 and was followed by criminal sexual psychopath legislation 
(CSP) in 194878. The HOP was designed to protect the larger society from particularly 
‘dangerous’ offenders, especially those who offended ‘habitually’ and did not respond to 
rehabilitation by imposing an -indeterminate sentence (Price and Gold 1976, 157-159). The CSP 
provision on the other hand, was aimed specifically at repeat sex offenders who were believed to 
be not insane, but suffering from some type of “disease of the mind” that resulted in 
uncontrollable and undeterrable sexual urges (Chenier 2003, 78).  This latter point, is what Elise 
Chenier (2003) notes was especially interesting about CSP laws as they represented “an 
epistemological shift in the way Canadians thought about sexual danger and human sexual 
behaviour in general. In the years following WWII, sex offenders were viewed as more mentally 
disturbed than criminally responsible, and sex crime was regarded as a major mental health 
problem waiting to be solved” (76). CSP laws thus represent a significant moment Canadian 
legal history, for as Chenier has pointed out, these laws represented the “apex of the 20th century 
marriage of psychiatry and law” (77).    
 In an attempt to keep the general public safe from this otherwise uncontrollable and 
unpredictable sex offender, CSP laws provided judges with the authority to impose an 
indefinite/preventative sentence on those found to be criminal sexual psychopaths.  However, 
Chenier (2003) notes that at the time when CSP laws were enacted, the definition of sex crimes 
was different than how we would define a sex crime today:  
                                                 
75 Since 1997, the dangerous offender provisions have been revised.  These changes did not immediately affect how 
Neve was prosecuted.  Because I have largely focused on the coverage of the case that ranges from when a 
dangerous offender application was put forward until a month after she was declared a dangerous offender, these 
changes are not significant to my analysis and therefore I do not review them.  If you are interested in the changes 
that have since taken place, you may consult the following sources:   
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm; http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-
crm/crrctns/protctn-gnst-hgh-rsk-ffndrs/dngrs-ffndr-dsgntn-eng.aspx.  
76 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, S.C., 1947 c.55, s.18.  
77 R.S.C. 1970, Ch. C-34, s.687. 
78 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, S.C., 1948 c.39, s.43.  
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the crimes covered by sex psychopath laws generally included the full spectrum of 
sex-related offences from sexual assaults against children to sex between two 
consenting male adults.  Sexual assault against females was not often included under 
criminal sexual psychopath laws since the object of perpetrator’s desire—an adult 
female—was not abnormal or ‘deviant’ and therefore was simply a violent assault 
and not the product of a mental defect. (Chenier 2003, 78-79).  
 
While the advent of these laws were intent on absolving sexual danger (where children were the 
primary concern), what the CSP laws also did was further criminalize and pathologize sex acts 
between consenting adult males.  As a result, Gary Kinsman has argued “during these years 
homosexuals were often viewed as more ‘dangerous’ and less ‘normal’ than heterosexual 
rapists” (1993, 18).  
 Both the HOP and CSP laws received harsh criticisms on a number of different fronts and 
resulted in reform (see, for example, Price and Gold 1976)79. In 1977, both laws were withdrawn 
and replaced with a new dangerous offender regime80 as part of Part XXIV of the Criminal 
Code81. These provisions, to some extent, combine the intentions of the HOP and CSP by 
targeting violent and/or sex offenders and imposing an indeterminate sentence if the offender is 
found to be a dangerous offender.  The specific purpose of the dangerous offender (DO) 
provisions according to Wayne Renke “is the protection of the public.  These provisions permit 
an extraordinary remedy—indeterminate detention—for an extraordinary class of criminals—
‘dangerous offenders’” (1995, 653).   Indeterminate sentencing is a preferred mode of 
punishment in these cases because of the belief that this offending population constitutes “a 
small minority of offenders (the ‘residue’ of the criminal class) who are not specifically deterred 
or reformed by ordinary punishment and who pose a serious risk to the mental or physical well-
being of other members of society” (654).  As such, in the context of criminal law, 
dangerousness is not about determining if the individual is at fault for a crime (this has already 
been determined prior to the DO application being submitted), but rather “the risk of criminality 
that their personality constitutes” (Foucault 1978 quoted in Petrunik 1982, 228).  In other words, 
                                                 
79 Habitual offender provisions were amended in 1961 (S.C., 1961 c.43 ss.33, 35-40) and in 1969 (S.C. 1968-69 c.38 
ss.77, 79-80) (Price and Gold 1976, 159). CSP provisions were amended in 1961 (S.C. 1960-61 c. 43 ss.32, 34-40) 
(Price and Gold 1976, 163). According to Price and Gold (1976), among the evidentiary and procedural changes, the 
name of the law was changed to “danger sexual offender” (217, fn.39). The law was amended again in 1969 (S.C. 
1968-69 c.38 s.76) (163).  
80S.C. 1976-77, c. 53; http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm#fn11  
81 R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46. 
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it is the nature of his or her ‘being’ (i.e. the ‘kind’ of person that one ‘is’) that is in question at 
the level of dangerousness that is as significant as the crime that was committed.  By extension, 
punishment is levelled not at the offence (as is usually the case), but at the offender’s 
dangerousness and his or her potential or probability to do harm (Petrunik 1982, 229).  As a 
result, dangerous offender legislation incorporates indeterminate sentences, a form of 
preventative detention, to allay the risk of dangerous individuals (Petrunik 1982).  
 While the concept of psychopathy is not a formal requirement or feature of the dangerous 
offender provisions as it was when it was in its infancy, psychopathy does often play a formative 
role at trial, and particularly at sentencing.  Ivan Zinger and Adelle Forth have noted that the 
introduction of a diagnosis of psychopathy during Canadian sentencing hearings “is considered 
an aggravating factor [...] which has serious repercussions on the length of the sentence handed 
down by the courts” (1998, 242).  In the context of DO hearings, they observe that “the diagnosis 
of psychopathy was used on numerous occasions both to support the position that an offender is 
likely to re-offend violently, and to justify an indeterminate sentence.  In one instance, the 
absence of psychopathy has facilitated the release of an offender who had been detained since 
1953 under the criminal sexual psychopath legislation (the former dangerous offender 
legislation)” (242-3).  What these findings suggest is that while psychopathy is not formally 
required to find an individual a dangerous offender, it is often used as means for determining an 
individual’s dangerousness to the extent that when psychopathy is absent, the offender is 
considered less dangerous.  
 In a more recent study, Lloyd, Clark and Forth (2010) found that when the psychopath 
label is used in a criminal justice context, perceptions of the riskiness of the offender increase, 
largely because it is believed that psychopathy is an internal cause of adult criminal behaviour 
and thus more difficult (if not impossible) to ameliorate (325). Furthermore, their research 
reveals that psychopathy is readily used in DO hearings and that PCL-R scores are “moderately 
related to trial outcome” (332).  More significantly, however, is that their “results indicated that 
experts’ ratings of treatment amenability, but not risk to reoffend, were related to trial outcome” 
(335).  The authors also note that while psychopathy is used to demonstrate the individual’s 
inability to be effectively treated, the research on this relationship is very limited and these types 
of opinions (which lead to life-altering decisions) are overzealous (327).  
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 In addition to the role that psychopathy plays in sentencing individuals as dangerous 
offenders, it is also important to note the demographic features of those designated as dangerous 
offenders.  The vast majority of those who have been declared DOs in Canada are males.  Since 
the advent of the first DO regime in 1947, only 5 women have been declared DOs. It is also 
important to bear in mind, that Aboriginal men are vastly overrepresented in this category of 
offenders.  In 2011, there were 458 dangerous offenders in Canada, and 26.4 percent of them 
were Aboriginal, whereas they constitute only 4.3 percent of Canada’s population (Milward 
2014, 620).  David Milward (2014) has explained Aboriginal peoples overrepresentation as DOs 
by examining how the historical legacy of colonialism continues to impact the daily and 
detrimental realities that Aboriginal communities face. Of particular import, Milward explains, 
are the interrelated affects of intergenerational trauma, mental illness, poverty, substance abuse, 
lack of educational and employment opportunities, physical and sexual abuse, and the residential 
school system.   
 
Lisa Neve’s ‘Biography’: “Criminal’s Past Riddled with Violence82” 
 
 Reading the coverage of the Lisa Neve’s case was a very different experience than 
reading the coverage of Williams and Bernardo/Homolka’s cases.  From the outset, and in 
contrast to Williams, Bernardo and Homolka, what we learn about Neve pertains strictly to her 
‘criminal career’; a discourse of criminality is already structuring how we can know her. In one 
of the first articles written about Neve we are told about an incident whereby Neve, along with 
others, beat up a woman named Jennifer McNalley (Jimenez 1994ab). According to the news 
record published in March 1994, on November 20, 1992, Neve along with her friends were at a 
bar in Edmonton and accused McNalley of stealing clothes and lying about it and then “coerced 
her” into the washroom and began beating her up (Jimenez 1994a). The news reports say Neve 
cut McNalley’s neck with an exacto knife and McNalley required stitches (Jimenez 1994ab). 
Neve was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, and was convicted for the 
former charge and was sentenced to two years in prison (Jimenez 1994b).  
 Aside from the details of the crime itself, it was immediately noted that Neve was under 
the influence of alcohol and cocaine at the time the assault took place (Jimenez 1994b). This 
                                                 
82 This was the headline of one of the news articles (see Jimenez 1994e). 
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information—her violence and struggles with addiction—is noted as being characteristic of Neve 
more generally: “Neve has been on the street since she was 12 and has 20 convictions, many for 
violent offences. She became involved with drugs and prostitution at a very young age and 
developed serious addiction problems” (Jimenez 1994c). Lists of her youth and adult convictions 
are also provided on many different occasions (e.g. Jimenez 1994e) and her violent crimes are 
described in detail in others (e.g. Jimenez 1994abd).  
When we do learn about Neve’s un-criminal life, it is only in passing and couched in her 
transgressions. Take the following two excerpts, where Neve’s life and her very personhood are 
bizarrely summarized in these point form lists:  
 
* 21 years old, five-foot-seven, 110 pounds, long brown hair, with blonde tips. 
* Prostitute, heavy drug user. Also a heavy drinker. Binge eater, with wild 
fluctuations in weight. “She would brag about how many Big Macs she could eat,'' 
said one police officer. 
* Grew up in Calgary. Moved to Edmonton. Worked 97th Street drag area. 
* Loves kids. Would skip working to babysit other prostitutes' kids. 
* Juvenile crimes included hostage-taking in jail. 
* Adult crimes include uttering death threats and Exacto-knife slashing. Two close 
street-friends murdered.” (McKeen 1994d) 
 
* Lisa was adopted by the Neve family at three months. 
* She was five pounds, three ounces at birth. 
* Learning difficulties were noticed in Grade 1. 
* She liked to ski; involved in jazz dance and Brownies. 
* Her aggression was revealed in Grade 5. (McKeen 1994g) 
 
It is also important to point out, I think, that the term “prostitute” often was used to refer to Neve 
instead of using her name or gender pronouns. For example:  
 
But a supervisor at the Calgary Young Offenders Centre described the former 
prostitute to fellow inmates and jail workers as probably the most notorious youth 
criminal of her time. (McKeen 1994a; emphasis mine) 
 
 Robertson first met Neve in the summer of 1991 and said he'd encountered the street 
prostitute probably 150 times over the following years. (McKeen 1994b; emphasis 
mine) 
 
The day featured the testimony of a police officer who had dealt extensively with 
Neve and had seized the former prostitute's secret diaries. (McKeen 1994b; emphasis 
mine) 
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Davison also suggested Neve had broken up Paull's marriage and Const. Robertson, 
as a friend, was angry with the prostitute. (McKeen 1994d; emphasis mine) 
 
In each of these references to Neve, her name or the pronoun “her” could have been easily used. 
Instead we are reminded of Neve’s transgressiveness and her criminality and are made to see her 
in a more pejorative and denigrated manner as “the prostitute”.  Indeed, as one editorial put it: 
“Lisa Neve could never be mistaken for the girl next door” (Another Chance Deserved 1999). 
 That Neve is a violent, convicted criminal, has a long criminal history, has an addiction to 
drugs and alcohol and is a ‘prostitute’, is how we are made to know Neve in the first half of the 
coverage. Providing this information without context and a critical perspective, is not only 
problematic for the way it obscures the conditions of criminalization, but it also produces a 
singular story of Neve as simply ‘bad’. Although at times, small bits of information about Neve’s 
non-criminal life are presented (e.g. about her family and that she was adopted as an infant) or 
information that may contextualize her crimes (e.g. that Neve was sexually assaulted by a teacher 
when she was in grade 5, and that she was removed from her family home by social services 
when she was 12 for drinking alcohol; Jimenez 1994e), this is never dwelled on or substantively 
elaborated.  
 Neve’s ‘biography’, therefore, was largely written as a criminalized biography and Neve 
constructed as purely criminal. This was characteristic of the first half of the news coverage 
which chronicled Neve’s DO proceedings and was one of the most startling features of the 
coverage. This interpretive feat was accomplished by outlining her criminal career, her struggle 
with addiction, her street life and the fact that she was a ‘prostitute’. In other words, most of the 
information contained in the articles detailed not the story of her life, but her criminal story.  
 The dangerous offender (hereafter DO) application was initiated, according to the news 
record, following Neve’s last three crimes (Jimenez 1994e).  One of those three crimes was the 
assault of Jennifer McNalley and the other involved Neve threating to kill a lawyer (Sterling 
Sanderman) and his children. The third crime was for the robbery and assault of Rhodora 
Nicholas. The crime against Nicholas is described in detail:  
 
[N]eve picked up Nicholas, a city prostitute, in May 1991 and suggested they go for 
a drink. They drove off in Neve's truck to a deserted parking lot in Abbottsfield. 
There, Neve pulled a knife with a 12-centimetre blade. She slashed Nicholas's black 
jacket, red top and skirt and threatened to slice her throat, too. Then Neve took off, 
leaving Nicholas naked, without even her underwear or purse. Sobbing, Nicholas 
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stumbled down Highway 16, covering herself with a piece of pink Fiberglas 
insulation she'd found on the side of the road. (Jimenez 1994d) 
   
It was after this conviction that the Crown decided to launch a dangerous offender application 
against Neve who was 21 at the time.  
 
Lisa Neve, “Canada’s Most Dangerous Woman” 
 
 Neve’s criminality was not unimaginable, but rather it was the only thing that we were 
made to imagine about her. The only thing that was up for discussion was exactly how dangerous 
Neve was to the general public and to corrections personnel and therefore how severely she 
should be punished.  It was in the midst of these stories, and only in this context, that 
psychopathy was deployed. This is important.  Unlike the other two cases that we have explored, 
where psychopathy is deployed in the news and where it is sometimes unclear if the label was 
presented during the trial and what its affects were, in Neve’s case the role of psychopathy in the 
news is clear. It is used to describe what happened during her DO hearing. In this way, it is 
descriptive and literal: “By law, the Crown and the defence must each call a psychiatrist to 
testify about a person’s likelihood to commit further crimes. Are they psychopathic? Do they 
have an anti-social personality disorder?” (Jimenez 1994d; emphasis mine). While psychopathy 
is not necessarily a formal requirement, it is often an important way that future dangerousness is 
assessed in a criminal justice context, as I discussed above. The stakes in a DO hearing are high, 
as one journalist notes: “this is the harshest punishment imaginable. Those who receive it are 
among Canada’s most vicious and unrepentant criminals” (Jimenez 1994d; emphasis mine). 
Below, I retell the story that was told in the news about Neve’s personhood to show how 
psychopathy and her interlocking identities enabled her to be seen as particularly and inherently 
dangerous. In doing so, I attempt to show the different work that psychopathy does in this 
representation as well as how her interlocking identities complement this work. 
 The coverage of the trial begins with testimony from police officers who knew Neve. The 
first of these articles conveys the presumably fractured testimony of Constable Brian Robertson 
(McKeen 1994b). The news representation of his testimony centred around several things that 
Neve had said to Robertson including that she had a severed hand that that she wanted to send 
him, along with pictures of a dead girl and telling him that she had taken a girl out of town, 
wrapping her in duct tape and leaving here there (McKeen 1994b). The representation of the 
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testimony of another officer, Sergeant JoAnn McCartney, also conveyed a picture of Neve as 
violent, either in her actions or her fantasies: 
 
Lisa Neve's body language changed when she described the finer points of killing to 
her friend the cop. Her voice slowed. She visibly relaxed. Her pupils dilated. It was 
as if she were visualizing it all. “She talked about the feeling of power it gave her,'' 
said Sgt. JoAnn McCartney, an Edmonton police officer known for her undercover 
work catching johns. “She talked about how neck wounds were better because they 
spurted blood.” Chest and back wounds weren't as good, because they only oozed, 
Neve told McCartney. With arm wounds, there wasn't enough blood. She liked neck 
wounds. (McKeen 1994c)  
 
Neve told McCartney she killed dogs and cats as a child, on a farm in Saskatchewan. 
She said how, with people, they'd all beg God for help at the very end. She said it 
made her feel like God, because in that last few moments of time she was the only 
one who knew whether they'd live or die. (McKeen 1994c)  
 
Although Neve has never been charged or convicted of murder, she is represented as often 
discussing murder either in her diary or to police officers; none of the incidents that she 
described to police have been found to be truthful. Importantly however, by relaying this 
information, we are given a particular image of Neve as someone who thinks and talks about 
doing terrible things and we are made to be suspicious of her. This information, when taken with 
her criminalized biography, convey an image of Neve as a criminal and woman who had 
departed from normative femininity. We are thus invited to ask ourselves: What kind of woman 
would have 22 convictions by the time she is 21?  What kind of young woman would think and 
say these kinds of things? Neve’s defence lawyer argued that these kinds of stories were “shock 
talk” and nothing more, but the Crown had a different explanation that would show that this talk 
coupled with her criminal record was indicative of the kind of person that she was. (McKeen 
1994d).  
 The first time in the news coverage where Neve is explicitly labeled a psychopath83 was 
during the coverage of the trial and specifically when the Crown called psychiatrists to testify. 
The Crown called four psychiatrists to provide expert testimony regarding Neve’s “mental 
                                                 
83 There was one earlier reference to Neve as possibly having an “antisocial personality disorder”. The context of 
this utterance was in relation to a news report on Neve’s sentencing for the crime against Jennifer McNalley.  The 
news article states that the trial judge “recommended Neve get treatment for a possible antisocial personality 
disorder and for her substance abuse problems” (Jimenez 1994c). This recommendation was apparently made based 
on a psychiatrist’s report that was read at the trial that “describe[ed] Neve as having several traits of someone 
suffering from antisocial personality disorder” (Jimenez 1994c).  
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condition” (McKeen 1994c). In each news report of their testimony, psychopathy was presented 
as the most important feature of the psychiatrist’s testimony (whether other kinds of information 
were presented at trial is not clear from the news portrayal) and the tie that binds Neve’s long 
criminal history (i.e. repeat offender) with her proclivity to violence.  
 Although the purpose of the trial was to determine if Neve was a dangerous offender, the 
coverage seems to be about psychopathy as much as it was about her dangerousness. For 
instance, one journalist writes “the defence of Lisa Neve, the accused psychopath, begins today” 
(McKeen 1994i; emphasis mine). Importantly, Neve’s trial is about determining if she is a 
dangerous offender, not if she is a psychopath, but psychopathy is being made to stand in for 
dangerousness, as though the two are synonymous.  In other words, if the Crown can prove that 
she is a psychopath, they have also somehow proven that she is dangerous, despite the fact that 
not all psychopaths are violent criminals (Hare 1999) and despite the fact that psychopathy is not 
formal legal requirement of dangerousness (Renke 1995).  
 Each psychiatrist for the Crown agreed that Neve was a psychopath.  The first 
psychiatrist, Dr. Pierre Flor-Henry, determined that Neve was a “dangerous psychopath” and 
described her threatening behaviour as “cold, callous and sinister” (McKeen 1994e). His 
testimony, which both explains psychopathy and illuminates the similarities between the 
psychopathic profile and Neve’s traits, is summarized in the following way:  
 
Psychopaths, testified Flor-Henry, live impulsively, cannot set goals and have no 
plans for the future. They are sensation seekers, are often bored and therefore often 
turn to drug and alcohol abuse, like Neve did. They are also completely indifferent to 
the suffering of others and blame the world for their problems. ‘They lack the 
empathy that other people have,’ he said. Flor-Henry said Neve's ‘criminal 
versatility’ and record for intimidation were other hallmarks of a psychopath. 
(McKeen 1994e)   
 
Dr. Flor-Henry’s PCL-R assessment of Neve is also provided to the reader, listing each 
psychopathic trait and the score Neve received for each: “the tests confirmed the diagnosis” 
(McKeen 1994f). Threatening. Intimidating. Callous. Without empathy. Cold. Sensation seeker. 
Violent criminality. As I discussed in the case of Homolka, these traits which are so central to 
the psychopath’s profile are not associated with normative femininity, but are imaginable as an 
extreme manifestation of hegemonic masculinity. I also noted how psychopathy is a 
masculinized disorder. We can see how representations of Neve’s criminality when it is 
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articulated through psychopathy masculinize her and pathologize her criminality and her gender 
transgressions and enable her to begin to appear as especially dangerous.  
 The significance of Dr. Flor-Henry’s testimony about psychopathy in general and the 
implications of this diagnosis for Neve is clear: not only is past behaviour the best predictor of 
future behaviour, but “the effect of treatment was to make psychopaths better psychopaths” 
(Flor-Henry quoted in McKeen 1994f). A picture of Neve is being drawn; she “a very dangerous 
threat” for which indeterminate incarceration is the only viable option (Flor-Henry quoted in 
McKeen 1994f). The testimony of the third psychiatrist, Dr. John O’Mahoney concurred that 
Neve’s prognosis was bleak because she has an extreme manifestation of the disorder (she’s “a 
psychopath’s psychopath” as the journalist put it; McKeen 1994h), and therefore, “she’s 
incorrigible” (O’Mahoney quoted in McKeen 1994h). In O’Mahoney’s opinion, she is not only 
incorrigible, but he predicts that her violence is likely to escalate (McKeen 1994h).  
 Neve’s dangerousness was not only articulated in relation to psychopathy and her 
criminal history, but in relation to her sexuality. For example, Dr. Flor- Henry’s testimony 
painted Neve as “a psychopath who is into homosexual sadism […] in light of evidence that 
Neve taped up and planned to kill a fellow hooker” (McKeen 1994e). While the logics that made 
this construal of Neve possible are not explained beyond this in this article, we get a better sense 
of the kind of thinking that made this articulation possible in a later piece when Neve is put on 
the stand. During her cross-examination, the Crown prosecutor asked Neve about her “sexual 
preference”: “her principal attraction was to women” (McKeen 1994k). This line of questioning 
allowed the Crown prosecutor to make a link between her sexuality and her violence by bringing 
up “two incidents where she had either assaulted or planned to assault other prostitutes” 
(McKeen 1994k). The point that is trying to be made here is that “Neve was getting some kind of 
sexual pleasure out of the violence” (McKeen 1994k). In other words, Neve is being constructed 
in the news not only as a psychopath and a violent criminal, but also as a sex offender. This way 
of framing and constructing her criminality through her biology (i.e. psychopathy) and sexuality 
(i.e. lesbian) allow for her to be made into a particularly dangerous criminal, if only we know 
how to look at the significance of her actions in relation to criminal pathology and more 
importantly, her sexual identity.    
 This image of her as both criminal and transgressive was further articulated in the news 
coverage and in Dr. Flor-Henry’s expert testimony: “She is homosexual and sadistic. She is a 
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female equivalent of a male lust murderer” (Flor-Henry quoted in McKeen 1994f). Although Dr. 
Flor-Henry did not have much to say about this analogy between Neve and ‘male-lust murders’ 
(what he meant by this was not explained, according to the journalist; McKeen 1994f), others 
have. For example, in the following excerpt from one of the news articles, the commentator is 
critical of how Neve’s dangerousness was partly determined by the way her crimes were re-
written as sexual crimes because of her sexuality:  
 
‘Ninety per cent of these dangerous-offender cases are based on people who are 
sexual predators,’ said Carol Hutchings, executive director of the Elizabeth Fry 
Society of Edmonton. ‘They have put her in that category despite the fact that her 
crime was not sexual in nature. I believe the reason they've done that is because she 
is a lesbian.’  Hutchings said that Neve was compared to a male lust murderer in the 
judge's deposition, despite the fact that Neve is not male and has not murdered 
anyone. ‘They said it was based on lust because she is a lesbian. They made that 
assumption and that assumption was allowed to stand in court’. (Metella 1995) 
 
Legal scholar, Wayne Renke (1995) is also critical of the way Neve’s gender and gender 
transgressions come to inform this analogy and how her gender transgressions and the cultural 
meaning they hold render her dangerous:  
 
Neve was said to be the equivalent of a “male lust murderer”.  Female lust murderers 
are, no doubt, rare.  Nevertheless, what is the significance of the gender reference? 
What difference does it make that Neve was the equivalent of a male lust murderer? 
One might infer that part of her crime was to act as a man.  Her gender transgression 
was so significant that it transmuted her deeds into the equivalents of murder.  
Perceiving Neve’s acts as gender transgression may explain or be a factor in the 
explanation of the apparent arbitrariness of her selection for the dangerous offender 
proceedings. (673) 
 
It was these more explicitly gendered and sexual characterizations of Neve— “homosexual 
sadist” and her equivalence to “male lust murderer”, coupled with the fact that there are men 
who have committed much more serious and violent offences that have not been labeled 
dangerous that became points of discussion for whether Neve deserved to be labelled “Canada’s 
most dangerous woman” (McKeen 1994m).   It’s all of these strands (e.g. her gender 
transgressions, her ‘deviant’ identities and psychopathy) that are woven together, that provide a 
particularly clear image of Neve as dangerous.  
 After Neve was found to be a dangerous offender the coverage suddenly became critical 
and sympathetic.  Many articles, as well as scholarly critiques, discussed how the decision and 
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the events that led up to the decision (including initiating the hearing in the first place) arbitrarily 
criminalized Neve in the most extraordinary way possible because she did not conform to 
standards of femininity (McKeen 1994n; Dolik 1994; Renke 1995; Yeager 2000). It was at this 
point in the news coverage that we are presented with additional perspectives on Neve’s life and, 
in particular, ones that contextualize her criminality.  For example, we learned that Neve was a 
victim of sexual assaults, exploitation, and other forms of violence while working as a sex 
worker and living on the streets (and that perhaps she acted as she did because of the street 
culture which she was trying to survive in; McKeen 1994o). In the scholarly literature, we learn 
that she was constantly institutionalized as a youth for acting out and in attempts to ‘manage’ her 
behaviour instead of understanding it and that she struggled with her mental health (Neve and 
Pate 2005).  This more contextualized narrative allows us to see Neve and the criminalization 
process in a different light, a light that never shone in the early coverage. The interlocking social 
and structural conditions in which Neve lived and survived were not discussed in the judge’s DO 
decision either (Renke 1995; Yeager 2000). As such, it was not possible to consider how living 
under these conditions might lead to behavioural issues and/or decisions that may seem 
unreasonable to those outside of it (McKeen 1994o; see also Yeager 2000; Renke 1995).  
Instead, as Matthew Yeager has noted, she is characterized in a number of different ways as 
transgressive: “as a diagnosed psychopath and ‘anti-social personality’, Neve violated white, 
middle-class norms of femininity. She had fantasies about committing murders and doing 
violence’ she was a lesbian, Aboriginal prostitute with a history of threatening violence, taking 
hostages, and strong-arming people” (2000, 16).   
 Neve’s case was certainly anomalous for many reasons, but for other reasons it was not. 
Women, like Lisa Neve, who are young, racialized, economically marginalized “are the fastest 
growing prison population in Canada and worldwide” (Neve and Pate 2005, 19; Comack 2006b). 
In addition, Lisa Neve and Kim Pate note “that women and girls who have cognitive and/or 
mental disabilities are more likely to be criminalized and jailed” and the criminal justice system 
works as one more way in which the state attempts to control poor, racialized women without 
remedying the conditions that lead to these issues (2005, 19). Indeed, as Elizabeth Comack 
(2006b) has noted, it is Neve that can be seen as the archetypical woman whom the Canadian 
state has come to routinely criminalize and incarcerate.  As one news article put it: “The thought 
that Karla Homolka was sentenced to 12 years for aiding in the sex slayings of two Ontario 
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teens, while she faces life, makes Neve seethe. ‘This woman will be out in seven years, and I will 
be in for the rest of my life,’ Neve laments” (Henton 1995).  
 We can summarize the representation of Neve in the following ways. At the outset, Neve 
is always already imagined as a criminal figure, not “the girl next door”. This is conveyed most 
clearly in the kind of criminalized biography that is written about her. The way in which a story 
of Neve’s dangerousness is built relies heavily on psychopathy as well as her departure from 
normative femininity: she constructed as a woman who is violent in her actions and fantasies, a 
woman who desires women, a woman who is not chaste and sells her sexuality, and a woman 
who is a sexual predator; she is, within this construal, an abomination who has taken flight from 
the norms of femininity in the most profound ways.  Her criminal transgressions as well as her 
interlocking marginalized identities make it possible to see her as a pathologically dangerous and 
masculinized figure.  
 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the emphasis placed on psychopathy and expert 
opinions at trial and in the news, together with her marginalized interlocking identities made it 
possible to imagine Neve as more dangerous than she was. While the trial judge did not find 
Neve to be a psychopath, he did find that she had an antisocial personality (although these terms 
are not clearly differentiated; Renke 1995, 670-671). Despite this, psychopathy was a significant 
feature of the news reporting and how Neve’s criminality was imagined as particularly 
dangerous and untreatable. This is in stark contrast to the Homolka case where her apparent 
normalcy concealed her criminality and it was only by deploying psychopathy later in the 
coverage that we were able to see her as criminal. Whereas for Neve, psychopathy was present 
from the outset, framing how she came to be known. Instead of psychopathy resolving the 
“paradox of appearance versus reality” (Weisman 2008, 199) by transforming her ‘normal’ 
appearance into a fiction, it did the opposite. It invited us to see Neve only as a dangerous 
psychopath and every attempt that she and her defence made to call the label into question was 
transformed into a ruse—the lies, deceit, manipulation so characteristic of a psychopath.  For 
example, Neve’s personal diary (which she kept with her in prison, knowing that it would be 
read by staff) was also significant for psychiatrists in determining if she was a psychopath.  Neve 
often wrote about killing in her diary.  The Crown argued that the diaries were “rife” with 
“sadistic fantasies” and these fantasies revealed her dangerousness/psychopathy (McKeen 
1994i). However, meaning is a tenuous thing.  While the psychiatrists read her diary as evidence 
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of her dangerousness and psychopathy, Neve argued that the meaning of what she said was not 
in the words themselves, but in her intentions in writing those words:  
 
Neve said the diary was a ruse. It was written in 1988 while in the Calgary Young 
Offender Centre as part of her case plan. As she knew, it was being read each day by 
staff. Neve said she pretended to be fixated on murder and death so that 
psychologists wouldn't ask her about things which really bothered her, like her life as 
a prostitute. Neve said she hates opening up to people and even preferred being 
thought a murderer than talking about her deep-seated feelings. ‘The things that 
really bugged me, I'd never talk about. I'm not good at that. I hate crying, I hate 
showing people that something's wrong.’ Neve said she realized people were starting 
to take her seriously about the homicidal talk. ‘I absolutely liked it. No one would 
ask me about things that hurt me.’ (McKeen 1994j) 
 
The contestation over the literal and symbolic meaning of Neve’s words is particularly 
significant in the context of psychopathy.  Because psychiatrists were already convinced that 
Neve was a psychopath, and psychopaths lie and manipulate, her text is not read objectively, but 
is read within the context of psychopathy.  As a result, whatever Neve utters is filtered through 
the psychopathic construal.  So in this instance, Neve’s words cannot be interpreted as a defence 
mechanism which shields her from discussing feelings and memories that are painful, but rather 
as evidence of her proclivities to lie, manipulate because of her pathology and her inherent 
criminality. In other words, Neve’s pain is construed as a psychopathic performance in an 
attempt to look ‘normal’ by defending herself in way that we might understand. This is further 
exemplified when Neve is accused by a psychiatrist of ‘playing the system’:  
 
Crown Prosecutor Brian Peterson finished his case Tuesday with the last of four 
psychiatric witnesses. Dr. Vijay Singh agreed with the previous three, who diagnosed 
Neve as being a psychopath. Davison [defence lawyer] again attempted to show there 
were other possible diagnoses, and that Neve had actually been making progress, by 
admitting herself to Alberta Hospital in 1993 when she was having homicidal 
thoughts. But Singh said another possible explanation is Neve, knowing the justice 
system well, was merely trying to manipulate it by trying to put herself in a favorable 
light. (McKeen 1994i) 
 
In addition to the psychopathic construal hijacking everything Neve uttered or wrote, the context 
of her actions, which could have made her crimes appear less psychopathic and more ‘normal’, 
was ignored and viewed through a lens of the ‘average’, ‘reasonable’ person: “ ‘We come from 
two separate worlds Mr. Peterson. Where I come from, this is normal’ - Neve, explaining to the 
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Crown prosecutor why she planned to seek revenge on another hooker by taping her up and 
beating her” (McKeen 1994l).  Unfortunately, the psychopathic construal does not allow for 
contextualization, it merely enumerates socially undesirable traits and behaviours as they appear 
in the normative imagination and reduces them to individual pathology.  
 The stories that were told about Neve and the way that these stories were couched in 
science and psychopathy, and in relation to her transgressions of normative femininity, made 
Neve appear as especially dangerous and therefore, ‘deserving’ of the DO label and an 
indeterminate sentence. Not only did psychopathy affect how Neve’s criminality was imagined 
in the news, it also had powerful and disconcerting material effects. In 1999, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal allowed Neve to appeal the dangerous offender ruling and removed the dangerous 
offender designation.  Neve was released from prison days later after serving six years in prison.  
While, the appeal judges had many reasons for removing the label from Neve, one reason stands 
out among them.  Part of the reason why the trial judge decided to sentence Neve to an 
indeterminate sentence even though he had the option of meting out a determinate sentence, was 
because of the psychiatrists’ testimony regarding the poor treatment options for psychopaths.  
The appeal judges note that, the trial judge did not find Neve to be a psychopath, but that she did 
have an antisocial personality (the judge does not explain what the differences are between these 
two designations).  The issue here is that: 
 
To decline to find Neve to be a psychopath, but to sentence her as if she were one, 
constitutes reversible error.  Since the sentencing judge did not find Neve to be a 
psychopath, it follows that he could not assess her treatment prospects as if she were 
one. Because this is precisely what happened, it cannot be said that this error falls 
into the harmless error category. Were this the only error, the appropriate disposition 
would be to order a new hearing.  But again, given other errors and their effect, this 
is not necessary.84 
 
This decision highlights the power of psychopathy in a DO context. That she was not found to be 
a psychopath radically changes her fate. Despite this decision, we have still been able to see the 
force of psychopathy at her trial and in the news: it allowed her to be imagined as “Canada’s 
most dangerous woman” (McKeen 1994m). Of course, however, it wasn’t psychopathy alone 
that did this representational work. It was how psychopathy linked up with her interlocking 
marginalized identities that allowed her to be imagined as far removed from the normalized 
                                                 
84 R.v. Neve [1999] ABCA 206 at 247. 
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community. The work that psychopathy does at the level of imagination cannot be removed from 
subjects that become implicated in its discourse.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 When we look at the Homolka case and the Neve case alongside each other, I think a few 
things become quite evident about the way in which (un)imaginable criminality gets expressed 
through psychopathy. The first thing that becomes evident is that, much like in Chapter 3, there 
are historical continuities in the ways in which Homolka and Neve are represented.  As I have 
noted, most women who were diagnosed as psychopaths were historically labelled as such when 
they transgressed the cultural expectations of their gender particularly surrounding sexuality 
(Rimke 2003; Lunbeck 1994).  We see these same ideas and practices mirrored almost perfectly 
in Homolka and Neve’s case.  
 The second thing that becomes evident, especially when these cases are thought about in 
relation to the analysis in Chapter 3, is that the social location of the offenders plays a significant 
role in how criminality is imagined both generally and in relation to psychopathy. This is 
particularly evident when we look closely at meanings, assumptions and expectations that get 
formulated around bodies, interlocking identity categories/difference and criminality.  These 
meanings, assumptions, and expectations not only inform how certain individuals are imagined 
as and thus represented as (un)criminal, but they also affect the work that psychopathy does in 
the representation revealing some of its bodily contingencies.  
 For example, in the case of Homolka, we witnessed how psychopathy was ushered in to 
resolve the mutual exclusivity of normative femininity and criminality.  While normative 
femininity and Homolka’s victimhood fit well together, Bernardo’s defence lawyer sought to 
transform Homolka into an equally or more culpable actor in the case and this involved rewriting 
her narrative of abuse.  Rosen, rewrote this narrative by framing her narrative of abuse within a 
discourse of psychopathy which enabled her to seen as a performer of victimhood and not a ‘real’ 
victim. This feat was also accomplished by the defence zooming in on her transgressive sexuality 
(or her hypersexuality). This move was an important discursive move because it fundamentally 
changed how Homolka appeared.  She was no longer viewed within the ambit of normative 
femininity and victimhood, instead, she appeared as a masculinized criminal psychopath.  
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 Importantly then, much like the way that representations of Williams and Bernardo’s 
(unimaginable) criminality relied on dual representations, so too did the representations of 
Homolka.  However, in the representations of her, things went a little further.  Because all 
women stand as a deviant in relation to the normalized male subject, and because white, middle-
class, heterosexual women do not necessarily stand as criminal in dominant criminal imaginings, 
the representation of Homolka’s criminality needed to accommodate for this and the 
masculinized condition of psychopathy did so; it was able to accommodate her normative 
femininity, as well as her criminality by rewriting the former as an appearance which conceals 
her ‘true’ masculinized nature. 
 The Neve case also signals, though in a different way, the significance of interlocking 
identity categories for imagining criminality and the role that psychopathy plays.  Unlike 
Homolka, who was a white, middle-class, heterosexual woman, Neve was an Aboriginal lesbian 
and sex worker. From the outset, the way in which Neve was represented was very different, 
particularly in how her criminality was understood as inherently part of her being—the 
importance of race, class and sexuality in this punitive criminalization of Neve cannot be 
understated.  In this instance, psychopathy did a different kind of work than in the Homolka 
(/Bernardo and Williams) case.  Instead of operating as a mode of representing and thus, 
constituting the (otherwise unimaginable) criminality of the normalized subject, Neve is 
constructed as always already criminal and psychopathic, along with her gender transgressions, 
are used to make her appear as particularly dangerous whereby only the most severe 
punishment is the appropriate criminal justice response to her dangerousness. The 
criminalization of Neve and the interlocking logics that make this reality possible have been well 
accounted for. For example, scholars have noted that “degrading stereotypes of women of color, 
particularly black women, have long served to masculinise them in order to justify harsh 
treatment. Such masculinising stands in stark contrast to white women, who have been placed on 
pedestals via sexist chivalry” (Dirks, Heldman and Zack 2015, 164; emphasis mine). Again, we 
see interlocking racializing and gendering process at work in the Neve case through the use of 
psychopathy and how they informed the representation, the different role that psychopathy 
played in this case and how it effects the workings of the criminal justice system itself. 
 I think that there is at least one last significant observation that we can make about these 
two cases. Despite the differences in how psychopathy is used, there is also at least one 
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similarity.  In both instances, psychopathy reinforces the normative expectations and 
assumptions about bodies by leaving the logic that was informing the representations intact. For 
example, psychopathy did not disrupt the expectations of normative femininity in the Homolka 
case. It was simply used to account for her departure from this norm.  Similarly, psychopathy did 
not in any way rupture the assumptions or expectations engendered by Neve’s body.  Instead, it 
reinforced a series of interlocking stereotypes about Aboriginal women, lesbianism, social class 
and criminality by reproducing these in a different register (i.e. psychopathy).  What we can take 
from the readings that I have made in relation to these two cases is that at the level of 
representation psychopathy is not only a means of imagining the criminality of the normalized 
subject, but it also sustains and reproduces bodily imaginings of (un)criminality.   
 At this point, I would like to leave you with some thoughts/questions that occurred to me 
while I was reading the news coverage of Neve’s case. First, race was largely absent from the 
news representation.  In fact, I only learned that Neve was Aboriginal by reading secondary 
sources. One of the things I have learned through my engagement with critical race research is 
that although race may be explicitly absent, it is always present (Goldberg 1993). This got me 
thinking about how race was being imagined in relation to psychopathy or, to put it differently 
how we might think about psychopathy as engendering racist/racial logics.  
  When I first read the article where Neve was likened to “a male lust murderer” I, like 
others was jarred by logics of gender, sexuality and her class (signified by the term ‘prostitute’) 
that were enabling this analogy. However, it also seemed to be racially significant as well and so 
I wondered how Neve’s race, class, sexuality and gender interlocked in ways that made it 
possible to construct her as emotionless, lustful, aggressive, and promiscuous. By focusing in on 
the interlocking systems of power that are at play in the representation, we can begin to see how 
likening Neve to a masculinized and criminalized figure (i.e. the ‘male lust murderer’ and 
psychopath) recalls familiar racist, colonial and sexist images of Aboriginal women, namely the 
‘squaw’ figure.   
 Sherene Razack has argued that this figure is the feminized version of the “Aboriginal 
male ‘savage’: “she has no human face; she is lustful, immoral, unfeeling and dirty” (Emma 
Laroque quoted in Razack 1998, 69).  The ‘squaw’ stereotype is also the masculinized 
counterpart of the ‘Indian Princess/Pocahontas’ figure, “who was lauded for being cooperative 
with colonial efforts to settle/usurp Native lands, easily ‘assimilated’ into Christian Euro-
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Canadian settler culture, and for possessing idealized virtues of middle-class white womanhood 
such as delicacy and submissiveness” (Gilchrist 2010, 384). When the ‘squaw’ image is placed 
against the ‘Indian Princess/Pocahontas’ image it becomes very easy to see how the stereotype of 
the ‘squaw’ involves “such grotesque dehumanization has rendered all Native women and girls 
vulnerable to gross physical, psychological, and sexual violence” (Emma Laroque quoted in 
Razack 1998, 69).  It is on her body, Razack argues, “that violence may occur with impunity” 
(69); and that violence may also be the law’s own violence through forced and indeterminate 
imprisonment. This makes me wonder: how does this stereotype map on to the way that Neve 
was represented? How does this stereotype which is not necessarily explicitly present allow us to 
see Neve as less than a woman and as dangerous? And, in what ways does it align with the logic 
of psychopathy?    
 In terms of this last question, it seems that the psychopath and the colonial and racist 
‘squaw’ stereotype share some core characteristics, namely they are both represented as 
inherently depraved, callous, impulsive, promiscuous and incorrigible. This is precisely the way 
that Neve was represented. Can we think about psychopathy as a mode of extraordinary 
criminalization and punitive punishment as well as, in certain instances, implicitly invoking a 
sanitized version of the sexist, racist and colonial stereotypes of the ‘squaw’ and the ‘incorrigible 
savage’? What I am getting at is that perhaps, in an era of race-blindness, how might we think of 
psychopathy as one manifestation of what Bonilla-Silva (2003) calls the “new racism”. This new 
racism, in contrast to more traditional or common sense notions and practices of racism, is a 
subtler racial structure in that racial discourse and practices are more covert, racial terminology 
is carefully avoided, and most of the mechanisms which reproduce the racial social order are 
largely invisible (272).  In other words, it is discrete, insidious, but just as effective as more overt 
forms of racism at reproducing racial inequality (272).  If the news representation of Neve 
allowed us to only see her criminality, and the discourse of psychopathy helped to construct an 
image of her criminality as a particularly dangerous kind (i.e. biological, untreatable, and only 
containable through incapacitation), can we think of psychopathy as discursively performing the 
same racializing, criminalizing and regulatory effects as overt racial discourse and practices have 
done in the past (e.g. renders her biologically inferior and immoral, criminalizes her, confines 
and contains her dangerousness) in the explicit absence of race?  Can we see psychopathy 
reproducing stereotypes of ‘deviant’ Aboriginal women in a different discursive register that is 
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on its face is racially insignificant (anyone can be a psychopath), but in its effects accomplishes 
the same ends?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
 
Chapter 5  
White Trash, Feeblemindedness and Criminality: Imagining Robert Pickton in the 
Absence of Psychopathy 
 
 In the last two chapters, we explored cases were psychopathy was used as a way to 
explain and represent the criminality of the normalized subject (Williams and Bernardo) and 
normative femininity (Homolka).  My readings of these cases highlight how psychopathy is not 
only used to explain their ‘departure’ from normalized subject positions, but I also explained 
why psychopathy is conducive to representing the criminality of the normalized subject.  In the 
previous chapter, I also provided a reading of the case of Lisa Neve where psychopathy did a 
different kind of conceptual work because of how she came to be imagined as criminal and the 
bodily contingencies of this imagining.  Despite these differences, I suggested that what united 
these cases was that in each instance the deployment of psychopathy and the discursive work that 
it does is similar—psychopathy, as a mode of representing criminality, reproduces the normative 
social order by leaving the normalized expectations, assumptions and logics about particular 
bodies and identities intact.  In this chapter, I take a bit of detour.  Instead of focusing on cases 
where the discourse of psychopathy is present and then unraveling how it informs the 
imagination of criminality, I explore the case of Robert Pickton and the “conspicuous absence” 
of psychopathy (Chandler 2002, 99). Daniel Chandler explains that conspicuous absence is what 
we expect to be present, but is not and where this absence makes a statement or delivers a 
message (2002, 99).  My task in this chapter is to query this absence in an attempt to understand 
what message(s) it carries.  
 Since the late 1970s, women from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, described as one of 
Canada’s poorest neighbourhoods, have been disappearing.  While missing person cases are 
generally immediately acted upon with urgency, this was not the case here (Hugill 2010).  Before 
1998, the attention paid to these disappearances was sparse, disorganized and of demonstrably 
low priority because many of the women were seen as ‘throwaways’, ‘disposable’ sex workers 
who struggled with drug addiction, many of whom were Aboriginal.  It has also been noted that 
the delayed response from police enforcement “demonstrates that brutality and predation had 
become a norm in the neighbourhood” (Hugill 2010, 9).  
 In the summer of 1998, the Vancouver Sun published a series exposing the gravity of the 
issue (Hugill 2010; Jiwani and Young 2006).  The police responded to the coverage by publicly 
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declaring that they were seriously investigating the growing epidemic of missing women in the 
Downtown Eastside by developing a working group to investigate the missing women cases 
(Hugill 2010). However, from 1998 to 2001 no headway had been made on the cases, and the 
number of missing women continued to swell. In 2001, the Vancouver Sun released another 
series of reports which, 
 
[…] unveiled a damning series of revelations.  They determined, among other things, 
that the official police figure of twenty-seven missing women was woefully 
inadequate and that at least forty-five cases should have been part of the 
investigation.  They also concluded that while police had taken pains to maintain the 
appearance of ‘aggressive, concerned investigation,’ their work has been 
devastatingly tainted by petty in-fighting, the absence of coherent leadership and a 
distinct lack of resources. (12; this series initiated the Missing Women Joint Task 
Force, which included the Vancouver police department and the RCMP) 
 
The Vancouver Police Department was heavily criticized by not only the Canadian media, but 
also various interest groups for their inaction on the case.  
 In February 2002, Vancouver police began searching a farm in Port Coquitlam, British 
Columbia (a 45-minute drive from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside) on a firearms search 
warrant, which was owned by the Pickton family.  During their initial search they discovered the 
IDs of two of the missing women among other items.  The task force applied for a second 
warrant to search the property (along with other properties owned by the family) and the farm 
quickly became the site of the largest police investigation in Canadian history.  
  On February 22, 2002, Robert ‘Willy’ Pickton was charged with two counts of first 
degree murder. As the search of the properties continued, the murder charges began to mount. By 
2005, Pickton was charged with 27 counts of first degree murder for the murder of: Sereena 
Abotsway, Mona Wilson, Jacquline McDonell, Diane Rock, Heather Bottomley, Andrea 
Joesbury, Brenda Ann Wolfe, Jennifer Lynn Furminger, Helen Mae Hallmark, Patricia Rose 
Johnson, Georgina Faith Papin, Heather Chinnock, Tanya Holyk, Sherry Irving, Inga Hall, 
Marnie Frey, Tiffany Drew, Sarah de Vries, Cindy Feliks, Angela Jardine, Diana Melnick, Debra 
Lynne Jones, Wendy Crawford, Kerry Koski, Andrea Borhaven, Cara Ellis and Jane Doe85. In 
June 2005, pre-trial arguments begin.  A year later, presiding judge, Justice James Williams, 
                                                 
85 The charge against Pickton for the murder of Jane Doe was later quashed because the evidence failed to meet the 
minimum requirements of the Canadian Criminal Code.  
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decided to split the trial into two (one cluster of 6 and the other of 20) because the length of the 
trial would place an unreasonable burden on jurors and could potentially result in a mistrial.  
Justice Williams decided to hear the cluster of six murder charges first, representing the killing 
of Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda 
Wolfe.   Almost a year later Pickton was found guilty of six counts of second degree murder. The 
remaining 20 counts of murder will not be heard.   
 While the interlocking social location of the victims was one of the most cited reasons 
why the police failed to take the reports of the missing women seriously and by, extension why 
Pickton was able to continue to murder these women over an extended period of time, Michael 
Petrie (Crown Prosecutor) in his closing arguments offered a different perspective as to why 
Pickton was able to carry out these murders as long as he did.  For Petrie, it wasn’t simply that 
the victims were ‘disposable’, but the fact that Pickton was able to remain concealed, not 
because of his normalcy (as was the case in the Williams and Bernardo/Homolka cases) but 
because he was a pig butcher by trade:  
 
The Port Coquitlam pig butcher, living on his isolated farm, had been in an ideal 
position to avoid apprehension, Petrie said. ‘Who could do these things over and over 
and over again, without detection, repeatedly, yet invisibly?’ Petrie said. ‘Someone 
who was a butcher, who was covered in blood all the time . . . whom no one would 
suspect, because he's just a poor old farm boy, low intelligence, a hillbilly. The 
person who's been putting that over on the police and others for so long is Mr. 
Pickton’. (Baron 2007h)   
 
Unlike Williams and Bernardo who were able to evade suspicion because of their invisibility 
(e.g. whiteness, middle-classness, heterosexuality, marital status, occupations and so on), 
Pickton’s ability to evade suspicion was due, in part, not because he blended in with the crowd, 
but rather the opposite.  He stood out in the community as someone who was different in 
appearance (e.g. “dirty”, “unkempt” and “rank”) character and conduct (e.g. pig butcher, 
“hillbilly” with “low intelligence”). For Petrie, these qualities and characteristics operated as a 
mask or a ruse to detract attraction away from Pickton as a suspect.  
 Additionally, Petrie argued that Pickton was not a man of ‘low intelligence’ despite the 
fact that his defence presented him as such.  Instead, Petrie argued that Pickton was a capable, 
strategic, calculated, cunning and chameleon-like figure.  Although this statement gestures at the 
idea that Pickton may be a psychopath, the term itself is interestingly almost never used in the 
221 
 
coverage. The only occasion in which psychopathy is mentioned is in one article where the 
author refers to Pickton as a “psychopathic killer” (Alan Young 2007).  Here, “psychopathic” 
operates as a stand-in for “serial [killer]” and this use of language is telling of the ways in which 
psychopathy is often associated with, and made synonymous with “serial murder” (especially in 
the popular imagination).  
  Academic research on psychopathy and serial murder has also attested to this link.  For 
example, in one publication by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from a Symposium that was 
held on serial murder, the authors note that “all psychopaths do not become serial murderers. 
Rather, serial murderers may possess some or many of the traits consistent with psychopathy”, 
such as “sensation seeking, a lack of remorse or guilt, impulsivity, the need for control, and 
predatory behavior” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2008; see also Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 
2015).  Given the common conflation of serial murder and psychopathy, one could reasonably 
expect that the media would reproduce this link in their coverage of Canada’s ‘most prolific 
serial killer’; however, this did not occur.  And so, the purpose of this chapter is to identify and 
analyze the way in which Pickton’s criminality was represented in the relative absence of 
psychopathy and to provide a tentative explanation for this absence.  
 I qualify this absence as a relative absence not only because psychopathy emerges only 
once in the news coverage, but also because it is never literally ascribed to Pickton in the news. 
As I mention above, there are few occasions where psychopathy is symbolically gestured to, but 
the language of psychopathy is itself not used. Take these three excerpts as an example, where 
terms associated with psychopathy, either culturally or with the actual disorder itself, are used:   
 
It's a different person, though, who appears on the two videotapes, alternate Pickton 
manifestations. With police he's lumpen, palpably dimwitted, acknowledging little 
until the very end, when he granted that investigators will find the remains of some 
women at the farm - but denying that he killed them. In the jail-cell tape, by 
comparison, an animated Pickton portrays himself as cunning, running the 
interrogation show, toying with his inquisitors and, critically, as the pig farmer who 
killed women. (Performance Made for the Camera 2007; emphasis mine) 
 
As a child, his younger brother Dave told him when to go to sleep; as an adult friends 
reminded him to bathe. His family held back joke punchlines because he never 
seemed to get them. The Crown argued he's more intelligent than he lets on, a 
calculating killer who was able to cover his tracks in gruesome ways. (Fong 2007c; 
emphasis mine) 
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I say potato, you say spud. A monster. A simpleton [...]Put the two tapes together 
and the totality of Pickton's cunning emerges, Petrie said, basking in the charges with 
one audience and attempting to barter out of them in the other. ‘If anything, what Mr. 
Pickton depicts in these two statements is that he's a bit of a chameleon. He's able to 
adjust.’ (DiManno 2007b; emphasis mine) 
 
In each of these passages, we see the duality of Pickton surface as well as terms that are often 
associated with psychopathy: cunning, calculated, manipulative, intelligent, chameleon. 
However, the fact remained that psychopathy was not literally present. When we think about this 
relative absence in comparison to the other cases where psychopathy was explicitly rendered, I 
think it is important to pay attention to how his criminality was generally framed. 
  Stuart Hall noted that meaning is relational in that it is derived from “what you expected 
to find in the first place, which is nowhere visible in the image, contrasted with what is actually 
in the image” (1997b, 15). In this instance, absence is meaningful because it subverts our 
collective cultural expectations.  The recognition of absence then, draws attention to not only 
what is present, but the kinds of assumptions and expectations we hold and project onto 
representation which allows us to identify absence and be taken aback by it. The fact that 
psychopathy is nowhere present in the representation of Pickton, but we expect serial killers to 
be psychopaths, raises a couple of important points of inquiry: what is present? That is, how is 
Pickton being marked as different and as a criminal/serial killer in the absence of psychopathy? 
And, second, what does the way in which Pickton is marked tell us about the relationship 
between psychopathy, identity, difference and criminal imaginaries?  These are the questions that 
structure this chapter.   
 While psychopathy was largely absent in the coverage, discourses of difference surfaced 
immediately and began constructing Pickton as a subject of a different ‘sort’—strange, bizarre, 
creepy, eerie, an oddball—suspicious perhaps, but not necessarily criminal. Although Pickton 
was manifestly different, his difference was not perceived as threatening to the community. In 
fact, he is often cited as quite the contrary—generous, naive, and often financially victimized by 
‘friends’.  One woman described Pickton as eerie, but insisted that “no one was scared of him, 
we all thought he was harmless” (Fournier 2002a).  
 From the outset, Pickton is also constructed as being situated outside the bounds of 
hegemonic masculinity and embodying a subjugated or subordinate masculinity, in relation to his 
working-class status and his off-whiteness, as well as his alleged intellectual disability (I explain 
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these constructions below). Representing Pickton as an individual who profoundly departed from 
the ideals of hegemonic masculinity and normative whiteness required that various 
characteristics that could testify to his departure be emphasized repeatedly such as Pickton’s 
‘low intelligence’, his lack of hygiene, and that he was farmer who lived in squalor. In this 
chapter, I explore how these characteristics culminated in constructing Pickton’s criminality 
through the linked discourses of ‘feeblemindedness’ and ‘white trash’.86   
 To this end, I begin by detailing representations of Pickton as a “simpleton” or 
“feebleminded”.  Here, I explore how these characteristics initially made it nearly impossible to 
imagine Pickton as the individual who was responsible for such a large number of crimes.  
Instead of criminalizing Pickton, the discourse of feeblemindedness constructed Pickton as an 
infant-like and innocent figure who inspired sympathy and required paternalistic attention.  In the 
following section, I demonstrate how his assumed un-criminality was transformed and 
criminalized through the deployment of a discourse of white trash. What I attempt to reveal is 
how Pickton’s criminality came to be imagined not only through recourse to the biological, but 
through his social location. In this representation, the discourse of white trash is not unrelated to 
feeblemindedness in that the former operates as the criminalizing other of the latter, or so I will 
argue.  It is within the discourse of white trash that Pickton’s criminality becomes imaginable as 
such. In the final section of this paper, I focus on Pickton’s murder victims— Mona Wilson, 
Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe—as well 
as Williams’ murder victims—Marie-France Comeau and Jessica Lloyd—and Bernardo and 
Homolka’s—Kristen French and Leslie Mahaffy.  So far, I have focused exclusively on how the 
offenders were represented.  While the way that these offenders are represented in relation to 
psychopathy is a central concern of this project, they are never represented in isolation.  That is, 
there are a variety of elements structuring and informing how offenders are represented in the 
news, and of particular importance is how their victims are portrayed.  In this final section then, I 
discuss the dialectic between representations of victims and offenders (McAilden 2014). More 
specifically, I compare the way that the victims came to be framed and known and I offer a 
                                                 
86 When I use these terms hereafter, I will not signal them as problematic or derogatory terms through the use of 
scare quotes, as this is implied in my usage and understanding of them. It should be noted that the term 
“feebleminded” was used in the news coverage.  
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reading as to how the constructions of the victims affected how each offender was represented as 
psychopathic or not. 
 
Pickton is of “Weak Intelligence” and the “Village Idiot”:  
Feeblemindedness and Un-Criminality 
 
 From Pickton’s arrest onwards, the news coverage was replete with narratives that told 
stories of Pickton’s feeblemindedness.  This story and its attendant images of Pickton were 
regularly conveyed in the news. This is apparently how those who knew Pickton best, knew him. 
For instance, one neighbour who had known the Picktons for more than two decades is quoted 
saying: “As far as I know he's like a high- functioning handicap. He's a slow learner.” (Joyce 
2003). Another neighbour simply notes that Pickton “didn’t get far in school and didn’t know 
how to read” (Joyce 2003).  Pickton’s sister, Linda Wright, is also quoted commenting on her 
brother’s intellectual capacity noting that “He was in a special class in Coquitlam. He dropped 
out [of school] about the age of 15” (Some Things You Didn’t Know About the Pickton Case 
2003). It is also suggested in the coverage that Pickton’s mother, who is deceased, also 
recognized that her son had some type of ‘intellectual impairment’ evidenced by her will.  
According to journalists, the will contained a special clause that stipulated that Pickton was not 
to receive his inheritance until he was forty and in the meantime, the estate’s trustees—Pickton’s 
brother, Dave and sister, Linda—were to pay him annually. It was surmised that “Helen Pickton, 
now dead, included that clause in her will because she thought Willie Pickton was simple” 
(Culbert 2007e). Sandy Humeny’s, Pickton’s ex-sister-in-law, trial testimony is quoted 
extensively in the news. Her testimony aids in the further development of the image of Pickton 
as “slow” and a “simpleton”: 
 
‘When we would talk, it would have to be very plain and clear. None of the words 
could be too elaborate or too above. His vocabulary was very minimal [...] Many 
times I would actually see that he would get a look on his face that he didn't 
understand the conversations, even with co- workers. ... Either he would go back on a 
different topic about work,’ or just walk away. ‘Even if they [the co-workers] were 
joking around, he did not get the joke. He did not get the punchline’. (Culbert 2007c) 
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While this image of Pickton was a significant aspect of the representation, the chain of meaning 
that this image unleashed in popular sensibilities is also significant.   Pickton was not simply 
‘slow’ or ‘simple’ he was also known as good hearted and pleasant: 
  
[Pickton] was too simple and goodhearted to be capable of murdering the women 
he’s accused of killing. (Fournier 2002d) 
 
According to those who know him, Robert William Pickton is a tirelessly hard 
worker who has limited social skills and intelligence but a pleasant demeanour. One 
neighbour even called him ‘a good-natured little bastard.’ It's an image that clashes 
starkly with allegations Pickton may be Canada's worst serial killer. (Joyce 2003) 
 
Willy is kind of slow. I'm not going to say he's retarded. He's not retarded and he'd 
give you the shirt right off his back. (Joyce 2003) 
 
He projects, on the tape, as agreeable and unthreatening and rather dim. Just a man 
and his hogs and a small circle of friends, not discontented with life, enjoys his 
brother's company, little to complain about, really. (Jury Gets a Glimpse of Pickton’s 
Mind 2007) 
 
Each of these passages demonstrates the link that is being drawn between Pickton’s level of 
intelligence and the alleged characteristics and qualities that are seemingly related to this: he is 
too simple to be capable of murder; he is dim and unthreatening; he is ‘slow’ but ‘good’ and it is 
this image of the ‘slow’ but ‘good’ Pickton that “clashes” with the image of him as a serial killer 
which usually presupposes that the killer is smart/clever and ‘bad.’ This image of the so-called 
feebleminded as incapable of crime and an innocent victim of biology, is similar to the ways that 
feeblemindedness was understood prior to the advent of eugenic criminology (Rafter 1997b).  
 To buffer this image and interpretation of Pickton as ‘slow’ and thus incapable of murder, 
there are also many stories that invoke sympathy for Pickton because of his ‘slowness’. For 
example, Dave Pickton is cited in the early coverage of the case noting how he often had to take 
care of Pickton because he had a child-like naivety about him saying that “Willie is too trusting” 
and that he has,  
[…] always been taken advantage of by losers. If someone wanted to borrow $30, 
Willie would give them his last $20. A woman would call him from New 
Westminster and tell him she needed money and she'd take a cab out to the farm to 
see Willie and get money. Now that's a loser. ‘I'd get mad at him. I'd say, 'Willie, we 
have all these losers coming around the farm. It bugs the s - - - out of me’. (Fournier 
and Tanner 2002) 
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This passage demonstrates the belief that Pickton was too naive, good-hearted and perhaps even 
infantile to perpetrate such heinous crimes over an extended period of time without being caught; 
for it was Pickton who was often victimized by neighbourhood bullies and freeloaders. This 
construal of Pickton also inspires sympathy for Pickton and transforms him into victim while 
negating the violence he perpetrated.  In this way, Pickton’s responsibility, much like the other 
white men who have murdered Aboriginal women, is diminished (Razack 2000).    
 Not only was this image of Pickton one that was constantly recycled in the news, it was 
also the crux of the story that Pickton’s defence attorneys told about him. The position of the 
defence was straightforward: Pickton is “feebleminded and innocent” (Baron 2007h).  The fact 
that these two terms often appear together either literally or conceptually highlights the popular 
ideology the defence case hinged upon: there is an apparently obvious incompatibility between 
criminality and feeblemindedness. Or, to put it differently, there is a relationship between 
innocence and feeblemindedness.   
 In forming Pickton’s defence, Peter Richie (defence) often characterized Pickton as  
“slow” and “simple” (Baron 2007b) with a limited mental capacity and thus a “limited ability to 
understand” (N. Hall and Culbert 2007a) and who “ ‘plateaued’ intellectually at Grade 5 and was 
weak-minded and naive (Fong 2007b). Journalists, Neal Hall and Lori Culbert (2007b) also note 
that the defence painted Pickton as a “yokel” and the “village idiot”.  Richie supported this 
characterization by explaining that Pickton had failed grade 2 and was subsequently put into 
special classes, his younger brother Dave often took care of him, and he was not allowed to 
receive his inheritance until the age of forty.   
 To legitimize the testimony of friends, family and acquaintances of Pickton’s intellectual 
capacity, the defence also relied on the expertise of a psychologist and specialist in intelligence 
testing and interpretation, Larry Krywaniuk and education expert, Gordon Cochrane, to 
demonstrate Pickton’s ‘cognitive (in)capacity’.  Their testimony ‘proved’ that Pickton had some 
kind of “cognitive disorder” (Baron 2007g; see also Culbert 2007d and Fong 2007a)   
 Ritchie also explained the Pickton made statements during the interrogation and during 
the cell plant video that were “odd” and “weird” (Baron 2007a). During the formal and 
undercover interrogation, it was noted by many that Pickton made a series of incriminating 
statements that amounted to a confession.  Perhaps the most famous statement that he made was 
when Pickton had said that he was ‘going to do one more’ to make it an even fifty (thereby 
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implying that he had killed 49 of the women and intended to commit at least one more).  While 
this was the position of the Crown, the defence argued to the jury that what they had heard in the 
footage was not a confession, but “a ‘weakminded’ man ‘parroting’ to police what they had 
already told him” (Culbert 2007g). 
  The defence also suggested that Pickton was “prone to spinning outlandish yarns” 
(Baron 2007d).  For example, “he claimed to have lived in a chicken coop at age two, and said 
that he was offered a job as a male model in his 20s” (Baron 2007d). Additionally, it is oft-cited 
that in the footage shown of the interactions between the cell plant and Pickton, Pickton was 
clearly unaware that the small structure hanging in the corner of the cell was a camera; Pickton 
insisted that the camera was an ornament. Pickton’s “mental capacity”, the defence argued, 
showed that he was not capable of killing or participating in the murder of the women. By 
relying on this story and the explicit assumptions the story rests upon, the defence invites the 
jury and the public to sympathize with Pickton, to see him as incapable of murder, and as a 
simple man who has unjustly found himself in deep water of which he is too ‘simple’ to even 
understand.   
 The Crown however, rejected this construal of Pickton.  Arguing instead that Pickton is 
“not a dumb ox; [...] there’s cunning there” (Pickton Planned ‘One More’ but Got ‘Sloppy’ 
2007). This statement further illustrates that the figure of the ‘simpleton’ is in some ways 
categorically incompatible with dominant and popular criminal imaginaries, and thus requires 
some revision in order for Pickton to be transformed into a criminalized figure. This leap from 
Pickton as ‘feeble’ and a ‘simpleton’ and thus incapable of murder, to Pickton as criminalized 
subject and serial murderer was made possible not by constructing him as a psychopath, but as 
white trash.  
 
Pickton, White Trash and the Criminal Imaginary 
 
 While Pickton’s intelligence was one of the reasons why he could not initially be 
imagined as a criminal subject, it also became central to the way his criminality was later 
constructed and imagined. Furthermore, the emphasis on his intellectual capacity could have also 
been one of the reasons why psychopathy was not deployed in this case.  In contemporary 
representations of psychopathy in the psychological and forensic literature, psychopaths are 
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assumed to have either average or above average intelligence (Hare 1999). This characteristic of 
psychopaths may have henceforth excluded Pickton from this form of criminalization, although I 
will explore other reasons why as well.  Instead of criminalizing Pickton through psychopathy, 
white trash was deployed as a discourse which structured how Pickton came to be known as a 
criminal.  As a reified stock figure and discourse, “white trash” is encapsulates transgressive 
subjects, like Pickton, who seem to defy the normative expectations of their white subject 
location by being characterized as backwards, dirty, ignorant, uncouth, and residing in spaces of 
squalor.  
 Before detailing the content, operation and significance of white trash in the 
representation of Pickton, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of whiteness. When I 
use the term ‘whiteness’, I am using it as a critical and anti-racist lens to read how whiteness as a 
social location or identity interlocks with other social identities.  However, whiteness is much 
more than simply a social location, it is also a system of power that informs how we come to 
know and understand criminality and also as an organizing principle of social and racial relations 
more generally. To conceptualize whiteness as a lens is to suggest that an examination of 
whiteness in a particular context “enables particular aspects of social relationships [to] be 
apprehended” (Garner 2007, 1).  In this way, whiteness can be used to both “name and critique 
hegemonic beliefs and practices that designate white people as ‘normal’ and racially 
‘unmarked’” (Hartigan 2005 quoted in Garner 2007, 5).  
 
Whiteness as an Identity and System of Power 
 
 While whiteness is generally referred to as an unmarked racial identity, its invisibility is 
premised on a white gazer—an individual or system that fails to see the privileges that this 
identity confers on individuals and groups designated as white (hooks 1992; Dyer 1997). 
However, when whiteness is approached from the perspective of those who have been racialized 
as non-white and who have experienced marginalization, discrimination, violence and oppression 
based on race, whiteness is anything but invisible. Instead it is hyper visible from this social 
location, as a source of terror and domination (hooks 1992; Garner 2007). It is through these 
concrete experiences of racialization that has allowed (some) white people to come to view 
whiteness as a system of power and domination that organizes contemporary race relations, that 
works to racialize and normalize those characterized as white, and which dehumanizes and 
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renders inferior those who are racialized as Other. As a system of power and domination then, 
whiteness exerts its pressures and influences on two different fronts: on racialized Others and on 
those who may be conceptualized at a certain point in time and in a particular location as ‘off 
white’ (Wray 2006; Webster 2007).  
 This latter point brings us to the other way that I have come to understand whiteness.  It 
is not simply a system of power or domination, but it is also (like all racial classifications) a 
socially constructed racial identity that confers privilege to those so classified by constructing 
those read as white as the invisible or the (unmarked) racial norm. Because whiteness, like race 
more generally, is “fluid and contingent rather than an essential or reified category” (Webster 
2008, 296), it remains “relational, productive and active in social relationships” (Webster 2008, 
295). Through this relational, active and productive process whiteness becomes an object or 
signifier that becomes attributable to individuals or groups.  In this critical perspective of 
whiteness, whiteness is not a natural object or ‘real’ thing, but becomes treated in this way 
through the very social relations that are organized according to various racial ideologies that 
posit whiteness as normative (Garner 2007).  
 As a racial identity, whiteness is both like and unlike other racialized identities (Garner 
2007).  It is like other racial identities because it is a racial identity—those who are marked as 
white are not racially unmarked or raceless as it is sometimes implied in popular discourse.  
Importantly however, Garner notes that whiteness is unlike other racialized identities “because it 
is the dominant, normalised location” (2007, 6).  Much like other race categories, the boundaries 
of whiteness are constantly being drawn and redrawn, including some individuals or groups 
within its borders and excluding others; or, in other words, racializing/normalizing some 
individuals or groups as ‘whiter’ than others. Whiteness, like race more generally, is not solely a 
process that ascribes or racializes in relation to the body or phenotype alone.  Rather, to be 
racialized as white usually incorporates many signifiers of race, including (but not limited to) 
culture, values, space, intellectual ability, and so on (Webster 2008).  What is important to 
realize about whiteness however, is that the boundaries and privileges of whiteness can be 
somewhat more permeable than other racial classifications which are dominantly characterized 
by phenotypic features.  For example, an individual whose body has the potential for being read 
as white in its normative and privileged connotations is able to ‘become’ white depending on the 
social circumstances that surround this reading.  Denigrated whites or ‘off-whites’, like the Irish, 
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were historically able to come into whiteness and the entitlements afforded to whites because of 
their visible whiteness (which was often an entitlement that was codified in law). The same is not 
true of other racial groups whose bodies are read as a visible deviation from whiteness (e.g. 
bodies read as Black, East Asian, South Asian, South American, Mexican, Middle Eastern, 
Aboriginal etc.) (Garner 2007).   
 Studies, like the above, that demonstrate the limits and liminality of whiteness, allow us 
to move away from a monolithic and essentializing view of whiteness as being solely 
characterized by a racial subject position of the dominant and the privileged (see also Wray 
2006).  Instead, these studies highlight the nuances of whiteness by exploring how whiteness 
interlocks with other systems of power (e.g. class and citizenship). By understanding these 
nuances and the liminality of whiteness, we can get a better sense of how whiteness, in its 
liminal form, figures in contemporary representations of criminality (Webster 2008; Linnemann 
and Wall 2013).  It is through this interlocking lens of whiteness that I read the coverage of 
Pickton.  
 
White Trash and the Limits of Whiteness  
  
 Matthew Wray (2006) famously argued that the phrase ‘white trash’ brings together two 
seemingly opposed terms ‘white’ and ‘trash’. Symbolically, the phrase summons a series of 
oppositions “between the sacred and the profane, purity and impurity, morality and immorality, 
cleanliness and dirt” (2). However, when we think about this phrase in relation to identity 
categories, we are confronted with a derogatory term that weds race and class (3). Whiteness is 
ideologically wedded to these positive terms “sacred”, “purity” and “morality” whereas ‘trash’ is 
linked to the negative side of the dualisms and engenders ideas about poor whites in particular 
(3).  In linking these two identity categories along with their opposing meanings, Wray argues, a 
liminal, transgressive and monstrous identity is formed (2)—“poor white trash”. That is, those 
who appear white, but do not have class privilege and therefore do not fit within the symbolic 
boundaries of normative whiteness. It is this group of white people that are rendered 
transgressive because their “very existence seems to threaten the symbolic and social order” (2). 
White trash then becomes not only a stigmatizing label, according to Wray, but it also does 
‘boundary work’. It expels whites that do not fit with the symbolic boundaries of normative 
whiteness, and in doing so protects and reaffirms its borders by constructing poor white peoples 
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as liminal figures, “not quite white” (Wray 2006).  White trash is thus one of the ways that we 
can observe the limits of whiteness (Wray 2006).  
 John Harigan (1997) has also noted that the label white trash does boundary work in how 
it constructs and maintains white racial and middle-class normativity. For instance, he writes that 
white trash is used “in a disparaging fashion, inscribing an insistence on complete social distance 
from problematic white bodies, from the actions, smells and sounds of whites who disrupted the 
social decorums that have supported the hegemonic, unmarked status of whiteness of whiteness 
as a normative identity in this country” (317).  As such, those white bodies who seem to disrupt 
normalized whiteness are branded as white trash. This process of differentiating between whites 
is integral to the formation of normalized white identities as well as the maintenance of the 
exalted status of white, middle-classness as a system of power.  However, white trash does not 
simply operate as a “rhetorical identity” in discourses of difference where the “marks of 
otherness are read on ill-fitting white bodies”, it is also a “pollution ideology” that establishes, 
organizes and maintains the cultural order (319-320).  Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, 
Hartigan argues that those elements of culture that appear to be out of place are rendered 
garbage, trash or dirt for the way that they disrupt the existing order.  White trash, he suggests 
fulfils this same function:  
 
Out of place, these materials rupture the smooth decorum of conventionalized 
existence.  In this regard, instances of the name ‘white trash’ should be read as 
inscriptions of racial pollutions, moments when the decorum of the white racial order 
has been breached and compromised. ‘White trash’ is used to name those bodies that 
exceed the class and race etiquettes required of whites if they are to preserve the 
powers and privileges that accrue to them as members of the dominant racial order in 
this country. (320) 
 
White trash then serves as both a liminal identity and serves the function of expulsion or 
‘dumping’ in an effort to secure the normalized and dominant class and racial order.   
 What makes these white trash bodies visible, despite the appearance of whiteness, are a 
number of physical and metaphysical signifiers of race and class, such as, morality, intellect, 
personal hygiene, character, appearance, behaviour, lifestyle and so on, as Hartigan (1997) and 
others have observed (Wray 2006).  In the cultural ordering of things, theses signifiers are given 
value-based meaning and purportedly offer clues about who one is and where one belongs in the 
cultural order. Gael Sweeney has observed that in cultural products, like film, subjects who are 
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characterized as white trash are usually depicted in two ways, as “idiot savants” or “amoral 
criminals” and in both instances the white trash figure is assumed to have inherited this 
inferiority (2001, 143).  Embedded in this construal of white trash is the belief that those 
designated as such are not like the normative/dominant white community. Instead they are 
regarded as like the racialized Other in their alleged inherited disavowal of the values, morals, 
intellect, character and conduct of normative or middle-class (hegemonic) whiteness.   
 To label someone white trash or to imply that they are white trash is to unleash a chain of 
race- and class-based signifiers and apply them to a person.  Of salience to this configuration of 
subjectivity are notions of incivility, immorality, vulgarity, bigotry, poverty, ignorance, 
backwardness or any other signifiers that attest to the rupturing of a “white [middle-class] social 
decorum” or “a class and racial etiquette” (Hartigan 1997, 324). These configurations of both 
body and personhood are also often linked with a certain spatial configuration.  Indeed, in this 
passage written by Matthew Wray (2013), space and subject are intertwined:  
 
White trash. For many, the name evokes images of trailer parks, meth labs, beat-up 
Camaros on cinder blocks, and poor rural folks with too many kids and not enough 
government cheese. It’s a put-down, the name given to those whites who don’t make 
it, either because they’re too lazy or too stupid. Or maybe it’s because something’s 
wrong with their inbred genes. Whatever the reason, it’s their own damn fault they 
live like that. 
 
The aesthetic of white trash is observable on the body (in the way it ‘looks’ or ‘acts’ via physical 
decorum, behaviour, mannerisms, language, gestures, intellectual capabilities and so on) as well 
as where it resides, where it frequents, where it is ‘in place’. Tim Cresswell (1996) has argued 
that “place clearly refers to something more than a spatial referent. Implied [...] is a sense of the 
proper. Something or someone belongs in one place and not in another” (3; emphasis original).  
For Cresswell, notions of ‘place’ engender normative assumptions about the ‘proper’ and he 
extends this idea to people (i.e. where are people imagined to be ‘in place’ or ‘out of place’).  In 
this way, space and bodies are co-constitutive, in that to belong to a particular place means that 
one is a type of person that fits with the ideological expectations engendered by that space and 
vice versa. Sherene Razack (2002) has also made the argument that space and place are not 
innocent, but rather social products that come into being through ideologically and discursively 
charged practices.  By approaching space as a social product, Razack argues that we can begin to 
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understand and uncover “how bodies are produced in spaces and how spaces produce bodies” 
(17).   
 Sweeney has noted that space is particularly significant when discussing the aesthetic of 
white trash.  In the United States, she argues, the South is one significant space where the white 
Other is continually located, “especially the rural, backwoods south, is one of those liminal 
spaces where mainstream culture locates the marginal elements of society: where people are 
strange or in-bred or homicidal maniacs, where the veils between reality and the Other are thin, 
where laws are arbitrary, and the uncanny is commonplace” (2001, 146). These spaces of white 
trash are also well known, they are “the backwoods or the swamps, in mountains or slums, or in 
trailer parks” (147) and their properties are easily identifiable, they are (we assume) “those 
people down the road with the washing machine and broken-down truck in the front yard” (Wray 
2006, 1). It was this spatial imagery as well as through a combination of class and race- based 
identity signifiers, which were drawn from a white trash aesthetic, that helped to paint Pickton 
not only as ‘feeble’, but as a criminal and white trash figure.  
 
“He’s Backward, Kind of a Hillbilly Type”87   
 
  Pickton was not simply a self-identified “plain old pig farmer”, he also resided on a pig 
farm. While the image of the farm does not necessarily need to have derogatory connotations 
attached to it, ‘the pig farm’ was given such an image in the coverage. The images constructed of 
the farm as a place where not only horrific crimes took place, but a place of horror in its very 
aesthetic:  
 
It was a creepy-looking place, all those outbuildings and vehicles, heavy equipment 
everywhere, and I have to admit they had this 600-pound vicious pig that I was pretty 
scared of [...] I never saw a pig like that, who would chase you and bite at you. It was 
running out with the dogs around the property. (Fournier 2002b) 
 
In addition to the pig farm being described as ‘creepy’ and ‘scary’ (see also Fournier 2002c) it 
was also described as a dilapidated, polluted, and defiled space: “ [...] the ramshackle property, 
cluttered with a house, trailer, several out-buildings, farm machinery, abandoned vehicles and 
mounds of landfill” (Some Things You Didn’t Know About the Pickton Case 2003; see also 
                                                 
87 This quote comes from an article written by Baron (2007e).  
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Girard 2002d).  Another article notes that nothing on the farm “had an order or a place” (Joyce 
2007b).  Defining the space in relation to its physical characteristics—littered, garbage-ridden, 
disorderly—highlights that the space in which Pickton resides is the antithesis of white middle-
class respectability. This image of incivility, impropriety and pollution is given further 
expression in the description of Pickton’s actual living quarters—his “old”, “grungy”, “filthy” 
and “cluttered trailer” (Culbert 2002; Joyce 2007a; N. Hall and Culbert 2007b). Pickton lived in 
“squalor” (Baron 2007i).  
 In one article, parallels are drawn between Pickton’s living conditions and his personal 
hygiene.  The article notes that beside Pickton’s trailer was a livestock trailer, behind the 
livestock trailer there was an “aborted litter” and wandering around were many animals that 
appeared to be severely neglected by their physical signs of distress, including one pig who 
seemed to have a rotting foot (Joyce 2007b). The article then abruptly shifts focus from the poor 
condition of the farm and the inhumane treatment of the animals to Pickton’s own hygiene.  One 
of the ways this link can be read is that a thematic connection is being drawn between Pickton’s 
character and the characteristics of the space in which he resides.  That is, Pickton is much like 
the space that he occupies (and vice versa)—dirty, morbid, inhuman. Indeed, we are made to see 
Pickton as an “oddball” who inhabits a “peculiar world” (Pickton Unmoved by DNA Evidence 
2007).  
 These descriptions of Pickton’s space emphasize a stark dichotomy between respectable 
space and degenerate space (Razack 2000).  Pickton, accordingly, belongs to or inhabits a 
degenerate space.  This construal is significant to the constitution of a particular type of 
subjectivity for Pickton; the ideological expectations of a space of ‘squalor’ suggest that the 
subject who inhabits this space is similarly a ‘degenerate’.  This idea reverberates in the news, 
not only when Pickton is directly labelled a “backward” “hillbilly” (Baron 2007e; see also Baron 
2007i) and a “yokel” (N. Hall and Culbert 2007b), but also in how space is constructed. Both 
helped to construct Pickton’s off-whiteness and the image of him as white trash in particular. 
 More than this, his appearance and especially his hygiene and intelligence also served to 
buttress the image of white trash.  Pickton’s appearance is often a point of discussion in the 
coverage.  Pickton is often described as “unkempt” (Cellmate Listened to Boasts and Whines 
2007), ‘dirty’, ‘dishevelled’, and ‘filthy’ (Baron 2007c) and uttering “quaint hick expressions” 
(Performance Made for the Camera 2007).  For example, one statement notes the condition of 
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Pickton’s hands: “grime-encrusted cuticles and calloused palms”.  In the same article, Pickton is 
also described as “dirty and rank” (‘Cellmate’ Denies Steering Jail Talk 2007).  Pickton’s hair is 
given significance through constant references to his balding scalp, and his long dirty blond hair 
which is often described as ‘stringy’ and ‘straggly’ and his ‘scruffy’, unkempt facial hair. People 
who knew Pickton are also cited referencing Pickton’s dirty and filthy appearance and noting 
how Pickton made people feel “grossed out” (Baron 2007c).  In addition to being portrayed as 
dirty and the like, he is also continually infantilized not only in his mental abilities (as I noted 
above), but also in terms of his observable behaviours.  One journalist describes how Pickton 
appeared on the video footage from his prison cell: “he burps. He picks his nose and eats it. He 
strips down to skivvies and undershirt. He often titters, a sinister hee-hee-hee. Sometimes he 
sighs, admonishes himself for stupidity, for being Mr. Sloppy” (Performance Made for the 
Camera 2007).   
 Taken together, these representations of Pickton, invite a reading of Pickton as an abject 
body inhabiting an abject space that is detached or beyond the boundaries of normative middle-
class whiteness. Such a representation facilitates the condemnation, repudiation and 
criminalization of off-whiteness (Webster 2008; Linnemann and Wall 2013). This reading 
clearly aligns with and supports the observations of others by showing how the practice of 
separating Pickton from the normative and respectable white middle-class community by 
invoking a white trash aesthetic denigrates the individual, erases the gendered and racial/colonial 
context in which he murdered his victims and ultimately protects the sanctity of the normative 
community (Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del Moral 2011). What the details of this analysis 
reveal are the historical and bodily contingencies that contour the imagination of crime and 
criminality.  In particular, we are able to see the specific ways that whiteness and class play in 
the imagination of crime and criminality and the ideological practices that ensue to maintain the 
supremacy of normative whiteness as both a system of power and a racial identity.  In order for 
the overriding narrative of “the ‘naturalness’ of white innocence and of Aboriginal degeneracy” 
to be countered, Pickton was racialized as off-white through the discourse of white trash (Razack 
2000, 95).   For it was only through this discursive move that the representation of Pickton 
moved from sympathy to condemnation, from incapability to criminality.  
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“Hierarchies of Worthiness”: Representing Race, Gender, Class and Victimhood 
 
 This chapter, and the ones that have came before it, have centred on the ways in which 
offenders are represented through psychopathy or in the absence of it.  While this focus on the 
representations of offenders has been deliberate, it is also incomplete.  What I have not included 
in my analysis until this point is the way in which the victims were represented in the telling of 
these violent crime stories and how their representation affected how each offender was 
represented and vice versa. Therefore, I would like to turn my attention to the victims of these 
crimes and explore how the media came to know each of these women and how this, in turn, 
informed how we came to know their perpetrators.  In this section, and much like I have done 
thus far, I will explore the interlocking bodily contingencies of the representations to better 
understand how “hierarchies of worthiness” on the basis of victimhood were being enacted and 
reproduced in the representations and how this affected how each offender was represented 
(Jiwani 2011).  
 The cases explored for this project have, thus far, been high profile Canadian cases that 
were widely and extensively reported.  There are a number of reasons why these cases may have 
garnered so much attention, each linked to the concept of newsworthiness.  It has been observed 
that the standard of newsworthiness is expressed in a number of different ways.  The first, is that 
newsworthy stories are often unconventional or uncommon stories.  Crime events, while not 
necessarily immediately newsworthy, come to be so when the crime is particularly uncommon 
and/or violent (Gruenewald, Pizzaro, Cermak 2009, 263), such as stranger homicide (Greer 
2007). However, it is important to note that not all homicides are equally newsworthy and not all 
are given the same amount of attention in news media.  Specific features of the homicide will 
impact if the crime is reported in the news at all and how much space is allocated to telling the 
story. For example, Gruenewald, Pizzaro and Chermak, have noted that when a homicide 
involves multiple victims, white victims, vulnerable victims (e.g. children or the elderly) or takes 
place in a wealthy neighbourhood, the homicide is much more likely to be extensively reported 
(2009, 264).  Furthermore, they note that when offenders are of a higher social status (e.g. white, 
middle-upper class male) the homicide is more likely to be reported. However, in instances 
where the case was more stereotypically familiar, for example, where the offender was Black and 
the victim was a white woman the news coverage would also increase (264).   
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 The importance of ‘who victims are’ is thus significant not only in determining if the 
story will get told and how much space it is given, but also how the story gets told.   It is now a 
commonplace observation in the academic literature that not all victims are represented in the 
same qualitative or quantitative way (Jiwani 2006 and 2011; Greer 2007; Gilchrist 2010; R. 
Collins 2014). This uneven distribution of space and thus, concern, has largely been attributed to 
discourses surrounding victimhood that enable certain victims to be seen as more “vulnerable, 
defenceless, innocent and worthy of sympathy and compassion” than others (Greer 2007, 22).  
This way of thinking about undeserving victims is often based on the template of the “ideal 
victim” which is defined as a “person or category of individuals who—when hit by crime—most 
readily are given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim” (Christie 1986 quoted in 
Greer 2007: 22). Part of what makes a ‘victim’ an ‘ideal victim’ is that the normative community 
can see themselves, or someone they care about in the victim. This makes it easier for the 
normative community to empathize with the victim and their family (R. Collins 2014).  
However, in order for the community to empathize with the victim, it also needs to be widely 
perceived that the victim was defenceless, innocent and certainly not believed to be complicit in, 
or culpable for their victimization (R. Collins 2014).  
 It is quite easy to see the problematic effects that this way of thinking about victimization 
can have on those individuals who do not clearly or perfectly fit the ideal victim template. These 
individuals are usually judged in relation to this template and can be perceived as ‘bad’ victims 
or ‘deserving’ victims.  The reasons why individuals or groups are relegated into this category 
varies.  Commonly however, they are cast as unworthy victims because they in some way (or 
ways) defy narratives of ‘true victimhood’ (e.g. drug or alcohol users, past criminal activity, 
uneducated, poor, racialized, sexually promiscuous, especially for women and so on).  
Perceptions of victimhood then are the result of a complex arrangement of variables that enable 
some victims of crime to be seen as more worthy or deserving of our attention, empathy and 
support.  The way in which identity categories as well as individual character, life story, and the 
sense of the family’s loss affect not only our ability to empathize but relatedly how these 
individuals or groups of individuals are represented.  
 The way that each offender is represented is not the only notable dynamic operating in 
the construction of the narrative of psychopathy.  The offenders’ representational transition into 
evil and the pathological is aided by the way in which the victims of their crimes are also 
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represented under the conditions of white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchy (hooks 1992).  In 
other words, hierarchies of victimhood are enacted through a dialogic reading and interpretation 
of victims and offenders. The way that violence and victimhood comes to be understood depends 
on who we believe the offender and the victims to be and these beliefs then come to inform how 
each are, and can be, represented. In other words, the hierarchy of victimhood shapes and 
informs the hierarchy of offenderhood and vice versa (McAlinden 2014).  
 In order to outline the interplay between victim and offender in the news media, I have 
found Anne-Marie McAlinden’s (2014) work useful, particularly her use of the term the 
“indissoluble dialectic” (Rock 1998 quoted in McAlinden 2014, 182). In her paper, McAlinden 
explores how offenders and victims are constructed relationally in sex crimes against children 
and how these constructions often lead to differential assignments of blame.  For example, she 
highlights how the victim of these kinds of crimes are often constructed as innocent, vulnerable, 
pure, sacred, blameless and deserving of help.  Usually, age has much to do with this 
construction because of our overreliance on discourses of childhood which hold that children are 
inherently pure, innocent and blameless.  The sex offender is often constructed as the 
fundamental opposite of the ‘real’ sex crime victim; as an adult male who randomly preys on 
children who are unknown to him thus rendering him particularly evil and monstrous other, who 
is deserving of contempt. McAlinden illuminates that these two images are ideal archetypes are 
very much sensitive to each other—“indissoluble dialectic” (182). So, for instance, she cites a 
case of a teenage male who is charged and sentenced for a sex attack on a 9-year-old girl whom 
he was babysitting, but is later freed on probation because the girl, according to the judge, was 
“no angel” (185).  In sum then, I think that McAliden’s work allows us to pay attention to the 
ways in which the construction of the offender and the victim are always in conversation with the 
other, informing how we see or imagine the culpability of each actor involved.    
 
Whiteness, Femininity and Respectability: Representing Leslie Mahaffy, Kristen French, Marie-
France Comeau, Jessica Lloyd 
 
 In the Williams case, the news media spends much time carefully painting a very clear 
picture of Jessica Lloyd and Marie- France Comeau’s character and personality.  These images 
buttressed the image of Williams as a motiveless, “evil”, “monstrous” and pathological 
“creature” (Duffy 2010; Hurley 2010b; Mallick 2010b; Mandel 2010a; Monster Has No Answers 
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2010; Poisson and Robson 2010).  Jessica Lloyd, a 27-year old white woman, was generally 
described as “bubbly and outgoing” (Vyhnak 2010), caring, fun-loving, who always put her 
family and friends first and who was generally a “fantastic person” (Vyhnak 2010; Kenyon and 
Barrera 2010).  Similarly, Comeau, a 37-year white woman and corporal, was described as 
nothing short of a “pure angel” (McLean 2010). She was a hard worker, loved to travel, a fun, 
friendly and overall lovely person who was liked by everyone (Kenyon and Barrera 2010). The 
enormous and inconvertible impact that Lloyd and Comeau’s murders had on their families and 
friends was also recounted in vivid detail. 
 In the Bernardo/Homolka case, we see a very similar construction of the victims. Leslie 
Mahaffy and Kristen French are always present in the coverage, and the horrors they were forced 
to endure while in captivity were regularly communicated in lurid detail. The young white 
women are also routinely infantilized, being referred to as “schoolgirls” and other child-like 
descriptions to illustrate their innocence and vulnerability to strangers like Bernardo (see also 
Kilty and Frigon 2016). In the coverage, the lives of Mahaffy and French are not narrated in 
detail, but despite this, it remained apparent throughout that these women were indeed, ‘ideal 
victims’.  The weight that the lives of these women carried was signified by the “Green Ribbon 
Task Force” (which was initiated almost immediately after the disappearance of French to aid in 
the search for her and then, later to find the person who murdered both Mahaffy and French), the 
weekly vigils that were held by various groups in honour of them and the specific quotes from 
family members or friends that emphasize each women’s personality.  For example, Leslie 
Mahaffy’s friends emphasize that she was a “good person” who was very funny and friendly and 
never took chances (DiManno 1995a)88. Kristen French is also described affectionately—a 
“social butterfly” who always had friends over and an honours student, who was heavily 
involved in extra-curricular activities like rowing, choir and figure skating.  She was also a 
responsible young woman—she was always punctual and made taking the family dog out of its 
                                                 
88 In his book, Karla’s Web: A Cultural Investigation of the Mahaffy-French Murders, author Frank Davey (1994) 
explains that Mahaffy was not always depicted in this way.  His observations of the Hamilton Spectator suggest that 
when Mahaffy first went missing her case received scant media attention, because her disappearance was discussed 
alongside her history of running away from home, therefore her disappearance was reduced to another teenage 
runway despite the fact that her parents protested that something was different this time.  In the earliest coverage, 
Davey notes that the news media often recounted how she refused to go to school, and that her social circle was 
similarly comprised of “school drop-outs and runaways” (13). However, the way Mahaffy was depicted began to 
change once French had been reported missing and the search underway; both women were now perceived to be 
“everyone’s girls” and innocent victims of a violent and predatory offender (9-20).  I thank Richard Weisman for 
bringing this shift in representation to my attention.  
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backyard pen a daily ritual (Duncanson and Pron 1995a). DiManno says that French was “so 
obviously, a joy.  Well-behaved enough that being an hour late coming home from school would 
provoke anxiety in her mom and her dad.  It was so unlike her” (DiManno 1995b) 
 While the specific details of French and Mahaffy’s lives were absent, what was present 
was a clear sentiment that they were both loved and that their murders marked a profound loss 
for their families and especially, their mothers.  For example, Rosie DiManno (1995c) conveys 
in vivid detail what she observed of Mahaffy’s mother in court while videotapes that depicted the 
captivity assault and horror her daughter was experiencing: 
 
Leslie Mahaffy's voice, from four years ago, reverberating through courtroom 6-1. 
Heard for the first time yesterday by all of us who never knew her. Heard again by 
the one person who probably knew her best, who gave her life, her mother. It was 
arguably an act of self- flagellation for Debbie Mahaffy to sit in that room and listen 
to her dead daughter [..] Debbie Mahaffy appeared like Michelangelo's Pieta, 
probably the most eloquent depiction of sorrow. With one white- knuckled fist 
pressed against her heart. Chin lowered into her chest, eyes downcast. As pale as 
marble. The force of will this required was written on her face, in the quiver of her 
jaw, and in the coiled tension of her body. Visibly crumpling. But not, as might have 
been expected, through some of the more lurid episodes.  
 
While this written representation conveys each woman’s humanness and innocence, it also draws 
our attention to the gravity of loss, of the potential that these women will never be able to realize 
and the profound suffering that those who were closest to them must be feeling.   
 In Kilty and Frigon’s (2016) analysis of the representation of French and Mahaffy, they 
argue that depictions of ‘ideal’ victimhood cannot be separated from considerations of 
hegemonic femininity, whiteness, middle-classness and space. Noting that ‘ideal’ victimhood 
often, though tacitly, entails “discursive descriptors of whiteness” (such as innocence and purity) 
(50-51). It was through these descriptive and visual portrayals of French and Mahaffy’s young 
age, femininity and whiteness and hence, their “likeness to mainstream (white) Canadian 
society”, enabled them (at least in part) to be cast as legitimate victims, vulnerable to violence, 
and blameless for their victimization (51).  
 Importantly, the authors also recognize the spatial and temporal logics that allowed them 
to be seen in this light. The crimes against each of their victims, did not occur in spaces that are 
regularly imagined as ‘criminogenic’ or ‘dangerous’, such the city, ‘slums’ or ‘ghettos’, or 
obscure rural places (58). Instead, the crimes occurred in a “safe space”: a white, middle-class 
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suburb and, more specifically, in a well kept, picturesque “Cape-Cod-style home” (59). The 
imagery that this setting brings forth, is not an aesthetic of horror or violence, but rather a space 
of community, serenity, and friendliness, which contributes to a narrative of ‘ideal’ victimhood.  
 Drawing on the work of Nils Christie and his notion of ‘ideal’ victimhood, Kilty and 
Frigon (2016) show how space and time are used to evaluate the actions, activities or the 
behaviours of victims.  For instance, at the time of the crime, ‘ideal’ victims must not be in a 
place where she can be “blamed for being” (Christie 1986 quoted in Kilty and Frigon 2016, 60), 
nor engaging in a “disreputable or unrespectable” activity (60). Kilty and Frigon (2016) explain 
that these ideas impacted constructions of Mahaffy and French’s victimhood. Mahaffy was often 
depicted in the news as being a “rebellious youth” who sometimes had an uneasy relationship 
with her parents, engaged in underage drinking, and broke her curfew (61). Since she was 
abducted in the middle of the night, outside of her home after being ‘locked out’ by her parents 
for failing to return in time for her curfew, she was pictured as the ‘bad girl’ (62-63). Although, 
the reasons for her tardiness in some ways ‘saved’ her from the full clutches of this 
representation—her and her friends were grieving the loss of a schoolmate who had recently 
passed. In other words, she was engaged in “an understandable and ‘respectable’” activity (62).  
French, on the other hand, was pictured as a ‘good girl’ from the outset, having been abducted in 
“broad daylight” from a church parking lot, while walking home from school (62). This, they 
argue, is why French, and to a lesser extent, Mahaffy, were seen as ‘ideal’ victims’.  
 Pictorial images also helped to secure this image of the women as ‘ideal’ victims and the 
moral outrage and ‘public grieving’ that followed (63). Chris Greer has suggested that the visual 
has come to have an important place in crime news because of the ability of the pictorial to 
“depict immediately, dramatically, and often in full colour what it may take several paragraphs to 
say in words” (2007, 30). This visual practice is particularly powerful when the enormity and 
sombreness of violent victimization is being represented because the images “present an 
idealized personification of innocence and loss. At the same time, they serve indirectly to 
highlight the monstrosity and evil of the offender” (31).  In the articles that centred exclusively 
on Lloyd and Comeau, one image is used of each woman to help to convey the sense of loss.  
Both images memorialize the women by depicting them as smiling, full of life, and happy. 
Additionally, there are a number of images in the Toronto Star’s coverage of the case that 
include Lloyd’s grief-stricken family members attending the trial, always with the photo of 
242 
 
Lloyd smiling framed and in hand. The same is true of the images that are used to depict 
Mahaffy and French. In both instances, the media repeatedly used (the now iconic) school photos 
of Mahaffy and French to signal their beauty, innocence and youth. 
 As the news media writes the story of the life and loss of these women and in doing so 
fitting their lives and personhood into a narrative of the ‘ideal victim’ they are also writing a 
narrative of the ‘sick’, ‘predatory’, ‘evil’, ‘sadistic’ offenders who negated these lives. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the criminality of each offender in these two cases was represented as 
pathological through psychopathy.  If we return to the “indissoluble dialectic” between victims 
and offender, psychopathy, as a mode of representation, fits well with this construction of the 
victims and vice versa.  Each woman was constructed within the bounds of normative femininity 
as well as completely innocent/blameless, a victim of stranger danger and thus vulnerable to the 
dangers ‘harboured by’ their perpetrators.  Within the dialectic, it is this offender who is placed 
at “the top of the offending hierarchy” (McAlinden 2014, 187) and seen as completely culpable, 
evil, monstrous and Other. Psychopathy fits this representational landscape well because 
psychopaths too are rendered biologically depraved, culpable actors, evil and monstrous (Ruffles 
2004).  Frank Davey highlights this dialectic succinctly in his book about Bernardo and 
Homolka’s crimes: “the victims were rapidly ceasing to be the actual young women they had 
been and were becoming as innocent as their attackers had been depraved.  Their lives were 
becoming as saintlike as their killers’ lives had been evil” (1994, 29).  
 
Narrating the Lives of, and the Violence done unto Aboriginal Women  
 
 Much of the scholarly attention given to the Pickton case has rightfully focused on a 
much larger and dire social problem, that is, the 1017 Aboriginal women or girls that have been 
murdered in Canada between 1980-2012 and the 105 Aboriginal women or girls that remain 
missing under suspicious circumstances (Amnesty International, n.d.).  Accordingly, much of the 
academic literature on the case focuses on the historical, sociological, legal and cultural context 
of this systemic and disturbing reality.  One of the most prevalent forms that this discussion takes 
in the academic literature is through a critical analysis of the representation of the missing and 
murdered women as well as how gendered and racialized violence against racialized women is 
enacted on these women’s bodies and through representation (Culhane 2003; Jiwani and Young 
2006; Jiwani 2009; García-Del Moral 2011).  Because the Pickton case has been and continues to 
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be of enormous interest to scholars, many of my own observations of the representation of the 
victims are already present in this literature.  Therefore, I briefly explore this literature and offer 
some insight into the “indissoluble dialectic” and why it was the case the psychopathy remained 
relatively absent in this representation. There are at least three interconnected points of 
discussion that cut through the literature: (1) the portrayal of the women as particular ‘kinds’ of 
victims, (2) the lack of critical and contextual analysis in the news coverage and (3) the portrayal 
of Pickton as a ‘deviant’ man. I explore each of these themes in turn.  
 As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, many of missing and murdered women 
that Pickton was suspected of murdering (he was only convicted of 6 whereas as he was 
suspected for 49) were regularly labelled and referred to collectively as ‘drug addicts’, 
‘prostitutes’ and Aboriginal women from the Downtown Eastside in the news.  Each of these 
terms (including the loaded signifier ‘Downtown Eastside’) are terms that contain much meaning 
on their own, but their meanings proliferate and congeal when they are repeatedly placed 
alongside each other in an effort to form an image of who Pickton’s victims were in life—
“invisible as victims of violence and hypervisible as deviant bodies” (Jiwani and Young 2006, 
899).  
 In addition to the women being homogenously represented as ‘drug addicts’ and 
‘prostitutes’, referencing their spatial location— the Downtown Eastside—was equally 
significant in how they came to be known.  Dara Culhane has reminded us that “the city of 
Vancouver was built on land owned and occupied by the Coast Salish peoples for at least 10,000 
years. In 1923, the last Aboriginal village was relocated across Burrard Inlet to a reserve north of 
the new city.  Aboriginal people from Coast Salish and many other First Nations have 
maintained a continual presence in what is now called the Downtown Eastside” (203, 595).  
What is also significant is that Aboriginal peoples are “disproportionately located in the poorest 
neighbourhoods of Canadian cities, at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy” (596).  These 
figures bear the scars of an ongoing colonial project through the segregation of racialized bodies 
in racialized spaces (Razack 2000).  
  It is not only the actual disproportionate presence of Aboriginal peoples in one of the 
Canada’s poorest neighbourhoods that is of import, but also the symbolic properties of the space 
itself. The Downtown Eastside is described as a “poor, drug-infested neighbourhood” (Girard 
2002a; see also Bolan 2002; Fournier 2002e), “one of Canada’s poorest neighbourhoods” (Girard 
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2002b), “skid row” (Middleton 2002; Girard 2002c), “goulish” (Jones 2002) or “destitute”, 
“sordid”, and “menacing” (DiManno 2007a). These terms when taken together, paint a vivid 
picture of the moral decay, degeneracy, and criminality of this space.  However, these adjectives 
were not just used to describe the Downtown Eastside, they also prescribe the types of people 
that belong to this space as similarly amoral, degenerate and criminal (Cresswell 1996). The way 
that images of space and personhood combined in this case, creates a specific image of Pickton’s 
crimes and his victims—their murders are regarded as banal, as an outcome which is 
characteristic of the body and space they inhabit (Razack 2000; Hugill 2010). Indeed, as Razack 
notes, “we do not ask what the spaces of prostitution enable nor what happens in them.  There 
are simply designated bodies and spaces where so-called contractual violence can happen with 
impunity” (1998b, 358).   
 Ignoring the relationship between space, race, violence and sex work negates the 
historical and social conditions which have enabled them in the first instance.  For example, 
Sherene Razack (2000) observed that by ignoring how history, space and bodies are connected, 
an utterly colonial encounter between Aboriginal women and white men is negated.  That is, 
Razack has argued that it is through ‘degenerate spaces’ and the enactment of racialized and 
sexualized violence in these spaces whereby the white male subject comes into being (96). The 
erasure of the conditions that render white, middle-class male subjectivity possible is what 
allows an additional violence to occur. Often-times, where Aboriginal women, who are also sex 
workers, are murdered the police do not intervene because of the pervasive belief that these 
women “simply got what they deserved” (Razack 2000, 99).  Equally significant is when there is 
police intervention, the white men who enact violence on Aboriginal women are at the receiving 
end of either legal or communal sympathy for the plight that they (the doers of violence) are in 
(Razack 2000, 100).  
 In order to counter this far too typical representational practice of criminalizing sex 
workers and negating (through blaming the victim) the violence that they endure, scholars have 
identified the way in which these dehumanizing narratives were countered in the Pickton 
coverage through various humanizing tactics (Jiwani and Young 2006; Hugill 2010; García-Del 
Moral 2011).  One of these tactics involved journalists telling the stories of family members and 
friends who did not view their dead loved ones as “disposable”, but as people they love dearly 
and will miss immensely.  These stories often highlight that the women were sisters, mothers and 
245 
 
children, who were full of love for their families and who tried their best despite their personal 
struggles and troubled lives.  Anna Draayers remembers her foster daughter, Sereena Abotsways 
fondly, noting how she would call everyday and speak to her in Dutch, a language she learned 
during a family trip back to the Draayers home country (Culbert 2007b). Draayers also 
remembers Abotsway for her big and generous heart: “In her final years, Abotsway owned 
nothing more than the clothes on her back. Anything the Draayers gave her, she would either 
lose or share with others, with little regard for her own needs. On one birthday, her foster parents 
took Abotsway out for dinner downtown and gave her some cigarettes because they were 
something practical she could use. She turned to the waitress and asked, ‘Do you want part of my 
present?’ Draayers recalled” (Culbert 2007b).  
 Marnie Frey is also remembered affectionately: “‘a carefree loving girl . . . [who] loved 
the simple things in life.’ The girl with the bright smile and light-hearted spirit enjoyed spending 
time with her family and small animals, and was praised for being trustworthy and generous” 
(Culbert 2007b). Frey’s generosity is echoed in a memory that Reverend Bill Rasmus shared. He 
notes that family members told him that “she would take her shoes off and give them to someone 
else and walk home barefoot.” (quoted in N. Hall 2006). Georgina Faith Papin, a mother of five, 
is also remembered warmheartedly by Elaine Allan, a worker at a drop-in centre for sex workers: 
“She was just so well respected. People just always said the nicest things about Georgina -- she 
was fun, she was beautiful, she was kind, everyone loved her […] From the time she went 
missing, everyone just talked about it because she was so popular” (quoted in N. Hall 2006). 
 Elaine Allan also remembers Brenda Wolfe, a “polite, kind and soft spoken woman”: 
“Brenda was a very quiet person, but she was a well-liked quiet person. She wasn't Georgina 
Papin, who was outgoing and gregarious, but she was well-liked and she always had a friend 
with her [at WISH] […] She had a boyfriend and she was a very gentle soul. She had a very 
affable nature. You liked having her around. She had a nice presence about her” (quoted in 
Culbert 2007b). Mona Wilson is characterized as a “dreamer” and a believer in unicorns (N. Hall 
2006) who hated putting on dresses for church and ribbons in her hair (Culbert 2007b). Greg 
Garley, Wilson’s foster brother remembers their childhood and in particular how Wilson would 
try to “smuggle chicks [baby chickens] into her bedroom to sleep with them” (Culbert 2007b).  
He also notes that “She'd lay right down in the mud with them, and play with them, and have 
them in her pockets. You had to check her when she came in the house because in her coat 
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pockets there would be a couple of chicks, and in her boot you'd have another” (quoted in 
Culbert 2007b). Andrea Joesbury was “a beautiful young woman […] with an engaging smile 
who went to Vancouver in search for love” (N. Hall 2006). The last phone call that Josebury 
made is said to be to her grandfather, Jack Cummer, who that she was “upbeat on the phone 
because she was completing a methadone program to kick her heroin habit and was hoping to 
move back to the island. ‘She was a very happy young lady whose life was in a starting mode.... 
Our conversation ended with our love to each other,’ Cummer wrote in a recent e-mail to The 
Sun. ‘I did say goodbye.’” (Culbert 2007a).  
 At first glance, this way of representing Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina 
Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe seems empathetic and humanizing, and 
the loss of these women palpable. Some scholars have taken issue with this form of 
representation, not because these narratives of life and love should not be shared, but because of 
the way that it reproduces hegemonic ideologies about worthy and unworthy victims (Jiwani and 
Young 2006; Hugill 2010; García-Del Moral 2011). For instance, Jiwani and Young note that 
conveying the women’s familial status not only challenges their status as simply ‘drug addicts’ 
and ‘prostitutes’ but that it also re-enacts a “gendered, racialized, and class-based understanding 
of the missing women [...]” by relying on a “dominant hegemonic frame that made these women 
more intelligible, and hence acceptable, through their positioning in ‘respectable’ societal 
roles—as mothers, daughters and sisters” (2006, 903; see also García-Del Moral 2011 and Hugill 
2010). This method of well-intentioned representation, they add, “serves a twofold function” that 
reproduces hierarchies of victimhood and deservingness:   
 
On the one hand, it makes these women more like ‘us’.  It rescues them from a place 
of degeneracy to a zone of normality. On the other hand, it conforms to the dominant 
hegemonic values, in that the only women who can be rescued or are worth saving 
are mothers, daughters, and sisters—women like us.  Making them like ‘us’ is a 
discursive move designed to privilege their deservedness both in terms of police 
intervention and social recognition. (Jiwani and Young 2006, 904) 
 
In other words, it is only through this form of representation that the lives of Mona Wilson, 
Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe actually 
become “grievable” (Jiwani and Young 2006), and in so doing the very conditions which make 
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this practice necessary remain robustly intact. This form of representation was needed in this 
case if their lives were going to become grievable through this counter-discursive strategy.  
 Among the many silences and exclusions that binary representations and thinking make 
possible, Yasmin Jiwani (2009) among others has observed that what is explicitly silenced in 
representations of violence against Aboriginal women are the conditions under which drug and 
alcohol addictions, poverty, and mental illness become a common reality.  In other words, the 
emphasis on these women as Aboriginal ‘drug addicts’ and ‘prostitutes’ minimizes not only the 
physical violence that is routinely enacted on Aboriginal women in white settler societies, but it 
also erases the structural and colonial violence that their communities continue to survive 
through. García-Del Moral (2011) has termed this practice of representation a “technology of 
violence” which functions by negating or erasing the historical conditions and the relations of 
power that render racialized women more vulnerable to violence. It also “institutionalizes 
discourses that construct these women as social waste and in doing so, creates the expectation 
that the violence to which they were subjected was inevitable or even deserved” (55).  
 By referencing the erasure of the various forms of violence that contour and constrain the 
lives of Aboriginal peoples, and Aboriginal women in particular, I do not wish to lock the fate of 
Aboriginal communities within a socially deterministic frame which negates agency.  Rather, 
recognizing these macro conditions provides an important context to the colonial legacies and 
interlocking power relations that constrain choice and action, but do not fully determine it 
(Jiwani 2006).  This larger context also allows us to understand more fully the conditions that 
made their initial disappearance unable to inspire urgency and action in the same way that the 
disappearance of Bernardo/Homolka (Kilty and Frigon 2016) and Williams’ victims did, and the 
reasons why hundreds of women were able to disappear (Jiwani and Young 2006). 
 Another element that is discussed in the literature is the way in which the perpetrators of 
racial and gendered violence against women, and racialized women in particular, are represented.  
Each work, in one capacity or another, suggests that Pickton was pathologized and rendered a 
‘deviant’ in the representations (Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del Moral 2011). This practice 
of exceptionalizing white men who perpetrate violence against women is well documented in the 
literature.  Such representations, scholars argue, suggest that Pickton embodies an “aberrational 
masculinity” insofar as only a man who is inherently ‘deviant’ is capable of such extraordinary 
violence against women.  “This positioning of Pickton”, Jiwani and Young argue, “calls on 
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audiences to make a number of conceptual leaps that reinforce masculine hegemony, in that only 
deviant males commit such heinous sexual acts” (2006, 905). Additionally, Jiwani notes that,  
[…] the focus on individual white men as singular perpetrators of sexual violence 
against Aboriginal women abstracts them from the larger historical patterns of sexual 
violence as an inherent part of the conquest of Aboriginal peoples. It also removes 
the focus from the larger societal patterns of gendered violence such that these men 
become signified as aberrant and pathological individuals. (2009, 9) 
 
This mode of representing Pickton as anomalous or as an exception to white hegemonic 
masculinity, “protects the status of whiteness” by suggesting that he is a white man of a different 
sort and that this enactment of white masculinity is not an implicitly sanctioned colonial practice 
and one of the ways in which white masculine subjectivities come into being (García-Del Moral 
2011, 51; see also Razack 2000). White trash serves this same function.  
 While I am in full agreement with these critical, nuanced and rigorous observations, there 
is something more specific occurring in this representation.  What we have been able to see thus 
far in my comparison of the construction of the victims in the Pickton and Williams and 
Bernardo/Homolka cases is that the victims were represented differently and this had much to do 
with the social location of the victims as well as the larger social and historical context in which 
all of women lived and were murdered.  However, I would also make the argument that while 
Pickton, Williams, Bernardo/Homolka were all represented as exceptional figures (e.g. through 
psychopathy or white trash) what remains unclear is why psychopathy was not used to frame 
Pickton’s criminality and the role that constructions of his victims played in this absence.  
 I have argued that one of the reasons that psychopathy may have been absent was 
because the discourse of white trash fit more readily into the narrative, but I would also argue 
that who his victims were thought to be was also significant.  If Pickton’s victims were made to 
appear as human through the deliberate, concerted, and counter-discursive process of placing 
them within a discourse of normative femininity, the fact remains that this work needed to be 
regularly performed in the news to allow them to be humanized because they do not fit this 
idealized template as well as Williams and Bernardo/Homolka’s victims do. The signifiers, ‘drug 
addicts’, ‘prostitutes’, and the ‘Downtown Eastside’ still litter the pages of the news. Therefore, 
while the women are able to access a semblance of humanness through narratives and discourses, 
the attempts to reposition them in “’respectable’ societal roles”, are in a constant struggle with 
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signifiers that seek to evict them from the category of victim and human (Jiwani and Young 
2006, 903).   
  Kristen Gilchrist (2010) has noted that white femininity is an ideological construction 
and as such it engenders meanings about what it means to be feminine and these meanings then 
come to define and order women’s appropriate place.  It is within this site that Otherness comes 
into being and it is “within this ideology poor and/or racialized women are pre-packaged as ‘bad 
women’ regardless of their actual behaviour” (376).  The ideological implications of white 
femininity are given expression in how Pickton’s victims were regularly portrayed as deviant 
women, not only because of the types of behaviours that they engage in, but also because of 
ways in which their bodies are both constituted and read through a lens of racial, gender and 
class Otherness.  This positioning in the representations is made possible by ideologies of white, 
middle-class, heterosexual femininity which structure how Pickton’s victims may be seen and 
the violence against them understood: “in order for there to be a ‘bad’, ‘unworthy’, ‘impure’, 
‘disreputable’ woman/victim there must simultaneously be a ‘good’, ‘worthy’, ‘pure’, and 
respectable woman/victim against whom she is judged” (375).  It is white, middle-class, 
heterosexual women that then make up the idealized template of who a victim is, because it is 
this woman who is worthy of our attention and our protection because she, unlike the Other, 
cannot be blamed for her ill fate.  It is within the binary framework that Pickton’s victims were 
framed and known as deviant women and Bernardo/Homolka and Williams’ victims known as 
virtuous and innocent.  
 These differential constructions could be another reason why psychopathy was not 
deployed as a way to render Pickton’s criminality intelligible. Psychopathy was not fully 
compatible with the discourses of victimhood that were already circulating and constructing the 
representations. If those at “the top of the offending hierarchy” (McAlinden 2014, 187) are 
placed there because they prey on the innocent and the sacred, and if psychopathy is one of the 
ways that those at the top of this hierarchy are portrayed, Pickton could not have been 
represented as such.  Thus, we see a discourse of white trash framing the story of his criminality 
instead.  White trash is able to do similar work as psychopathy by evicting Pickton from 
normative whiteness and hegemonic masculinity. Significantly however, white trash is a cultural 
designation and not a scientific one, it is not able to criminalize him as forcefully as psychopathy 
can, nor does it enable him to appear as dangerous as a psychopathy does.  Psychopaths are 
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dangerous by their very being, whereas the white trash label implies that while these figures can 
be potentially violent and dangerous, their danger lies in their “racist or violently misogynistic 
beliefs” (Hartigan 1997, 324). Therefore, the targets of his potential violence is not anyone, but 
rather people of colour and women in particular, and as a result he is not placed at the top of the 
“offending hierarchy”. It would appear then, that Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina 
Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe were “unequal in life” and “unequal in 
death” (Unequal in Life, Unequal in Death 2006).   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Despite the fact that scholars have remarked that Pickton was constructed as a 
psychopath in the news coverage (García-Del Moral 2011), this was not the case89.  Psychopathy 
was almost never explicitly used in the over one thousand news articles that I canvassed for this 
chapter.  While one can make the argument that psychopathy was implicitly gestured at by using 
terms commonly associated with the condition (e.g. cunning, manipulative, remorseless, 
chameleon-like), or by the narrative struggle between the Crown and the defence which, when 
taken together, emphasized his dual nature (i.e.  Pickton as “just a plain little pig farmer, a simple 
fellow who is mentally slow” versus Pickton as “a wily killer who acted alone and was cagey 
enough to elude capture for years”; N. Hall and Culbert 2007b), the fact remains that 
psychopathy and its counterpart anti-social personality disorder were never used (barring one 
exception) explicitly to characterize or explain Pickton’s actions or being.   
 As I have been trying to argue throughout, and as we have seen in previous chapters, 
psychopathy is readily deployed in instances where the offender appears as normalized subject 
and thus, as unimaginably criminal. In these cases, the invocation of psychopathy enables us to 
imagine the otherwise un-criminal subject by splitting that subject into two figures.  This sense-
                                                 
89 García-Del Moral (2011) argues that Pickton was represented as a psychopath/serial killer in the Canadian news.  
In the first instance, it is not clear why she chooses to use these terms interchangeably because the evidence that is 
provided does not explicitly suggest that Pickton was labelled a psychopath. Paraphrasing the Toronto Star, García-
Del Moral argues that Pickton “is described as being dirty, unstable, sinister, evil, psychotic, and devoid of feelings 
of guilt or shame for what he did, let alone compassion for his victims’ relatives” (50).  While some of these 
characteristics are certainly terms that are directly associated with psychopathy (e.g. ‘devoid of feelings of guilt or 
shame’ and ‘compassion’) and other terms that are implied with the condition (e.g. ‘sinister’, ‘evil’), there are other 
qualities that are not associated with the disorder (e.g. ‘dirty’ and ‘unstable’) or are diametrically opposed to 
psychopathy itself, such as a state of psychosis which can be a symptom of mental illness (Rhodes 2002, 446).  It 
therefore remains unclear on what basis this observation is being made.  
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making exercise was not required in this case (or in the one that follows in the next chapter).  
What the absence of psychopathy in the Pickton case reveals, in part, is that psychopathy is a 
mode of representation or a discourse that is deployed when dominant criminal imaginings do 
not fit with the identities of the criminalized subjects, or in other words, when the criminalized 
subject appears as a normalized subject and thus un-criminal in these imaginings. While Pickton 
was at first represented as an un-criminal and sympathetic figure, he was never constituted as a 
normalized figure because of the ways in which the discourse of feeblemindedness was deployed 
at trial and in the coverage of the case. In this way, Pickton was already represented as a different 
‘kind’ of person than the normative community and a different kind of criminal than Homolka, 
Bernardo and Williams because of his very ‘strangeness’. The deployment of white trash as both 
a discourse and an aesthetic helps to make his transgressive status hyper visible and his 
criminality imaginable.  
 The absence of psychopathy in this instance does not counter the arguments that I have 
made in the previous chapters, but rather affirms them. The absence of psychopathy in Pickon’s 
case tells us that there may be a distinct relationship between psychopathy and the normalized 
subject at the level of representation.  The Pickton case also provided us with some more insight 
about the interlocking bodily contingencies of psychopathy and the importance of a normalized 
subject for this kind of representation.  Pickton was not constituted as a normalized subject 
whose criminal transgressions were unimaginable.  
 The other significant observation that I made in this chapter is that the deployment of 
psychopathy is not only contingent on how the offender’s subjectivity is constituted, understood 
and rendered deviant, but it is also contingent upon how his victims are imagined in the news.  In 
the Williams and Bernardo/Homolka cases, Leslie Mahaffy, Kristen French, Marie-France 
Comeau, and Jessica Lloyd fit hegemonic prescriptions of normative femininity and this allowed 
them to be represented as ‘ideal’ victims.  This way of framing their personhood and 
subsequently the crimes that took their lives invited a representation of their perpetrators that 
clearly expressed their dangerousness and their evil and also enabled moral condemnation under 
the veil of scientific objectivity.  By contrast, in the representation of Mona Wilson, Sereena 
Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe there is continual 
struggle and effort in the news to paint the women as mothers, daughters, sisters and friends and 
as women who were loved and gave so much love to counter the representations of them as 
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merely ‘disposable’ Aboriginal ‘drug addicts’ and ‘prostitutes’.  The representation of Pickton 
was also affected by this representation.  While Pickton was represented in similar 
individualizing terms as Williams and Bernardo/Homolka, the nature of his transgression was 
differently articulated in the news—he was feebleminded and white trash.  The absence of 
psychopathy in this case highlights not only the discursive work that psychopathy does—
representing and rendering intelligible the normalized and un-criminal subject—but also 
highlights that the deployment of psychopathy as the scientifically rooted personification of 
‘evil’ is a label, discourse and image that is contingent upon who we imagine the victims of 
heinous crimes to be and how “grieveable” their lives are.   
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Chapter 6 
Imagining Criminality, Nation and Charles Kembo 
 
 Aided by a never-ending stream of fictionalized cultural representations of serial murder, 
our collective criminal imaginary would have us believe that the majority of, if not all, serial 
killers are white men.  However, criminological research tells a different story about race and 
serial murder.  Philip Jenkins (1994), in his study of the social construction of serial murder has 
observed, like others (Walsh 2005; Branson 2013), that racial statistics of serial murderers are 
proportionate to the larger racial composition of the United States. Despite this fact, the names 
and faces of Ted Bundy, Jeffery Dahmer, and David Berkowitz (among other white male serial 
killers) remain seared in our collective imagination as the archetypical modern serial murderer. 
Why?  Jenkins suggests that one reason why there is a disconnect between the image and the 
reality of serial murder on the basis of race is because of the vocabularies and discourses used to 
construct serial murder.  For example, Jenkins notes that serial killers are invariably referred to 
and constituted within a biological and pathological frame which posits that serial killers are 
“primitive atavistic monsters” (172).  These terms, and the racist histories and connotations 
which are invoked by them, are likely, according to Jenkins, one of the main reasons why 
racialized serial killers are underrepresented, for they would immediately be condemned as 
overtly racist.  
 If popular representations of serial murderers are abidingly white then, thus far, this 
dissertation has perpetuated this myth by focusing by and large on white male offenders. One of 
the main reasons I focused so heavily on white serial killers was to make manifest that which is 
often ignored in criminological conversations: representations of normalized subjects and 
criminality.  In doing this, I have attempted to tease out the various logics, assumptions and 
criminalization processes that go into constituting representations of criminals who appear as 
normalized subjects and the significance of psychopathy to this end. Focusing exclusively on 
representations of dominant and interlocking subject positions (e.g. whiteness, middle-classness, 
heterosexuality, masculinity) and criminality alone has clear methodological limitations.  For 
example, one might suggest that because I have only focused on white serial killers, how are we 
to know that psychopathy is not deployed in cases where serial killers are racialized to aid in the 
imagination of criminality?  
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 This chapter focuses on another Canadian case of a serial murder, the case of Charles 
Kembo who was convicted in 2010 for the murder of Margaret Kembo, Sui Yin Ma, Ardon 
Samuel and Rita Yeung. However, this case is different from the others because it is not part of 
our national memory, and Kembo does not occupy a normalized subject position—he is a Black 
refugee. To be clear from the outset, my intention in this chapter is not to return our criminal 
frame to racialized subjects, or to claim that the image of the stereotypical serial killer is wrong, 
or that we must also pay attention to serial murders committed by racialized subjects, because 
they commit serial murder too! I have no interest in perpetuating these kinds of derogatory and 
fatal stereotypes of criminality and Blackness. Instead, I focus on this case to tease out the 
interlocking logics of criminality, which are always bound to systems of power, that are 
operating in this case and how these logics, along with the logic of psychopathy, preclude 
Kembo from being represented as psychopathic. In other words, this case is the last building 
block of my central argument, that psychopathy is a way of imagining the un-criminality of the 
normalized subject.  
 Before proceeding, I first want to be clear on what I will not attempt to do in this chapter.  
Jenkins’ analysis can shed light on why whiteness maintains a chokehold on iconic 
representations of serial murder. However, this insight does not offer much by way of explaining 
how racialized serial murderers are represented when their crimes are reported especially when 
this more usual way of presenting serial murderers is ‘off limits’ as Jenkins notes.  Jenkins’ 
reasoning may also provide some insight as to why psychopathy is explicitly absent in this case.  
As I have discussed in the previous chapters, psychopathy is conceptually and historically linked 
to ‘primitiveness’, ‘savagery’ and atavism and in the contemporary context psychopathy can be 
understood as the “the modern degenerate” (Jalava 2006; Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015). 
Given these links between psychopathy and atavism as well as the links between atavism and 
scientific racism, it may make sense that psychopathy might remain absent in the interest of 
avoiding charges of racism. However, I remain unconvinced that this is one of the reasons why 
racialized serial killers are absent in news representations because it has been well documented 
that it is precisely this type of coded racial language that is most prominent in news discourse 
about race (see for example Chan and Chunn 2014; Jiwani 2006). I also remain unconvinced 
because this type of sanitized and subtle racist language does feature in representations of 
racialized serial murder.  For instance, in the case that I analyze in this chapter, racialized and 
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dehumanizing terms like ‘bloodthirsty’, ‘soulless animal’ and ‘predator’ are used.  Instead of 
attempting to explain why the serial murderer is stereotyped as a white man as Jenkins does, I am 
more interested in the question of how Kembo is represented and how psychopathy is/not 
deployed in such instances.  
 When I first began reading the coverage of the Kembo case, it appeared that the terrain 
was ripe for the invocation of psychopathy.  Many of the terms associated with the disorder (e.g. 
remorseless, lack of conscience, promiscuous sexual behaviour, manipulative, liar and so on) 
were used and images of Kembo’s duality surfaced at times.  However, Kembo, like Pickton, is 
only labelled a psychopath once. Much like in the case of Pickton, where he was constructed as 
‘white trash’ and ‘feebleminded’ in the explicit absence of psychopathy, this chapter continues to 
dwell on the question of absence.  Similar to the Pickton case, psychopathy is largely absent, and 
in its place is a more pervasive or master narrative and discourse.  In the Pickton case, the 
narrative and discourse of ‘white trash’ structured how we were made to see and make sense of 
Pickton, whereas in the Kembo case, he is constructed as a ‘national stranger’ (Ahmed 2000).  
This chapter is guided by the following questions: How is Kembo’s criminality constructed in the 
absence of psychopathy? What other discourses are being deployed that can do similar 
conceptual work as psychopathy? And, how do Kembo’s victims figure in the coverage?  I take 
up each of these questions in turn.   
 
The Case of Charles Kembo 
 
 December 31st, 2002 was the last time that Margaret Kembo was seen.  Since that day, no 
one has heard from her except for her husband, Charles Kembo, who maintained that she was 
alive and well, living overseas. In November 2003, a person walking their dog through 
Vancouver’s Quilchena Park stumbled across a body partially buried under autumn’s fallen 
leaves.  The “corpse” was later identified as 38-year-old Ardon Bernard Samuel, who was a 
long-time friend and business associate of Charles Kembo. According to investigators, Samuel’s 
body was found mutilated and his penis was dismembered and stuffed down his pants along with 
a note “which contained crude messages with racist overtones: Samuel was black” (N. Hall 
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2009a)90.  Exactly one year later, while two road maintenance workers were eating lunch at a 
park in a Richmond park, British Columbia, they discovered a hockey bag tied to a tree in a 
nearby slough.  After releasing the bag from the tree and cutting the bag open, the workers 
discovered a dead body and immediately reported their discovery to police.  The body was 
identified as Sui Yin Ma, 55, who was Charles Kembo’s mistress. On July 27, 2005 the body of 
Rita Yeung, 21, Margaret Kembo’s biological daughter and Charles Kembo’s stepdaughter, was 
found by police wrapped in garbage bags in Richmond’s Fraser River. Soon after finding Rita 
Yeung’s body, Charles Kembo was arrested and charged with four counts of first degree murder.  
His trial began on October 13, 2009 and less than a year later he was found guilty by a jury on all 
four counts.  In only one article, was ‘shock’ expressed by neighbours that Kembo had been 
arrested for murder: “Most assumed it was a happy family that moved in in the spring. ‘He was a 
real sweetheart,’ said one neighbour yesterday. ‘It sounds completely out of character,’ said 
another” (Ramsey and Luymes 2005). 
 
Criminalizing Kembo’s Biography 
 
 In Chapter 3, I discussed the ways in which discourses of pathology invite a particular 
construction of offenders.  Of salience was the way in which these discourses invite a 
biographical inspection to discern if the pathology was transformative or incremental or both.  In 
the Kembo case, the content of the biography is very different. One of the reasons for this 
difference is that discourses of pathology are not structuring the limited91 representations of 
Kembo. The absence of discourses of pathology is not necessarily surprising. Nancy Heitzeg’s 
(2015) research demonstrates that when white offenders commit crime often a medical model is 
used to understand their criminality, whereas when the offender is racialized they are 
criminalized. 
                                                 
90 During the trial, the Crown argued that these notes left by the perpetrator (Kembo) were intended to be a “red 
herring” to mislead investigators in thinking that the person responsible for the murder was white (N. Hall 2009a).  
In other words, Kembo attempted to orchestrate a ‘racial hoax’.  
91 It is significant to note, that when compared to the other cases that I have examined for this project, the Kembo 
case did indeed have limited coverage especially when we consider the number of deaths he was responsible for 
(Kembo was convicted of four counts of first degree murder, which was only surpassed numerically by Pickton).  
The Kembo case received the least amount of coverage by returning only 77 results on the database Canadian 
Newsstand, whereas the Williams case received the second least number of hits (333) on the same database with date 
restrictions imposed.      
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 From the information conveyed, one is made to imagine that Kembo’s life began when he 
arrived in Canada from Malawi in 1989 as a Convention refugee; this is where Kembo’s 
biography begins. The articles that tell us about Kembo’s personal history, all tell the same story.  
The following excerpt is exemplary:  
 
Kembo received his first criminal conviction within two years of arriving in the 
country as a government-sponsored refugee from Malawi [...] he was convicted of 
theft twice within a four-month period in 1991 and made three different refugee 
claims within a year from 1991-1992 using three different names [...]in 1993, he was 
convicted of several counts of fraud and one count of uttering a forged document [...] 
he received a three-year sentence.  In 1994, Mr. Kembo was given a confidential 
deportation order, which he appealed. [...] Between 1991 and 1993, he used at least 
22 aliases to apply for welfare [...] in 1997, he was convicted of breaking and 
entering and theft and received a 12-month sentence. (Fong 2005; see also Ramsey 
2005a; O’Brian 2005ab) 
 
Unlike the Williams and Bernardo cases, where their criminality was, from the outset, rendered 
unimaginable, which thus required biographical information to make sense of their criminality, 
no such information was presented about Kembo. Kembo, like Lisa Neve, is imagined as only 
criminal.  Despite the fact that both Williams and Bernardo had criminal histories, additional 
information was still needed and journalists dug deep into their histories to uncover this 
information to make sense of their crimes.  This is not the case here; there is no ‘criminal’ origin 
story that is constructed and then offered. While one article briefly discusses why Kembo may 
have turned to a life of crime, citing the accidental death of his two older brothers as such a 
tragic event that “he dropped out of school and embraced a life of drugs and petty crimes” 
(Mulgrew 2010a), the article remains centred on detailing Kembo’s criminal history as opposed 
to trying to explain the reasons for it.  It would seem that all Kembo is, is criminal.     
 In the process of telling stories about Kembo’s criminal history, we learn that Kembo’s 
crimes are financially motivated: 
Crown counsel Jennifer Oulton said Kembo used the identities to obtain credit cards, 
open bank accounts, set up companies and take out a life insurance policy, raking in 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. ‘Mr. Kembo either benefited or was poised to 
benefit financially from the murders, and these situations or opportunities for Mr. 
Kembo to profit were set up ahead of time by him,’ Oulton told the jury at the 
beginning of Kembo's trial on four counts of first-degree murder Tuesday. (Ferguson 
2009) 
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Even though Kembo’s motivations are ‘revealed’ and this helped to make his crimes legible (at 
least somewhat), his motivations are not flushed out in any greater detail than this. Few articles 
attempted to probe beyond this. It appeared that the fact that Kembo murdered four people whom 
he was closest to for financial gain, was a reasonable and sufficient motive to not ask anymore 
questions about who he is and what his story is.     
 The way that Kembo’s biography is narrated resembles the observation of Stowell-Smith 
and McKeown who note that medical accounts of criminalized Black patients fail to query the 
intentions of the subjects, and therefore offer  “little insight into the patient’s mental life. Few 
connections are made between seemingly traumatic events and their possible emotional 
sequelae” (1999, 465). Instead, they note, Black patients “are constructed as people who act [...] 
and those actions are evaluated within a type of legal discourse concerned with an appraisal of 
innocence or guilt” (467).  In much the same way, Kembo is similarly constructed as a 
criminalized and racialized subject ‘who acts’, who is reduced to his actions and where the 
affective and psychological dimensions of his life are made to appear insignificant to or 
disconnected from those actions.  In other words, we see the Cartesian split being reinscribed in 
this representation that Stowell-Smith and McKeown observe in their research, whereby the 
Black man is reduced to his ‘mindless’ body, and juxtaposed against “the post-Enlightenment 
representation of the thinking, rational, white male self” (469).  
 The meanings that are derived from this textual encounter with Kembo’s biography are 
already providing a rather clear and familiar image of Kembo—he is imaginable as the 
“criminalblackman” (Russell 1998)—because all we are made to see is that criminality was 
present long before the murders.   Indeed, as one article put it, Kembo, two years after arriving to 
Canada, “began to show what he is made of” (Refugee Screen Lets in Bad Bugs 2005).  The 
article then goes on to explain his litany of fraud and theft-related crimes.  What he is ‘made of’, 
according to this selective and flat biography, is criminality, nothing more and nothing less. This 
way of imagining Kembo as criminal, and not pathologically so, does not attempt to deconstruct 
the symbolic and material associations between Blackness and criminality as either “precriminal 
or morally suspect” (Covington 1995, 547). Rather, the representation relies on it, and in doing 
so reinforces that very association to represent Kembo.  He is not able to be imagined as un-
criminal and then experiencing some type of pathology to explain that criminality.  He is made to 
exist as perpetually suspect. It is the processes of racialization and criminalization that enable 
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this image of Kembo to take form. Importantly, and as Wendy Chan (2013) has shown, this way 
of representing national ‘outsiders’ is commonplace in the Canadian news media. For example, 
she notes that in news texts relating to crime and immigrants and/or refugees, the most dominant 
narrative found in these texts is “immigrants as individual criminals” (31).  Within these stories, 
there is little information about the individual immigrant, aside from their crime, immigration 
status and criminal history (31).     
 
Revealing Kembo’s ‘Strange(r)ness’ in the Absence Psychopathy  
 
 Constructing Kembo’s criminality as an entity that was already constitutive of who he 
was is a pronounced thread throughout the texts. In many ways his criminality is conveyed in a 
similar way as Neve’s—it is a matter of fact. This, of course, runs in stark contrast to the ways 
that Williams, Bernardo and Homolka were represented as unimaginably criminal and where 
psychopathy helped to resolve their ‘normal’ appearance and the reality of their crimes. Of the 
many differences between Kembo’s case and the cases of Bernardo, Williams and Homolka, is 
that Kembo’s crimes were financially motivated whereas the crimes of the others were seen as 
motiveless. At first glance, this might be seen as one of the reasons why Kembo was not labelled 
a psychopath. For example, Matthew Burnett (2013) has argued that one way that psychopathy is 
deployed in the media is to make sense of otherwise inexplicable behaviours, and especially 
violent crimes. This was also, as I discussed in Chapter 1, part of the impetus for the 
development of a diagnostic category like moral insanity—to account for violent crimes that 
appeared to be without motive and otherwise unintelligible at the time (Foucault 2003). Despite 
the historical and cultural links to motivelessness, motivelessness is not a necessary condition of 
psychopathy’s deployment in the news or other settings.  
 In Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun’s (2015) critical evaluation of contemporary 
psychopathy, they argue that part of psychopathy’s power and popularity is due to its flexibility. 
Part of its flexibility can be seen in how it has been applied to non-criminals and non-violent 
criminals, such as the ‘corporate psychopath’. Although criminal behaviour forms a significant 
part of the PCL-R, Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun (2015) observe that the scope of psychopathy is 
much wider than the PCL-R itself. The idea of psychopathy has been applied to situations where 
non-criminal features of the disorder can be seen in social life more generally, like in the 
corporate world (80-81). Within this context, psychopaths or people with psychopathic 
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tendencies, can use their traits to manipulate, lie, con and callously and remorselessly steal from 
others for their own gain (e.g. to acquire money, success and power; Hare 1999, see his chapter 
on the “white collar psychopath” in particular). That Kembo would murder four innocent people, 
and then planned to exploit those murders for his own selfish ends, links up quite clearly with 
psychopathy. It’s absence then, is even more curious.   
 Additionally, it seemed that the representational terrain was ripe for the invocation of 
psychopathy because of the way that Kembo and his criminality were described through 
reference to common psychopathic traits (e.g. pathological lying, conning, manipulative, 
remorseless, shallow affect, promiscuous sexual behaviour, criminal versatility, impulsivity, 
many short term relationships, and failure to accept responsibility for actions, and so on). 
However, as we will see below, these traits are not used to build a picture of him as a 
psychopath, but as a criminal. More specifically, they are used to either describe him as a 
criminal figure or to pronounce him as such.  
 Kembo’s criminal versatility was implied throughout the texts, especially in detailing his 
criminal history from fraud to murder:  
The Crown alleged Kembo also used his missing wife's name to file a false ICBC 
claim, false UIC claims, false GST claims and false income tax returns. The 
prosecutor said the Crown will prove the accused also paid for and took out an 
$850,000 life insurance policy on his business partner, Ardon Bernard Samuel, 36, 
whose body was found in Quilchena Park at Maple and 29th Avenue on Nov. 5, 
2003. (N. Hall 2009a) 
 
Although criminal versatility is a psychopathic trait, in this instance it is used in a way that 
accomplishes the same work as his criminalized biography: it invites us to see criminality as part 
of who Kembo is.  This image is bolstered by the use of other criminality-related nouns, such as 
“liar”, “manipulator” and “con man”, which help to paint a picture of the ‘kind’ of person that 
Kembo is:   
 
 Kembo is a skilled manipulator and liar whose movements are hard to track. 
(Ramsey 2005b; emphasis mine) 
 
 A con man with no violent convictions. (Ferguson 2009; emphasis mine) 
 
 [...] He was a con man—an admitted and unmitigated liar, cheat and thief. (Mulgrew 
2010a; emphasis mine) 
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The judge said Kembo adopted the persona of a sophisticated, cultured man ‘that 
belies your character as a greedy, selfish, corrupt criminal. The image you projected 
was as a pure victim. In reality, you are completely devoid of any moral compass.’ 
(Keith Fraser 2010c; emphasis mine) 
 
Although conning, manipulative and lying are psychopathic traits, here they are not used to 
describe the disorder and the possibility that Kembo might be a psychopath, but instead they 
refer to his personhood, his criminality92. In the latter passage above, the judge draws our 
attention to Kembo’s lack of morality/conscience. This trait is further discussed throughout the 
texts, and are often entangled with Kembo’s lack of remorse and unwillingness to take 
responsibility for his misdeeds:  
 
The only time he acknowledged feeling a pang of conscience […] the only time he 
felt real remorse during police interrogations he said, was when they mentioned his 
stepdaughter Rita Yeung. […] He would have the jury believe her death, like the 
other three, was just another odd coincidence in his unique life. (Mulgrew 2010a)93 
  
While Kembo never admitted to the murders, he often blamed the murders of Samuel, Ma, 
Yeung and Margaret Kembo on happenstance and his other misdeeds, including his incestuous 
relationship with Yeung, on a drug and alcohol problem (Keith Fraser 2010a; Mulgrew 2006).  
This lack of conscience and remorse, along with his shallow affect more generally, are all 
expressed in the judge’s and a journalist’s scathing condemnation of Kembo’s criminality and 
their interpretation of his demeanour:  
 
‘You are a serial killer, a very dangerous man. The public deserves protection from 
you.’ Kembo -- who came into court with a jaunty stride, similar to the upbeat 
attitude he adopted during much of the trial -- had little reaction at the verdict and 
declined an offer by the judge to make any comments. (Keith Fraser 2010c) 
 
Implied in much of the coverage was also reference to Kembo’s many (and at times confusing) 
sexual dalliances by referring to his victims in relation to the sexual and/or intimate relations he 
had with them. In March 2002, two years after Kembo’s first son, Grant was born, Kembo 
                                                 
92 It also bears mentioning that Kembo’s defence tactic did not rely on denying his history of fraud-related 
criminality, but on denying that he was a murderer. 
93 See also Mulgrew (2010b) for an additional example of how Kembo was seen as not taking responsibility for his 
actions because of his refusal to give “straight answers” or admit to damning inconsistencies in his testimony during 
the cross-examination. Instead, he turned the tables around and accused the prosecution for manufacturing evidence 
or simply suggested that he misspoke in some instances. 
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married Margaret Kembo (the biological mother of Rita Yeung).  During this time, Kembo is 
said to have had an affair with his “mistress”, Sui Yin Ma, all while living with his girlfriend, 
Genevieve Camera.  In the same year that Kembo married Margaret Kembo, Camera, gave birth 
to Kembo’s second child, Claire (Keith Fraser 2010c).  It was also frequently noted that Kembo 
had incestuous sexual relations with his 21 year-old stepdaughter, Rita Yeung. Although 
promiscuous sexual behaviour is part of the psychopath’s profile, here we are made to see these 
sexual encounters as further evidence of his trangressiveness, not his psychopathy.  
 Each of the sentiments I have cited rely on psychopathic traits.  While we might read this 
construal of Kembo as an attempt to construct him as a psychopath, such a construction is only 
literally expressed in one article.  In this article, the journalist collects each of these sentiments—
Kembo as jaunty, gregarious, manipulative, a con man, a liar and fraudster, charming, without 
conscience, having a cool and relaxed demeanour, an easy smile and a performer of success and 
riches all while being accused of murder—and ultimately calls Kembo a psychopath:  
 
Still chipper after a year in jail, Kembo acted like My New Best Friend. He was 
ingratiating. He was chatty. He was attentive. He immediately struck me as a 
psychopath […] Kembo exhibited all the traits and his biography bore all the 
hallmarks of this psychological impairment: delinquency, promiscuity, a parasitic 
lifestyle....He was impulsive, irresponsible, egocentric, callous, boastful, patronizing 
and antagonistic. At the same time, he displayed indifference to or rationalized the 
pain and suffering he had caused others by hurting or stealing from them; he 
condescended to women and had no interest in bonding. He lacked a conscience. [...] 
Kembo's history, his demeanour, his blank obliviousness to the outrageousness of his 
explanations: It all gave him away. (Mulgrew 2010c) 
 
To the exclusion of this one article, psychopathy remained absent. Given that the deployment of 
psychopathy makes perfect sense in this instance, why is it absent? Why is it not used to 
construct his criminality? One of the ways that we can read this absence is in relation to 
imaginability. Psychopathy did not need to be explicitly manifest for Kembo’s crimes to be 
imaginable—his criminalized biography along with the way that his criminality was assumed to 
be a matter of fact allowed his criminality to be imaginable.  However, in order to fully 
understand why his criminality was imaginable in the absence of psychopathy, we need to 
explore the other kinds of thinking that made this representation possible and ‘commonsensical’. 
In particular, we need to understand how discourses of criminality, identity and difference made 
it possible for Kembo to already be ‘known’ as criminal. 
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Stories of Nation and Nationals: Kembo as an Always Already Transgressive Outsider  
 
One of the ways that criminality becomes stuck to Kembo is in the way in which the texts tell 
not only a story of his criminality, but also how they simultaneously tell a story of nation. This 
story becomes the master narrative of Kembo’s criminality. I attempt to retell the story of nation, 
national subjects and race that animates ‘who Kembo is’ here, by illuminating the ways in which 
Kembo is posited outside of not only the moral community (because of his crimes), but also the 
national community.  
 In every article published about Kembo and his crimes, the terms ‘refugee’ and/or 
‘Malawian national’ are permanent racial94 signifiers:  
 
 He is now charged with three counts of first-degree murder, the latest and most 
serious charges the onetime refugee has faced in his 16 years in Canada. (Fong 2005; 
emphasis mine) 
 
Kembo, a Malawian national who came to Canada in 1989 as a government-
sponsored refugee, has now been charged with first- degree murder in the November 
2003 death of Arden Samuel, his business partner and long time friend. (Fowlie 
2005; emphasis mine) 
 
From the outset, we are made to imagine that Kembo is already different in so far that he is not 
imagined as a member of the normative community—both nationally and racially.  That 
difference is not only articulated in relation to his violent criminality (e.g. he is different from the 
law abiding community by virtue of his crimes), but his difference is also expressed in a more 
general way that precedes his crimes as signified by his ‘foreigner’ status: he is not part of, and 
was never really part of, the national community.  Benedict Anderson has famously argued that 
nations come into existence through imagination and it is through a process of collective 
imagination and storytelling that the nation comes to be imagined as a community that is bound 
together by an “image of their communion” (2006, 6). This image of communion is 
accomplished, in part, by imagining the nation as a community that despite “the actual inequality 
                                                 
94Following Yasmin Jiwani (2006), I would characterize these terms of citizenship and nationality as racial terms 
because as she notes “there is an increasing tendency within hegemonic institutions to signify race by using terms 
such as ‘immigrants and ‘foreigners,’ to refer to those who are constructed as racial Others in terms of their 
language, ethnic origin and practices, or religion” (91).  The use of these types of signifiers work to deny the 
presence of race and race thinking in the news by transforming race into culture and thus enable the deniability of 
the persistence of race and racism.    
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and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep historical 
comradeship” (7).   
 These imaginings of nation as community which form around fraternity, but also shared 
values, ethics, morals and qualities (a metaphorical family, as Sharma (2012) notes) are given 
expression in national stories or mythologies of white settler societies, like Canada. Sherene 
Razack (2002) characterizes these stories as primarily about “a nation’s origins and history”.  
These stories are also constitutive of national subjects’ subjectivity in that “they enable citizens 
to think of themselves as part of a community, defining who belongs and who does not belong to 
the nation” (2002, 2).  Razack (2002) recounts the unfolding national mythologies that have 
come to animate the national subjectivities of Canadians, Canada’s national character as well as 
those who stand in relation to the nation as its ‘strangers’. This “master narrative of nation” 
(Thobani 2007), is developed in three installments which are premised upon a racial hierarchy 
and regenerate the white racial character of the nation.  The first installment tells the story of 
conquest and it is based on the doctrine of terra nullius, which held that Canada was 
‘uninhabited’ land prior to white European settlement (Razack 2002, 3).  The second part of the 
story picks up where the first part leaves off:  the arrival of more Europeans and thus when “the 
settler colony becomes a nation” (3).  In this part of the story we are told who the national 
subjects of the new nation are: The white European man who is robust and “of grit”, the bearer 
of civilization, independent and committed to democracy (3).  In the third part of the story of the 
nation, we are told that: “The land, once empty and then later populated by hardy settlers, is now 
besieged and crowded by Third World refugees and migrants who are drawn to Canada by the 
legendary niceness of European Canadians, their well- known commitment to democracy, and 
the bounty of their land” (4).  
 Within this mythos of nation, and among the variety of ways it gets told and retold in 
different contexts and for variegated purposes, it is not simply the white national subject that is 
being constructed; national outsiders, strangers, and/or foreigners are also being written into the 
story. The relational nature of definitions of nationhood and the character of national subjects is 
explained by Sunera Thobani, in her book Exalted Subjects, where she notes that “the national is 
law-abiding where the outsider is susceptible to lawlessness; the national is compassionate where 
the outsider has a tendency to resort to deceit to gain access to valuable resources [...] (2007, 5).  
It is thus the white national subject that is “a much venerated one, exalted above all others as the 
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embodiment of the quintessential characteristics of the nation and the personification of its 
values, ethics, and civilizational mores, in the trope of the citizen, the subject is universally 
deemed the legitimate heir to the rights and entitlements proffered by the state” (3).  
 The imagined benevolence of both the nation and the national subject is a thread that runs 
throughout the coverage. The signifier ‘Convention refugee’ is the first way in which we see the 
mythos and characteristics of the Canadian nation implicitly expressed and the qualities of the 
national subject constituted.  The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees along with 
the 1967 Protocol95 inform the international signatories as to who may be deemed a Convention 
refugee and under what circumstances.  A person may be deemed a Convention refugee if they 
fear persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political group or by virtue of their 
membership to a social group (e.g. women and/or people of a particular sexual orientation). 
Canada, as one of the signatories to the Convention, is made to appear in the representation of 
the Kembo case.  Through a discourse of humanitarianism, Canada is constructed as a goodwill 
nation that will accept and provide refuge or “safe haven” (Refugee Screen Lets in Bad Bugs 
2005) for those who suffer under the weight of state prosecution of presumably more ‘backward’ 
states.  This enables the image of Canada, and its nationals, to appear as progressive, 
compassionate, heroic, tolerant and hospitable. But in order for Canada and Canadians to appear 
as such, there also there needs to be countries that do not have these characteristics so that the 
nation and its nationals can differentiate themselves, and there needs to be opportunities where 
Canada and Canadians can demonstrate their good will in order to uphold the national 
mythologies it tells. Indeed, as Eva Mackey has noted, racial and cultural Others “are necessary 
players in nationalist myths: they are the colourful recipients of benevolence, the necessary 
‘others’ who reflect back white Canada’s self-image of tolerance” (2002, 2).  Therefore, at the 
same time as the term ‘Convention Refugee’ is signifying the compassion of Canada and its 
nationals, Kembo is being imagined as outside of the nation, the “colourful recipient[t] of 
benevolence” (MacKey 2002, 2) by the continual reference to him as a refugee and “Malawian 
national”; He is a “guest of the state” (Refugee Screen Lets in Bad Bugs 2005).  
                                                 
95 The 1951 Convention was created at a meeting of the international community in Geneva after World War II in an 
effort to assist European peoples who were fleeing their countries in search of refuge.  In 1967, the Protocol was 
designed to widen the scope of the Convention to include those who were non-European, in recognition that issues 
around state violence, displacement and prosecution were not isolated to Europe. 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html  
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 As I mentioned above, Kembo’s criminal history since arriving in Canada was frequently 
discussed.  Throughout these discussions it was not only his citizenship status and criminality 
that was highlighted, but also the fact that the state had tried, unsuccessfully, to remove him 
through deportation.   
 
Accused triple murderer Charles Kembo was a government-sponsored refugee with a 
lengthy criminal record who was ordered deported from Canada eight years before 
his alleged killing spree. (Ramsey 2005a) 
 
 Lower mainland resident Charles Kembo—a refugee charged with murdering his 
wife, her daughter and a girlfriend—was ordered deported more than a decade ago, 
long before he allegedly began killing people close to him. (O’Brian 2005b) 
 
Kembo is a Malawi national who has claimed refugee status although ordered 
deported a decade ago. He has been imprisoned for fraud and impersonation after 
Canadian welfare authorities found he had used 22 aliases to claim benefits between 
1991 and 1993. (Bellett 2005) 
 
In these passages, we begin to see that Kembo was no longer welcome in Canada, but because of 
a ‘generous’ immigration policy, the state could not legally deport him: the “refugee screen 
doesn’t keep out the bugs, only the butterflies” (Refugee Screen Lets in Bad Bugs 2005).   Here, 
the nation’s goodwill is criticized as being too welcoming and too trusting of Others despite 
early signs (e.g. his criminal history) that Kembo was never going to be one of ‘us’ Canadians.  
 In this next passage, there is a clear separation or difference between ‘us’, the ‘victims’ of 
criminals and immigrants, and ‘them’, who are imagined as both immigrants and criminals:  
 
Canada immigration critic MP Randy White says the Kembo case proves the 
deportation system is not working. ‘The system virtually guarantees your 
permanence in Canada,’ he said. ‘Until we wake up and realize this is not a racial 
issue, but a safety and security issue, nothing is going to change. The immigration 
boards and the refugee boards have become obstacles to deportation as well as the 
stupid rules that allow criminals to abuse our system. They know every rule and they 
know how to break them.’ (Ramsey 2005a; emphasis mine) 
 
 It is also interesting to note the work that is being done in the below passages through reference 
to the deportation order that was issued long before Kembo began to murder.  Kembo’s 
criminality and the potential danger that he posed was never overlooked. As Janis Fergusson, a 
spokeswoman for the Canadian Border Services Agency is quoted saying to the news media:  
 
267 
 
Kembo has been in a sort of ‘limbo state’ for the past decade because there is a 
removal order against him, but he can't return to his home country. ‘If we're seeking 
to remove somebody that's designated as a convention refugee it's much more 
difficult to return them to their home country, because we've identified them under 
the Geneva Convention as being a person that needs protection,’ Fergusson said. 
According to Human Rights Watch, life under the rule of the former Malawi 
president was ‘synonymous with torture, extrajudicial killings, detentions without 
trial and severely circumscribed civil and political liberties.’ (O’Brian 2005b) 
 
All this information is positioned in defence of the nation. Officials knew Kembo was ‘a 
problem’, but could not act to remove him; the threat to Canada’s ‘safe haven’ was already 
inside its borders (Ahmed 2000). The relational understanding of national subjects and outsiders, 
together with the mythos of nation, is something that Sara Ahmed (2000) explores in her book 
Strange Encounters.  Ahmed (2000) makes the argument that one way that identity is formed is 
through our ‘encounters’96 with strangers—both the identity of stranger and the individual who 
recognizes the stranger as such are formed through the encounter.  For Ahmed, this encounter is 
not one in which the stranger is someone who “we fail to recognize, but as that which we have 
already recognized as ‘a stranger’” (3).  
 By questioning the ways in which the ontology of the stranger comes into being through 
social and material relations and especially through regimes of difference, Ahmed (2000) 
explores how techniques of reading the body allows us to differentiate between strangers and 
those who belong in/to a bounded space or community. This reading of the body as a sign to 
achieve recognition, is also an historical encounter because in every encounter past encounters 
are reopened and broader social relations (e.g. identity and difference) are brought to bear. So the 
stranger is not someone who we do not know, but is someone that we know as a stranger, as 
someone who doesn’t belong. In rendering some people as strangers, we are also implying that 
other subjects are more familiar and that they do belong.    
 Space is central to the recognition of strangers, according to Ahmed: “others are 
recognized as strangers by those who inhabit a given space, who ‘make it’ their own” (25).  This 
applies to the nation as well.  Those who are understood as national subjects and who claim the 
nation as their own, are able to recognize strangers through the perceived differences of the 
                                                 
96 When Ahmed (2000) uses the term ‘encounter’ she is referring not only to a face-to-face meeting with another, 
but also the more general “coming together of at least two elements” (p.7).  In this understanding, a ‘strange 
encounter’ may also include the interaction or encounter between a reader and a text.  
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stranger. This attachment or tethering of subjects to nation enables Kembo’s crimes be perceived 
as personal injuries and personal threats. That is, Kembo’s crimes were not only interpreted as 
crimes against his specific victims, but as acts that injured the nation: “we’ve let people like 
Kembo abuse our hospitality” (Refugee Screen Lets in Bad Bugs 2005; emphasis mine). Here, it 
is ‘good Canadians’ that have been hurt, victimized, abused or take advantage of by Kembo. 
Somehow the nation and its subjects have also become Kembo’s victims. Furthermore, the 
notion that it is not just Kembo, but also people like Kembo (i.e. 
immigrants/refugees/foreigners/strangers/racialized Others) that are a threat to the nation and its 
generosity and hospitality. It is interesting to note that in none of the other cases that we have 
looked at were the crimes represented in this manner. This is one of the (many) consequences of 
the criminalization of race (Covington 1995). It is not simply the individual who perpetrates the 
crime that is indicted; it is also the entire community to which they belong (Russell 1998; 
Mingus and Zopf 2010; Thobani 2007).  
 Sara Ahmed’s (2000) work also points out how danger is often imagined as coming from 
difference and ‘outside’ the national community (i.e. the stranger). This belief reinforces the idea 
that community is safe as long as outsiders do not penetrate its borders: “the projection of danger 
onto that which is already recognizable as different—as different from the familiar space of 
home and homeland—hence allows violence to take place: it becomes a mechanism for the 
enforcement of boundary lines that almost secure the home-nation as safe haven” (Ahmed 2000, 
36).  The image of the nation as a safe haven and the construction of nationals as law abiding 
gives rise to a pervasive narrative whereby the nation is constantly under threat and vulnerable to 
outsiders. This historically derived idea helps to construct the boundaries and the limits of the 
nation, especially in regards to who may pass through its borders.  The figures responsible for 
such feeling of vulnerability in the national subject may be captured under the general rubric of 
the stranger (Ahmed 2000).  
 This idea of the nation and its citizens in danger was a theme that was constantly revisited 
in the news media.  Despite the fact that it was Kembo who was in danger, which is why he was 
in Canada as a Convention refugee, the conditions he was fleeing were never explored.  In the 
coverage, Kembo was imagined only as a dangerous figure, and not the one that was once in 
danger. Given this absence of information about the conditions of danger he was once in, 
coupled with the dearth of information regarding his finically motivated crimes, we are made to 
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see Kembo as a ‘bogus refugee’, that is a fake refugee who conned his way into Canada by 
making himself appear to be a victim of the Malawian state and thus ‘jump the queue’ of the 
ordinary immigration process.  This sentiment, which hovers over many of the texts, is finally 
made explicit:    
He has always been a hustler, a grifter, a fraud artist: He has been conning people, 
insurance companies, credit-card firms and banks his entire adult life. Kembo 
dropped out of high school, left home and sweet-talked his way into Canada via the 
U.N. refugee process. He has never been straight, milking the student-loan program 
upon arrival and then trafficking in narcotics, petty theft and extortion until he 
learned more sophisticated legerdemain. [...]. (Mulgrew 2010c; emphasis mine) 
 
In many ways Kembo is represented as the personification of the national fears and anxieties 
surrounding strangers. Such ‘bogus refugees’ betray the imagined benevolence of the nation that 
was ‘graciously’ offered to them by passing through it borders and wreaking criminal havoc. 
When taken together, these images of Kembo as a national stranger, a violent criminal, a danger 
to the nation and its subjects, already casts Kembo as an imaginable criminal figure because he 
stands as already outside the imagined boundaries of the nation and his transgressions already fit 
within the stories that ‘we’ (national subjects) have told about ‘them’, and which our national 
identity relies.  Evidently, the work of psychopathy is not necessary here. 
   
Where are Rita Yeung, Ardon Samuel, Margaret Kembo and Sui Yin Ma? 
 
 Thus far we have explored a some of the conditions which made it possible to represent 
Kembo as imaginably criminal in the absence of psychopathy. His criminalized biography, 
constructing him as a criminal figure and stories of nation and race made it possible to see 
Kembo as already suspicious and a criminal outsider. I have made the argument that it was these 
features of the representation that made Kembo imaginable as a criminal and, by extension, 
foreclosed the entrance of psychopathy because its discursive work wasn’t necessary here. I 
would like to continue to build this argument in this last section by exploring how the 
representations of Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo made this representation of Kembo 
possible and vice versa.  
  The aforementioned constructions of Kembo were not only made possible by the way in 
which he was positioned as already outside the nation and as an already transgressive subject, it 
was also accomplished by who his victims were.  It was immediately apparent to me that 
270 
 
Kembo’s crimes were not met with the same type of moral outrage.  In contrast to Williams and 
Bernardo, Kembo was not routinely referred to as evil, monstrous or psychopathic (the latter 
usually links the former two terms of moral opprobrium; see for example Ruffles 2004; Stowell-
Smith and McKeown 2006).  While I have argued that the absence of psychopathy was in part 
readable in relation to the narratives and discourses of nation, national subjectivities and 
‘strange(r)ness’, I would also suggest that this was also accomplished by the ways in which his 
victims’ lives were negated throughout the coverage and rendered “ungreivable” (Butler 2004). 
But to suggest that it was simply these registers that made the negation of their lives affect the 
image of Kembo as a national stranger and already transgressive subject would be to ignore the 
“indissoluble dialectic” (2014) that was taking place between victims and offender.  For it was 
also the way in which Kembo’s transgressions were framed as injuries to the nation and its 
subjects that removed the focus away from those whose Kembo’s violence was actually directed 
at. This interpretative and dialogic practice had enormous implications for the way that we were 
made to come to know Yeung, Ma, Margaret Kembo and Samuel as without personhood and as 
only dead bodies.  
 The lack of ‘newsworthiness’ of Kembo’s crimes and his victims was most clearly 
evidenced in the ways in which the news media came to discuss the three “Asian” women (this is 
how they were referred to) Yeung, Ma, Margaret Kembo and Samuel, “a black man”97. Where 
Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo are featured in the news, their representation mirrors 
the typical and stereotypical ways in which racialized peoples are portrayed in news media 
(Jiwani 2006) and it is their victimhood that is emphasized and their personhood is negated.  This 
happens in two different, but interrelated ways.  The first way, which is starkly different from the 
ways in which Mahaffy, French, Lloyd and Comeau were represented98, paints a flat, one-
dimensional image of Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo as victims. As we saw in the 
preceding chapter, all of the victims were humanized via the deployment of (problematic) 
discourses that sought to render each victim as more than just a victim by referring to them as 
                                                 
97 Significantly, explicit racial and ethnic markers were absent in the other cases where offenders and victims were 
white. 
98 I am not including Pickton’s victims in this statement.  Although Pickton’s victims were humanized as ‘real’ 
victims throughout much of the coverage, I cannot convincingly argue that this would have been the case if police 
did not garner the criticisms they did for not formally and seriously attending to the disappearance and murder of the 
women from as early as the 1970s.   I think the air of condemnation inspired the kind of deference shown to the 
victims in the representations, although this was not always the case (see, for example, Jiwani and Young 2006).  
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mothers, daughters, sisters and so on. Importantly however, although this discursive tactic was 
deployed in the representations of Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea 
Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe, it was used to counter the negative portrayals about 
the women that were circulating in the news, which highlights how identity and difference 
informs constructions of both personhood and victimhood. We also learned, albeit to varying 
degrees, about the personal elements of each of their lives such as their personality traits, the 
people they unwillingly left behind, their hobbies, how they touched the lives of those around 
them and so on.  In this present case, we are told nothing about what makes Yeung, Ma, 
Margaret Kembo and Samuel, like every individual, unique or who they were before they 
become victims of homicide.   The only things that we are told about Yeung, Ma, Samuel and 
Margaret Kembo are their names, ages, affiliation to Kembo and the way that their corpses were 
discovered.  
 Coupled with this one-dimensional understanding of who they were in life, they are also 
made to exist in the news as only dead bodies. When each of the victims is discussed they are 
largely referred to not as people, but as bodies, material objects, lifeless corpses, and/or remains. 
The following excerpts were typical of the way in which Yeung, Ma, and Samuel99 are 
portrayed: 
 
In July [Kembo] was arrested for the murder of his wife who disappeared in 2003, 
his girlfriend whose body was found in a hockey bag in a Richmond slough in 2004, 
and his daughter-in-law whose body was found in the Fraser River two days before 
his arrest. (Refugee Screen Lets in Bad Bugs 2005; emphasis mine) 
 
[H]er [Rita Yeung’s] naked corpse was found wrapped in garbage bags. (Hutchinson 
2009; emphasis mine) 
 
Rita's body was found in the Fraser River on July 27, 2005. She was clad only in a 
bra and wrapped in several garbage bags. She'd been strangled. (Keith Fraser 2010b; 
emphasis mine) 
 
                                                 
99While Margaret Kembo was never found, she is often also reduced to her body and not her personhood.  Phrases 
similar to her “body was never found” (N. Hall 2009b) were common place alongside the references to, and 
descriptions of Yeung, Ma, Samuel’s dead bodies.  Within this crude mode of representation, we are implicitly 
invited to see the absence of her body as a significant barrier to the workings of the criminal justice system or as an 
indication of non-coincidental nature of the Kembo’s crimes.  In either instance, we are not invited to see the 
absence of her body as the absence of a life.  
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 A woman walking her dog in Vancouver's Quilchena Park in November 2003 
stumbled across the remains of Kembo's former business partner, 38-year-old Ardon 
Bernard Samuel, partly buried in leaves. (Ramsey and Luymes 2005; emphasis mine) 
 
Ardon Samuel's strangled corpse was discovered in a Vancouver park in November 
2003. (Hutchinson 2009; emphasis mine) 
 
 Ma's remains were found stuffed in a hockey bag and dumped into a Richmond 
slough. (Ramsey and Luymes 2005; emphasis mine) 
 
It was the corpse of Sui Yin Ma. She had been either drowned or suffocated. 
(Hutchinson 2009; emphasis mine) 
 
The excessive attention given to the condition of their bodies in death and not to their lives, 
echoes Judith Butler’s (2004) essay Violence, Mourning and Politics.  In this essay, Butler 
discusses the vulnerability inherent in the human condition—we are all vulnerable to death— 
and we rely on others to avoid, as best as we can, this inevitable fate. She is also careful to point 
out that vulnerability to violence and to death is not distributed equally—some humans are more 
vulnerable to violence and death than others because some people are more protected than 
others. When vulnerability is realized in the most horrific of ways—through the imposition of 
the will of another on the body via violence and maybe death—not all lives are grieved and 
indeed not all lives are grievable for there is a “hierarchy of grief” (32).  This hierarchy of grief 
is tied to a “restrictive conception of the human” that has been naturalized in its “western mold” 
where this mold excludes and expunges (without grief) those who fall outside it (32-33). When 
violence is done to those who come to exist through discourses of dehumanization, then “from 
the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already 
negated [...] they cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never 
‘were’” (33) 
 By way of example, Butler explores the genre of the obituary—“where lives are quickly 
tidied up and summarized, humanized [...]” (32)—where some lives are collectively grievable in 
this genre and others are excluded all together, such as the thousands of Palestinians who have 
been killed by the Israeli military or Afghan people killed by the US military.  These deaths are 
not “tidied up, summarized and humanized” in the obituary because the loss is not seen as a loss 
at all and therefore we do not need to ask “if they have names, faces, personal histories, family, 
favourite hobbies, slogans by which they live” (32). Indeed, as Butler notes: “if there were to be 
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an obituary there would have had to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and 
preserving, a life that qualified for recognition” (35).  
 While Butler’s analysis is specific to the obituary, I think it is possible to think about her 
observations here in relation to the way that Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo’s lives 
were narrated in the news and especially in relation to the other lives lost that I have discussed 
here, namely the lives of Kristen French, Lesley Mahaffy, Tammy Homolka, Marie-France 
Comeau and Jessica Lloyd.  We learned their names, their hobbies, what they were like and who 
they left grieving their lives.  No such information is given here. There are no humanizing 
narratives of life being written or told upon which their lives may become ‘grievable’—“there 
will be no public act of grieving” over Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo (Butler 2004, 
36).  
 Instead of narratives, discourse and images that seek to humanize Yeung, Ma, Samuel 
and Margaret Kembo all we find in their place are that which make them appear as less than 
human and ungrievable. In addition to rendering the victims’ bodies and the violence done to 
them central to their representation, these portrayals also sexualize and eroticize their dead 
bodies in gendered and racially specific ways, which is not uncommon when victims are socially 
marginalized (Gilchrist 2010; Greer 2008).  For instance, in reporting the condition under which 
Samuel’s body was found, his dismembered genitalia are constantly referred to alongside 
references to his race: “The man's penis was cut off and put in his pants along with four notes, 
which contained crude messages with racist overtones: Samuel was black” (N. Hall 2009a).  This 
crude, graphic and derogatory image of the deceased bears traces of the historical, but familiar 
images and practices of the torture and lynching of black men in the United States.  Furthermore, 
the association between Blackness, masculinity and male reproductive genitalia has, as Saint-
Aubin (2002) shows, since the nineteenth century been both a fantasy and narrative central to 
constructions of the inferiority of Black masculinity. Saint-Aubin has argued that physicians and 
scientists centred their gaze on the on the Black man’s sexuality and in particular, his “virile 
organs” (262).  These white men of science, through their observations, unanimously held that 
what differentiated the white man and the Black man anatomically was the greater size of the 
Black man’s penis in contrast to the average white man (Saint-Aubin 2002).  This physical 
difference, they argued was indicative of the Black man’s excess sexual passion and appetite and 
thereby ‘confirming’ that Black men more “bestial” and “had not evolved significantly as a race 
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much beyond their ‘animal subhuman ancestors’” (263).  In the current case, I would suggest 
that the invocation of this crude imagery could be read as an attempt to racialize and further 
dehumanize Samuel by reducing the violence that led to his death to his dismembered body 
parts.  
 Ma is similarly racialized and sexualized.  From the outset, Ma is identified as Kembo’s 
mistress and the only other thing that we learn about her is that she immigrated to Canada from 
Hong Kong and her petite body size: “Ma, also known as Elvie, was a quiet woman who lived 
alone after moving to Canada from Hong Kong a dozen years ago. She worked as a labourer for 
a Richmond business. Her tiny, four feet eight, 100-pound body was found [...]”. (Ramsey and 
Luymes 2005). In this exemplary passage, Ma is constituted within an orientalist frame that 
reproduces racial and gendered stereotypes of East Asian and Chinese women in particular as 
quiet, submissive, hardworking, and petite, the ‘model minority’ so to speak. Rita Yeung is 
similarly sexualized in life and in death.  All we learn about Yeung is that she is Kembo’s 
stepdaughter, Margaret Kembo’s biological daughter, a student at the University of British 
Columbia, and that she had an “incestuous” relationship with Kembo. We are told that when she 
was found murdered she was only wearing a bra.  Margaret Kembo whose body was never found 
is the least grievable—she is erased in the news altogether, barring when she is part of the body 
count or when her presence in the story is demanded for narrative coherence.  
 The ungrievability of the lives of Ma, Yeung, Samuel and Margaret Kembo was made 
clear from the outset.  Upon reading the news coverage of the case, I immediately realized that 
not much had been written about the victims, so I used an additional search strategy: I searched 
each victims’ name to capture articles that were written before Kembo was identified100 (my first 
search strategy captured all the articles written after this point). Interestingly, all of the articles 
except for one were published after Kembo was arrested. This means that four people who were 
living in relative close proximity to each other and who were all found brutally murdered and 
another had been missing for an extended period of time and none of this was considered 
newsworthy. This, of course, is not surprising since news reporting of violent crimes is deeply 
racialized, classed and gendered (Gilchrist 2010, 375). This remains troubling no less.   
                                                 
100 In both the Bernardo/Homolka and Williams cases, as soon as their victims were reported missing the news 
began covering and following the case.  
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 One journalist offered an explanation as to why it was the case that Kembo “was able to 
fly below the radar for so long: the victims were generally ‘low net worth people’ whose values 
were elevated only when their identities were stolen and used by Kembo” (Burgmann 2009).  
Kembo was able to evade suspicion for so long, not because he blended in or because he wasn’t 
suspicious, as was the case with Williams and Bernardo/Homolka (Philip 1993; Chan and Chunn 
2014), but because his victims are barely able to exist as grievable victims, as humans in the first 
instance.  Perhaps it is if for this reason, that this case evades our national memory; Ma, Yeung, 
Samuel and Margaret Kembo were not ‘our own’.  Additionally, we could also surmise that 
because Kembo was not a stranger to Ma, Yeung, Samuel and Margaret Kembo and therefore he 
targeted them in particular, his danger, in some ways at least, was not generalizable to everyone 
or anyone. It is perhaps for this reason that the most severe form of moral condemnation (i.e. 
psychopathy) was reserved for people like Williams, Bernardo and Homolka who betrayed 
societal expectations of them and were seen as posing a danger to any and every white, middle-
class woman.   
 Finally, we might also recognize the bodily contingencies upon which the deployment of 
psychopathy may rely on, not just in terms of the offenders, but also in terms of who the victims 
were imagined to be.  Kembo did not occupy normalized subject positions and he never appeared 
as unimaginably criminal, we could argue that this may be a reason why psychopathy was never 
brought to the fore. However, we could also partly attribute psychopathy’s absence to the ways 
that Yeung, Ma, Margaret Kembo and Samuel were made to fit into the crime narrative.  Similar 
to the way in which the personhood and victimhood of Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, 
Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe were constructed and 
informed how Pickton was represented as not at the “top of offending hierarchy” (McAlinden 
2014, 187), neither was Kembo. As I noted in the previous chapter, psychopathy in many ways 
represents the pinnacle of criminality because psychopaths are rendered irredeemably and 
biologically evil and are thus well suited to occupy the “top” position of the offending hierarchy, 
as we saw in the case of William and Bernardo/Homolka. This, as we’ve seen, was not the case 
for Kembo. The ungrievability of the lives of Ma, Yeung, Samuel and Margaret Kembo, as it 
was portrayed in the news, suggests that Kembo need not be placed on the same level as 
Williams, Bernardo and Homolka. It also suggests that Kembo did not defy collective 
imaginings of criminality in such a way that his criminality required a construal that evicted him 
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from the normative and moral community because he, like his victims, were never truly part of 
that community in the first instance.  
 On a final note, it is important to situate this representation of Ma, Yeung, Samuel and 
Margaret Kembo in a larger social context. Wendy Chan observes that while immigrants 
regularly feature in crime stories as perpetrators, the news rarely focuses on immigrants as 
victims and “fails to adequately recognize the extent to which immigrants are victimized by other 
immigrants and by non-immigrants” (2013, 32). Moreover, this kind of representation reaffirms 
the imagined association between immigrants and criminality in Canada (32) and the ‘threat’ that 
‘outsiders’ pose to the nation and its subjects (41). The violence that ended Ma, Yeung, Samuel 
and Margaret Kembo’s lives was not the only violence they experienced. The way they were 
represented is also a form of systemic violence (García Del-Moral 2011) and is part of a much 
larger and disturbing Canadian reality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 From a purely technical perspective it would have made sense for journalists to label 
Kembo as a psychopath, but they didn’t. Given the way that the psychopath label was casually 
used in the cases of Bernardo and Williams, makes its absence striking and significant. However, 
once we began unpacking the representation of Kembo and his victims, this absence is consistent 
with my reading of the other cases. When taken together, we can begin to see how psychopathy 
operates as a method of representing the unimaginable criminality of the normalized subject. 
Kembo’s body and acts already figure in our criminal imaginaries in a number of different ways. 
His criminality does not need to be repackaged in order to become intelligible.  Like Pickton, he 
exists as ‘strange’, ‘foreign’ and outside already, albeit for different reasons. The conceptual 
work that I argued psychopathy does, is not necessary here. There is no puzzle or paradox to 
solve or account for.   
 The “dialectic” between Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo and Kembo was also 
significant. Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo were barely present in the news and when 
they were present their lives and deaths are portrayed as ungrievable. The importance of the way 
their race, class and gender interlock cannot be understated in a context, like the Canadian news 
media, which routinely diminishes or erases the violence that is done to marginalized subjects 
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(Jiwani 2006; Gilchrist 2010). This enables Kembo to be seen as a ‘run of the mill’ type of 
criminal, and not an exceptional criminal psychopath.  Moreover, the way that Kembo was 
represented as a transgressive outsider also allowed for his crime against Yeung, Ma, Samuel and 
Margaret Kembo to be met with a less severe mode of representation. His crimes were framed as 
injurious to the nation, while at the same time Yeung, Ma, Samuel and Margaret Kembo were 
largely erased from the news.  
 While my reading of the absence of psychopathy here confirms my central argument, 
there is something that still haunts me about this analysis. As I have noted throughout, this 
research has been largely inspired by those who have subjected historical conceptualizations of 
psychopathy/moral insanity to critical analysis. The works of Fee (1978), Rafter (1997a), 
Lunbeck (1994) and Rimke (2003; 2005) have explained how discourses of identity and 
difference played a significant role for how psychopathy and moral insanity were imagined. 
More specifically, Lunbeck (1994) and Rimke’s (2003; 2005) work has highlighted the racial 
significance of moral insanity/psychopathy, by demonstrating how people who were racialized 
were not diagnosed with the disorder.  What haunts me, then, is the absence of psychopathy in 
this case in particular and whether the same racist logics are being reproduced here in the 
absence of psychopathy in representing Kembo and if this this finding, along with the findings of 
Stowell-Smith and McKeown (1999; 2001), are indicative of a much larger pattern. Although I 
cannot answer this question, I do think that this is an area that requires further research.  
  I also wonder to what extent the idea of psychopathy is already embedded in racist 
discourses and representations. For example, in his brief history and description of the brute 
caricature, David Pilgram (2000) explains that “the brute caricature portrays Black men as 
innately savage, animalistic, destructive, and criminal—deserving punishment, maybe death. The 
brute is a fiend, a sociopath, an anti-social menace.  Black brutes are depicted as hideous, 
terrifying predators who target helpless victims, especially white women” (emphasis mine).  
Similarly, Donald Bogle in his book Toms, Coons, Mulattos, Mammies and Bucks: An 
Interpretive History of Blacks in American Films notes how the figure of the “brutal black buck” 
is not only innately ‘animalistic’, but is also a psychopath (2001, 14).  These similar and 
pervasive racist tropes for representing Black deviance assume that the ‘black brute’ and the 
‘brutal black buck’ are anti-social psychopaths. Such representations are explicit in their racist 
connotations, but do not need to explicitly suggest that the ‘deviants’ are psychopaths because 
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such a condition is assumed in the way that race is understood and portrayed.  In this context, 
racist discourses do the work that discourses of pathology do in cases where offenders are white.  
So I wonder, but I cannot say for certain, is this another reason why psychopathy is absent in this 
representation of Kembo? Is psychopathy always already implied in the criminalizing and 
racializing processes that are occurring? It seems to me that there may be a bigger story about 
race (including whiteness) that psychopathy has not yet been made to tell.  
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Conclusion 
 
What seems necessary here is an acknowledgement that we make errors in our 
perceptions, we imagine things that are not there.  What is important is not to stop 
looking, but to continually look again, to see afresh, and to remain open to new 
interpretations, new conclusions. (Biber 2006, 22) 
 
 The historically derived, and enduringly popular idea that ‘criminals’ look different than 
‘normal’ people has been at the centre of this project. This idea about bodily appearance coupled 
with the notions of difference/identity and in/visibility are entangled with ideas of criminality, 
deviance, and normalcy. Throughout this dissertation, I have demonstrated, in a similar way as 
others have, that these ideas have implications for who we imagine to be criminal or suspect and 
who we are unable to imagine as such. However, I also showed how, in the case of the latter, 
psychopathy works to render appearances of normalcy pathological and unimaginable 
criminality, imaginable.  
I began this study by tracing ideas about bodies, difference/identity, in/visibility 
(un)criminality, by looking to the works of others who have explained how criminality, 
difference and the body have long been implicated in how criminality is imagined in distinctly 
racial, gendered and class-based terms. I followed these ideas and used them to read the cases to 
understand the mechanisms that allowed Bernardo, Williams and Homolka to be read as 
unimaginably criminal, and Neve, Pickton and Kembo to be already imaginable as such. It seems 
that imaginings of criminality remain tethered to bodies and visible difference. It was this 
observation that that led us to question how psychopathy is able to render the un-criminality of 
the normalized subject imaginable as criminal.  
As I discussed throughout, psychopathy is a personality disorder that is often explained 
biologically.  Within our contemporary context, psychopathy is not understood as a condition 
which expresses itself on the external body (as it was historically, see Rimke 2005; 2003), but as 
a condition “localizable within the body” (Pickersgill 2009, 46). As a condition that is generally 
invisible to the naked eye, one of the ways that psychopathy is rendered visible is through 
“doing”: “for the psychopath action is a reflection of being” (Weisman 2008, 198).  Aside from 
the clusters of personality and behavioural traits and tools that allow trained professionals to 
“identify” psychopaths or make their condition visible (Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun 2015, 45), a 
hallmark of the contemporary psychopath is “the paradox of appearance and reality” (Weisman 
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2008, 199). This paradox is significant because it tells us that aside from the psychopath’s 
transgressive doings, their condition remains concealed under the mask of their appearance, their 
apparent normalcy. It was within this contemporary understanding of psychopathy that we were 
able to begin to see how psychopathy is amenable to representing the unimaginable criminality 
of the normalized offender, as well as the bodily contingencies of this kind of representation.  
In Chapter 3, we explored how Williams and Bernardo, two serial killers who occupied 
dominant/normalized and interlocking subject positions, were represented as psychopathic 
criminals and how this helped to resolve the conundrum of their imagined un-criminality and 
reality. The discourse of pathology, and psychopathy in particular, gave rise to the biographical 
inspection and their pathological criminal biographies.  These biographies I suggested, following 
the lead of others, sought to construct them as “changed” or “changing” figures, who were 
beginning to or had already departed from the expectations and assumptions their normalized 
subject positions (Foucault 2003; Rimke 2005; 2003; Heitzeg 2015; Daniels 2015).  I also argued 
that the “paradox of appearance and reality” (Weisman 2008, 199) was central to their 
representation as psychopaths and was expressed through duality—they were made to appear as 
‘normal’ as well as transgressive and criminal. Psychopathy enabled them to be represented as 
both. In other words, psychopathy was able to render their criminality imaginable in light of their 
normalized appearance/identities. This is what I think makes psychopathy a unique discourse in 
comparison to more general discourses of pathology which are often analyzed in the literature.   
In Chapter 4, I explored how psychopathy was a way of imagining the unimaginable 
criminality of a normalized woman—Homolka—as well as its bodily contingencies.  Since 
psychopathy is not readily diagnosed in women and this has been explained in a number of 
different ways, we took the respective representations of Homolka and Neve as curious.  We 
began with the case of Homolka.  While other scholars have recognized that Homolka was 
represented as a dual figure, we sought to explore this representation in relation to psychopathy 
specifically. Not only did psychopathy help to resolve the competing constructions of Homolka 
as a ‘normal’ woman (e.g. a “woman in danger”; Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016) and a ‘criminal 
women’ (e.g. a “dangerous woman”; Kilty and Frigon 2006; 2016), by transforming her 
appearance (with all that that entails) into a ruse which hides the reality of her personhood (i.e. 
psychopathy), it also did additional work that was specific to normative femininity.  As a 
masculinized disorder, psychopathy not only accounted for the misfit between appearance and 
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reality, but it also masculinized Homolka’s actions. By inserting her actions and proclivities into 
a gendered/masculinized paradigm of psychopathy, her appearance was rendered a fiction, and 
her actions were construed as the truth of her being.  Significantly, because psychopathy is 
understood as manifesting as normal(ized) appearance, her re-gendering is only partial. She 
must, within the ambit of psychopathy, be seen as normal(ized) in appearance because this hides 
her ‘true’ criminal and abnormal nature.   
We then turned to a fundamentally different, but important, case—that of Lisa Neve. 
Neve is a gay, Aboriginal woman and sex worker, from a working- class background who 
struggled with addiction. Her crime story is also very different.  The crimes that Neve committed 
were violent (although not nearly to the same extent as the crimes Homolka participated in) as 
well as transgressive of the norms of femininity. In this case, Neve’s criminality is never seen as 
unimaginable and therefore, psychopathy does not aid us in imagining the unimaginable. Instead, 
it is used to build a picture of how dangerous she is. As a result, Neve is made to appear as more 
dangerous than she actually is and is sentenced as a DO to an indeterminate sentence (although 
this decision was later overturned). Constructing Neve as a ‘deviant’ woman who profoundly 
transgressed normative femininity in both her interlocking subject locations and her crimes, led, 
as others note, to her being harshly punished (Renke 1995; Yeager 2000; Neve and Pate 2005). 
My reading of Neve’s case, along with Homolka’s, showed us how contemporary representations 
of psychopathy (much like historical accounts) rely on and reproduce the normative social order 
in more ways than one. However, they also demonstrated the different work that psychopathy 
does in different contexts—its interlocking bodily contingencies—as well as that psychopathy, in 
case of normalized offenders, aids in the imagination of their unimaginable criminality.  
In the final two chapters, we explored cases where the perpetrators of serial homicide did 
not occupy normalized subject positions to gain a better sense of the interlocking bodily 
contingencies of psychopathy and whether there is some kind of imagined relationship between 
psychopathy and the normalized offender. The tentative answer to this latter question (as far as 
my readings of these specific cases go) is yes, there is a relationship at the level of imagination or 
representation. As we saw in both the Pickton and Kembo cases, psychopathy is relatively absent 
and the discourse of psychopathy is not used explicitly to construct their criminality. Instead 
what we see are other discourses that construct their criminality through their alleged difference 
from a normalized subject position—the discourse of ‘feeblemindedness’ and ‘white trash’ in the 
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Pickton case and discourses of race and nation in the Kembo case. Neither Pickton, nor Kembo, 
are seen as ‘normal in appearance’ where this normalcy is hiding a deep-seated and invisible 
pathology. They are already imaginable as different, and potentially suspect. These observations 
told us (again, insofar as these cases are concerned) that representations of unimaginable 
criminality are contingent on identity and difference and that representations of psychopathy are 
also contingent on how bodies and subjects are constituted and read within discourses of 
(un)criminality.  
However, the reading that I put forward in these last two chapters also brought our 
attention to an additional set of interlocking bodily contingencies that contour imaginings of 
psychopathy—that of the victims. In no uncertain way, the representations of victims also 
informed how each offender was represented as psychopathic or not.  As I discussed in relation 
to McAilden’s (2010) work, psychopaths are constructed at the “top of the offending hierarchy” 
and in order for an offender to be constructed as such, their victims need to be seen as 
completely innocent and worthy of being seen a ‘real’ victims where the identity of the victims, 
as others have shown, play a significant role in how we see/know victimhood (Jiwani and Young 
2006; Jiwani 2009; 2011; Gilchrist 2010; García-Del Moral 2011; R. Collins 2014; Kilty and 
Frigon 2016). However, it is not simply that representations of offenderhood are dependant on 
imaginings of victimhood, the reverse is also true. When the victims are pictured in this way, we 
are forced to see the offenders as purely evil (McAilden 2010). What we saw in the news 
coverage was Jessica Lloyd and Marie-France Comeau—Williams’ victims—and Kristen French 
and Leslie Mahaffy—Bernardo/Homolka’s victims—being constructed as ‘ideal’ victims. These 
representations were accomplished because of their interlocking identities—normative 
femininity—along with the fact that they were victimized/murdered by strangers.  This construal 
enabled Williams, Bernardo and Homolka to be seen as offenders of the worst kind—evil, 
psychopathic— and vice versa. In contrast, Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, 
Andrea Joesbury, Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe—Pickton’s victims (or, the women he was 
convicted of murdering)—and, Margaret Kembo, Sui Yin Ma, Ardon Samuel and Rita Yeung—
Kembo’s victims were not represented as ‘ideal’ victims.  Instead, in the news coverage, as 
others have pointed out, Mona Wilson, Sereena Abotsway, Georgina Papin, Andrea Joesbury, 
Marnie Frey and Brenda Wolfe struggled to be seen women and undeserving of the violence that 
took their lives (Jiwani and Young 2006; Jiwani 2009;). Their struggle into personhood in life 
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and in death (i.e. the news coverage), has been situated within a social and historical context that 
sees Aboriginal women, sex workers, and people who struggle with addiction as less than human 
and as bodies that can be ‘violated with impunity’ (Razack 1998b; Jiwani and Young 2006).  
Attempts to render Margaret Kembo, Sui Yin Ma, Ardon Samuel and Rita Yeung as people (and 
not simply dead bodies) was never something that was attempted in the news. Instead, they were 
pictured as bodies and objects—not subjects, not people. The significance of their race and class 
in blocking their entrance into personhood and ‘ideal’ victimhood cannot be underestimated.  
While this reading of the victims, certainly reveals, how representations of violence are also a 
technology of violence themselves (García-Del Moral 2011) as well as how race, class and 
gender inform representations of ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ victims (Gilchrist 2010; Jiwani 2011; 
R. Collins 2014; Kilty and Frigon 2016), I would also add that it showed us that there is a pattern 
or contingency in representations of violence and psychopathy.  When the victims are 
represented as ‘ideal’ victims, the offenders are represented as evil and psychopathic, whereas 
when the victims are represented as ‘less than ideal’ and ‘less than a person’, the offenders are 
not represented as psychopaths.  
 
 
Implications, Contributions and Significance   
  
 The insights that we have collected throughout these pages have a number of important 
implications. The first is that by reading each of these cases individually and against each other 
we were able to uncover how bodies, appearances, identity and difference are implicated in 
cultural imaginings of (un)criminality. While this is by no means an original observation, it is a 
significant one insofar as it reaffirms that how we think about people affects how we come to 
know and treat them (Brock 2012). This is especially true in a criminal justice context. For 
example, imaginings of criminality on the basis of identity are reflected in the demographic 
composition of Canadian federal prisons. The Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator101 for 2014-2015 presents a startling picture of the reality of criminalization in 
Canada.  Howard Sapers, Correctional Investigator, reports that while Aboriginal peoples 
                                                 
101 The Office of the Correctional Investigator “provides independent oversight of the Correctional Service of 
Canada and serves as an Ombudsman for federally sentenced offenders” (http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/bio-
eng.aspx). 
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represent 4.3% of the Canadian population, they represent 24.6% of the prison population, with 
Aboriginal women representing 35.5% of all incarcerated women (2015, 2). Additionally, 
between 2005-2015 the “Black inmate population grew by 69%. The federal incarceration rate 
for Blacks is three times their representation rate in general society” (2). In the case of female 
inmates, Sapers (2015) notes that “close to 70% of federally sentenced women report histories of 
sexual abuse and 86% have been physically abused at some point in their life. Their life histories 
of trauma cannot easily be separated from their conflict with the law” (3). The picture of 
Canadian federal prisons is not only racialized and gendered, it also represents other forms of 
inequalities found in Canadian society (which interlock with each other) including 
‘unemployment or chronic underemployment’ or educational needs (2). As Sapers points out: 
“prison has always shone a spotlight on the problems and inequalities of the larger society in 
which it functions. This remains true today as substance abuse and addiction, poverty and 
deprivation, discrimination and social exclusion, mental health and stigma continue to define and 
shape modern Canadian correctional policy, practice and populations” (2)    
 I present this information not to suggest that there is a causal relationship between news 
media representations and the reality of criminalization (i.e. the news conveys stereotypical 
images or ideas that are then acted upon by police, for example), or that the news simply reflects 
the ‘reality’ that these populations are more ‘prone’ to crime and are therefore ‘inherently’ more 
likely to be incarcerated. Instead, I present it to show the continuities between (un)criminal 
imaginings and the lived realities of racialized groups, women, and those who are economically 
marginalized and the criminal justice system. These realities are a product of many variables 
including, historical legacies of colonialism, racism and sexism and current structural and 
institutional inequalities and discrimination (Chan and Chunn 2014). I think it is fair to suggest 
that these realities come to impact how (un)criminality is imagined and that the impact of these 
imaginings cannot be divorced from these lived realities. If image and reality cannot be divorced 
from one another (Young 1996; 2014; Carrabine 2012), then any vison of social change, of 
social justice, needs to account for the power and persistence of imagination, of how we come to 
think, know and represent the world around us.  
  Although psychopathy appears to be a neutral scientific term to capture a group of 
biologically ‘evil’ people, the idea of psychopathy engenders and reproduces many assumptions 
that are formative to the normative social order itself. This is the second implication of this 
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study. Part of what makes this research different from the works that have come before it, is how 
I have brought the insights of critical psychopathy research (past and present) together with the 
insights of critical criminological works to explore how criminality is imagined in relation to 
psychopathy (or not). I think this is what makes this study unique. By paying attention to when 
(i.e. absence and presence) and how psychopathy is deployed (i.e. imagining unimaginable 
criminality; imagining the extent of criminality/dangerousness) in criminal imaginings, I was 
able to untangle the assumptions and interlocking bodily contingencies of psychopathy as well as 
how these reflect, and reproduce, cultural criminal imaginings as well as the existing social 
order.   
 Reading the representations of the cases in this way revealed a number of consistent 
logics across the texts in regards to crime and identity/difference.  In general, we saw how social 
difference, especially in relation to race, class, gender, sexuality and citizenship, is linked to 
imaginings of crime. The cases of Neve, Pickton and Kembo drew our attention to how the 
criminality of those rendered Other or different, are easily and readily imaginable as criminal. 
The case of Homolka demonstrates the difficulty of imagining normative femininity as violently 
criminal. Whereas Neve’s case highlighted that when an female offender occupies marginalized 
interlocking subject locations in terms of race, class and sexuality imagining her criminality was 
much more straightforward because she is already imagined to have taken flight from normative 
femininity in important ways. Finally, in the cases of Bernardo and Williams we saw how their 
interlocking subject positions and appearances made them appear as both unsuspicious and un-
criminal.  Although, men’s violence is not anomalous, it has been so normalized in our culture 
that we often fail to see male perpetrators as gendered subjects (Collier 1997; 1998; Consalvo 
2003). Arguably then, it was the way that their other subject positions interlocked and their 
appearances coalesced—whiteness, class, heterosexuality and occupational status (Williams) or 
attractiveness (Bernardo)—that made them appear as un-criminal and that required this be 
reckoned with.  
In looking to the way that psychopathy moved through these cases (or didn’t) we were 
able to see the work that it did (or didn’t need to do) to account for these assumptions about who 
each subject was thought to be. In the cases, of Bernardo, Homolka and Williams psychopathy 
was used to render their unimaginable criminality imaginable and was able to account for all of 
the assumptions therein because of the way that the condition is conceptualized through duality: 
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appearance of normalcy and abnormality/transgressiveness. In the case of Neve, psychopathy did 
a different kind of work.  It was not used to imagine her criminality, but was used to paint a 
picture of just how criminal/dangerous she was. In the cases of Pickton and Kembo, psychopathy 
was absent largely because the work that it did in the other cases was in some ways redundant 
here. Pickton and Kembo, in different ways, were already imaginable as criminal. In essence, by 
tracking psychopathy’s movement and paying attention to its nuances, I showed how cultural 
(un)criminal imaginings align with and complement contemporary imaginings of psychopathy. 
This alliance however, is both political and profane.   
Although, it can be argued that representations of violence that rely on explaining or 
reducing violence to a pathological individual when there are other more holistic and 
contextualized perspectives available could also be rendered political (I discuss this below), I 
would insist that there remains something distinctly significant about psychopathy. In looking 
closely at how psychopathy is imagined (e.g. as an invisible, biological condition that is not 
readable from the external body and which relies on a ‘normal’, but deceiving appearance) and 
then how this is relayed in the representations, what we begin to see is how our ideas about 
normalcy (what constitutes it; the assumptions that it engenders; who we picture and so on) are 
intimately tied to criminalization and the practices, processes and power that circulate around it. 
These are not merely ideas without effects. These ideas point to an entire structure of thought 
and power that are at the very root of the criminalization process. It is these ideas that help to 
reproduce some subjects as more ‘normal’ or, more criminal than others.   
Third, the way that psychopathy is imagined in relation to cultural imaginings of 
criminality is premised on the idea that it is only within the context of psychopathy that 
appearances betray reality. As I noted above, at no point in my analysis of these cases did 
psychopath disrupt the social order, instead it reproduced those ideas in a number of ways. One 
of the other ways it did this was by constantly reaffirming the Lombrosian myth that criminals 
look different than ‘normal’ people.  As I have discussed throughout, critical scholars of 
psychopathy and psychopathy researchers themselves often discuss the “paradox of appearance 
and reality” (Weisman 2008, 199). What has gone unremarked about this way of imagining the 
psychopath, and what I hope to have implied in my reading of these cases, is that the presence of 
this paradox tells us that psychopathy is exceptional in that it is only within the context of 
psychopathy that appearances betray reality. This suggests that outside of psychopathy, looks or 
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appearances are not misleading, they are reality or tell a truth about who someone is (e.g. that 
people who appear ‘normal’ are ‘normal’; or, to invert this statement, that people who appear to 
be ‘abnormal’/’suspicious’ probably are).  
By conceiving ‘normal’ appearance within the ambit of psychopathy as part of the 
condition itself and then also rendering the misfit between appearance and reality a pathological 
exception to the rule, we end up returning to the idea that the body is an objective text that tells 
us the truth about who people are, what they are like and what they are capable of.  It is precisely 
this kind of thinking that renders the normalized subject as unimaginably criminal, while at the 
same time constructing marginalized subjects as perpetually suspect or criminal. This idea about 
visible bodily appearances and difference has stood at the centre of racism and sexism and 
continues to do so (Alcoff 2006). It is these ideas which continue to inform 
‘criminalizing’/’normalizing’ thinking, and the “abusive systems of power” (Gordon 2008, xvi) 
which make them possible that I have sought to disrupt, make visible, and subject to critical 
scrutiny in these pages.  It is my hope that in doing so I have allowed us to begin to see 
criminality otherwise (Young 1996): that we were able to see that criminality is not only 
perpetrated by “an-Other” (Ritskes n.d.); that our assumptions about bodies, appearance, 
difference/identity, normalcy, and criminality are unreliable and problematic for the way they 
support the existing social order; that there is a fuller, more complex picture that remains to be 
seen; and, that our imagination of criminality may not be as it seems.   
The fourth implication of this research is that the deployment of psychopathy not only 
aligned and complemented cultural imaginings of (un)criminality, it also aligned and 
complemented imaginings of victimhood. By tracking not only when and how psychopathy is 
deployed in relation to offenders, but also in relation to victims, we saw how psychopathy was 
used to represent those perpetrators who negated the lives of those who were seen as most 
worthy of the ‘ideal victim’ label (Greer 2008). Others have noted that representations of racial 
and gender violence affirm “hierarchies of worthiness” in relation to victims and these 
hierarchies are maintained through interlocking identity categories (Jiwani 2011; Gilchrist 2010). 
Others have also demonstrated how our understandings of victims and offenders cannot be 
divorced from each other (McAilden 2010). My readings of the cases confirmed these 
observations and extended them, by revealing how imaginings of the psychopath as a figure of 
‘ultimate evil’ links up with images of ‘ideal’ victims.  When all of these observations are taken 
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together, we can see how representations of violence can be a form of violence themselves when 
they maintain the ideas so formative to the social order (Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del 
Moral 2011) 
The final implication of the readings that I have put forth, is that psychopathy, like 
discourses of pathology more generally, reduces gendered and racial violence to an individual 
problem and exceptionalizes the subjects who perpetrate this violence. One way that we can 
think about each of these cases of gendered and racial violence is by looking to the ways that 
psychopathy is deployed to render this violence legible by transforming into and reducing it to an 
isolated act, by a psychopathic individual (e.g. Williams, Bernardo and Homolka). In looking at 
this form of representation in this way, as others have done, we can see how discourses of 
pathology turn our attention away from the social conditions in which physical, structural and 
symbolic violence takes place (Jiwani 2006; Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del Moral 2011). 
Within this kind of pathology narrative there is no room to discuss how interlocking systems of 
power, such as whiteness, colonialism, hegemonic masculinity, heterosexuality, and capitalism 
are conditions that make racial and gendered violence possible, that make some people more 
vulnerable to violence than others, and that make some people able to commit these kinds of 
violent crimes (e.g. Jiwani 2006; Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del Moral 2011). It should 
also be noted that it wasn’t only representations of psychopathy that did this work. In fact, this 
issue of ignoring the social conditions of violence and criminality was present in every case, in 
different ways. For example, by representing Kembo’s crimes as symptomatic of a supposedly 
‘generous’ and ‘compassionate’ immigration system, and Pickton as ‘feebleminded’ and ‘white 
trash’ the news portrayals do not invite us to consider the interlocking violence of sexism, racism 
and classism which are the social conditions under which the physical and lethal violence of 
these racialized women occurred (Jiwani 2006), nor does it invite us to ask what conditions 
produced the criminality of Kembo and Pickton. As a result, these representations themselves 
turn out to be a “technology of violence” (García-Del Moral 2011; see also Jiwani 2009 and 
Jiwani and Young 2006).  
 Additionally, the lack of critical discourse in the earliest coverage of Neve’s case and the 
coverage of Homolka more generally, failed to capture the complex reality of criminalized 
women, and their lived experiences.  In the case of Homolka, and as Kilty and Frigon (2016; 
2006) have demonstrated, the news failed to seriously consider the links between Homolka’s 
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experience as a victim of intimate partner abuse and her crimes, choosing instead to focus on one 
of those ‘personas’ to the detriment of the other. This is in despite of the fact that many 
criminalized women have histories of abuse. In the case of Neve, the details of her past and 
especially her history of sexual abuse was never a context that was explored in a meaningful 
way, nor were the interlocking systems of power that impact and constrain the lives of racialized 
and economically marginalized women, like Neve (Yeager 2000; Neve and Pate 2005; Comack 
2006ab).   
 We should also think about the ways that psychopathy exceptionalized the violence of 
white, middle-class, heterosexual, masculine subjects who occupy these powerful and dominant 
subject positions, as others have done (e.g. Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del Moral 2011).  
By rendering Williams and Bernardo’s violent transgressions as exceptions to the rule, the 
boundaries of the imagined normative community were reaffirmed as where the characteristics 
that are ascribed to these subjects (Jiwani and Young 2006; García-Del Moral 2011). This was in 
contrast to the cases of Kembo and Pickton, where their criminality was not exceptionalized, but 
was see through the problematic and ‘common sense’ lens that criminality is perpetrated by 
members of groups who are ‘deviant’ and/or Othered.  By looking at the ways that Bernardo, 
Homolka, Neve, Williams, Pickton and Kembo’s criminality was constructed, we can see the 
different kinds of “boundary work” each configuration accomplished in how it redrew the lines 
between the normalized community and Others (Hartigan 1997; Wray 2006).  
 Taken together, each of the implications of this research points to a dire need to know, 
think about and imagine people, criminality and victimhood “otherwise”, to develop a more 
ethical way of imagining (Young 1996). In Chapter 2, I discussed the work of Stuart Hall 
(1997c) and how he conceptualized the work that he did. Hall, Sut Jhally explains, entered into 
his research by not exploring effects of power (i.e. racism, sexism and classism), but the logics 
that constitute their existence: “how racism is cultivated in our imaginations, of how it works in 
our heads, so that we can better combat it on the streets” (Jhally quoted in S. Hall 1997c, 1). This 
is how I approached this project. I sought to understand and make visible the very logics that 
congeal to produce imaginings of (un)criminality and the very logics that make psychopathy 
amenable to this end. It is my hope that this dissertation has revealed these logics and has also 
made a case for why we, as a collective, need to understand and unpack how we imagine, so that 
things might be different in the future.   
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 At the outset of this project, one of the ways that I framed the novelty of this study was in 
terms of the way that it brings insights from different scholars and different fields of research 
into conversation. Keeping this in mind, I would now like to review what I believe are the most 
significant contributions of this project. The first contribution is methodological. As I have 
discussed throughout this dissertation, the way I have come to question and analyze 
representations of psychopathy in our contemporary context is inspired by historical works on 
psychopathy/moral insanity (e.g. Fee 1978; Lunbeck 1994; Rimke; 2003; 2005; and Rafter 
1997a).  In different ways, these studies sought out the discourses of identity/difference that were 
informing how psychopathy/moral insanity conceptualized, how it was diagnosed, and the 
significance of bodies, identities and differences to this end. In this study, I borrowed this 
methodology and applied it to contemporary representations of psychopathy. According to my 
review of the literature, contemporary critical scholarship on psychopathy has not employed this 
methodology nor have the kinds of questions such a methodology invites been substantively 
explored (see Chapter 1). This application provided me with an opportunity to rethink 
psychopathy in relation to bodies, appearances, identity and difference and provided a different 
perspective on contemporary psychopathy than what is often discussed in the critical and 
scientific literature. It was also able to reveal that the way that psychopathy is culturally 
imagined remains political. 
 By designing this study in a way that mirrors these insightful historical works, we were 
also able to see some of the continuities between historical imaginings of psychopathy in relation 
to the body and contemporary ones. Although critical scholars of psychopathy historically 
contextualize their research, none have explored the (dis)continuities in the kinds of identity 
logics contemporary representations of psychopathy engender in comparison to its historical 
representations. In being attentive to these logics, my research suggests that there are continuities 
in how psychopathy is imagined culturally (i.e. in the news) and how it was historically imagined 
by doctors who wrote about the disorder or who diagnosed it: those who occupy normalized 
subject positions and who deviate from cultural expectations and assumptions surrounding their 
identities are pathologized in ways that reflect these expectations and assumptions (Fee 1978; 
Lunbeck 1994; Rafter 1997a; Rimke 2003; 2005).  
 The second contribution is also methodological.  As I discussed in Chapter 1, critical 
criminologists, along with other interdisciplinary scholars who have explored the intersections 
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between crime, representation and identity/difference, have recently turned their attention to the 
normalized identity categories, which have historically been an ‘absent presence’ in disciplines 
like criminology (Collier 1998). These works have attended to the relative silence on the 
question of masculinity (and hegemonic masculinity specifically) and whiteness. Despite this 
relatively recent critical intervention, by in large the normalized subject has escaped the 
criminologist’s gaze, it has been the Other whom criminologists and the public have imagined as 
criminal (Young 1996). Although the normalized subject has largely been explicitly absent from 
critical criminological conversations, it has never been completely absent. Indeed, as Urla and 
Terry have put it: “the specter of the normal body, be it a white, heterosexual, healthy or male 
body is always simultaneously present—even if in shadow form—in discourses of deviance” 
(1995, 5).  
In the introduction to her book, Ghostly Matters, Avery Gordon (2008) uses the concept 
of ‘haunting’ to refer to an experience,  
[…] in which a repressed or unresolved social violence is making itself known 
sometimes very directly, sometimes more opaquely. I used haunting to describe those 
singular yet repetitive instances when home becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings 
on the world lose direction, when the over-and-done-with comes alive, when what’s 
been in your blind spot comes into view. (2008, xvi) 
Methodologically, haunting allows us to consider both absence and presence by calling our 
attention to social violence that is “unresolved” or has been “blocked from view” and that has 
now made itself known and somewhat visible. While these moments of haunting can be 
produced by social violence, Gordon also explains that hauntings also have the capacity to make 
the very conditions of this social violence visible by tugging at us to pay attention to that which 
has largely been absent, invisible or taken-for-granted, but is no less present, such as the 
“abusive systems of power” (xvi). In other words, the social violence(s) that haunt the 
representation of crime and criminality are also the conditions or contexts that produce the 
haunting in the first instance (xvi)—the “spectre of the normal body” (Urla and Terry 1995, 5). 
If, for Gordon, the context or conditions of haunting is a past social violence that has yet to 
resolved or made visible, we can think about the social violences that the normalized subject 
represents, not only in relation to the actual crimes the normalized subjects of this study 
committed, but also in terms of the systems of power that construct them as un-criminal or un-
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imaginably criminal. It is these same interlocking systems of power that also produce some 
marginalized subjects, such as Neve and Kembo as always already criminal102.  
 Ghosts, Gordon explains, often appear at moments of trouble, they “appear when the 
trouble they represent and symptomize is no longer being contained or repressed or blocked from 
view. The ghost […] is not the invisible or some ineffable excess. The whole essence, if you can 
use that word, of a ghost is that it has a presence and demands its due, your attention” (xvi). I 
would like to think that this moment, this dissertation, is a sign of trouble; a time when the social 
violence of criminalizing the Other and the normalization of historically valorized subject 
positions are being disrupted, called into question, made visible. Although, the ghost of the 
normalized subject has visited before, I think that what makes this moment unique is that we are 
able to discern its presence perhaps more than before because we have seen, in each preceding 
chapter, the work that it does across these cases. For one, we saw the significance of 
psychopathy for imagining a subject that does not often appear as criminal and how, when faced 
with this reality, the conceptual logic of psychopathy was put to work to resolve the conundrum 
of the normalized subject who does not appear as criminal.   By making this other, often ignored 
or invisible subject visible we have gained a deeper understanding of how the (un)criminalizing 
process works in the context of power and it has allowed us to notice that in the midst of 
stereotypical representations of Pickton, Kembo and Neve, there is also something else 
happening; there is a normalized, un-criminal subject who only becomes imaginable as criminal 
through psychopathy.  
 By making this ‘ghost’ visible and engaging with it, I joined others who are doing this 
work and helping to create a more holistic picture of the effects of these processes by looking at 
both the privileges they confer, as well as oppressions they help to reproduce. The way that I 
designed this study, and especially the case studies used and its comparative focus, helped to 
reveal this relationality.  
 The third contribution that I have made is linked to the second. In the literature that I 
reviewed for this study, it seemed that many scholars have observed that discourses of pathology 
                                                 
102 Nick Sciullo (2015) has made a similar argument in relation to white supremacy and Black criminality. He 
suggests that we can look at white supremacy as a ghost which haunts our “post-racial” context, invisible to 
everyone but “its targets” and structuring contemporary race relations, law and criminal justice (1398).  The 
haunting presence of white supremacy is made visible by the all too pervasive notion of “Black criminality”.  
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are often used in representation to constitute and explain the criminality of an otherwise 
normalized subject (e.g. Mingus and Zopf 2010; García- Del Moral 2014; Heitzeg 2015; Tyrell 
2007). Although these studies have demonstrated the significance of these forms of 
representations in general, none explore the specific way that this image and discourse is 
represented through psy labels. My research attempted to fill this gap, by looking at the specific 
way that the criminality of the normalized subject is represented as pathological. I did this by 
focusing on psychopathy. By focusing specifically on psychopathy I was able to arrive at 
different, and more specific interpretations of this form of representation by asking what is 
specific about psychopathy in particular that makes it amenable for imagining the un-criminality 
of this subject?  Hopefully, in drawing out the ways that psychopathy complements and aligns 
with imaginings of (un)criminality, scholars will see this as a significant insightful, provocative 
direction for further study with regards to psychopathy or otherwise.  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
 There were many things that I tried to shed light on by undertaking this project in the way 
that I have; and, of course, in prioritizing some things other things were ignored. I would like to 
end this project by pointing out some of the shortcomings of this research and using these gaps 
as a springboard for potential research directions.   
 
The Logics of Psychopathy Research 
 
 One of the things that I have tried to demonstrate is that although theories of psychopathy 
no longer ‘in theory’ imagine the disorder in relation to specific bodies as they did in an 
historical context (Fee 1978; Lunbeck 1994; Rafter 1997a; Rimke 2003; 2005; Chenier 2003), 
the disorder is still imagined in bodily terms in popular or cultural imaginings of (un)criminality. 
One of the things that I did not explore, and which is glaringly absent from my analysis (in my 
opinion), is an exploration of the ways in which the interlocking logics of whiteness, patriarchy, 
hegemonic masculinity, heterosexuality and the ‘middle-class measuring rod’ are implicated in 
scientific psychopathy research itself. I think a more sustained and substantive critical 
exploration will be useful, especially since psychopathy is often rendered a politically neutral 
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condition insofar as identity/difference is concerned, and since it has the effect of facilitating 
some of the most extreme and punitive forms of punishment.  
What I have in mind here is an updated approach akin to how historical scholars teased 
out the logics that were informing doctors and researchers’ understanding and diagnoses of 
moral insanity/psychopathy (Fee 1978; Lunbeck 1994; Rafter1997a; Rimke 2003; 2005), or how 
Lombrosian scholars critically analyzed his texts (Gibson 2002; Horn 2003; 1995; Rafter 2008), 
or how Stowell-Smith and McKeown (1999; 2001) uncovered a distinct racial logic that informs 
how psychopathy is applied in a contemporary forensic setting using case files.  
This kind of exploration of contemporary scientific psychopathy research, retrospectively 
seems to be quite significant given how psychopathy is usually explained and represented in 
these texts. As an example of where I could see this kind of approach heading, we could take the 
point of Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun that the modern psychopath is conceptualized in such a 
way that its formulation includes the “basic tenets of degeneracy” (2015, 42; see Chapter 1 in 
this dissertation) and one of these tenets is how the psychopath is conceived of as an 
“evolutionary throwback”, similar to ‘the degenerate’, ‘the born criminal’, animals and 
‘primitives’ (43).  Future critical researchers might then ask: How do racial/racist discourses and 
logics inform, or even make possible this conception? What other kinds of logics, especially on 
the basis of identity and difference, interlock with race? What are the continuities between what 
Lombroso did when he imagined ‘the born criminal’ in relation to Others (Horn 2003, 33)— as 
“closer to dark-skinned [‘]savages[‘] than to lawful, white Europeans” (Rafter 2008,211) or 
through “female inferiority” (244; see also Horn 2003; 1995)—and scientific imaginings of the 
contemporary psychopath? One could also ask about the kinds of sexist and/or gendered 
assumptions that are embedded in psychopathy research (see Chapter 4) or the ways in which 
racist stereotypes incorporate ideas of psychopathy (or vice versa; see Chapter 4 and 6). 
 
Towards Generalizability 
 
 My intention in designing this research in the way I have was never done with the 
intention of producing generalizable research findings and so, I do not claim that the readings 
that I offer here are generalizable in any way. Instead, I see the observations that I have made as 
a product of a specific kind of reading/perspective and therefore as only a partial account.  I read 
these cases as a situated reader, from a specific point of view, with a particular purpose in mind, 
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paying attention to certain things and not others.  It is entirely possible and very likely that 
another researcher may read these cases individually or together and see something completely 
different; I invite others to do this, indeed, I think it is important. What I do hope that you take 
from my reading is a suspicion of representations of psychopathy—the logics, contexts and 
contingencies that make its deployment possible in certain situations and not others, the work 
that it does when it is deployed, why it doesn’t emerge when you think it might/should, and 
whom it is used to label and why.   
In saying this, researchers who are interested in the kinds of readings that I have put 
forward might be interested to see if these readings are generalizable (e.g. is the psychopath label 
predominantly applied to normalized subjects in representations?), by creating a research design 
that has a different or a larger sample and that explores the interlocking bodily contingencies as I 
do here.  This could be done in the news media or in different site, such as judicial decisions. An 
additional point of inquiry might to be to qualitatively explore news representations of 
psychopathy generally (i.e. a general search of psychopathy, not searching for the term in 
relation to a specific case). This is something that Matthew Burnett (2013) did in his dissertation. 
However, in his study he only paid attention to common themes in the news (e.g. that 
psychopaths are usually described as evil, dangerous and untreatable and it is often used to 
explain unintelligible violence). Given the insights that I have put forth here, other researchers 
might be inclined to pay attention to other dynamics, such as: who is labelled a psychopath? 
How is the designation structuring the representation? What kind of work is it doing in different 
instances? Why are they labelled in such a way? And, what kinds of assumptions about 
transgression and personhood are facilitating such a representation? 
 
Whose Utterance? 
 
 In my reading of the cases, I did not prioritize where the psychopathic label emanated 
from. The first reason for this is that I was interested in understanding the role of psychopathy in 
representations of (un)criminality in general, and not tracking the specific discursive domain of 
the utterance. The second reason, which is related to the first, is that the textual materials that I 
was using for this analysis did not lend itself to this kind of exploration across cases. That is, the 
kinds of observations that I was able make about how psychopathy was being invoked was 
limited to what was made available in the news articles. So on the one hand, in the coverage of 
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Neve’s case which detailed the trial proceedings and given that psychopathy played a large role 
in the trial, it was clear who was invoking the label and why and how it was being invoked. On 
the other hand, however, in the Williams and the Bernardo/Homolka case, the label was being 
used by people who occupied different subject locations: journalists, lawyers, doctors/’experts’ 
and laypeople. Usually it functioned as a way of giving language and meaning—classifying—to 
the ‘kinds’ of people they were thought to be. Whereas at other times it was being used in 
passing and in a matter of fact way. In other words, my analysis of psychopathy was limited to 
what was provided. Therefore, it was not always clear what work psychopathy was doing in 
different contexts (outside of the news representation of course; e.g. medical and/or legal 
domains).  
 My focus on how psychopathy helps to imagine the unimaginable criminality of the 
normalized subject, then, does not account for the different kind of discursive work psychopathy 
does in different domains/contexts. Although the Neve case alerted us to the fact that 
psychopathy did a different kind of discursive work in a legal sense, I cannot speak to the 
different work it does outside of a news/representation context. This is certainly a limitation of 
this project. However, it would be interesting to track not only the representational significance 
of psychopathy, but to explore the different domains in which the label emerges and the different 
kinds of work it does in these contexts. For example, Richard Weisman (2008) explored the 
work that psychopathy does in the capital trial. Lorna Rhodes (2002) did an ethnography in a 
maximum security prison and explored the work that psychopathy does in this context. And, 
Stowell-Smith and McKeown (1999; 2001) discursively analyzed forensic reports of Black and 
white inmates who were deemed psychopaths and their results revealed that psychopathy does 
different conceptual work on the basis of race. Each of these studies considered the medico-legal 
work that psychopathy did in a specific domain (e.g. criminal trial, prison, forensic hospital), but 
it would be equally interesting to compare the different work that psychopathy does in these 
contexts (as either a cultural label or medico-legal one) and, how interlocking identity categories 
impacts the work that it does.  
 
Beyond Crime and Beyond Canada 
 
 Another limitation of this study is that I focused specifically on criminal and Canadian 
cases. This involved making two significant decisions about the textual materials that I would 
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use. First, I focused exclusively on cases that were of a criminal nature. I focused on these kinds 
of cases because I was not simply interested in understanding how psychopathy was imagined or 
represented in the news, but I was also interested in how (un)criminality is imagined. Not only 
did I focus on criminal cases specifically, but for the most part I focused on cases of serial 
murder.  Serial murder cases seemed to me to be a good place to begin given the way that serial 
killers and psychopathy are often imagined in relation to each other. Furthermore, because I 
wanted to get a sense of the contingencies of psychopathy by comparing cases, I figured that 
choosing cases that were similar in terms of the crimes committed would be important. While I 
still see these decisions as sensible and suitable, this decision was not without its own 
limitations.  For instance, I did not focus on other kinds of crimes or social transgressions and 
how psychopathy is deployed/or not in these instances.  This gap obfuscates the flexibility of 
psychopathy (Jalava, Griffiths, Maraun 2015). For example, Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun have 
thought about psychopathy in relation to Ian Hacking’s concept of the “adjustable degeneracy 
portfolio”, and revise it to: “adjustable psychopathy portfolio” (2015, 46).  The authors use this 
term to account for the enduring popularity of ideas and theories, like degeneracy and 
psychopathy, which are empirically problematic but persist no less. The argument here is that 
these ideas persist because they are flexible enough to capture the sources of social fear and 
anxieties of the day (46). The flexibility or adjustability of psychopathy, is evident in the way 
that it has come to be applied to a series of criminal and non-criminal people such as, the 
corporate psychopath, politicians, professionals, concierges, internet predators, law enforcement, 
serial killers as well as the different ways that psychopathy is thought about in different contexts 
(e.g. it’s not always considered a bad thing; see Jalava, Griffiths and Maraun [2015] Chapter 5, 
especially).  Given these observations, along with my own, it would be interesting to explore 
how psychopathy is used in other crime or non-crime contexts and if it has the same interlocking 
bodily contingencies. Exploring how psychopathy is used to explain or imagine corporate 
transgression (in the media or in the scientific literature on psychopathy) might be a particularly 
interesting or revealing given the observations I have made throughout regarding appearances, 
normalized identities and criminality/transgression.  I think that this avenue would be especially 
interesting since the image of the ‘corporate psychopath’ is someone who is outwardly wealthy, 
educated, intelligent, successful, and charming and is also often tacitly pictured as a white man.  
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In addition to exploring how psychopathy in used and understood in different contexts, it 
might also be interesting to replicate my study in another national context or perhaps even 
conduct a cross-national comparison.  When I was designing this research, I initially thought that 
I would do a cross-national comparison between Canada and the United States. The United 
States seemed to be a good point of comparison because much of the information that Canadians 
have about serial homicide whether in the academic literature, or in fictional representations 
come from an American context. In other words, for Canadians our knowledge and imaginings 
of serial homicide cannot be easily divorced from an American context. The other reason why I 
thought that the American context would be a good point of contrast is because serial homicide 
seems to be much more prevalent in United states than in Canada, or any other country (Aamodt 
2013). Additionally, according to the FBI, serial murder in the US is mostly committed by men 
and the racial distribution of these crimes are proportionate to the general population; this would 
have given me an opportunity to explore imaginings of (un)criminality and psychopathy in 
relation to differently racialized offenders 103.  However, once I began writing it became clear 
that it would be most efficient to focus on Canada exclusively in order to keep the project 
manageable.  
 In preparing to undertake this cross-national research, my preliminary research suggests 
that this might be a significant research direction. For example, using the Factiva database104, I 
conducted a simple search of American news articles and serial murder and the results appear to 
mirror (at least superficially) the same historical continuities and contingencies that I was seeing 
in the Canadian context.  I conducted this search again on August 18, 2016 to ensure that I 
provided the most up-to-date information and this is a snapshot of the results of this quick 
search.  
Using the Factiva database, I began my search by looking up the news coverage of the 
four of the most notorious American serial killers—John Wayne Gacy, Charles Manson, Jeffery 
Dahmer and Ted Bundy. These serial killers are white and male. Using their name, no date 
restrictions, the connector “AND” and the term “psychopath”, my search returned the following: 
John Wayne Gacy AND psychopath returned 99 hits; Charles Manson AND psychopath returned 
266 hits; Ted Bundy AND psychopath returned 382 hits. Interestingly, Jeffery Dahmer AND 
                                                 
103 See http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder/serial-murder-july-2008-pdf  
104 This database covers worldwide information sources.  
299 
 
“psychopath” only returned 6 hits, however the database would not search earlier than 1999 for 
this particular case only.  Given that he began committing these crimes in the 1970s this could 
explain why this number is significantly less than the others.  
In contrast, using the names of notorious racialized offenders who committed serial 
homicide in the United States with the same search formula “AND psychopath”, did not garner 
nearly as many hits. For example, the case of Anthony Sowell returned only 14 hits (this number 
excludes duplicates identified by Factiva).  Interestingly, of these 14 hits, 7 of the articles were 
returned because they discussed another case where the perpetrator was labelled a psychopath 
and reference was also made to Sowell in the article. In other words, Sowell was not labelled a 
psychopath here, but was associated with one in the articles. In the remaining articles, the term 
psychopath appears usually only once; these articles all cite a statement made by the assistant 
prosecutor who calls Sowell a psychopath.  In the case of Derrick Todd Lee, I received only 1 hit 
that contained his name and psychopath. This one hit was in reference to a Cosmopolitan 
Magazine article, not a news paper article. Finally, I conducted the same search in relation to the 
case Rafael Resendez-Ramirez; when coupled with “psychopath”, his name garnered two hits, 
and neither article directly labelled him a psychopath.  Although I did not read or analyze these 
articles, it seems at first sight that there might be a similar and telling absence of psychopathy in 
these cases which I think would be interesting and important to account for using a critical 
perspective. However, a detailed, thoughtful, critical and comparative analysis of these cases 
would be required before we could say anything more about this potential disparity.   
Despite the value of conducting a cross-national comparison, focusing exclusively on the 
Canadian context was important in its own right. Aside from the fact that there are very few 
critical analyses of psychopathy in general, and even fewer contemporary studies that critically 
explore the relationship between psychopathy, identity and the body, none of this research is 
exclusively Canadian-based. Furthermore, although critical Canadian criminological research 
continues to thoroughly document and explore the links between marginalization and 
criminalization, and especially how imaginings of criminality are abidingly gendered, raced and 
classed, there is a paucity of research that explores the other side of this relationship—how our 
imaginings of criminality enable those who occupy normalized subject positions to be seen and 
known as un-criminal (this tide however, is beginning to turn; see Chan and Chunn 2014; Kilty 
and Frigon 2016).      
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Focusing exclusively on the Canadian context was also significant from a more general 
perspective as well. As I have noted, part of my intention in conducting this research was to 
uncover how whiteness, patriarchy, nation, heteronormativity, and ideas surrounding middle-
classness inform how we imagine (un)criminality in powerful and insidious ways. Throughout 
this dissertation, I attempted to counter the wide-spread denial that racism, sexism, and classism 
are not ingrained in the fabric of Canadian society. Indeed, as, Yasmin Jiwani (2006) has noted 
“[…] Canada, as a nation practices denial when it comes to issues of sexism, classism and 
especially racism” (xv). Canada’s national identity is premised on the idea that Canada is a 
multicultural, diverse, tolerant democracy characterized by equality and where racism, sexism 
and classism supposedly do not exist. The readings that I have put forth here tell us, as Jiwani’s 
(2006) research does, that such stories and images of nation conceal or deny what remains a 
potent reality. 
 In tracing the Canadian news landscape of these cases, I made the more insidious aspect 
of this reality visible, by drawing out the seemingly banal and various logics that undergird 
oppression and privilege and that structured how we were able to see and know each subject, 
through psychopathy or in its absence. This reading further alerts us to the fact that the logics and 
ideas that are so formative to racism, sexism and classism continue to persist in Canadian public 
discourse, and that psychopathy is culturally entangled with these troublesome and persistent 
ideas. However, because the identity-based logics embedded in cultural representations of 
psychopathy are largely tacit, the existence and persistence of these ideas are obscured, 
powerfully contributing to our (mythic) national image.        
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